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This thesis is a critical study of the Anglo-American relationship between 1938 and 
1944. The work is primarily concerned with the unifying and destructive forces that 
affected the partners, as they searched for a strategic solution to the war in Europe. 
Focusing upon the series of high-level strategy meetings which took place from 1938 
onward, revealed is a growing divergence of strategic thought, a diminishment of 
mutual trust, and an awareness of unforeseen cultural barriers. An increasingly 
questionable negotiating process failed to match established civilian labor-management 
negotiations and codes of conduct or to produce comparable results. Further analysis 
highlights the interplay between the major participants within the civilian-military 
administrative structures in both countries. These dynamic structures, although not 
completely created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. 
Churchill, were shaped, to an appreciable extent by these men. Roosevelt and 
Churchill's methods of leadership are compared and contrasted, their personal 
relationship investigated. It is argued that the `Special Relationship' between these two 
major political figures and their civilian-military establishments was a public relations 
myth whose intensity varied with time. Inherent American suspiciousness of British 
strategic intentions is seen as a major factor demonstrating against it, in spite of the Axis 
threat. Anglo-American tensions are disclosed and assessed with regard to clandestine 
warfare, special operations and rearming the French. The strategic divergence which 
culminated in the ANVIL debate, reached its crescendo in July 1944. It marked the end 
of Britain's coalition dominance. The debate and the actual ANVIL operation, the 
invasion of southern France, is examined, not only for its value as an operational 
procedure, but as the embodiment, instrument and termination-point of the Anglo- 
American strategic conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Anglo-American Coalition 
The American historian, Maurice Matloff wrote in 1964 that, 
Many of the trends set in motion during World War II are still open- 
ended and our perspective is blurred. We cannot always be sure what is 
important, and it is difficult to evaluate with certainty what we identify. 
We have tons of records. No war was better recorded. Never have 
historians made such a concentrated assault on war documents so soon 
after a conflict. ' 
With the advent of the Freedom of Information Act in 1976, the American government 
declassified many documents that had previously been unavailable for scrutiny. Morc 
access compounded the problem, as Mark Stoler suggests. 
World War II records are so enormous that no individual historian can 
read all of them. Consequently, each historian writing on this period 
has concentrated on a specific set of documents. Studies based on such 
examinations have been extremely valuable. Such concentration, 
however, can easily lead to a distorted view of the entire picture. 2 
While the following thesis approaches certain controversial aspects of Anglo-American 
relations with a sense of `mental self-liberation from the certain knowledge of its 
outcome', 3 it proposes to rectify distortions in the literature. It examines Anglo- 
American relations at the highest levels as they affected strategy in both the 
Mediterranean and European theaters of operations during the Second World War 
culminating in operation ANVIL, the Allied landing in southern France. The overall 
theme, supported by a wide variety of official documents and private papers, explores 
the problems generated by the coalition's efforts at co-operation, as well as the 
controversies raised by divergent strategic views. Clearly, despite British and 
American aberrations, which included attempts to dominate the coalition, an Allied 
victory was obtained. 
t M. Matlott. `Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR as War Leader'. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in 
Military History. 1959-11), x'7. Lt. Col. H. Borowski (ed. ). (Washington, 1988), p. 107. 
2 NI. Stolcr. The Politics cal The Second Front. (Westport. CT, 1977). p. 165. 
3 G. Weinberg, World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes in World War II. (Hanover. NH. 1981), p. xi. 
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The ANVIL, debate was part of this greater controversy in which the search for an 
agreed, effective, war-winning strategy predominated. The coalition was disrupted by 
both the disunity and controversy within the American executive branch, which 
confounded and delayed British attempts to reach an expeditious, co-ordinated and 
mutually acceptable global strategy. During the early phases of the Alliance, the 
Americans, lacking an accountable executive organization from which an applied 
strategy could flow, failed to present a unified and coherent policy. Their strategic 
concepts uncertain, the virtual antithesis of British competence, the Americans not only 
undermined their negotiating possibilities, but aggravated their suspicions of British 
needs and intentions. 4 Treating the Americans as junior partners and behaving 
pretentiously, the British did not elicit cooperation. 
Although disagreements were rife between the Allied Chiefs of Staff, Prime Minister 
Winston S. Churchill's strategic concepts (with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
concurrence) determined Allied operations from 1942 to 1943. Churchill recognized 
that wars created as many problems as they solved; that the art of grand strategy was to 
foresee the outlines of the future and the steps that were required to deal with it. 
Roosevelt, skeptical of the feasibility of a European invasion in 1943, confounded 
General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff who thought he had convinced 
the President. 5 Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff (COS), haunted by the 
memories of the previous war's attritional battles, sought to protect British manpower 
from a direct confrontation with the Germans in northwest Europe and chose to attack 
them in the Mediterranean instead. The British believed in wearing down the Germans 
with the assistance of indigenous resistance movements. The events of the war itself, 
specifically Britain being driven from the Continent and losing her principal ally, 
France, left few options between 1940 and 1941. During this period, Britain fought on 
alone, without any rational prospect of final victory. Its military philosophy was 
4 F. Pogue Interview with Gen. G. Marshall, 15 January 1957, in Ordeal and Hope, (New York: 1966), 
pp. 76-79; H. Wynter (ed. ), The Higher Strategic Decisions of the War, I& II, (London, 1945), pp. 
15,16,112. 
5 G. Craig, `The Political Leader As Strategist', P. Paret, (ed. ) Makers of Modern Strategy, (Oxford, 
1990), pp. 502-03. 
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influenced by such concepts as the 'continental commitment* (a version of the 'maritime 
school' strategy), the `indirect approach' (avoidance of direct massed strategic 
confrontation with the enemy) and `limited liability' (the commitment of the fewest 
possible troops). 6 
The American chiefs were opposed to the British tangential, 'soft-underbelly', 'closing 
the ring' approach.? Once Western Hemispheric defence was assured, the Americans 
wanted to defeat the German Army as quickly as possible in northwestern France. 
Feeling that Mediterranean military side-shows would only delay this purpose. 
American acceptance of the British Mediterranean strategy was viewed as acquiescence 
to Britain's imperial designs. 8 
John Erhman concluded that, `the area of Anglo-American consent remained larger than 
the area of dispute, and that, even when differing, the partners remained closely tied to 
each other. '9 For the most part, they had no other choice. They fought as a team. 
minimized discord, and caused serious injury to the enemy. 10 This was accomplished 
at various levels of command and during all the operations leading to Germany's defeat. 
However, the preceding assessment fails to reveal the shortcomings in the partnership 
that compromised Anglo-American strategy and operations. 
This thesis describes the relationship as a marriage of expediency, more of a coalition 
than the `grand alliance'. Alliances and coalitions are not the same thing, even though 
the terms are often used interchangeably. " `An alliance is a more formal arrangement 
for broad, long-term objectives between two or more nations. A coalition is an 
informal agreement for common action. ' 12 
6 Sir M. Howard, Studies in War and Peace, (New York, 1970), pp. 122.40; B. Bond, Liddell Hart, A 
Study of His Militan" Thouglht, (London. 1977), pp. 52-58. 
7 Gen. Sir W. Jackson to Author. Some Thoughts on British Strategic Thinking, 23 Jan. 1991. 
8 R. Wrigley. The American Way of War, (Bloomington, 1973), pp. 328-29. 
9 J. Ehrman, Grand Strategy. vol. V, (London, 1956). p. xvi. 
10 Marshall to Churchill, 8 June 1943. PREM 4.72/3. 
11 Maj. Gen. J. Deane, The Strange Alliance. (New York. 1947). pp. 119-20. 
12 JCS Office of the Chairman, Basic National Defence Doctrine, Washington, 24 July 1990, 
(Department of Defence. Joint Pub 0-1). pp. 111-35. 
Necessity drives nations to form coalitions. as going it alone normally 
imposes serious limitations. Individual nations are usually insufficiently 
capable of addressing a given threat. Mobilization resources or time 
[sic] may not be available, and few factors contribute to public 
legitimacy like a coalition effort. 13 
An entente, a friendly understanding between states? Possibly, but an entente 
subjectively describes a casualness and graciousness unheard of in wartime. Stationed 
in Washington during the period under consideration. one British official wrote, 
'Britain and America are partners, but they are also rivals, each anxious to prove that its 
views on policy, indeed its way of life is superior to that of the other. It is this element 
of competition which distinguishes the partnership. ' 14 
Mindful of this, the present study questions whether concordance was the predominant 
mood existing within the coalition and examines the issues where friction and conflict 
were prevalent. Inherent are themes of competition and opposition relating to a variety 
of conflicting national interests, customary spheres of influence and the historical 
balance of power, each representing a potential collision course between the two allied 
protagonists. 15 German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel put it succinctly: 
A war of alliance always causes difficulty and friction between the allies, 
as each country tries to work for its own ends rather than the other's. 
The right thing in these circumstances is to air all differences openly and 
not to cover them with a cloak of silence. 16 
He expresses another theme of this study: Allied policy and decision-making, the search 
for a coherent strategy, were marred by each nation's reluctance to reveal its hidden 
a`Tcndas. It was assumed that revelation would lead to further discord and loss of 
power, rather than closer collaboration. To the extent that an Anglo-American `special 
relationship' existed, it was based on self-interest and a common threat, not on 
sentiment. Even if the British and Americans were comrades in arms, they were also 
13 Lt. Col. W. Silkett. `Alliance and Coalition Warfare'. Parameters. XXIII. 2, (Summer 1993). pp. 
74-85. 
14 \V'. Clark, Less Than Kin, (London, 1957), p. 1. 
t` T. Wilson. The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill At Placenta Bay. 1941, pp. 152-162. 
(Lawrence. KA, 1991): C. Thorne. Allies of a Kind. (London, 1978), pp. 101-105,273-77. 
Sir B. Liddell Hart (ed. ). The Rommel Papers, (London, 1Y84) p. 369. 
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rivals. The `special relationship', viewed as a `common-law alliance', 17 eventually 
revealed all the stresses of any protracted, intimate undertaking, however global in 
scope. 
Another issue to be considered is the correlation between the ascending power of one 
partner and the declining power of the other, the recognition of their changing roles and 
how that influenced strategy. Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan, Assistant Chief of 
Staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) wrote, 
As a British officer of SHAEF, serving an American Chief, I was well 
placed to watch the distressing drift apart, the growing impatience on 
American part with British bombast and bland assumption of superiority 
in so many fields. While on the British side there appeared all the 
evidence of a growing inferiority complex, jealously of lavish American 
resources of all kinds and reluctance to acknowledge the scale of 
American achievement. 18 
The complex problems of a global war demanding resolution by negotiation included 
choosing between the European and Pacific theaters, arming the French versus applying 
limited resources elsewhere, Mediterranean operations versus those in northwest 
Europe and a landing in southern France versus operations in Italy. 
At the administrative level, the managerial bureaus responsible for the allocation of 
resources (production and logistics), while proliferating within the American 
bureaucracy, co-operated and performed well on a day-to-day basis. Marshall 
remarked after the war, `that is was the most complete unification of military effort ever 
achieved by two Allied nations. ' 19 
His assessment was disputed by General Montgomery, C. in C. British 21st Army 
Group, who wrote to Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS), during the summer of 1944, `that the British officers at SHAEF must realize 
that in addition to being good Allied chaps, they must demonstrate definite loyalties to 
17 Winston Churchill defined the term `special relationship' in 1940, as the friendship that developed 
between him and President Roosevelt. A romantic by nature, Churchill used it to gain the 
President's assistance for Britain's war effort. Robert E. Sherwood, American author and one of 
President Roosevelt's speech-writers, called it a `common-law alliance' in 1941, to describe the 
complex relationship that developed between Britain and America. 
18 Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, Peace and War, (London, 1961), p. 211. 
19 H. Hall, North American Supply, (London, 1955), p. 353. 
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their side of the house; and in our side of the house, we must all pull together. '2° 
Brooke kept a diary for most of the war, in which he recorded his doubts concerning 
the Americans, `... My God! What psychological complications war leads to!... I am 
tired to death with humanity and by all its pettiness. Will we learn to `love our allies as 
ourselves?! I doubt it. '21 
An Overview 
Given the complexity of the material, offered is an outline of the main sequence of 
events leading to ANVIL, which are discussed in detail in the following chapters. In 
Chapter One three major ingredients are tied together and remain so during the period 
described in this thesis: the Allied leadership, the divergent strategic points of view and 
the varieties and perceptions of the external threat. They will remain central and 
changeable, acting upon each other in countless permutations, throughout the 
forthcoming chapters. 
The thesis begins with an overview of the opening rounds of pre-war exploitative, non- 
binding negotiations between the British and the Americans in recognition of Axis 
threats. Early arousal of American prejudice and suspicion of British intentions cast a 
shadow on future negotiations. Although American preoccupation with western 
hemispheric defence acted as a brake upon British requirements, US military plans were 
drawn seeking to defeat Germany first. Early wartime negotiations revealed divergent 
customs, practices and misperceptions that inhibited timely solutions of economic 
issues and military programs. To reduce these problems, several executive agencies 
were created. The Allied leadership is introduced and its influence upon the higher 
direction of the war is considered. 
Chapter Two provides a generic description of a summit conference and the negotiating 
procedures that were followed. Two early conferences in 1941, RIVIERA, in 
21' S. Ambrose. The Supreme Commander: The War Years o/ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, (Garden 
City. NJ. 1970), p. 159. 
21 FNI Lord Alanhrooke, 'Notes On My Life. 3B/XIII'. Alanbrooke Papers, p. 987. 
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Newfoundland, and ARCADIA, in Washington, are described from both the British 
and American viewpoints. At RIVIERA, Anglo-American staffs met for the first time 
and took stock of each other, a process that was crucial to the future, if not to the 
survival of the coalition. While British negotiating and organizational skills were 
considered impressive, American disunity and prejudices were notable. Strategic 
interests were in conflict: the Americans worried over hemispheric defence, while the 
British attempted to protect their island from an enemy invasion. Greatly in nccd of 
material, they sought American supplies, but initially America's industrial production 
was unable to satisfy Britain's needs. 
During the meeting, the Atlantic Charter, a declaration of American and British war 
aims, was written and proclaimed to the world, but the final version reflected existing 
political and economic divisions. The public's reaction was lukewarm. Churchill 
warned the President that if American participation in the war was not forthcoming, 
Britain and Russia would not only be unable to contain German aggression, but could 
actually lose. Unfortunately for the British, Roosevelt chose to follow American public 
opinion rather than to lead it. 
Two wecks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, ARCADIA was convened in 
Washington. The American command remained disunited and did not have an 
operational plan to present. Churchill, who dominated the Conference, presented a 
strategy in concordance with that of RAINBOW 5 and a `Germany-first' approach, and 
he was relieved by his ally's acceptance. Since an executive inter-allied military 
organization seemed to be the best way of running the war on a day-to-day basis, the 
Chiefs agreed to form `combined' agencies to do so. For the first time a theater 
command was established in the Pacific which was placed under the control of the 
newly established Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). 
Roosevelt expressed strategic ideas that included a desire to hold the line in the Pacific, 
display a powerful naval force in the Atlantic and send American troops into action as 
soon as possible. He was tempted by Churchill's recommendation of a French North 
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African campaign. Marshall. who advocated an attack in northwest Europe, was 
without an existing tactical plan or the means with which to implement one. 
Chapter Three describes the meetings the major participants attended in London, 
Washington and Moscow. 1942 was the year in which the Russians demanded that 
Britain and the United States open a second front in northwest Europe. V. M. 
Molotov, the Russian Foreign Minister, petitioned both Churchill and Roosevelt. The 
President assured him that a second front would be forthcoming during the year. 
Roosevelt and Churchill were seriously concerned, not only about the severe losses 
inflicted upon the Russians by the invading German Army, but that the Russians might 
sue for a separate peace. 
Churchill's influence over Roosevelt was demonstrated at the June Washington 
ARCADIA Conference. Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Churchill's emissary, 
visited and charmed the President before the Prime Minister's arrival. Because of 
Roosevelt's executive style, his Chiefs of Staff were only marginally effective and 
minimally accountable. Cross-Channel operations during 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER) 
were discussed between the Anglo-Americans, but came to naught, because Roosevelt, 
insisting on action before the Congressional elections, was more interested in a North 
African campaign. These American political considerations coupled with Churchill's 
Mediterranean strategy overrode the views of each country's Chief of Staff. Although 
Brooke considered an invasion of French North Africa an inappropriate response to the 
German threat in the Middle East, he reluctantly sided with Churchill. 
Chapter Four describes how the continuing disagreements between the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) and their planners slowed the negotiations with the more authoritative and 
better organized British. Roosevelt warned the JCS of British competence before the 
January 1943 summit meeting in Casablanca, but had no suggestions to offer. Only he 
could choose between continued action in the Mediterranean or action in northwest 
France. 
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SYMBOL, the code-name for the Casablanca Conference of January 1943. was 
considered to be the `watershed' conference of the war, because it embraced a military 
strategy based on attrition rather than maneuver, on liberating land rather than defeating 
the German Army. Churchill felt that he was being punished by Marshall and Admiral 
Ernest J. King, Chief of US Naval Operations. Because Churchill had rejected 
SLEDGEHAMMER, men and material designated for BOLERO. the build-up of 
American forces in Britain, were sent instead to the Pacific. Brooke stressed the nccd 
to knock Italy out of the war before a landing in France. Already known as a competent 
negotiator and facilitator, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, the head of the British Military 
Mission to Washington (JSM), enhanced his reputation further at Casablanca. In spite 
of this, meetings were tedious and arguments were repetitious. The Americans sought 
modification of `Germany-first'; because with increased productivity, Pacific operations 
could also he increased. The negotiations ended in unsatisfactory compromise. 
Agreement was not reached on the apportionment of resources between the two major 
theaters. However, the British view prevailed: Germany would be defeated first and 
Japan would he held in check with the existing Pacific forces. 
Roosevelt's 'unconditional surrender' policy is assessed in the chapter. Its purpose and 
effcct are considered. Congressional and Churchill's views are noted, alternatives to 
the policy are described. As the Conference concluded, Roosevelt met with French 
Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud, with the hope of improving relations 
between them. The Allies agreed to continue the bombing of Germany, to defeat the U- 
boat threat and to invade Sicily. 
However, the Americans were unhappy with the result. American attempts to break the 
Casablanca agreement are considered in the light of language usage. contractual 
responsibility and lack of penalties for non-compliance. 
Prior to the 1943 Washington TRIDENT Conference, the JCS continued to reorganize 
and improve its administrative structure. New committees were formed to advise the 
JCS in preparation for the conference with the British. The Americans devised a 
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method by which the fundamentals of their policy. the cross-Channel attack, no 
Mediterranean incursions and increased combat activity in the Pacific would be 
maintained. The British priority was to eliminate Italy from the war. Conflicts over the 
timing, the conditions, the feasibility, even the desirability of a cross-Channel attack 
remained. 
Military versus civilian collective bargaining is examined in detail, particularly the use 
of `going off the record', `belief systems' and `mind-sets'. An agreement was reached 
at TRIDENT which included a1 May 1944 cross-Channel attack and the transfer of 
seven divisions from the Mediterranean to Britain. Brooke pleaded for future meetings 
to he scheduled more frequently, fearing that separation bred an even wider divergence 
of strategies. Churchill's attempts to defy the agreement failed, but he lobbied 
Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George C. Marshall later in Algiers for an 
invasion of Italy. 
Marshal Stalin's reaction to the Conference was severe and predictable. His demand 
for a second front in Normandy had been transformed by Churchill, with Roosevelt's 
concurrence, into another Mediterranean diversion. 
Chapter Five explores a series of JCS preparatory meetings that preceded the 1943 
Quebec QUADRANT Conference. At these meetings, the mood was sanguine; later, 
the same mood pervaded the Conference. The JCS, ready for a showdown on 
European strategy after two years of negotiating, was prepared by their planners to act 
decisively and choose either the European or Mediterranean theaters. King mocked 
British delaying tactics, insisting that if OVERLORD, an invasion of northwestern 
Europe in 1944, was to be enacted, a firm decision had to be reached before they left 
Quebec. 
Eisenhower's chief planner, Maj. General Lowell Rooks. assured the JCS that, even 
without the seven divisions assigned to Britain as stipulated in TRIDENT, there were 
enough troops in the Mediterranean to fulfill operations in Sardinia. Corsica and 
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southern France. However, Balkans operations, if executed, would have a disastrous 
impact on OVERLORD. Churchill and Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. 
expressed conflicting views concerning future Balkan operations. 
America's inability to campaign in Europe independent of Britain persisted throughout 
the war. It followed, therefore, that OVERLORD could not be mounted without the 
inclusion of the 15 British divisions stationed in Britain. If OVERLORD were to 
become a reality, greater planning would be required to meet production, training and 
shipping schedules. Even though the Americans considered future operations against 
Italy, the British did not feel that the acceptance of OVERLORD was a fair exchange. 
As part of a global strategy, OVERLORD would affect operations in all other theaters. 
During QUADRANT, the JCS was wary of many of the British proposals and plans. 
To help place them in perspective, a review of negotiating tactics and skills is 
advanced. 
During the Conference, various strategic reports were given, some at odds with each 
other. While POINTBLANK, the `combined bomber offensive', was favorably 
reported by British Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (CAF) and 
his American counterpart, General Henry Arnold, Chief of the US Army Air Forces, 
expressed concerned about the excessive loss of Army Air Force (AAF) air crews. The 
OVERLORD argument between Marshall and Brooke intensified. Their differences 
appeared to be irreconcilable: Marshall sought to assign OVERLORD top priority. 
Brooke countered with conditions for its acceptance that would reduced that priority, 
i. e., that OVERLORD should be linked to Italian operations. 
Brigadier General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Marshall's chief advisor, in a pre-conference 
`pep talk', took the JCS through a series of British positions to demonstrate the 
capriciousness of their Mediterranean strategy. The seven division transfer remained 
controversial with the Americans who insisted that the British live up to the TRIDENT 
agrccmcnt. Marshall refused to countenance further British circumlocution. An 
imminent showdown was averted by the arrival of Roosevelt and Churchill. After three 
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days of intense debate, a compromise emerged in which OVERLORD's priority was 
lowered. The intensity of debate was such that Brooke asked to clear the room of staff 
and 'go off the record'. 
At QUADRANT, Eisenhower was asked to plan for ANVIL, designed to establish a 
beachhead in the Toulon-Marseilles area of southern France and then move northward. 
OVERLORD was targeted for 1 May 1944. If that was to prove impossible, 
consideration was to be given to the following: operations in northern Norway. 
pressure on the enemy in Italy and to supply the Resistance in southern France by air. 
It was agreed that an American would lead OVERLORD. Landing craft production, 
distribution, procurement and allocation problems were also discussed. JCS policy is 
reviewed and analyzed throughout the chapter. It closes with a description of Italian 
armistice negotiations and AVALANCHE, the landing at Salerno, near Naples. 
Chapter Six reviews the three issues raised at the November 1943 Teheran EUREKA 
Conference: the Second Front, the French Resistance and the Free French Army. 
During the Conference, OVERLORD and ANVIL were considered as independent parts 
of the same operation. Churchill, fearing that Russian advances into central Europe 
would create post-war problems, tried to convince Roosevelt that his Mediterranean 
strategy was the only effective counter. More concerned with immediate political 
realities, Roosevelt tried to fulfill his Second Front promise to Stalin and would not 
tolerate any British delays or postponement. Stalin lobbied for implementation of 
OVERLORD and ANVIL, arguing that, if necessary, troops could be transferred to 
southern France from Italy. Churchill, no longer the dominant partner, could do little to 
alter the Russo-American strategic concept. Gone were his plans for operations in the 
eastern Mediterranean. It became clear, however, that the implementation of any plan 
depended on the availability of landing craft and shipping. 
Chapter Six also deals with issues concerning the French Resistance and the Free 
French Army. The shock of the French surrender in 1940. resulting in a changed 
political climate, shifting social attitudes and modified military expectations, all 
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contributed to the Anglo-American perspective of French affairs. Vichy French 
Premier, Marshal Henri Petain, and President of the Free French National Committee, 
General Charles de Gaulle, emerged from the French defeat as political rivals who 
influenced British and American foreign affairs. 
When the British were driven from the Continent in 1940, the need for `irregular' 
warfare grew in importance. British reorganization of its intelligence operations led to 
the establishment of Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the sub-organizations it 
controlled. SOE activities in France were co-ordinated with indigenous Resistance 
organizations. Both made the transition from `intelligence gathering' to `sabotage' and 
concentrated on actions designed to frustrate the German occupation forces. With the 
creation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an American organization analogous 
to SOE, the Allies built an effective covert force. Allied planning and the French 
Resistance suffered the consequences of distrust, poor organization and security lapses 
that resulted in the misuse or loss of invaluable officers and agents. 
Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) 
and inherited an administrative headquarters in Britain. He had little choice but to 
accept its recommendations, however prejudiced, concerning clandestine operations. 
The projected Normandy and southern France invasions were assisted by Special Force 
Headquarters in both London and Algiers. The Resistance in France is surveyed 
against the background of German intentions during the Occupation. The predictably 
tragic outcomes of pitched battles between the Resistance and the Germans typified and 
underscored errors in judgment by the local French command. Their sabotage activities 
were more successful. Allied air supply missions in aid of the Resistance were 
increased during the spring of 1944 and after D-Day, armed teams and groups were 
dropped throughout France in support of the landings. They worked closely with the 
Resistance. On 15 July, one month before the ANVIL, equipment was dropped in 
sufficient amounts to the Resistance throughout southern and central France. Thus. the 
role the Resistance played in the liberation of France is considered. 
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An important element of the whole ANVIL enterprise was the rearmament of the Free 
French forces in North Africa. Rearming the French Army involved not only the 
complicated issues of production, training and supply; but also the re-allocation of 
scarce resources, the redirection of global shipping and the quarrels between Churchill. 
Roosevelt and de Gaulle. Military discussions became deadlocked. a problem 
exacerbated by the fact that the objectives were frequently more political than military. 
The speed of Rearmament was linked to the availability of supplies and shipping and. 
as a result, came second to the needs of Allied forces in the Mediterranean. 'Agreement 
in principle', a term borrowed from real-estate law, proved troublesome between 
Roosevelt and Giraud. Roosevelt expressed his irritation regarding the French reaction 
to the Anfa agreement, the written instrument through which rearmament would be 
completed. Marshall attempted to assuage French doubts by satisfying their specific 
needs, subscribing to the argument that the United States would benefit if the French 
supplied the soldiers. However, arming, organizing, and training a foreign army to 
American standards posed a multitude of problems not encountered in raising an 
American army. Although the end results were impressive, inter-Allied political 
disputes delayed the process. De Gaulle demanded that the existing French forces and 
those newly raised in North Africa serve France in its projected liberation. He offered 
little objection to ANVIL's command structure when French combat participation was 
assured. 
Chapter Seven looks at other aspects of the EUREKA and SEXTANT Conferences not 
covered in Chapter Five. These relate to the TRIDENT and QUADRANT agreements. 
which the President considered settled, but Churchill did not. Churchill wanted 
modification of the QUADRANT agreement, because of a deteriorating Italian winter 
campaign. Roosevelt accepted Churchill's entreaties to meet in Cairo, in late November 
194 3. but decided to avoid substantive conversations with him in preference to those 
with China's Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek. The Americans knew little of the 
preferred Russian strategy relating to Europe and the Mediterranean theaters. Roosevelt 
did not want to leave himself open to Stalin's criticism, if their strategic views varied. 
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Thus, the President wanted to arrive in Teheran without a common Anglo-American 
plan. This was unacceptable to Churchill and Brooke. 
The First Cairo Conference, SEXTANT I, in late November 1943. was a grueling and 
acrimonious affair for the participants, whose nerves were frayed both by its content 
and by time pressures. Much was expected in the short time allotted: and as a result 
little was accomplished. Basic disagreements remained unresolved. Eisenhower 
supported an all-out winter offensive in Italy, but the primary quarrel was fought over 
future eastern Mediterranean operations versus those in the Far East. The British did 
not want Stalin to arbitrate an Anglo-American conflict. 
The Russians surprised the Americans at the Tehran. EUREKA Conference, 28-30 
November 1943, by revealing that they favored the two French landings, to the 
exclusion of Churchill's eastern Mediterranean forays. Caught between Roosevelt and 
Stalin, and the power they represented, the Prime Minister was marginalized. 
The Americans returned to Cairo for a second SEXTANT conference, 3-7 December 
1943, jubilant that the Russians accepted their strategy. The British delegation was 
dismayed. Far Eastern operations were in conflict with OVERLORD/ANVIL and both 
sides were once again deadlocked. There were not enough landing craft and shipping 
to accomplish both. Roosevelt yielded. The amphibious operation (BUCCANEER) in 
the Far East was canceled. Although the British were pleased, it resulted in one of the 
most bitter strategic arguments of the war. Almost everyone was exhausted from the 
ordeal. Brooke's pleas to meet more frequently were not supported in practice. Nine 
months would pass before both sides met again. 
The ANVIUItalyBalkans Debate of 1944 is closely studied, because it demonstrates 
how the negotiators, by their intransigent positions, raised the stakes of the Anglo- 
American strategic conflict to one of 'winner-take-all'. A shortage of landing craft, 
increased manpower requirements and financing the French Army were just some of the 
problems that jeopardized ANVIL being a simultaneous operation with OVERLORD. 
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Recommendations that Brooke and Marshall meet in London to resolve these problems 
were avoided, but Eisenhower was chosen to act on Marshall's behalf. The COS 
sought to cancel ANVIL, giving first priority to the Italian campaign, but Roosevelt 
refused, because of his second front promise to Stalin. Eisenhower searched for a 
compromise and discovered that his proposal for separate OVERLORD tactical and 
logistical lifts was attacked and discounted by 21st Army Group planners. Matters 
worsened when the amphibious landing at Anzio in Italy miscarried and competed for 
scarce ANVIL resources and landing craft. British Intelligence discovered that the 
Germans were more concerned about a seaborne attack at the head of the Adriatic than 
one in southern France. On 21 March, ANVIL, caught between OVERLORD and the 
Italian campaign, was canceled by Eisenhower. Marshall was unyielding, and 
suggested instead that if the COS agreed to mount ANVIL on 10 July, the United States 
would transfer 68 Pacific landing craft to take part in the operation. The British 
accepted, but in seeking other options for an ANVIL-type operation, irritated the 
Americans. The British were outraged that the offer of the landing craft was linked to a 
southern France operation, but Marshal reaffirmed his decision not to squander these 
resources for an indeterminate ANVIL. Attempts to break the deadlock included an all- 
out offensive in Italy and developing a threat against southern France. However, 
without the required landing craft, ANVIL seemed incapable of supporting 
OVERLORD. Soon after the successful D-Day landings, Eisenhower demanded 
ANVIL be executed, because a severe Channel storm disrupted his logistical situation 
and increased his need for a seaport. To accomplish this, he wanted a three divisional 
ANVIL no later than 15 August. 
The disagreements intensified between the Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff to such an 
extent that the Americans brought the negotiations to a halt. Deadlock was again a 
reality, until Churchill and Roosevelt were asked to intervene. Roosevelt was unmoved 
by Churchill's requests that ANVIL strategy be reconsidered. While the COS were 
forced to accept the inevitable, Churchill attempted to change Eisenhower's mind in 
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early August - to no avail. ANVIL's planning and execution are discussed and their 
value is considered. 
Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter, assesses the different military. political and 
cultural aspects of the two countries that affected the coalition's search for a viable 
strategy in Europe. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introductory Strategic Talks 
A co-operative strategy, aimed at defeating Germany and Italy first, characterized the 
Anglo-American position when and if the United States entered the war. One historian 
labeled the `Germany-first' approach the most important single strategic concept of the 
Second World War. ' The position was expressed in a paper. ABC-i. produced by 
both parties at informal secret American-British conversations held in Washington, 
from January through March 1941. Both countries agreed that it was essential to co- 
ordinate Joint action to meet and eliminate the German threat to the security of the North 
Atlantic and the British Isles. Clinging to their neutrality, the Americans proclaimed the 
paper to be hypothetical and non-binding in nature. Moreover, they insisted that the 
paper simply contained the force of `professional predictability', and should not to be 
construed as a blueprint for future political commitments. ' One of the officers 
defending this position was General Stanley D. Embick. 
To Dissent or to Obstruct 
Embick, General Marshall's strongly anti-British senior advisor on strategy, objected 
to any British `Germany-first' plans leading to operations in North Africa and the 
Mediterranean. 3 An individual with 45 years of experience in national policy, 
diplomacy and grand strategy. He preferred to appease Hitler. In 1938, as Deputy 
Chief of Staff, he distributed and promoted the ideas of a prominent conservative anti- 
war and anti-military organization, The National Council for Prevention of War. It has 
been suggested that Embick was a dissenter. 4 However, it is one thing to dissent, and 
quite another to obstruct. During an interview in 1968, Eisenhower said, `When they 
K. Greenticld. (ed. ), Command Decisions, (Washington. 1960), p. 11. 
2 E. Larrabee, Commander in Chief. (New York. 1987), p. 18. 
3 Notes on ABC Conf'erence'. Washington, 16 Apr. 1941, RG 165. Exec. 8. 
4 R. Schaffer, 'Gen. Stanley D. Embick: Military Dissenter'. Military Affairs, Oct., (1973). p. 92. 
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say that soldiers ought to make political decisions... then they're showing their 
ignorance of what democratic government is. This is the kind of thing that makes 
Napoleons and Hitlers. '5 Embick considered a general European war a colossal 
blunder and in April 1941 opposed an American declaration of war, because he thought 
that Britain's plight was less serious than his colleagues believed. Sent to Britain in 
1941, he considered Churchill an amateur strategist, incapable of concentrating on the 
main issue. As Embick's pessimism about Britain's ability to survive increased, he 
opposed early landings in North Africa and disapproved of action in the eastern 
Mediterranean. 6 Although Marshall was less hostile, he was wary of dealing with a 
strategy motivated by British political interests. He also conceded Embick's point that 
it was nearly impossible to keep Churchill focused on the main issues. 
Embick's eminent position on the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) gave him a 
new and powerful forum for expression of his Anglophobic views. He and his 
colleagues advised the JCS on all global and political matters and served as liaison with 
the State Department. Given extraordinary responsibilities and powers, the JSSC 
produced a series of papers which constituted, in the original, the eventual JCS position 
on virtually every wartime issue. 
Concurrently, within the General Staff Division (GSD), referred to as Marshall's 
`Washington Command Post'. the Operations Division's (OPD) Strategy and Policy 
Group (S & P), called the 'Brain Trust', formed similar views after studying British 
strategy and policy in the Mediterranean. S&P was primarily responsible for most 
strategic thinking and war planning with the Army and for liaison work with the other 
military services and the State Department. Its members served on various planning 
committees, but the head of S&P. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Embick's son in- 
law, was Marshall's Chief Strategic Planner from June 1942 to October 1943. 
Wedemeyer, a US Army graduate of the German Kriegsakademie (which made an 
5 A. L. Funk. `Interview with Gen. Eisenhower', Washington, D. C.. 31 July 1968. 
6 R. Schaffer. Op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
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indelible impression on him) in 1938, shared many of Embick's views. `While not a 
member of the `America First' Committee he was `in accord' with many of its views. 
and immediately before Pearl Harbor found himself suspected of leaking the famous 
`Victory Program' he had helped author to the isolationist Chicago Tribune. '7 
Embick deeply distrusted British strategy, policy and leadership and had actively 
opposed American entry into the Second World War. Both officers were representative 
of a large clique within the armed forces with similar beliefs. For example, they were 
convinced that Britain did not intend to invade Europe and defeat Germany; instead 
Britain sought control of the Mediterranean in accordance with her traditional balance of 
power policy. 8 
These anti-British analyses and conclusions were not buried in their respective 
committees. They appeared throughout 1943 in formal OPD papers and in memoranda 
emanating from the Joint Committee, staffed with S&P members. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive memo on British strategy and policy came from the Joint War Plans 
Committee (JWPC) who reorganized and synthesized the various American 
viewpoints. It accused Britain of maintaining her world position at the expense of other 
countries, including the United States. 
These S&P and JSSC ideas also found a welcome audience among the JCS. They 
surfaced in statements and notes by individual chiefs, and in Stimson's presentations 
and warnings to Roosevelt. In July Marshall offered his `personal opinion' of British 
strategy. In August he forwarded what he described as a `formidable' S&P paper 
emphasizing that Anglo-American strategic divergence reflected very deep differences 
in national character and interests. Searching for other fundamental causes, it found 
these in the differing geographic positions, national structures and basis of power of the 
two countries. 
7 M. A. Stoler, `The American Perception of British Mediterranean Strategy. 1941-1945', C. L. 
Symonds (c d. ) New Aspects of Naval History, (Annapolis. MD, 1 )79). p. 330. 
8 Ihid., p. 320. 
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Unaltered in their beliefs, Embick and Wedemeyer concluded that a slow. dispersed 
war of attrition centering on the Mediterranean would restore British control of that sea 
and avoid heavy casualties inherent in a cross-Channel attack. They believed that, 
despite adhering to the unconditional surrender formula, the British might attempt to 
delay a German defeat while Russia was made weaker. This evaluation avoided the fact 
that the Russians, fighting the bulk of the German Army. would register strong protest 
against Britain's behavior. 9 It is not known to what degree Roosevelt accepted or 
rejected these conclusions, but it is known that he criticized the British before the JCS. 
During a 1948 interview, Major General Ian Jacob, Assistant Secretary to the War 
Cabinet, agreed in principle, 
... 
if we had not been driven by American confidence and enthusiasm we 
would never have dared to make the cross-Channel assault,... if the 
Americans had not been restrained by the British determination to guard 
against every mishap and to plan and prepare to the last detail the assault 
would almost certainly have been a ghastly failure. 10 
The American military directorate's fixed beliefs and prejudice poisoned and 
jeopardized inter-allied negotiations. To argue the relatives merits of different strategic 
view points was expected during discussions and negotiations. To argue strategy as a 
means of subverting one's coalition partner was not. Embick and the JPC felt that the 
United States could ill afford to entrust their country's national future to British 
direction. Both insisted that the United States could defend the North American 
continent and the Western Hemisphere without British assistance. The committee 
doubted British motives from the beginning, considering them to be self-serving. In 
accordance with the views expressed by Embick, Colonel Joseph McNarney, of the 
Army Operations Division (OPD) and Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Navy 
Director of War Plans, collaborated to write the following, 
It is to be expected that proposals of the British representatives will have 
been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British 
Commonwealth. Never absent from British minds are their post-war 
Ibid.. p. 32S-32. 
Sir B. Liddell Hart. 
15/15/1. p. 5. 
'Notes of Discussion with Maj. Gen. Sir Ian Jacob', 31 Mar.. 15 Apr. 1948, 
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interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard our 
own eventual interests. " 
Although no plans were drawn up for the use of American land forces in a major 
offensive against Germany, their build-up and employment was envisioned. The Joint 
Board, a corporate organization of American military chiefs, approved ABC-1 on 14 
May and sent the papers on for presidential approval. Roosevelt returned the paper 
unsigned, because Churchill had done likewise. However, Marshall felt that the lack of 
a presidential signature would not slow up troop movements of approximately 100,000 
men to Britain. ABC-1, as a collaborative agreement, became the foundation on which 
all future Anglo-American strategic meetings were based, despite an underlying 
American distrust of the British position. 
Admiral King's Pacific Preoccupation 
The incident that propelled the American `Germany-first' strategy towards a coherent 
operational plan, however difficult to implement, occurred at a meeting attended by 
both Marshall and King on 18 February 1942. King, seeking increased action against 
the Japanese, requested that the Army provide ground and air forces to garrison a 
number of small Pacific islands. Marshall objected, predicting that if he acceded to 
King's request, it would dilute the Army's Atlantic strategy, minimize his influence 
with the President and weaken Army and Army Air Force personnel at the desired point 
of European concentration. Moreover, if accepted, King's proposal would subvert 
Arnold attempts to create a separate air force. 12 Marshall argued this was a negation of 
a Germany-first policy. The Army, in short, viewed its own future to be interwoven 
with its concept of the correct way to defeat the Axis. 13 
Concerned that this modest request could lead to a full scale Army commitment in the 
Pacif'ic. '4 a misdirection of the highest magnitude, Marshall demanded and received, a 
I Col. J. McNarney & Adm. R. K. Turner. `Joint Instructions for Army & Navy Representatives', 
Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, 21 Jan. 1941, RG 165, Exec. 8. 
12 Marshall to King, Washington, 18 Feb. 1942, RG 165 Book 4, Exec. 8. 
1' M. A. Stoler, Op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
14 A. D. Chandler, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, I. (Baltimore. 1970), p. 112. 
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complete strategic analysis. Eisenhower, as the new head of the War Plans Division, 
responded with a position paper, writing: 
We must differentiate sharply and definitely between those things whose 
current accomplishment in the several theaters over the world is 
`necessary' to the ultimate defeat of the Axis, as opposed to those which 
are merely `desirable' because of their effect in facilitating such a 
defeat. 15 
Defence of the Western Hemisphere 
Many senior American and British officers having made a similar diagnosis, were 
fearful that the previous arrangements as expressed in ABC-1 and listed in RAINBOW 
5, which included an aggressive plan extending American security frontiers beyond the 
continental limits of the United States, would be abandoned in practice. Since the 19th 
century, the security and defence of the Western Hemisphere had always been a major 
consideration when defining American military policy. Even though the German Army 
was unable to cross the Channel to invade England in 1940, American planners were 
certain that it had the capability of crossing the Atlantic to invade the Americas. 16 
Obsessed with this apocalyptic vision, the planners, reflecting traditional `isolationist' 
doctrine, sought a line of defensive outposts to form a bulwark against a Nazi invasion: 
England and Iceland in the north and Dakar in the south. In 1941, General `Vinegar' 
Joe Stilwell was ordered to plan a pre-emptive strike of the Azores, formative island 
links in the partially completed American hemispheric defence. Distorted American 
perceptions of German designs on North and West Africa increased the already existing 
anxiety in Washington. Only 1,800 nautical miles separated Dakar from Natal, Brazil, 
a potential target for German air attack and airborne invasion. 17 The suppression of 
potential fifth column activities, Axis influence in, and German expeditions to, South 
America, were subjects addressed by the planners. 18 Moreover, the Army was 
15 'Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to the Southwest Pacific', Army War Plans Div., 
Washington, 28 Feb. 1942, RG 165, Exec. 4. 
16 A. Funk, `The United States and TORCH: Strategy and Intelligence', Special Issue: Operation 
TORCH and its Political Aftermath: Franco-Anglo-American Relations in 1942, Franco-British 
Studies, (Spring, 1989), p. 16. 
17 L. DeJong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War, (Chicago, 1956), pp. 39-143. 18 H. Stimson, `Diary quote in Pogue, Op. cit., p. 266. 
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doubtful whether it could defend the eastern seaboard of the United States against a 
cross-Atlantic assault or prevent an enemy expeditionary force from landing. 
Even after the Pearl Harbor attack, the American public sought hemispheric isolation, 
the majority of whom supported the war effort with an attitude of `rational resignation'. 
Forty-five percent of the people questioned in a polling sample admitted they did not 
know what the United States was fighting for; 25 percent of the population favored an 
immediate end to the war with Germany through negotiation, and ten percent on any 
terms. Fifty-nine percent of those polled were willing to fight an all-out war against 
Japan. 19 Many Americans were unwilling to support active military ground operations 
overseas. The President realized that his words could not galvanize the public's martial 
spirit and its willingness to mobilize. Only military action focused on the German 
threat would reduce public indifference and increase its participation; if not, the whole 
war effort was imperiled. Projecting American power outward would have a twofold 
purpose: first, the occupation of West Africa and the Atlantic islands by American 
troops would prevent any hypothetical German seizure of those same areas; and 
second, It would also put the public actively in the war. Broadcasting to the nation on 
9 December 1941, the President said, `... a German attack against Algiers or Morocco 
opens the way to a German attack against South America, and the [Panama] Canal. 120 
The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, considered the continued existence of Britain 
essential to the security of the United States, because it was Britain's naval power that 
secured the Atlantic frontier. President Roosevelt, in turn, believed that the continued 
existence of Britain as a world power was in the best interest of the United States, and 
that the aggressive foreign policies of Italy and Germany threatened Britain. 
Roosevelt's willingness to co-operate with the British began as early as January 1938. 
a result of a naval incident the previous year between the Japanese and the Americans in 
China, in which the USS Panay, a US gunboat was sunk. By granting permission to 
t9 L. Mellet. 'Cantrill Poll'. 10-16 Dec. 1941. PPF, FDRL. 
S. Rose nman. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Call to Battle 
Stations, 1941.10. (New York. 1950), pp. 529-530. 
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institute Anglo-American Naval conversations, Roosevelt laid the foundation for 
assured military co-operation, although the subjects that were considered failed to result 
in an integrated strategy. 21 Two years later, conversations were held in London from 
August to September 1940, at which time closer ties were established with the creation 
of the Anglo-American Standardization of Arms Committee. 22 Roosevelt had 
approached the leading members of the Chamberlain government at the outbreak of the 
war, but only Churchill demonstrated any interest. The exchange of letters that 
followed between them, and the President's willingness to exceed the limits of co- 
operation by a neutral state, led Churchill to believe that the United States would enter 
the war on the side of Britain. 23 They received additional support from American 
Admiral, Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, who warned his superiors 
against a `Japanese first' policy in his `Plan Dog' memorandum: `... if Britain wins 
decisively against Germany, we could win everywhere; but if she loses, the problem 
confronting us would be very great; and, while we might `not lose everywhere', we 
might possibly, not `win' anywhere. '24 
Further, he objected to an `unlimited' commitment in the Pacific, that would place 
severe limitations on aid to the British and the Atlantic defence. He feared that even a 
`limited' commitment in the Pacific could turn `unlimited', if only as a result of public 
impatience. Once this happened, the Pacific would take precedence, undermining 
American strategic emphasis. 25 Germany's defeat, therefore, would be primarily 
dependent upon the efforts of Britain and Russia, a daunting prospect. In the light of 
subsequent events, Stark was prescient. 
American planners envisioned sending task forces overseas to co-operate with Britain 
and France in a war against Germany and Italy. As an offensive strategy, based on 
21 T. B. Kittridge, U. S. British Co-operation, 1940-1945, n. d., Naval Historical Center, Washington 
22 Maj. C. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present, (Washington, 1990), pp. 38-41. 
23 J. Leutze, The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence', September 1939-May 1940', 
JCH, 10,3, (1975). 
24 Adm. G. Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, (Washington, 1969), pp. 156-160; T. Higgins, 
Winston Churchill and The Second Front, (New York, 1957), pp. 43-46. 
u M. Matloff & E. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, (Washington, 1953), 
pp. 6-10. 
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ABC-1 and in agreement with the Joint US-Canada War Plan 2 (ABC-22, ). the first 
Army draft of RAINBOW 5 was completed on 7 April 1941, and submitted to the Joint 
Board for approval by the Joint Planning Committee on 21 April. 26 Directed against the 
European section of the Axis, forces were to be increased in preparation for a 
predetermined Mobilization Day (M Day), which might precede a declaration of war or 
hostile acts. 
Concurrently, the Joint Board considered a potential German-Japanese threat to seize 
strategic Atlantic and Caribbean outposts, construct U-boat bases in West Africa and 
Brazil, in order to cut America's sea-borne supply lines. The Army's ability to thwart 
any Axis attempts to gain a South American foothold during 1940. particularly in Brazil 
and Uruguay, was limited. American planners believed that a massive build-up of 
enemy ground and air forces in various collaborationist South American nations would 
precede an Axis invasion of the United States via Mexico or the Gulf and Atlantic 
coasts. According to the British, American planners were obsessed with Latin 
Amcrica, 27 but the United States was only too aware that British and Dutch Guinea of 
South America refined 95 percent of the oil sent to the eastern seaboard of the United 
States. The occupation of Dutch Guinea was under consideration by American forces. 
In mid-June, 1941, Adolph Hitler ordered German armies east into Russia, thereby 
embarking upon a war of annihilation, rather than sending them west on a war of 
conquest into the Iberian Peninsula, across to North Africa and into the distant reaches 
of the Western Hemisphere. There was little to be gained in a German move to the 
west, i. e., restricted space and few resources offered little compared to the Russian 
heartland. Hitler's move east relieved the Americans of any immediate threat to the 
Western Hemisphere, lifted the danger of an invasion of the British Isles until 1942, 
and improved Britain's position in the Middle East. Stimson believed that a significant 
26 Ibid., p. 43. 
27 Ibid., p. xii. 
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common strategic goal was required for Europe. Writing in his diary entry of 5 March 
1942, he stated, 
Sending an overwhelming force to the British Isles and threatening an 
attack on the Germans in France; that this was the proper and orthodox 
line of our help in the war as it had always been recognized and that it 
would now have the effect of giving Hitler two fronts to fight on, if it 
could be done in time while the Russians were still in. It would also 
heavily stimulate British sagging morale. 
Inhibitors to Negotiations 
British and American senior officers, on whom the future of coalition policy was to rely 
in 1941, had the unenviable two-fold task of not only achieving synthesis in 
negotiations, but achieving a viable working atmosphere. Even a common language 
could at times prove divisive. 
Differences in military, social and political backgrounds were exaggerated by language 
difficulties. 29 During the 1943 Casablanca Conference, British General John Kennedy 
discovered a remark in Oscar Wilde's, The Canterville Ghost that seemed appropriate to 
the discussions then in progress, in which the author suggested that the Americans and 
the British had everything in common except a language. 30 When British General 
Frederick Morgan was assigned to Eisenhower's Headquarters in early 1944 and 
received his first orders from the American General, he later wrote, 
But there came a terrifying shock, when his formal orders in writing 
were conveyed to me by his staff. It was a lovely job, no doubt, 
compiled according to the best War College standards. The words were 
all pure English but the whole document as it stood meant not a thing to 
any of us. So we began by getting ourselves instructed in US staff 
language and procedures. It is strange to think that less than twenty 
years ago the mutual ignorance of American and British fighting 
services was complete. 31 
The combination of language interpretation, persistent prejudices and personal 
deception were bound to effect the meetings between the British and the Americans. 
Many senior American Army officers, were Anglophobic, anti-Empire, and isolationist; 
28 H. Stimson & M. Bundy, Op. cit., p. 214. 
29 Interview with Gen. Sir W. Jackson, London, 20 January 1991. 
30 Maj. Gen. Sir J. Kennedy, The Business of War, (London, 1957), pp. 280-281. 
31 Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, Op. cit., pp. 149-150. 
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the word `Allies' was alien to them and British strategy and `generalship' were suspect. 
Settling for an armistice in 1918 rather seeking outright victory meant that the British 
military record inspired little respect in 1939-1941. Britain sought to reap post-war 
political benefits at the expense of the United States and exploited the resources and 
peoples of other nations to ensure her dominant position. 32 To some, the tactical 
principles expressed in writing by Guderian and Rommel were compelling. 33 
McNarney, considered to be an `immediatist', 34who argued for increased American 
involvement, was of the opinion in the Spring of 1941 that if Britain capitulated, the 
internal unrest created by this disaster could lead to a Communist take-over within the 
United States. 35 Like their British counterparts, the Americans were more fearful of 
Bolshevism than Fascism. 
Most senior British Army officers were either `pan Anglo-Saxonists' or `Imperial 
isolationists'. Moreover, described as `Easterners', in First World War parlance, they 
advocated the peripheral or `indirect approach', as the only pragmatic way of defeating 
the Germans. 36 Many British officers criticized the American Army's lack of 
experience in modern war, discounted its officers because of limited overseas 
experience and questioned its performance in the First World War, i. e., the United 
States raised large armies, but failed to equip them properly. Defined as Westerners, 
accustomed to working with vast amounts of manpower and material, the Americans 
chose to concentrate their superior forces on the shortest, albeit, the most heavily 
defended route to victory. 37 Once fully mobilized, the Americans were sure that the 
`direct approach' was the best way to use their unlimited resources. 38 
32 Ibid, pp. 93-94. 
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Strategy dictated that a number of unforeseen issues required reconciliation between the 
Allied services. For example, Britain described the first day of operations as `D Day'. 
followed by `D+1' , `D+2' etc., whereas the United States used the version `D. 
1', 
`D. 2', `D. 3', etc. Thus there was a critical difference of one day in the operational 
dates. In signal procedure, the British used `12/2' to denote February 12 whereas the 
Americans used `2/12' to denote the same day. The British used GMT for all overseas 
operations, whereas the Americans used local time. When American officers of JPS 
Allied Force Headquarters Algiers were engaged in a planning study for post HUSKY 
(the 1943 invasion of Sicily) operations with their British associates, they were 
occasionally piqued by them: 
... we were at work by 8 o'clock, took a short break 
for lunch, and 
knocked off at about 6: 30. The British, however, began work about 9 
or 9: 30, took a long lunch break and worked until about 8: 30. On a few 
occasions we would find on our desks in the morning a revised plan, 
prepared by the British after we had left, to conform to their views and 
altering our previous plan. The hassles that followed did little to 
promote international relations. 39 
These and many other operational and procedural points had to be resolved and each 
nation was reluctant to change its own procedures. Not only did national differences in 
language usage and interpretation cause difficulties, but the legal differences in 
contractual law underlined the variations between the British and the American 
approach. Combed, they added to the prolongation of the negotiating process and 
increased the possibilities of assumptive outcomes. Hypothetically, if one of the 
partners were replaced by the Russians, the language barrier between them would have 
been insuperable and negotiations would be painfully protracted and the outcome 
doubtful. 40 Concerning the 1942 London SLEDGEHAMMER meetings, Marshall 
surmised that the British operated on the belief of an agreement in principle while the 
Americans depended upon the formal interpretation of written agreements. `Agreement 
in principle' represented the spirit of the law and `formal interpretation', the letter. 
Moreover, it can be presumed that each country had integrated its contractual behavior 
39 Brig. Gen. M. MacCloskey, Planning fo' r Victory in World War II, (New York, 1970), p. 96. 40 Interview with T. Dudina, Professor of Moscow Linguistic University, London, 3 Nov. 1992. 
37 
within its military ethos. British flexibility was regarded by the Americans as lacking in 
commitment and certainty, while American determination was regarded by the British 
as inflexible, over-determined, and insufferable. As TORCH, the British choice 
prevailed over ROUNDUP, the American one, the British soon learned that `formal 
interpretation', as applied to 'CCS-94', could be just as frustrating as their `agreement 
in principle'. It resulted in a turn towards the Pacific by the Americans in 1942.41 
Sir Ralph Kilner Brown, a former British Brigadier GHQ planner and retired High 
Court Queen's Counsel, concluded that `agreement in principle', predicated on caveat 
emptor, `let the buyer beware', originally applied in British real-estate law. Neither 
interested party was bound by the agreement, usually accomplished by oral approval 
and a hand-shake. As soon as agreement was arranged in writing and signed by both 
parties, in which both were bound by contractual liability if either defaulted, it changed 
from an `agreement in principle' to one of formality. Moreover, it followed that any 
Anglo-American strategic agreement based upon real-estate law could only bind by 
mutual good faith and not by financial constraints. The usual civil financial penalties, 
therefore, for binding the two coalition partners together were inapplicable. 42 Specific 
to the April 1942 London Conference, Marshall had cause to worry when he wrote, 
`Everyone agreed in principle, but many if not most of the participants held 
reservations regarding this or that. It would require great firmness to avoid further 
dispersions. '43 
During the August 1943 Quebec Conference, when Brooke had enough of American 
intransigence; he cited, 
... the strain of arguing 
difficult problems with the Americans who try to 
run the war on a series of lawyer's agreements, which when once 
signed can never be departed from, is trying enough... but I suppose 
that when working with allies, compromises, with all their evils, 
become inevitable. " 
41 CCS 32 Meeting, Washington, 24 July 1942, Reel III. 
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The problem with an `agreement in principle', as in the case of SLEDGE R, 
was that it harbored a number of unwritten and unspoken British reservations. Since 
these concerns and objections were not revealed to the Americans present, they 
assumed that the British had agreed to their plan. The cost of British subterfuge was 
high: alternate, viable strategies were delayed, trust was eroded, and the coalition 
weakened. 
Churchill drew a description in his post-war memoirs of the differences between the 
thinking processes of the two peoples: 
The American mind runs naturally to broad, sweeping logical 
conclusions on the largest scale. It is on these that they build their 
practical thought and action. They feel that once the foundation as been 
planned on true and comprehensive lines all other stages will follow 
naturally and almost inevitably. 
The British mind does not work quite in this way. We do not think that 
logic and clear-cut principles are necessarily the sole keys to what ought 
to be done in swiftly changing and indefinable situations. In war 
particularly we assign a larger importance to opportunism and 
improvisation, seeking rather to live and conquer in accordance with the 
unfolding event than to aspire to dominate it often by fundamental 
decisions. There is room for much argument about both views. The 
difference is one of emphasis, but it is deep-seated. 45 
Whatever may be laudatory and intuitive in Churchill's revelations, Eisenhower had a 
number of pre-D-Day administrative problems to face. Arriving in London on 16 
January 1944, seeking consensus from a gathering of some fifty or sixty British 
officers at SHAEF, Eisenhower spoke forthrightly to them, 
Now I want you British to know that all Americans when they go to 
school learn in history that it was `John Bull', the red-coat, who was 
always the nigger in the wood pile, and when Americans grew up they 
did not forget this teaching until they were put in contact and learned to 
know the British. 46 
A Special Relationship 
To what end did Churchill try to create a `special relationship', knowing that either 
nation's self-interest was inviolate, believing that their survival was determined by what 
45 W. Churchill, The Second World War, III, (Boston, 1950), p. 673. 
46 Air Vice Marshal E. McCloughry, The Direction of the War, (London, 1955), p. 117. 
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was best and efficacious? As a politician, he knew that American economic and 
defence interests were part reflections of its sovereignty. The Americans demanded 
British gold, `new-world' bases and scientific secrets in payment for armaments; these 
assets were held hostage to protracted Anglo-American military trade negotiations, 
while Britain needed interim finance policies, on which its survival depended. He 
addressed these concerns to Roosevelt with self-imposed restraint on numerous 
occasions, such as `I am convinced that the assistance from the United States on a far 
larger scale.. . is essential, if we and you are to escape 
disaster, and we are fighting for 
our lives. '47 
The British and the Americans had deliberated on the benefits of mutual survival, but 
even when both nations' leaders seemed to be speaking with one public voice through 
the Atlantic Charter proclamation, the difficulties of converting rhetoric into action 
exposed more differences than similarities and more division than agreement. 
Moreover, the formulation of a coalition strategy was corrupted, in part, by each 
nation's self-interest, regardless of the combined communiques avowing unity of 
purpose. London officials frequently assumed that a mutual identity of interests 
existed, to which the Americans were not always willing to agree. The British, 
dependent upon American goodwill, had little choice but to focus on the United States, 
while for the Americans, the Britain's good will was not nearly as vital. Strength is 
easily recognizable between nations. 
Sometimes a nation may sense its own identity in war-time, but that does not imply that 
it is easily translatable to its allies. De Gaulle's clear and resolute personification of a 
fragmented France ran into difficulties with the Anglo-Americans, because of mutual 
variations and misunderstandings in language, custom and practice. Churchill had an 
easier time molding public opinion in an essentially uni-racial wartime Britain, and 
therefore had a freer hand. Roosevelt, directing a multi-racial non-belligerent America, 
suffered from an unclear mandate and chose to follow public opinion rather than mold 
47 W. Kimball, Op. cit., Pt. 1., pp. 91,93,101,115,182. 
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it. Even though this drawback existed, Roosevelt's expressions of good will were 
expressed in general terms, much to Churchill's chagrin. Aware of Roosevelt's 
sensitivity to the public mood in 1941, Churchill mused that, if a question of peace or 
war had been placed before Congress, there would be a lengthy three month debate. 
This in spite of Roosevelt's sentiments revealing a sympathy for Britain. ' He hoped 
Roosevelt would become more and more provocative and create a maritime incident. 
Without a resultant composite strategy, however compromised and lacking in vitality, 
neither nation could survive for long: while both nations had reasons to coalesce, 
national precepts and policies created difficulties. A common policy, war and post-war 
arrangements had to be found for their treatment of Franco's Spain, Japanese Pacific 
expansion, commercial competition in Argentina, commodity arrangements, merchant 
shipping and civil aviation. It seemed as if the European war was once again enabling 
the New World to `fatten on the follies of the Old. '49 
Regrettably for both countries, with the President shifting between indecision and 
provocation on the one hand, and Churchill continually and desperately appealing for 
America's participation on the other, confusion prevailed at Placentia Bay. Measured 
against accomplishment, Churchill could exult little, although he believed that the 
partnership had to be maintained at all costs with other considerations subordinated to 
it. Churchill stated, `that a complete understanding between Britain and the United 
States outweighed all else', 50 and told Eden, `My whole system is based upon my 
partnership with Roosevelt. '51 
Churchill, having the accepted Roosevelt's frequent invitations to dine with him aboard 
the President's ship at Placentia Bay, believed he had created and furthered a special 
and personal alliance. This tie was not without discord, and it became increasingly 
one-sided as time passed. The relationship, as process, was subject to the same 
pressures as the rest of international relations. For Britain to survive, Churchill 
48 CAB 65/19, WM 84(41) 1, Annex, 19 Aug. 1941. 
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idealized the American relationship: Churchill's post-Placentia Bay report to the War 
Cabinet, proclaiming that the President had given the US Navy an order to shoot U- 
boats on sight had more to do with `wish-fiilfillment' than actuality, because no 
evidence exists proving that any such order was issued. 52 Roosevelt needed the 
relationship less so, although he sometimes liked Prime Minister's company. 
Churchill never wavered in his belief that it was the Anglo-American partnership that 
mattered, exclusive of Stalin. He wrote to the President, `Our friendship is the rock on 
which I build for the future of the world, so long as I am one of the builders. '53 
Policy makers in Washington did not return such intimacy; although Britain was needed 
for America's safety, it was not needed for its survival. From Washington's point of 
view, British policy, all too often, displayed short-sightedness, arrogance, even 
duplicity. Distrusting Washington, some British officials, misunderstanding 
Churchill's intent, had warned, as early as the 1940, that too close an embrace with 
America would be akin to exchanging one master for another. 54 
Churchill's `special relationship', lacking a quorum of adherents, could not overcome 
British or American self-interest regarding modifications in military strategy, 
protectionist trading policies, spheres of influence, and colonial independence. 55 
Regardless, Churchill perpetuated the myth. Assessing Britain and her prerogatives of 
empire, Roosevelt, in a prescient mood, felt that, `We will have more trouble with 
Great Britain after the war than we are having with Germany now. '56 
Prior to America's entry into the war, American sensitivity in defence of its national 
interests took priority over any real or imagined kinship with Britain. When British 
warships severely damaged the German pocket cruiser, Graf Spee, during a sea battle 
off Uruguay in December 1939, the American State Department protested Britain's 
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western hemispheric intrusion. 57 Co-operation on a personal basis, founded on the 
belief that some shared aspects of history, institutions, ideologies, language and an 
identified common enemy, was encouraged by a small minority. However, Brooke, as 
CIGS, deduced that the manifestations of commonality were more of a hindrance than a 
benefit when both sides conferred. 58 Marshall and Dill discovered that their new 
friendship could serve as an incentive for improving the negotiating process. British 
Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, Admirals Turner and King remained 
aloof and prejudiced against similar possibilities. Nevertheless, 
Individuals might help to dissipate genuine ignorance or genuine 
misunderstandings, a Lothian, a Halifax might make relations easier... a 
Purvis break through the jungles of red tape that might have strangled 
lesser men... But the great issues were decided as a result of factors 
outside their control. 59 
To Roosevelt and his advisors, their relationship with the British was defined as a 
combative kinship. The popular image of the British ambassador neatly illustrated 
many of the unsavory qualities which millions of Americans held in contempt: wily, 
polished, and thoroughly unscrupulous, seeking to disadvantage his unsuspecting 
American counterpart. 60 Historically, American tension and distrust had always been 
paired with the sense of a `special relationship', as a reaction to the Revolutionary War, 
Britain's meddling in the American Civil War, and British challenges to America's 
expression of `manifest destiny' during the 19th century. Anti-British sentiments 
existed in the United States, and `twisting the lion's tail' was not only expressed by 
Irish-Americans. 61 Therefore, the `special relationship' may have been nothing more 
than a realization that the military and socio-economic competition between the two 
powers had to be subordinated to one of co-operation, in view of the Axis threat. 62 
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Facing their common enemy, British and American reactions were comparable to those 
of the settlers crossing the American west after the Civil War, who, in their attempt to 
survive, had placed their wagon trains in a fortified circle as a defence against attacking 
Indians, while preparing to take the offensive. The analogy can not be carried too far, 
because of the imbalance of power and production between the two countries. At this 
stage of the war, although America moved towards industrial supremacy, for the 
moment there existed a rough equality between the British and Americans. Even if 
Britain were given the tools, Churchill knew that despite his rhetoric, it could not finish 
the job. Considering the fears and jealousies that exist between nations of equal 
stature, Britain's emerging relative weakness vis a vis America may have evoked an 
American paternal-benevolence, in the short-term, that furthered co-operation between 
the two countries, noted as a `special relationship'. Transcending the divination of a 
`special relationship' was the real sympathy expressed and the military aid offered by 
Roosevelt and Marshall to Churchill when Tobruk fell and its garrison of 33,000 men 
were taken prisoner by Rommel's forces on 21 June 1942.63 If Lend-Lease were 
considered as America's most unsordid act, a questionable evaluation, the American 
offer of military assistance in the Middle East, at its own expense, was the most 
unconditional and immediate; the Prime Minister was deeply touched. M Brooke who 
was present at the White House that day, recorded the event in his diary later, `I 
remember vividly being impressed by the tact and real heartfelt sympathy which lay 
behind these words. There was not one word too much, not one word too little. ' 65 
The fall of Tobruk, the British North African fortress was portentous, Churchillian 
rhetoric notwithstanding, because the balance of power had tipped ominously towards 
Washington. Churchill was intelligent and realistic enough to create a belief system, 
albeit with limited but acceptable credibility and appeal, to which he and others could 
turn to in an uncomplicated way. The title `special relationship' was simple enough to 
63 Adm. J. McCrea, `Unpublished Memoirs of John L. McCrea', McCrea Papers, Box 1, FDRL. 
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cover aspects of personal relations, a real or imagined goal to be achieved, within the 
war's bureaucracies. By way of contrast, Robert Sherwood described the relationship 
between the Anglo-Americans as `common-law allies', indicating that they were allies 
by reason of their conduct rather than as a result of official signatures to that effect, i. e., 
an unsigned integration of effort. 66 The problem with this phraseology, however 
accurate, was that it lacked the color, emotion and connectedness that the term `special 
relationship' evoked. 
Churchill described the `special relationship' as if it were a romance, a love-affair 
between two people. They could be perceived visually, up close, a strong point in the 
selling of an idea. He went as far as to suggest, `No lover ever studied the whims of 
his mistress as I did those of Roosevelt. ' 67 Two great democratic states, teeming with 
millions of inhabitants, were reduced to one loving couple, identified as easily as icons. 
When the United States became a belligerent, Churchill, his eyes twinkling, responded 
to a question regarding its change in status: `Oh that is the way we talked to her when 
we were wooing her, now that she is in the harem we talk to her quite differently !' 68 
Churchill added a metaphorical variation to his original theme. The Prime Minister's 
19th Century Romanticism described the relationship as a later Grand Alliance, which 
he compared favorably to the relationship Marlborough had forged with Prince Eugene 
of Austria. He wrote of this coalition against Louis XN of France, with unparalleled 
intimacy, `No one can comprehend the battle of Blenheim unless he realized that 
Eugene and Marlborough were working like two lobes of the same brain. '69 
Churchill understated his case when addressing the House of Commons in 1940; he 
alluded to the informality of the Anglo-American relationship, descriptive of 
Sherwood's Common Law Alliance, `These two great organizations of the English- 
speaking democracies, the British Empire and the United States, will have to be 
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somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for mutual and general 
advantage. ' 70 
Nevertheless, he repeatedly returned to his favorite theme, romance, marriage and a 
love-affair with all its vicissitudes. He told the King that after months of `going out'. 
Britain and America were now married. 71 Churchill's attempts to forge the myth are 
poignant because, in reality, the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Washington 
were fighting rear-guard actions in defence of a position and prestige which was no 
longer supported by requisite power. Without this essential ingredient of successful 
diplomacy, relying on experience and maturity instead, the British discovered that their 
partners were more interested in tanks and gold than advice. Even if the old story that 
made the rounds in Whitehall at this time, revealed that the two most important things in 
the world were `love' and the `special relationship', American officials rarely expressed 
the same interest and remained indifferent. `It was this cavalier treatment, this apparent 
indifference to relations with Britain that so infuriated, and the same time perplexed, 
those in London who were responsible for devising a British policy toward the United 
States. '72 
Portal, cast the relationship in a similar but more complicated mold a few years later at 
Casablanca. Churchill appealed to the public, Portal to the professional, `We are in the 
position of a testator who wishes to leave the bulk of his fortune to his mistress. He 
must, however, leave something to his wife and the problem is how little in decency he 
can set apart for her. '73 
This analogy relates to a conflict of resource allocation between the two major theaters 
of' war; it distorts reality, and thus fails, because the British had little control over 
American resources -a major problem. Portal implied that the British are the `we' in 
the above. To the contrary. the Americans are the `we', testator and wife combined, 
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the British the mistress. The analogy may serve the additional purpose of identifying 
the subjective British negotiating position, i. e., common-law alliances and mistresses 
are not recognized, and lack influence in many jurisdictions. Britain*s influence over 
American goods and services declined when the enormous power and resources of the 
United States came to dominate the partnership. 
Moreover, the idea of a `special relationship', however ascribed, may have had more to 
do with Anglo-American public morale rather than with the men who were in positions 
of leadership, particularly when considering the American public. There was much to 
be gained by advancing the myth, because many Americans, according to a Life 
magazine poll, were not prepared to fight just to keep the British Empire intact, 74 but 
the reality at the command level was something different, as written by Eisenhower in 
January 1943, 
I am not so incredibly naive that I do not realize that Britishers 
instinctively approach every military problem from the viewpoint of 
Empire, just as we approach them from the viewpoint of American 
interests. One of the constant sources of danger for us in this war is the 
temptation to regard as our first enemy the partner that must work with 
us in defeating the real enemy. 75 
Churchill spent all of the war trying to overcome American distrust of Britain as shaped 
by competition, naval rivalry, tariff restrictions and war debts, which almost precluded 
the possibility of any significant political and military co-operation. What might have 
been achieved if these hindrances to co-operation had never existed, or had been at least 
neutralized. `Churchill's idea of a lasting Anglo-American partnership ended in the 
dustbin of history. '76 By 1944, not only did American infantry divisions outnumber 
British and Canadian forces by a ratio of four to one in Europe, but American industry 
dominated munitions and supply production, out-producing all the Allies combined. 
Under these conditions, Churchill, however he fumed, whatever his strategic 
viewpoint, had little option but to follow where Roosevelt led. Churchill, demoted to 
junior partner, said, `Up to July 1944. Endland had considerable say in things. after 
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that I was conscious that it was America who made the big decisions. '77 In turn, 
British prejudice had been expressed earlier by Neville Chamberlain. it is always best 
and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words... '78 
To some extent, as demonstrated, that was true. The incident that Churchill had waited 
for, the condition that was to relieve his immediate anxiety and deep concern for the 
future, was the attack on Pearl Harbor. He wrote, `So we had won after all! ... All the 
rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force. ' 79 
Economics, The Victory Program and Lend-Lease 
America, no less than other countries, was not simply a vast politico-economic 
monolith, but a mosaic of conflicting beliefs which affected its foreign policy in a world 
at war. The battle for an acceptable Lend-Lease program was fought between the 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, each 
with a view that either demanded dissolution of British Empire economic preference 
and economic nationalism or the defeat of Hitler's Germany without economic 
extortion. Morganthau saw Britain's fight against Hitler as just compensation for 
Lend-Lease. 80 Hull, as an anti-colonialist, wanted Britain to post $2 to $3 billion 
dollars of collateral written into an agreement, believing that Britain possessed $18 
billion dollars in Imperial wealth. 81 Both sides represented a portion of the President's 
thinking, but he did replace Morganthau with Hull during the final Lend-Lease 
negotiations. Linking economic nationalism with the perceived quality of peace in the 
post-war world, the American government attempted to drive a hard bargain in concrete 
contractual terms. Instead of an outright subsidy for an ally admittedly fighting 
America's war, the Roosevelt administration wanted continuing assurance that Britain 
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was fighting as hard as it could. As Britain's liquidity dwindled, her ability to buy 
arms on a `cash and carry' basis diminished. Roosevelt indicated that she was prepared 
to divest herself of an estimated $7 billion dollars worth of American financial 
investment to continue her fight for survival. Both Secretaries and other cabinet 
members were ardent supporters of the sale of privately owned British shares in 
American companies, and advised English officials to sell such direct investments as 
Shell Oil, Lever Brothers, etc. Courtaulds, whose subsidiary, American Viscose 
produced 60 percent of all American rayon and accounted for half of its parent 
company's income, was pressured by the American government to relinquish its 
control. Sold at a loss in order to protect American nominal national security, it was the 
American government who benefited financially. 82 
Moreover, American businessmen were concerned that Britain was re-exporting Lend- 
Lease goods for profit into areas it had once dominated, and which were now being 
exploited by the Americans. Although the Americans respected British national pride 
and sovereignty, their assumption persisted during the Lend-Lease negotiations that 
Britain's policies had led to depression and war and these had to be changed to suit the 
American image. Calculations indicate that Britain received $27 billion dollars worth of 
Lend-Lease aid from the United States , without cash payments, and 
Britain, in her 
turn, provided America with $6 billion worth of Reverse Lend-Lease, a rarely 
mentioned amount. This was at a time when the official exchange rate was four dollars 
to the pound, when a box of breakfast cereal cost just over three pence and petrol 
slightly less than ten. 83 
Britain emerged from the First World War impoverished and financially indebted to the 
United States. In turn the United States, a debtor nation at the beginning of the war, 
emerged as the world's leading creditor. American revisionist historians argued that 
Britain had gulled the United States into fighting and financing a war on their behalf, 
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had created an unjust peace at Paris and had torn President Wilson's principles to 
shreds. 84 Once again, in 1940, Britain had to swallow its pride and trust in American 
goodwill, for immediate political necessity outweighed long-term economic 
considerations. 85 
If Roosevelt fought for an improved post-war world, both he and Congress referred to 
more immediate and tangible matters without admitting to long-term British 
exploitation. Unfortunately, by avoiding the difficult Lend-lease questions, Roosevelt 
delayed enactment of policy, which increased the sense of drift. 86 While the British 
were vainly trying to avoid having to barter `Imperial-Preference' in exchange for 
money and goods, Marshall awaited the formalization of Lend-Lease and its effect on 
the Victory Program, portions of which were inter-connected, with trepidation, because 
of the potential brake they might impose on the Army's growth. Nevertheless, both 
would provide the United States and its Allies with a substantive method of achieving 
maximum economic productivity and military effectiveness. 
While Britain and Russia's constant demands for equipment continued to vex the War 
Department, contracts for the manufacture of Lend-Lease material served to establish 
major military production lines well before America went to war. Industry generally 
refused to convert to war production unless some sort of guarantee sustained 
production. Lend-Lease provided such a guarantee, and the War Department found that 
an important segment of industry was already mobilized by 7 December 1941.87 
General Sir Ian Jacob, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, during a 1948 interview 
with Sir Basil Liddell Hart, represented British strategic wartime thinking, which 
misconstrued Marshall's systematic approach to the nation's total mobilization. 88 
Marshall did not propose to raise a force of over eight million men without knowing 
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how and where they were to be equipped and employed. To him, that smacked of 
opportunism, devoid of strategy and lacking in preparation. The reverse was true, as 
expressed by General Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, speaking 
for Marshall in 1941, 
We must first evolve a strategic concept of how to defeat our potential 
enemies and then determine the major military units required to carry out 
the strategic operations. 89 
Wars are won on sound strategy implemented by well-trained forces 
which are adequately and effectively equipped. The ultimate question 
was where military operations should be conducted in order to produce 
decisive results. 90 
The American Victory Program: (The Brief of Strategic Concept & 
(A WPD/l ) 
On 9 July 1941, Roosevelt requested that the Secretaries of War and Navy, Henry L. 
Stimson and Frank Knox, estimate the overall production requirements needed to defeat 
America's potential enemies. 91 By 11 September the Joint Planning Committee of the 
Army and Navy's Joint Board submitted a strategic estimate, which provided a basis 
for future military production. Moreover, it asserted that Britain could only defeat 
Germany with American military participation, a reflection of Stimson's view; 
Germany was considered the prime enemy, and once defeated, Japan would retreat 
from the territory she conquered. The Board had no faith in the British idea that aerial 
bombardment could defeat Germany, concluding that only land armies could finally 
win wars, as an integral part of combined arms. 92 
Although the President had turned to Marshall to place America on a war-footing, a 
resourceful American supply policy was lacking. British competition for scarce 
resources and demands for American assistance provoked an acerbic diary comment 
89 R. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, (Washington, 1951), pp. 60-63. 
90 Gen. A. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, (New York, 1958), p. 74. Note: John J. McCloy, 
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from Colonel Orlando Ward, Secretary General Staff: `We are like a pointer pup. If 
someone with a swagger stick and a British accent speaks to us, we he down on the 
ground and wiggle. '93 Roosevelt's highly personal style of administrating included 
three small cliques within the White House whose advisors were not necessarily 
qualified to solve the major military supply problems. Ward promptly noted in his 
diary, `GB [Great Britain] has asked Santa Claus for equipment totaling about 25 
billion dollars. It is tragic that we can't shape our course on a long-range, clearly- 
thought out program. '94 Adding six weeks later, `The story of the British fifth column 
and how it captured our Govt. without anyone knowing it will be amazing indeed in the 
light of future history. ' 95 
Concurrently, some British military leaders in Washington had concluded that America 
was not only utterly unprepared for war, but doubted its will to fight. This was not 
startling news to Marshall, who not only recognized the political divisions within the 
country, but had struggled to reorganize the Army since his accession as Chief of Staff 
in 1939. Marshall, having witnessed the Army's chaotic attempts to mobilize in 1917, 
hoped that the mobilization and training plans he presently envisioned would go far to 
reduce this disorder and dispel British prejudice. `gradualists' within the Army 
hierarchy were beginning to embrace the tenets of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5, which he 
advocated. They were also separating themselves from the isolationist position of 
Embick and his devotees. 96 The Chief of Staff was under no illusions. The White 
House cabal was seeking greater control of economic mobilization, which, if 
accomplished, would curtail War Department autonomy. To limit the demands by 
Britain, Russia, and China for American arms, which at times seemed excessive and 
unrealistic, Marshall's advisors and planners advocated the establishment of an agency 
in which the acquisition and disbursement of munitions would be placed under military 
control. Marshall clearly defined the need for a unified command over war orders, 
93 Col. O. Ward, `Ward Diary', Dec. 1940, quoted in T. Wilson, Op. cit., p. p. 41-44. 
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which, in part, would effectively assist the American Army to rearm in timely 
fashion. 97 The establishment of a central military agency would eliminate the chaotic 
`blank-check' policy of supply as espoused by the White House. In a letter written to 
the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, Roosevelt stated, `I wish you would explore the 
munitions and the mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be 
required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. '98 
Marshall felt that the British view of American participation was in the area of war 
production alone. If the Office of Production and Management was placed in charge of 
American production, the Army was under threat of not only becoming another 
claimant for its nation's arms, but a competitor against Britain and Russia as well. To 
neutralize this threat and counter the British effect upon White House thinking, 
Marshall, growing impatient with British arrogance, demanded a clear, orderly plan for 
the Army to follow in the months ahead. This and other deeper priorities, discussed 
between American military chiefs, were never shared with the British during the war, 
as Marshall stated, `We discussed political things more than anything else.. . But we 
were careful, exceedingly careful, never to discuss them with the British, and from that 
they took the count that we didn't observe these things at all. '99 He reasoned that 
politics was the domain of the heads of government, but strategy was based upon 
policy. Therefore, ideas and assumptions could be excluded from Allied military 
discussions. 
Recognizing the enormity of his task to transform a small pre-war army into a world- 
wide effective fighting machine in eighteen months, Marshall assigned Major Albert C. 
Wedemeyer of the War Plans Division in July to produce a position paper on the 
subject. The paper, `Brief of Strategic Concept', suggested that the two existing plans, 
i. e., the inappropriate `Protective Mobilization Plan' and its supporting `Industrial 
Mobilization Plan of 1939' were outmoded and had to be replaced. Moreover, the 
97 J. Alsop, `George C. Marshall Interview', Washington Spring 1941, Joseph Alsop Papers, Library 
of Congress, Box 32. 
98 Roosevelt to Stimson, Washington, 9 July 1941, RG 165, Box 498. 
" E. Larrabee, Op. cit., p. 11. 
53 
administration needed to be provided with current data and estimates required for the 
mobilization of manpower, industry and shipping to defeat the Germans. Further, 
based on this information, these goals were to be achieved without causing the internal 
economy to suffer. The survey was not politically motivated by the President who, 
according to Stephen E. Ambrose, was more interested in post-war markets than full 
mobilization. 100 On the contrary, the President sought a formula by which victory 
could be achieved in the most cost-effective way, although he compounded the problem 
by failing to make distinctions between American and Allied supply priorities during the 
spring of 1941. Wedemeyer, the paper's author, in collaboration with personnel from 
the Navy and Army Air Corps, speculated that if Germany defeated Russia in 1941, 
Britain faced invasion and defeat in the spring of 1943, at the same time that American 
mobilization would reach its practical level of effectiveness. If Russia could hold on, 
he opined, Britain would survive, because American industrial capacity, productivity, 
and military forces, of a size and quality described and recommended in his paper 
would achieve its goals. The recommended estimates therein, combined with those of 
Britain's, would suffice to defeat the Germans. 
Using the `Brief of Strategic Concept' as its foundation, the paper, produced as a 
booklet in conjunction with the Army Air Forces estimate, `AWPD/1', briefly defined 
the Army's approved strategy with regard to war plans, geo-politics, military 
philosophy and Army infrastructure. The `Brief of Strategic Concept' and `AWPD/1' 
originally lacked compatibility, because of their divergent views concerning the final 
battle of concentration and victory through air power. Wedemeyer accommodated both 
points of view in his final version, in an attempt to satisfy the proponents of either side, 
since there was too much at stake to do otherwise. With regard to British and American 
strategic theories, based on ABC-1, they varied for an additional reason, at one 
important point: the same American Army planners believed that the German Army had 
to be defeated on the battlefield and its will to fight broken in combat by future Allied 
100 S. E. Ambrose, Op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
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armies; the British did not, relying instead on an overall German collapse, as defined in 
`closing the ring'. 101 
Wedemeyer estimated manpower requirements, the probable size and composition of 
task forces, the possible theaters of operations, and the probable dates at which forces 
would be committed. 2,500 ships would transport five million men overseas. By 
1945, bombers would have a 4,000 mile radius of action. Although criticized by 
segments of the tabloid press, it was popularly called the Victory Program upon 
completion in September 1941.102 Henceforth, it served as a fundamental, albeit 
flexible103, planning document in preparing the country for war. 104Matched against the 
reality of 1944, manpower proposals erred in three categories: 
1. ) the men needed for the `divisional slice' (the troops in support the 
infantry) 
2. ) provision for individual infantry replacements 
3. ) the amount of armored formations, anti-aircraft artillery, and tank- 
destroyers required'°5 
Originally, Marshall conceived of an US Army consisting of over 200 infantry 
divisions, but for political, economic and strategic reasons, the great expansion of the 
Army Air Forces being one, this number was changed to approximately 85. Therefore, 
theater commanders were always short of infantrymen, which placed great strain upon 
the generals and soldiers alike. On the ground, operations would suffer and more had 
to be accomplished with less. 
How well the Victory Program succeeded can be judged by the following assessment: 
before the Japanese attack, US Army trainees were using broom sticks in place of 
rifles, and the gross national product was $100 billion dollars. By 1943, the American 
101 'Brief of Strategic Concept', Washington, Sept. 1941, RG165, Exec. 4. Note: `AWPD/1' was 
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`arsenal of democracy' produced more war material than all the other belligerents 
combined and its military budget alone would reach Sl 00 billion dollars. The United 
States would reach levels of production within the next two years that were scarcely 
believable, e. g., 45 percent of the world's arms, nearly 50 percent of the world's 
goods, and 66 percent of all the ships afloat. 106 In 1955, the Army staff calculated that 
Lend-Lease had equipped the equivalent of 101 US type divisions to eight of its Allies 
including the British Empire. 107 Japanese Admiral Yamamoto remarked after Pearl 
Harbor, `We have awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve. ' 108 
The benefits accruing to Marshall and the Army if the `Victory Program' were approved 
by the President were manifold: the Army could achieve its manpower expansion levels 
within the allotted time span, because industry and production would be geared to meet 
these targets. It would be pre-eminent in the allocation of resources. Attempts by the 
White House and the Office of Production Management to control the allocation of 
munitions and the production and distribution of war material to allies would be 
eliminated. Britain's needs would be evaluated accordingly in conjunction with thosc 
ut' Russia and China's. 
With Britain fighting for survival while America dithered, Churchill's need to create 
the myth of a `special relationship' was vital. In so doing, he attempted to cover over 
national differences and draw the two nations closer together at any level, however 
superficial, because Britain desperately needed American support. Lacking substance. 
since Churchill and Roosevelt had not met in the nineteen years before Placentia Bay, 
the `special relationship' was perceived as a good public relations approach. Myths die 
sloowwwly, but at least now sentimcnt was replaced by a plan. 
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Anglo-American Bureaucratic Structures 
The variations in the bureaucratic structures of both nations indicated that the search for 
and the acceptance of and the application of a mutually agreed Anglo-American strategy 
would be an arduous and complex process. Article H, Section 2 of the American 
Constitution provided that the service Chiefs were to carry out the duties of their 
Commander in Chief. Policy was to be determined by the civil authorities, strategy by 
the Chiefs, but what if there were was no real direction from above? Was the building 
of an army to have top priority or was it to be all-out aid to Britain? American strategy, 
made unsteady by the divergent views of the Chief of Staff, and the President as 
Commander in Chief, was erratic and inconclusively drawn. 109 The absence of a much 
needed civilian-controlled staff-system coupled with Presidential ambivalence towards 
formalizing the strategic process, diluted purpose and delayed effective planning. By 
describing the power of Commander in Chief as an `office' rather than a `function', the 
Framers of the Constitution left undefined the Commander in Chief's specific powers 
and functions. 110 Unlike the bureaucratic British system, in which Churchill as Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence was linked to the Chiefs of Staff, a Secretariat, 
Defence Committee for Operations, and the War Cabinet, all of which combined to 
form a unified and organic chain of command", the President could interpret his role 
accordingly without comparable intervention or assistance. Churchill, as controller of 
both the executive and legislative branches, had his agents serving on all the major 
governmental committees connected with the war effort. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff 
and Churchill met daily, ran the war and worked together to forge Britain's strategy. If 
the Chiefs of Staff could not reconcile their differences, Churchill stepped in to resolve 
the issue. 112 
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However, in practice, by devising his own executive military system predicated on his 
dual roles, Churchill breached the jurisdictional subdivision of responsibility by which 
the formal independence of the bureaucracy was maintained. When Churchill formed a 
small inner cabinet, over which he presided as Minister of Defence, the three Chiefs of 
Staff were left without a civilian chief in the War Cabinet who could champion their 
case against him. Jurisdictional boundaries were also breached by the Prime Minister 
when he insisted that either he or his personal representative, General Ismay, attend 
Chiefs of Staff meetings on a regular basis. This prevailing situation limited the 
Chiefs' opportunities to consult in private, to view matters from their own perspective, 
and to co-ordinate a strategy against the Prime Minister should they fundamentally 
disagree with him. The Chiefs could only fight it out directly with either Churchill or 
Ismay on a day to day basis. Under this system, Churchill as Minister of Defence 
could not remain dispassionate or critical regarding plans, which as Chairman of the 
COS he had helped to formulate. It was a system that favored Churchill's demanding 
personality and strategic perceptions, and limited the Chiefs' ability to parry and 
counter. 113 
What Churchill called the `large issues' were first thrashed out by the 
Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff and only then brought for formal 
approval to the War Cabinet, whose meetings were thus transformed 
into something akin to briefings sessions... Thus it was that the 
framework of decision making constituted a triangle with Churchill at its 
apex. It was he who directed and managed British `grand strategy' by 
means of an intimate dialogue... with the Chiefs of Staff on one hand 
and Eden on the other. 114 
Theoretically, the chain of command differed between the two allied systems, but in 
practice one aspect was common to both, i. e., each system was interpreted and defined 
by the President and Prime Minister according to their idiosyncratic views of 
leadership, regardless of the table of organization. Both had created a small decision- 
making apparatus cut from his own cloth. Roosevelt rejected the idea of a war council, 
choosing instead to surround himself with a clique of personal advisors on war strategy 
113 B. Villa, Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and The Dieppe Raid 1942, (Toronto, 1989), pp 258- 
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set between him and his regular military advisors. ' 15 The Service Secretaries were 
relegated to the periphery by an executive degree, Military Order of July 1939.116 
Although each system provided for advisors and planners at every level of fact-fording, 
consultation, and decision-making, both Churchill and Roosevelt could manipulate the 
system to their advantage. This is not to imply a whimsical disregard for the office of 
high command within the political process; it simply demonstrated that these men were 
flexible and inquisitive enough to maximize their own investigative and strategic 
techniques and abilities collaterally. In addition, as national leaders and politicians, 
they demanded timely responsiveness and expertise from their subordinates on 
demand. If it suited them, they by-passed the accepted chains of command. 117 With no 
set of rules for compliance indicated, some sensitive personalities might disapprove, 
but the leader's recognition of accepted political custom and practice within a war-time 
frame of reference kept that within reasonable limits, even though Churchill tried the 
patience of many, one of whom was Brooke. ' 8 Theoretically, there was a difference 
in power between the President and the Prime Minister. Roosevelt formulated foreign 
policy whenever he chose, whereas Churchill directed foreign policy subject to the 
decisions of the War Cabinet. However, in practice, the differences were not as great, 
since Churchill frequently led the Cabinet and Roosevelt often deferred to the wishes of 
his advisers. 119 
Without benefit of a Secretariat or a linkage to a Chiefs of Staff Committee, the 
President's formulation of American military strategy was handicapped, i. e., Army 
responsibility for war strategy diminished and its body of professional military opinion 
ill-used. 120 Both Marshall and Stimson were concerned with the President's 
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unorthodox approach to strategy the Army's limited influence. 121 Unlike Churchill's 
day to day handling of the war, the President and Chief of Staff rarely met to explore 
and review their strategic aspirations. Misperceptions and assumptions occurred 
between the two men, but until April 1942, Marshall had few alternatives to counter 
Roosevelt's strategic predilections and his demand for action. 122 Clausewitz wrote, 
`No one starts a war without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by 
that war and how he intends to conduct it. ' 123 
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Prior to February 1942, the center of American military power was the Joint Board, a 
corporate military executive established in 1903. It consisting of eight high-ranking 
officers, four from each service. Throughout its existence, the Joint Board was not a 
staff agency but simply an inter-departmental committee established by agreement 
between the Army and Navy service secretaries, from whom approval for action would 
have to sought and created to make recommendations in the interests of inter service co- 
operation. 124 
The exigencies of the coming war led to an expansion of the Joint Board in 1939 and 
the establishment of the JCS in 1942. On 5 July 1939, Roosevelt, conscious of the 
war's approach and jealous of his authority, as Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces, issued a Military Order which transferred the Joint Board, the joint Munitions 
Board and several other military procurement agencies from the service departments 
into the newly established Executive Office of the President. ' With the signing of this 
executive order, 126 the two boards were superseded by the JCS, but formal legalization 
to this structural change did not follow. In the end the JCS emerged by reason of 
semantics: whenever the services chiefs met, they simply called themselves the JCS. 
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Lacking authorization as a separate entity, its status obscure, its power undetermined, 
the JCS was left to interpret its role from within, relying on presidential guidance. The 
role of the JCS was to keep the President informed on all inter-service matters, which 
included manpower needs, munitions, production and distribution, and strategy. Any 
JCS directives, the result of special sub-committees' studies that set operations into 
motion, required presidential approval Direction suffered because JCS Presidential 
recommendations demanded unanimity. The variations of the personalities involved 
increased debate. King's temper caused problems, and the President's availability was 
limited. Admiral Leahy, who had direct access to the President, summarized the views 
of the JCS to him, a role in which the Admiral excelled. Moreover, the President came 
to rely on Marshall, as his military consultant, regarding the consideration and 
application of grand strategy. 127 Permission granting the JCS to function rested simply 
on an exchange of letters between the President, Marshall and King, which added to the 
jurisdictional confusion. Provoked by a series of military disasters in 1942, the 
American press and Congress clamored for a Department of National Defense under a 
civilian secretary reporting directly to the President. King opposed the idea, claiming 
that he and Marshall, in their individual capacities as service chiefs, always had 
authorization to confer directly with the President on strategic, tactical, and operational 
matters pertaining to their respective services. 128 
Churchill gave a brief summary of Roosevelt and his Administration when he returned 
to Britain in early 1942: 
The President had no adequate link between his will and executive 
action. There was no such organization as the Secretariat of the Cabinet 
or the Chief of Staff Committee. When the President saw the 
Ministerial heads of the Fighting Services, who were little more than 
private secretaries and responsible to him only, meetings were quite 
informal... Harry Hopkins... played a great part in helping the President 
to give effect to his policies. There was little risk of the Americans 
abandoning the conventional principles of war... Roosevelt said to me 
on leaving, `Trust me to the bitter end. ' 129 
126 R. Cline, Op. cit., p. 45. 
127 H. Stimson & M. Bundy, Op. 
128 T. Buell, Op. cit., pp. 182-83. 
129 CAB, 65/25 WM (42), 17 Jan. 
cit., p. 662; Sir A. Bryant, Op. cit., p. 335. 
1942. 
61 
The JCS's close identification with the President rested upon his concept of executive 
control. He preferred quasi-formal legal positions coupled with informal personal 
relationships. However, top army and navy commanders were chosen, because they 
possessed a sense of statesmanship that enabled them to consider the political as well 
as the purely military aspects of the global situation. 130 
The JCS became, next to the President, the single most important force 
in the overall conduct of the war, the level and scope of their activities 
far transcending those of a purely professional body. As a result, the 
JCS ended the war with no experience in functioning simply as a 
military organization. Four years of war had given them a political 
tradition and role. 131 
Although King could lay claim to the above, his personality did little to facilitate 
negotiations. Colleagues described his demeanor as bleak, composure as fixed, 
resolute, grim, harsh, and ruthless. 132 `Tough as nails, carrying himself as stiffly as a 
poker, he was considered to be blunt and arrogant, almost to the point of rudeness. ' 133 
When they met in Washington in 1942, Admiral A. B. Cunningham believed King to 
be, 
... a man of immense capacity and ability, quite ruthless in his methods, he was not an easy person to get on with. He was tough and liked to be 
considered tough, and at times became rude and overbearing... He was 
offensive and I told him what I thought of his method of advancing 
allied unity and amity.. 
. he could hardly be called a good co-operator. Not content with fighting the enemy, he was usually fighting someone 
on his own side as well. 134 
Liaison between the White House and the Joint Chiefs was unreliable and faulty; 
needed decisions were delayed, papers lost. Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the 
JSM described their functioning as follows. 
There are no regular meetings, and if they do meet there is no secretariat 
to record their meetings. They have no joint planners and executive 
planning staff ... Then there 
is the great difficulty of getting the stuff over 
to the President He just sees the Chiefs of Staff at odd times, and again 
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no record... The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington. 135 
Marshall convinced the President, over King's objections, that Roosevelt's affable and 
trusted friend, retired Admiral William D. Leahy, pre-war CNO (Chief of Naval 
Operations), two-term governor of Puerto Rico and former Ambassador to Vichy 
France, would be an excellent choice as his personal chief of staff. Leahy joined the 
JCS as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the US Army and Navy, became 
its extra-legal chairman through seniority, and remained an equal among equals without 
any command authority. From the summer of 1942 onwards, the JCS consisted of 
King, Marshall, Leahy, and Arnold. 136 Lacking the power that their quasi-legal status 
imposed when dealing with government agencies over war-related issues, they solicited 
for an Executive order to rectify the situation. Roosevelt refused, insisting that it would 
inhibit their flexibility. Left to serve solely at the President's pleasure, basing their 
authority on his approval, confidence, and tacit consent, the JCS sought self- 
identification and failed. 
Since Roosevelt wanted to control American war policy, he disallowed the creation of a 
civilian-military council. Henceforth, the civilian departmental secretaries of War, 
Navy, and State were refused entry into any organization dealing with policy. 
Responsibility in all matters of strategic policy resided with the newly created JCS and 
the President. Without the additional contribution of civilian-political viewpoints, the 
JCS, as arbiter, lacked the experience and qualification necessary to originate and 
advise on strategic possibilities; to that extent an imbalance existed and policy-making 
was distorted. 
It was on firmer and more familiar ground when it kept the President informed on all 
common Army and Navy matters of policy, including manpower needs, munitions 
production/distribution, and strategy. Subordinate to it were subsidiary groups and 
135 Sir A. Bryant, Op. cit., p. 234. 
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specialized committees that dealt with a multitude of problems. Their findings were 
reported to the JCS and the President. Leahy, as go-between, briefed the President on 
the committee's findings as well as the actions of the JCS, who sometimes joined the 
President to discuss the concepts of grand strategy privately. Usually it was Marshall 
who maneuvered the other Joint Chiefs into a unified position on particular issues. 
With the President's approval, the JCS issued the directives that put men and weaponry 
in motion. In effect, the President determined the general objectives, the JCS worked 
out the policies and logistics, and theater commanders determined the details. Whatever 
its shortcomings, the JCS provided the President with the support he needed. 
The Wider Role of the JCS 
A Substitute for a war council, redefining its role, seeking direction from above, the 
JCS was forced to extend its activities and interests far beyond the normal confines of 
military direction into areas of diplomacy, politics, and economics. Although it dealt 
with military issues such as the evacuation of sick and wounded from overseas, naval 
escort operations in the Atlantic, and munitions assignments, the JCS also considered 
the appropriation of critical raw materials. 
As the war progressed, more and more political questions had to be addressed and 
decided. The formulation of American policy preparatory to the great inter-allied war 
conferences, for example, was normally done by the military and the President, at the 
exclusion of the civilian Secretaries, who were left to deal with Congress and their 
departmental operations. From 1940 onward, the Secretaries of War and Navy were 
excluded from matters of grand and military strategy137. The JCS dominated the 
established system, discovering that the lack of a formal charter facilitated the 
expansion of its functions. Concurrently, close alignment to the President tended to 
expand its interests and power, as his expanded. To its surprise, no rival agency, 
therefore, could juridically accuse the JCS of exceeding its authority. 
137 P. Hammond, The Secretaryships of War and Navy, Ph. D. Thesis, (Harvard, 1953), pp. 306-11. 
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So far as the major decisions in policy and strategy were concerned, the 
military ran the war. In this area of policy and strategy, the military ran 
the war just the way the American people and American statesmen 
wanted it run.... On the domestic front control over economic 
mobilization was shared between military and civilian agencies. 138 
On 11 September 1941, two months before America's entry into the war, the Joint 
Board had compiled a list of American `eventual' interests, as opposed to those of 
Britain. This confidential position paper, signed by both Marshall and Admiral Stark, 
defined the major national objectives of the United States as: 
... preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; 
prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of further 
extension of Japanese territorial domination; eventual establishment in 
Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure 
political stability in those regions and the future security of the United 
States; and, so far as is practical, the establishment of regimes favorable 
to economic freedom and individual liberty. 139 
The above statement by the Joint Board represented pre-war limited executive military 
thinking. Incrementally influenced by the President's interpretation of wartime foreign 
policy, its previous thinking underwent an inexorable change. Rather than maintain 
the accepted military views of balance of power and military security, the JCS acceded 
to the President's assumptions and values of civilian thinking. Moreover, it exchanged 
balance of power and military security for two other components: first, military victory 
was to be the overriding goal; and second, the requirements of military strategy to be 
decisive in national policy. 14° 
Clausewitz and the JCS 
If the purpose of war was to express a nation's political will by an extended admixture 
of other means, the American military was not prepared to apply Clausewitz's basic 
tenet, that of the duality of and the interplay between political Ends and military Means 
to achieve that purpose. 141 During the early phases of the war, the JCS tried to separate 
138 S. Huntington, Op. cit., p. 315. 
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the political Ends from the military Means, referring the former to the White House, 
while focusing on the latter. The military floundered without any clear notion as to the 
government's policy. Since war aims can change as a war progresses, the JCS needed 
the President's guidance and direction on which to base strategy. This was rarely 
forthcoming. The Americans failed to see that strategy and statesmanship were 
synonymous at the highest levels. The Clausewitzian concept of violent means as the 
mere servants of political deliberations was poorly adhered to. While keeping the 
political Ends, the first of the dicta, at arm's length, the Americans simply included the 
last part, the military Means by which an enemy was totally destroyed in battle. In a 
different command structure, the redefinition and assessment of America's war aims 
and policy could have clarified the purpose of the JCS. `No war was better recorded 
than World War II, but all too often the historian who has struggled through mountains 
of paper finds the trail disappearing, at the crucial point of decision-making, 
somewhere in the direction of the White House. ' 142 
Nevertheless, the basic outline for action was the President's. The JCS had to translate 
the general blueprint of his grand strategy, at times unclear, and then fit it into a specific 
application. Roosevelt would reject any proposal by the JCS if it were in conflict with 
the animating principles of the American effort.. The edifice he created mirrored his 
view of governance: he liked to work in an unstructured and competitive environment 
in which he held all the strings and made all the final decisions. 143 
Roosevelt's Use of Secrecy 
The President who arbitrarily cloaked his affairs in secrecy, frequently chose, when 
sending a message to the Prime Minister in London, to withhold its content from his 
Chief of Staff. British bureaucratic policy, by contrast, required that copies be supplied 
to designated governmental officers on a `need to know' basis. Roosevelt's methods 
of confidentiality, excessively misplaced here, were disruptive and time consuming. 
142 M. Matloff, Op. cit., p. 3. 
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Dill supplied COS copies of secret Roosevelt Churchill correspondence to Marshall, his 
close and trusted friend, the discovery of which would have ruined his career. 144 
Marshall, the recipient of this intelligence, not only knew what was happening, but for 
what reasons. 145 
Roosevelt believed in flexibility and improvisation while practicing a highly personal 
form of government. He had done much to create an administration whose weaknesses 
were those of informal and overlapping confusion rather than rigidity, by which he 
chose to keep everybody guessing. Reminiscent of the New Deal years, Roosevelt 
formed committees of men with divergent views and invited them to seek consensus. 
He dissolved and reconstituted his own committees, and neglected their proposals. 
Although he had admired President Wilson's systematic attempts to secure peace in the 
world, he was determined not to entrap himself as did his predecessor. In politics, 
Roosevelt was perhaps the finest intuitive politician of modem times. He had learned 
to solve problems not by reasoned analysis but by intuition. Bored by administrative 
procedures, he left clear and precise directives unwritten; as a consequence, his own 
office was not tightly organized and his bureaucracy was often chaotic. 146 
He strove to do many things simultaneously, even though this meant keeping all parts 
of the war effort going at varying tempos in all directions. While he tended to 
compartmentalize military and political affairs, the JCS could not. As a military leader, 
he had an easy and casual way with his Chiefs of Staff. Meetings between Roosevelt 
and the JCS were impromptu affairs, usually convened to deal with a specific problem. 
He listened carefully to their recommendations, trusted them to carry out his orders, 
remained amiable, and overruled them at times. The President decided who would 
attend, presumably inviting only those specialists whose advice he needed. Scheduled 
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appointments diminished from 1942 onwards, in sharp contrast to Churchill's almost 
daily meetings with the COS Committee. '47 
The British Chiefs of Staff 
The chaos that beset the Americans searching for and designing a military/executive 
administrative system suited for global war did affect the British to the same extent. 
When their negotiators met at various inter-allied conferences, faults in the American 
system slowed agreement However, a major problem that distinguished the British 
system from the American was Churchill, as noted by Brooke, 
Marshall's relations with the President were quite different from my 
relations with Winston. The President has no great military knowledge 
and was aware of this fact and consequently relied on Marshall and 
listened to Marshall's advice. Marshall never seemed to have any 
difficulties in countering any wildish plans which the President might 
put forward. My position was very different. Winston never had the 
slightest doubt that he had inherited all the military genius from his great 
ancestor Marlborough! His military plans and ideas varied from the 
most brilliant conception at the one end to the wildest and most 
dangerous ideas at the other. To wean him away from these wilder 
plans required superhuman efforts and was never entirely successful in 
so far as he tended to return to these ideas again and again. 148 
Britain's system, by comparison possessed a level of accountability, realism, 
flexibility, and systematic co-ordination unknown to the Americans. Churchill took 
immediate action to establish and consolidate his position as Prime Minister in May 
1940, by making some changes in Lord Maurice Hankey's (minister without portfolio) 
existing bureaucratic structure. Even if Churchill had achieved his position through a 
spontaneous Parliamentary revolt, which reflected Britain's mood, rarely had a prime 
minister in a time of crisis grasped unlimited power. Much like Roosevelt, he excluded 
his service ministers from the War Cabinet, a body consisting of five members of 
whom he was one. The War Cabinet acted as an occasional court of last resort for his 
ministers and committees. before he decided. The Prime Minister's domination of 
foreign policy was clear and complete, and in effect, his direction. leadership, and 
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action obtained. Furthermore, Churchill added to his power by creating and assuming 
the post of Minister of Defence. To achieve the most flexibility, he deliberately kept the 
powers of this post imprecise. He wanted to force a highly structured bureaucracy into 
more energetic action as part of Britain's war effort. Churchill made a subtle and il1- 
defined change rather than a legal and constitutional one, affording him great po«wcr 
without any interference from any other lawful supervisory authority. 149 As both Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence, he supervised the war effort, and became its chief 
director through the exercise of political authority and the formulation of defence 
policy. 150 
In addition to the permanent machinery of government, Churchill made a practice of 
establishing ad hoc committees over which he presided whenever he wanted to focus 
dramatically on a particular aspect of the war effort, e. g., the 1941 U-boat menace. In 
other similar organizational efforts, he demonstrated a pragmatic flexibility, searching 
for the most efficient ways to direct total war. 151 
Churchill established the post of Minister of State, a position accountable to the War 
Cabinet, with direct access to the Prime Minister, created to provide the local British 
Commanders-in-Chief with the political guidance not hitherto available. The 
appointment of Harold Macmillan as Cabinet-ranked Minister Resident to Eisenhower's 
Allied Headquarters, North West Africa, demonstrated Churchill's need to have the 
British point of view placed before the American commander. 152 Restraint was not one 
of Churchil. l's virtues: during March 1944, he attempted to wrest the Joint Planners 
from the COS Committee. He argued that they belonged to his staff all along and not to 
the COS. Known as the `Planners', it was an operational branch of the COS 
Committee, composed of two main inter-service sub-committees. Planning and 
Intelligence, without which the parent organization could not function as a national 
military headquarters. Through these two branches the COS gathered all information 
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and intelligence on which plans were prepared for future offensives, and events of 
current operations were kept under review. Brooke rejected any change of structure, 
commenting that, 
To suggest, as the Prime Minister was doing, that the 'Planners' were 
part of his staff and not that of the COS Committee, was the equivalent 
of depriving the headquarters of command of its Operational Branch. 
The idea was fantastic for even if he did complete a plan with the 
planners the plan would still have to come before the COS Committee. 
All that he was doing was wasting the planners time, and they were very 
busy people... 153 
In the end, Britain's organizational machinery for prosecuting the war achieved an 
important balance between Churchill's application of leadership and the Defence 
Committee's ability to restrain him by a variety of military and civilian resources. At 
the beginning of his tenure, Churchill often called `full' meetings of either the Defence 
Committee or the War Cabinet to address a myriad political-military issues, to prepare 
for eventualities and to determine policies associated with total war, at least once a 
week. 154 
The results of these deliberations led to more detailed planning by government agencies 
created for that purpose. However, both the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet 
fell increasingly into disuse as the war continued. Churchill had replaced the Military 
Co-ordination Committee with a Defence Committee consisting of two sections, 
`Operations' and `Supply'. The Defence Committee (Operations) was composed of the 
Deputy Prime Minister, the three Service Ministers, and later, the Foreign Minister. 
The Chiefs always attended Operations meetings, as did other ministers when required: 
it was this organization, as well as Churchill himself, that became the focal point where 
the political-military elements of power were synthesized. The Defence Committee 
(Supplies), usually chaired by the Prime Minister, separated the many detailed logistics 
issues from policy and operations, ensuring that this important link was addressed. 
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In another brilliant move, Churchill placed the military wing of the War Cabinet 
Secretariat under him, as his own machinery for action rather than a : Ministry of 
Defence. Thus actual power soon shifted from the War Cabinet to Churchill, even 
though it had represented the supreme executive authority. As its influence waned. the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, subordinate to the Defence Committee (Operations). 
presided over by the Prime Minister, gained ascendancy. Through this committee the 
Chiefs operated as a joint headquarters, using two principal subordinate structures, the 
Joint Planning Board and the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. These committees, 
composed of either statutory members or liaison officers, as well as civilian specialists 
from the key ministries of War Transport, Home Security and Economic Warfare, 
emphasized inter-service co-operation. With the clear lines of a unified command 
structure established, Churchill was free to form an intimate relationship with his 
Chiefs, something Roosevelt failed to accomplish with his own. The Chairman chaired 
the meetings, acted as spokesman for the Chiefs before the Defence Committee or 
Cabinet, and advised on matters concerning his service. The strategic questions as well 
as the day-to-day running of the war devolved upon the Minister of Defence and the 
Chiefs. At the same time, rather than convene the whole Defence Committee, Churchill 
tended to rely more and more on meetings between the Chiefs and those ministers 
whose jurisdiction covered a particular problem or issue. These changes represented 
practical improvements to the original system's functioning commensurate with total 
war. 155 Demand for an independent principal strategic adviser never arose, which 
suited Churchill, who always believed in straight-forward dealing with the responsible 
professionals. There was undoubtedly disadvantages, perceived and termed by the 
military as operational interference; nevertheless, a unique political-military bond 
emerged that favorably affected those involved in directing the war. 
To operate this organization, Churchill relied on what he termed his `handling 
machine'. General Hastings Ismay, called `Pug', who became his representative on the 
155 Ibid., pp. 164-166. 
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COS Committee. As head of the Cabinet Secretariat, Ismay brought years of invaluable 
experience on the Committee of Imperial Defence to his new position. Ismay was a 
hard worker, of unchallenged reliability, a consummate bureaucrat. and a negotiator 
who could elicit decisions and compromises without antagonisms. 156 Churchill 
admitted that he owed more to him than to anybody else in the whole of the war. How 
was Pug treated by Churchill during the war? Brooke comments, 
I should like to pay tribute to Pug Ismay and all the work he did as an 
intermediary between the COS Committee and the Prime Minister. He 
bore all the brunt of the first storms which some of our papers created, 
and was able next morning to warn us as to what the reactions were. 
He was kept up practically every night by Winston, was abused and 
sworn at, and seldom received any word of encouragement, and yet he 
went on serving Winston with utmost devotion. 157 
To the extent Ismay was abused, he succeeded in his position, partly, because of his 
ability to handle an extremely complex job: he served on the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
as Churchill's `Chief Staff Officer' and functioned as his personal representative. 
Though junior in rank to the three members of the COS, in his capacity as Principal 
Staff Officer to the MoD, he qualified for full membership on the basis of this position, 
but the right to sign the Committee reports was disallowed. 158 Analogous in function to 
Dill in Washington, he had influence but final responsibility lay elsewhere, with 
Churchill and the COS. Like Leahy, his chief function was to make rough ways 
smooth; unlike Leahy, who presided over the JCS meetings, Ismay was not a member 
of the British Chiefs of Staff. Ismay kept the Prime Minister informed of the routine 
meetings of the COS Committee, often submitting reports and plans to him for 
approval. Sometimes Churchill approved immediately; on other occasions, Churchill 
would withhold approval until he had discussed their proposed action or some 
associated issue that required political guidance. 
Additionally, Ismay's duties, performed through the small but efficient Defence 
Secretariat, included keeping Churchill in touch with all organizations concerned with 
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defence; he conveyed his instructions to those responsible for action with the 
appropriate follow-up, and co-ordinated actions whenever more than one department 
was involved in a defence decision. '59 Finally, the debt to Ismay included the general's 
resistance to the attempts by Churchill to fill the Office of the Minister of Defence with 
such well known court favorites as Professor Lindemann and Major Desmond Morton. 
Ascribing power to them in defence matters without responsibility could have been 
disastrous. 
By 1942, Cabinet meetings and Defence Committee (Operations) meetings decreased, 
superseded by informal meetings between the Prime Minister, a few invited ministers, 
and the COS. Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff were now running the war. Their 
relationship was never precisely defined, but it was close and constant. He met the 
three service chiefs and Ismay once a day, and more often on an informal basis as well. 
At first, Churchill had some difficulty getting service representatives with whom he 
was comfortable, but when Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal in `1940, General Sir 
Alan Brooke in 1941, and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham in 1943 replaced their 
predecessors, the membership was set. Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief 
of Combined Operations, participated as needed for his expertise. The actual running 
of the services was left to the vice chiefs, who like their superiors, met together daily. 
In general, while Churchill and the chiefs worked together to forge Britain's war 
strategy, the COS had to deal with day to day problems and the conduct of the war: 
available resources; allocation of forces, shipping, and munitions; operational plans, 
orders and directives transmitted between London and its theater commands: and the 
development of infra- and inter-allied strategy and the co-ordination of the political 
aspect of military actions. 160 
The COS Committee was composed of the CIGS, CAS, the First Sea Lord, and the 
Prime Ministers representative, if the Prime Minister was unavailable. The work of 
159 Ibid., pp. 167-168. 
160 A. Millets & W. Murray. Op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
73 
COS was to advise the Government through the Prime Minister on all questions of 
British military policy and strategy. Between the wars, the Imperial Defence College 
offered a one year course designed to familiarize and prepare chosen senior officers for 
high command. The IDC `old school' tie, worn by each of the COS members, came to 
represent a lessening of inter-service rivalry and the augmenting of a heretofore 
unknown high level of co-operation. The COS, moreover, combined with the 
American Chiefs of Staff to form the CCS who advised the President and Prime 
Minister together on matters affecting American and British forces jointly. 161 
The British had developed a blueprint for a system of sequential responsibility and 
accountability, which included the military leadership, the War Cabinet, and 
Parliament. Thus a collective body rather than an individual exercised supreme 
authority, allowing it to approach decision-making realistically. This was achieved as a 
result of the COS being given broadly defined powers and having excellent information 
on which to base decisions. The British system was flexible; it maintained centralized 
control, but there was considerable appreciation for versatility between the British nerve 
center and the war theaters. 162 It seemed to work; co-ordination was finely honed, and 
apparent in all aspects of the decision-making process, i. e., among joint military 
committees and civilian and military agencies as well. For most of the war Churchill's 
organization, redesigned from Maurice Hankey's original system, was rational and 
efficient, creating, as he claimed, `a stream of coherent thought capable of being 
translated with great rapidity into coherent action. ' 163 
This is theoretically true, but it was a Churchillian exaggeration. Even though the COS 
expressed a remarkable degree of unity, it suffered from persistent, strong inter-service 
disagreements. To its credit, the chiefs remained friendly, not allowing argument to 
degenerate into acrimony, sublimating special service interests to the needs of victory. 
In this, both Ismay and Portal played an important part. As the war progressed. the 
161 D. Richards. Op. cit., (London, 1978). p. 181. 
162 Gen. Lord Ismay. Op. cit.. pp. 166-172. 
163 R. Lewin. Churchill as Warlord. (New York. 19SO), p. 34. 
74 
chiefs achieved a higher level of solidarity, tempered by time and experience. They 
approached and confronted strategic problems, in like manner, as highly trained 
intelligent professionals, despite their varied temperaments-164 
Some British Personalities 
COS records rarely described the rough and tumble process of committee debate by 
which issues were resolved and agreements reached. The stress and tension of the 
many meetings and inter-allied conferences in which the COS attended was alleviated 
by the chiefs shared interest in fishing as an art and science; it brought the three men 
closer together in and out of the conference room. In addition, both Brooke and Portal 
were expert bird-watchers, who found the odd moment away from the war to enjoy 
their hobby. 165 
Churchill's relationship with his Chiefs of Staff was heavily dependent on personality 
factors, a condition manifest throughout the war by the taking of strong adversarial 
positions. Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, maintained a certain resistance 
to the Prime Minister; it is not clear and still debated whether this attitude was based on 
Pound's personality per se or as a reaction to Churchill's ideas. One of Pound's 
methods of diffusing Churchill's wilder schemes was to delegate planning officers to 
undertake a full-scale investigation of his proposals. The planning staff would then 
produce a detailed refutation of the project which usually resulted in the project's quick 
demise. Since Churchill found Pound congenial, he accepted him professionally. 166 
Neither Pound's successor as First Sea Lord, Cunningham nor Dill, as CIGS, ever 
achieved the same kind of acceptability, regardless of talent or professionalism. 167 Dill 
wrote, shortly after assuming the position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS) on 27 May 1940, `I am not sure that Winston isn't the greatest menace. No 
one seems able to control him. He is full of ideas, many brilliant, but most of them 
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impractical. He has such drive and personality that no one seems able to stand up to 
him. ' 168 
Three years later, Dill had not changed his mind, and in a letter dated 26 August 1943, 
he wrote, `I often wonder if the people will ever know of the difficulties and the 
dangers of Winston. It may be a great privilege to work with a genius, but my Lord it 
is difficult and terribly wearing. I wonder where we should be now if Winston had his 
untrammeled way. ' 169 
Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, whose fortunes as a commander had reached their 
nadir in the Mediterranean in 1941, wrote to Brooke after the war that, `... I know how 
much the success of our strategy owed to your personal efforts and direction, and to 
your ability to handle with patience and yet firmness that very difficult personality, 
Winston... ' 170 
With someone as irascible as Churchill, it might have been too much for Dill and 
Wavell, representative of military organization and methodology, to deal satisfactorily 
with him, even though they had dealt with other politicians before. Both men found it 
difficult to work with the Prime Minister; Wavell could be inarticulate in his presence 
and Dill lacked self-confidence. 171 One outcome of Churchill's behavior was 
manifested by an insensitivity toward members of his inner professional circle. Even 
though he could be considerate, Churchill did things to suit himself, regardless of how 
he inconvenienced others. Lacking the capacity to develop close friendships, he used 
people for the immediate service they could render and replaced them according to 
need. ln 
If Churchill had difficulty making friendships, he had no difficulty forming an 
important relationship with Portal. For his own part, Portal early conceived a 
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corresponding admiration and affection for Churchill. No serious disagreement, 
professional or otherwise, occurred to mar their relationship. If Churchill made 
inaccurate statements about the RAF, Portal put the facts straight, but kept his temper. 
He recognized that though the Prime Minister's incessant probing might be a nuisance, 
or on any other given occasion, wholly unfounded, it was the Prime Minister's right 
and duty to probe, and that by such energy at the top would the war be won. 173 An 
exchange of letters revealed the frequent clashes between the domineering Prime 
Minister and his skillful Chief who refused to be dominated. By a display of tact, good 
manners, and patience, Portal usually won the argument. In another, in which he 
violently disagreed with Churchill, Portal's recognition of his heated behavior led him 
to apologize. A broad smile appeared across Winston's face, and he said to Portal, 
`You know, in war you don't have to be nice, you only have to be right. ' 174 
Brooke, promoted to CIGS after an exhausted Dill was relieved in November 1941, 
reassessed his relationships between the COS Committee and Churchill as Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defence, recognizing that the best method of getting along 
with him was to give way on nonessentials. When a matter of vital importance arose, 
the CIGS would say to the Prime minister, `I am your subordinate. I'll only carry out 
what you wish if you give it to me in writing and sign it. ' las 
On these occasions, Brooke heard nothing more about the matter; Churchill had 
dropped it. With Brooke's ascendancy, Churchill discovered that he admired his 
intelligence, his ruthlessness in dealing with unsuccessful commanders, and his 
strategic sense. Moreover, the new CIGS was also quick, decisive, methodical and not 
afraid to decentralize. 176 In addition, Brooke suffered from an underlying vein of 
pessimism and uncertainty that was an invaluable complement to Churchill's constant 
self-confidence and occasional euphoria. Brooke's reaction to his appointment as CIGS 
was in direct contrast to Churchill's ebullient acceptance of his office in May 1940: 
173 Sir B. Liddell Hart, Op. cit., 15/15/1. 
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I had never hoped or aspired to reach those dizzy heights, and now that 
I am stepping up onto the plateau land of my military career the 
landscape looks cold, bleak and lonely, with a ghastly responsibility 
hanging as a black thundercloud over me. 177 
... I have felt that every day of this war was taking off a month of my life. l78 
Churchill's self-confidence were misleading. Recurrent fits of depression and mania 
affected Churchill's behavior, which in turn, affected relationships with his 
professional staffs. Ceaseless activity coupled with obsessive thinking mitigated 
against his `black dog' mentality and lassitude. Relaxation was out of the question. He 
achieved a number of successes functioning this way, but it was Brooke who bore the 
brunt of his incessant mental pounding and persistent energy. The CIGS tried to parry 
the Prime Minister's strategic requests by keeping him on a tight rein. 179 Brooke 
constantly rebuked him in his diary, dwelling on his overbearing and inconsiderate 
nature. 180 Another diarist, Admiral Cunningham, wrote of Churchill, 'No decisions 
were reached; in fact, a thoroughly wasted day. What a drag on the wheel of war this 
man is. Everything is centralized in him with consequent indecision and waste of time 
before anything can be done'. 181 
Part of Brooke's outbursts were certainly due to the constant efforts by the Chiefs 
throughout the war to dissuade Churchill from his penchant for tangential enterprises 
that dissipated the energies of staff and his commanders. Planning staffs, for example, 
were ill-used, wasting time on either secondary or wholly irrelevant objectives, 
particularly when there was a lull in the war's action, i. e., Operation WORKSHOP (an 
invasion of Pantelleria), Operation JUPITER (a Norwegian expedition) and Operation 
ACCOLADE (an invasion of Rhodes). 182 None of these plans were activated, because 
176 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/AN, pp. 374-377. 
177 Sir A. Bryant, Op. cit., p. 213; J. Coleville, Op. Cit., p. 142; J. Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 203; R. 
Lewin, Op. Cit., p. 126. 
178 Lord Moran, Op. cit., p. 304. 
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the Chiefs opposed him on strategic grounds, and Churchill, at heart a compromiser, 
however recalcitrant, grudgingly respected their judgment. '83 
All those who worked with Churchill paid tribute to the enormous 
fertility of his ideas, and the inexhaustible stream of invention which 
poured from him... They agreed that he needed the most severe of 
restraints, and that many of his ideas, if activated, would have been 
utterly disastrous. 184 
According to Martin Gilbert, Dill and Eden, who were sent to Athens to study the 
Greek situation, failed him. When they recommended an early 1941 military expedition 
to Greece, he agreed, but had warned beforehand, `Do not consider yourself obligated 
to a Greek enterprise if in your hearts you feel it will only be another Norwegian fiasco. 
If no good plans can be made please say so. ' 185 Even though the COS warned against 
British inability to repel a German invasion of Greece, Churchill sought active military 
action in the Balkans. 186 
The British expeditionary force sent to Greece precipitated a German invasion of that 
country. Fortunately, this and other mistakes that Churchill made were not fatal, except 
to the Greeks. Dill, assigned to India in December 1941, was reassigned to 
Washington as Head of the British Joint Staff Mission the following month. Serving in 
this capacity, Dill was considered by Marshall to be the guarantor against the American 
perception of Churchill's imperial pretensions and strategic prejudices. Brooke 
described the position as one that combined the duties of a deputy ambassador and 
deputy minister of defence. He wrote in his diary: 
... to see Prime Minister about sending 
Dill to the USA. as head of our 
mission there.. . This agreement was not arrived at without a good 
deal 
of discussion. Winston's dislike for Dill was nearly upsetting my plan at 
one moment. I had to press for this appointment and pointed out to him 
that with Dill's intimate knowledge of working of the COS Committee 
and of our strategy, there could be no better man to serve our purposes 
in Washington... Thank heaven I succeeded... few men did more in 
furthering our cause to final victory than Dill... I look upon that half 
hour's discussion with Winston at 10 Downing street ... as one of my 
most important accomplishments during the war. 187 
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Marshall believed that Dill's search for an acceptable 'combined global strategy. as a 
member of the JSM and the CCS, was never fully appreciated by Churchill, and he 
reminded the Prime Minister of this in writing, when Dill died in November 1944. 'I 
doubt if you or your Cabinet associates fully realize the loss you have suffered. ' 188 
The Prime Minister's demanding behavior increased Marshall's wariness of Churchill. 
Without benefit of an American nucleus mission in London and without the access the 
Prime Minister afforded to the British Chiefs of Staff, Marshall took Churchill's 
pronouncements seriously and literally. To him and his colleagues, Churchill appeared 
to be unpredictable and unreal, his talk extravagant. Moreover. stirred by an admixture 
of distrust and appeal, the American Chiefs approached him with caution, because they 
were unable to place his strategic imagination within the context of practicability. When 
he advocated the occupation of Norway's North Cape, the Americans thought him 
mentally unsound, although their British counterparts recognized the idea simply as the 
exploration of his manifold thoughts. Portal considered the American mind to be 
pedestrian and practical; this increased the difficulties of understanding Churchill: 
.. they were susceptible of 
his personality, because they were frightened 
of being carried away by him and so they tended to oppose from him 
ideas which they might have willingly accepted from a more restrained 
and less captivating personality. They admired and respected him, but 
they were doubtful of his strategic judgment and suspected his political 
motives. '89 
. 
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Between December 1941 and August 1944, eight major summit conferences convened: 
two were held at Quebec, two at Washington, two at Cairo and one each at Teheran and 
Casablanca. The designated conference participants met to discuss strategy and the 
war's crucial issues. Cities in foreign countries became the preferred venue, because 
neutral ground offered a more relaxed atmosphere in which to work, away from the 
intrusive, easily available, self-serving bureaucratic machinery. Summits usually 
occurred when strategic planning had reached a point at which decisions on Allied 
strategy and policy demanded resolution at the highest levels. ' They were designed to 
hammer out strategy based on the approved grand strategy, although this was not 
always adhered to. In attendance were the CCS, COS and their retinues, capped and 
often superseded by the presence of the civilian leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill (and 
occasionally Stalin), whose final approval was required. Left behind were the 
American Secretaries for State, War, and Navy, and their British counterparts. They 
were expected to administer their departments and to carry out policies, not to formulate 
them. The ground-work for each conference was done by staffs with varied 
competence based in either Washington or London. They preceded the arrival of the 
Combined Chiefs, the Prime Minister and the President. The strategic issues placed on 
the agenda followed traditional negotiating procedures designed to produce a solution. 
Sometimes certain issues were tabled, carried-over, poorly compromised, or dropped 
during the course of these meetings. ' 
I Brig. Gen. M. MacCloskev, Op. cit., (New York, 1970), p. 96. 
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The General as the Negotiator 
The members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as professional military officers were 
not experienced negotiators, although Marshall had learned the rudiments in dealing 
with Congressional committees. He was politically intuitive. During 1941, he lobbied 
extensively for a bill extending the Selective Service Act. Even though a national 
emergency existed, and an external belligerent threat existed, one vote separated victory 
from defeat when it was passed by the House of Representatives -a clear indication of 
the nation's political divisiveness. The bill scraped through, but without Marshall's 
tireless and non-partisan efforts, it would have been defeated. 3 
Marshall and his service colleagues had reached the pinnacle of their military careers in 
a hierarchy of limited dissent. Cultural, service and personal eccentricities affected their 
approaches to problem-solving. Since the JCS and the COS rarely met in executive 
session, unfamiliarity conspired against optimum results, although a few co-operative 
members helped to contain the friction. 4 The planning staffs serving these officers 
improved with time, but the presentation of an individual strategic paper, read by one of 
the major participants, followed by the usual discussion, was no guarantee to either 
side that a desired outcome would or even could be attained. Envy, distrust and 
prejudice, acting as a catalyst for protracted debate ranged from aggravation to 
acrimony, inhibited the speed of deliberations and undoubtedly affected their outcome. 
Whatever was achieved by negotiation meant nothing without a Presidential directive or 
approval. Roosevelt was not one to look at the world and its terrors through the proper 
end of the telescope, nor could much be accomplished by his devoting only two days a 
week to the war. 5 John Maynard Keynes, the British Treasury's expert on external 
Finance, considered the Americans as wayward Anglo-Saxons. who mangled the 
English language into what he openly and contemptuously referred to as 'Cherokee'. 
' F. Pogue. George C Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, (Ne« York, 1966), p. 58. 
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Keynes warned the British Cabinet, upon his return from Washington in 1941, that 
negotiating with the Americans was provisional until the last moment, and that an 
orderly progression in the quest for a final settlement was non-existent. 6 The 
Americans continued to suffer from confusion, division and indecision during the 
Allied meeting at Placentia Bay. 
PLACENTIA BAY and ARCADIA 
The 1941 meeting at Placentia Bay, Argentia, Newfoundland, code-named RIVIERA, 
was held against the backdrop of a British victory over the Italians in Libya, the 
neutralization of the French fleet in North Africa, the British loss of Greece, and the 
possibility of further German Mediterranean incursions. Churchill, seeking American 
approval, hoped to achieve a joint declaration of war aims. The meeting was held 
without an agenda and without any sharing of views beforehand. This did not prevent 
Roosevelt from demanding two preconditions for the meeting: no discussions regarding 
a possible American declaration of war; and no economic or territorial deals for a post- 
war world. Sumner Wells, Assistant Secretary of State was concerned about rumors of 
deals made by Britain with the deposed Greek and Yugoslav monarchs in return for 
their wartime support.? 
British Organizational Skills and American Corporate Disunity 
At Placentia Bay, the British Chiefs impressed the Americans with their negotiating and 
organizational skills. One of their favored techniques was to present a 'united-front'. 
The COS never admitted to internal dissension. Disagreements between government 
and military, between the services themselves, were ironed out in advance or 
obfuscated within formidable studies. King and Marshall, by contrast, expressed 
differences at Placentia that continued to reveal American disunity and caused their 
6 J. Wheeler-Bennett, Special Relationships, (London, 1975), p. 16. 
7 `Memorandum of Welles-Cadogan conversation', Washington, 9 Aug. 1941, FRUS, Conferences at 
Washington. 1941,1: 351. 
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interests to suffer. 8 Roosevelt refused to offer guidance to them and remained evasive. 
seemingly until he was assured of the American public accepting the inevitability of 
war. By keeping his strategic intentions private, by maintaining a nebulous national 
policy, little could be accomplished during the forthcoming military discussions and the 
application of the Victory Program suffered. 9 
Churchill's party included General Sir John Dill, CIGS; Admiral of the Fleet Sir 
Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord; Air Vice Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman, VCAS: Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Professor F. A. Lindemann, scientific adviser and Lord Moran, Churchill's personal 
physician. These men were assisted by an array of deputies, all ready with position 
papers and supporting studies. If British staff work were not necessarily better, it was 
certainly more comprehensive. 
The American delegation, by contrast, was small, with few aides and planners. Joining 
Roosevelt in the American delegation were his three military chiefs, Marshall, Stark, 
and Arnold; besides King, Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State; and two civilian 
advisors, Harry Hopkins, Personal Assistant and Special Advisor to the President and 
Averell Harriman, Director of the Lend-Lease program. Having been impressed with 
British thoroughness on a visit to Britain earlier in the year, Arnold felt the Americans 
were going into the conference cold. 10 Staff arrangements were so limited that Army 
Air Force Captain, Elliot Roosevelt, the President's son, was asked to perform as a 
recording secretary during military discussions. 
Placentia Bay offered the first opportunity for many of the British and American senior 
officers to assess each other's professional abilities, but the anti-British attitudes, 
expressed by several senior American staff planners, did not bode well for the future. 
However, when Marshall and Dill first met at Placentia, there began a close 
8 T. Buell, Op. cit., p. 146. 
C. Beard. 'Roosevelt Deceived the Public', R. Dallek, (ed.. ). The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World 
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professional friendship that would benefit Allied co-operation. Since 1935. Dill's 
approval rating had remained high with the Americans who dealt with him. Reports of 
Dill to the President from virtually all of the Americans who came in contact with him 
were favorable The two sides assembled at Placentia were less apprehensive than 
ambivalent toward each other. Their approval ratings of each other, in situ, would 
directly impinge upon the coalition Roosevelt and Churchill had in mind. Wilson, 
Churchill's physician, believed that Marshall was the key to the situation, having been 
told by Churchill that the American Chief of Staff, in his quiet way, meant business. 
`If we are too obstinate', the Prime Minister observed, `he might take a strong line. 
That would avail us little, because neither side could contemplate going forward 
without him. ' 11 
Only by working closely together ahead would personal antagonisms or questionable 
abilities be exposed. 12 Attempts to form a coalition were considered ill-conceived, if 
not impossible to these senior officers, because of their disparate backgrounds. King, 
for example, while not openly hostile like Embick, was distinctly cool toward the 
British, influenced no doubt by his earlier thinking, when he considered Britain a 
maritime adversary. Even the ship on which the Americans traveled, the USS Augusta, 
had been a pawn in the United States-British rivalry over the definition of `cruiser' 
during the early 1930s. He epitomized the prevailing attitudes of the previous 20 years, 
i. e., indifference, suspicion and bitterness. Regarding Britain's national, imperial and 
halancc of power concerns, Roosevelt was to say shortly after Pearl Harbor that, 
'... I've been trying to tell Churchill that he ought to consider it; it's in the American 
tradition, this distrust, this dislike and even hatred of Britain. '13 Questions of trade, 
shipping and naval strength precipitated Anglo-American tensions during the inter-war 
years. Britain was regarded as a serious and dangerous competitor. 14 For example, 
early in the decade. Roosevelt had adjured his officials in London that if Britain even 
II Lord Moran, Op. cit., p. 21. 
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concluded any separate trade agreements with Japan, he would try to convince the 
British that their future security was linked to the United States-" The English, not to 
be outdone, went so far as to break at least one of the United States State Department 
codes. 16 
Divergent Strategic Philosophies 
The British believed that the Germans could be defeated without an Allied landing on 
the Continent. This was in direct conflict with American strategic thinking. Roosevelt 
and Churchill agreed that the war to be fought could be won by a combination of 
blockade, propaganda, armies of liberation, and strategic bombing. The coalition's 
application of economics and psychology against Germany would it was hoped 
eliminate the need for a huge invasion army striking at the Continent. Modem armored 
divisions accompanied by a popular Continental uprising, secretly armed from without, 
would ultimately defeat Germany. '? This favorite Churchill theme, approved by the 
COS, carried over to the next conference. In essence, Britain did not need another 
American Expeditionary Force. What was needed was America's productive genius. 18 
The British recognized America's wish to remain neutral, for the time being they even 
encouraged it, preferring that they continue manufacturing and supplying the vast 
amounts of military hardware needed to support Britain's war effort. In their final 
analysis, Europe would be re-occupied, not liberated. When the British landed troops 
in Europe they would `go as policemen'. 19 
Marshall and some of his planning staff thought otherwise: the conflict was over grand 
strategy. It was the British emphasis on strategic bombing versus the American 
emphasis on massive ground assault at the chosen point of concentration. `Closing the 
ring' left the Americans unconvinced. The military chiefs did not get on any better than 
15 E. Nixon (ed. ), Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, II, (Cambridge, MA, 1969), p. 263. 
16 Churchill to Roosevelt, 25 February 1941, Roosevelt Papers, Map Room, box 7A, FDRL. 
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their diplomatic colleagues, Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office and Sumner Welles. They had failed to agree on an endorsement that 
would have warned the Japanese to desist in their encroachments in the south-western 
Pacific. Too strong a warning could lead to war in the Far East, a war the Anglo- 
Americans were in no position to wage against the Japanese -a war that, in British 
eyes, would divert desperately needed assets to that area. Waving a number of British 
proposals aside, the Americans agreed to convoy all shipping, including Britain's, from 
Newfoundland to Iceland. The British were stunned by American concerns about 
western hemispheric defence and their `Monroe Doctrine' approach, concluding that the 
American military planners were too parochial in their outlook and lacked an 
appreciation of global strategy. To them America's preoccupation with the defence of 
the Panama Canal seemed misguided at best, when the Suez Canal was threatened. 20 
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner believed that, as they became allies, American 
interests would be subordinated to British interests, because the British did not 
understand or appreciate the fundamental policies and strategic necessities of the United 
States. 21 
Variation of National Interests 
The variation of each nation's perceptions regarding the war's priorities, and the 
application of strategy exposed the fundamental differences in each nation's position. 
Britain was engaged in a war; while the United States was neutral, wobbling on the 
verge. National interests and perspectives did not coincide, even though Roosevelt 
viewed Germany as the greater threat. Before the meeting, the Americans, however 
lacking in consensus, had the temerity to send a series of cables to London expressing a 
position that argued if the British did not fight the American way, they might not win at 
all. 22However unrealistic, Anglo-American suppositions were based on a conflicting 
set of expectations: would America simply be an arsenal of productivity or would it 
20 `Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat Our Potential Enemies', Op. cit. 
21 McNarney and Turner to JPC, Op. Cit. 
22 M. Watson, Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations, (Washington, 1950), pp. 406-410. 
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actively engage and defeat the Germans with an army of its own? Only the President 
could clarify America's grand strategic view. Although Churchill and Roosevelt, 
having much in common, got along better with each other than with their own chiefs. 
little progress could be made without a clarifying political statement from them. The 
British military desired an American presence in Europe, but Dill was disturbed by the 
American emphasis on protecting their own hemisphere. 23 Disregarding Dill's 
assessment, Marshall believed in a strategy culminating in a northwestern Europe 
campaign. Between the parties, readiness clashed with actuality, prejudice affected 
understanding, preconceived notions persisted, and expectations ended in 
disappointment. Many present protected their national and service interests, and their 
professional reputations; all of which combined to affect the extent to which they were 
prepared or willing to cooperate. 
Anglo-American Commitments 
The following will demonstrate diverging attitudes: American planners were not 
concerned with saving the British Empire; nor were they intent on preserving territories 
for British exploitation. Roosevelt could easily irritate Churchill by mentioning 
t'reedom for India. 24 Churchill countered by attacking American exploitation of the 
Philippines, but Roosevelt defended his own country's management of prospective 
Philippine independence as a `model' for other states to follow. Dill was disappointed 
by Marshall's seeming lack of interest in grand strategy. The Americans spoke only of 
production and mobilization rather than operations. Marshall did not lack for 
operational zeal, but he was well aware of American unpreparedness. At the time 40 
tanks were apportioned between four armored divisions. Clearly, America lacked the 
tools for a global war. Air enthusiasts, including Roosevelt, eagerly awaited the 
massive production build-up of air forces as envisioned in ABC-2, thereby eliminating 
(according to the theory) the need for large ground forces. Germany would he bombed 
23 D. Haglund. 'George C. Marshall and the Question of Military Aid to England, May-June 1940', 
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into submission. 25 Churchill could defend his willingness to invade the Continent, 
under the foregoing conditions, from this time hence, executed only at Germany's total 
collapse. This view differed considerably from the American viewpoint as expressed by 
British General Morgan: 
On the US side there were several considerations. They were forming 
one hell of an army, navy and air force. A big navy had plenty of uses, 
so had a big air force, but when you came to look for a theatre of war 
where you could deploy such an army there weren't many. That factor 
was dominant from an early stage. The best theatre for such an army 
was western Europe... 26 
Within this maze of opinions, judgments and varied national positions, the conflict 
between a British peripheral strategy and an eventual American battle for the `heartland' 
remained; therefore, a mutually acceptable strategy seemed a distant goal, but one that 
demanded immediate attention and resolution. 27 
The Atlantic Charter 
The meeting at Placentia Bay resulted primarily in a combined political document 
entitled the Atlantic Charter, an eight point contract for world peace once Germany was 
defeated. Although some hesitant steps were taken to improve existing military co- 
ordination, it was a document that philosophically bound the two nations together in a 
common cause. 28 This notwithstanding, Churchill and Roosevelt failed to resolve the 
impediments to world trade - American high protectionism and the British Ottawa 
agreements, a combination of restrictions and artificial controls. No viable compromise 
was reached and Article Four became a declaration of intent to remove tariff barriers 
rather than a directive for trade liberalization. Roosevelt capitulated, Welles was 
infuriated at the result, as Churchill had been before the final draft. Controlled 
25 Air subcommittee, `ABC-2', 29 March, 1941, Letter to CoS, CNO, Br. CoS, AWPD. 26 Sir B. Liddell Hart, Interview with Gen. F. Morgan, Dep. CoS, formerly `COSSAC', November 
1945,15/15/24, p. 3. 
27 T. Kittridge, 'US Defence Policy and Strategy', US News and World Report, 3 (December 1954). 
28 E. Roosevelt, As He Saw It, (New York, 1946), pp. 42-44; A. Danchev, Establishing the Anglo- 
American Alliance, (London: 1990), pp. 6-8. Note: Representatives of fourteen countries, meeting 
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capitalism had prevailed over free trade. Less controversial and more attractive were 
points one to three in which Britain and the United States respected the existing 
territorial sovereignty of nations, sought no territorial changes against the wishes of the 
people therein and allowed the right of all nations to choose their own form of 
government. Articles Five and Six were concerned with world-wide improvements in 
living standards, and Articles Seven and Eight were concerned with freedom of the seas 
and general disarmament after the war. 29 
A Question of the United States Assuming Power 
Beyond that, the United States chose to maintain its neutrality. Churchill could not lead 
America into war at Placentia Bay, however hard he tried, although many people in 
Britain expected it. During the previous year, in an exchange of letters between 
Harvard University president, James B. Conant, and Budget Director, Lewis W. 
Douglas, both men agreed that not only must the United States become the dominant 
world power, but an expression of that dominance had to be its willingness and 
capacity to fight to maintain that power when necessary. They concluded that if the 
American people did not think the assumption of that power was worth it, all would be 
lost. 30 There was little sympathy in America for the cost Britain had to pay in human 
and economic terms. Roosevelt, aware of that reluctance, understood that American 
public opinion was deeply pacific. Recognizing that obduracy, he used hemispheric 
defence as an excuse to rearm. Moreover, until the prevailing mood changed, the 
United States would leave Britain to fight the war alone. Aid moved slowly, but on 23 
February 1941, the United States and Britain decided to exchange British bases for 
American war material. Article VII of the recently Lend-Lease Agreement referred to 
post-war international economic policy, which read `... to pursue the avoidance of 
harmful discrimination and generally the economic goals of the Atlantic Charter. ' 31 
29 R. Lamb, The Ghosts of Peace, 1935-1945, (London, 1987), pp. 219-20; T. Wilson, Op. cit., pp. 
168-72. 
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Although Roosevelt had it watered-down to please British sensibilities, Churchill 
believed that its inclusion would undermine the system of `Imperial Preference' 
established by the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. Little was written of economic post- 
war trade liberalization, a goal of the Roosevelt administration. However objectionable 
trade barriers and colonial inequities were to the Americans, on which the British 
remained intransigent, they were over-shadowed, for the moment, by Churchill and 
Roosevelt finally meeting. 
A working alliance seemed possible, even if their timing were different. 32 By 
agreement, hundreds of tanks and planes were destined for the Middle East, some 
American shipping would be shifted to British control, and 150,000 rifles were ear- 
marked for Britain's Home Guard. 33 American reluctance to accede to British increased 
material requests was used as a ploy to assess Britain's actual needs; meanwhile Britain 
agreed to overhaul its purchasing mission in Washington to achieve greater co- 
ordination. Finally, the `shoot on sight' order regarding the protection of Atlantic 
convoys was soon to be announced by the President, but Congress would not revoke 
the Neutrality Act of 1939, containing its `cash and carry' provision, until the first 
week of November, one week after the sinking of the American destroyer, USS 
Rueben James by the German U-562, six hundred miles off the coast of Ireland. 34 
Returning from a supply allocation meeting in Washington, Lord Beaverbrook reported 
to the British War Cabinet in London, `There isn't the slightest chance of the United 
States entering the war until compelled to do so by a direct attack on its own territory, 
and it seems that this could not happen until Britain and Russia have been defeated. '35 
Even if Beaverbrook was prescient and Churchill bewildered as to how America would 
come in on Britain's side, Roosevelt had taken a step closer towards active 
belligerency. Hitler regarded Roosevelt's avowal of the Lend-Lease agreement and the 
32 E. Roosevelt, This I Remember, (New York, 1949), p. 226; M. Gilbert, Finest Hour. W. S. 
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extension of the Atlantic neutrality zone as an American declaration of economic 
warfare. As a retaliatory measure, on 25 March Hitler extended the North Atlantic «-ar 
zone as far west as Greenland. Japan and Germany would solve Roosevelt's dilemma 
four months later. 
American Public Opinion and Presidential Efforts 
In spite of the President's efforts, American public opinion considered the meeting a 
failure. The meeting had little effect upon the level of American aid designated for 
Britain; originally low, the increase was minimal. Immediately after the meeting 
became public knowledge, a Gallup poll on 18 August inquired, `Should the United 
States enter the war against Germany today? ' The respondents revealed that 20 percent 
supported entry, 74 percent were opposed, and five percent were undecided. 36 Wellcs 
felt that by the time the public's mood shifted, the Allies could have lost the war. An 
American political tendency, almost religiously adhered to by Roosevelt, to follow 
rather than lead public opinion, was no match for the German Blitzkrieg. 
Returning to London on 19 August, Churchill reported to the War Cabinet. He 
revealed the depth of Roosevelt's concern for Britain, but recognized that the American 
people and particularly Congress were determined to remain neutral. He admitted that 
the President's and his perceptions of the American public's mood differed, the Prime 
Minister choosing to discount the polls, regarding them as less than representative. He 
acknowledged a lack of urgency in Washington, sensing that if Roosevelt were to put 
the issue of peace and war to Congress, they would probably debate it for three 
months. He had warned the President that he could not answer for the consequences if 
Russia collapsed while the United States remained neutral. Roosevelt, in agreement, 
but still the dependent upon the opinion polls, hoped to provoke the Germans into 
hostilities by creating an incident in the Atlantic naval war. 37 
'f' H. Cantril. Public Opinion Polls, 19 August, 13 Sept. 1941. FDRL. 
17 CAB 65/19 `VM 84 (41). 19 Aug. 1941 
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The Chiefs of Staff, in their assessment of the Atlantic talks, recognized the lack of 
direction within the American hierarchy and stated: `We neither expected nor achieved 
startling results. The American COS are quite clearly thinking in terms of the defence 
of the Western Hemisphere and have so far not formulated any joint strategy for the 
defeat of Germany. '38 
ARCADIA 
Two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on 23 December 1941, the 
Americans officiated at a second Anglo-American Conference (code-named ARCADIA) 
attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, and their military staffs series of meetings from 22 
December 1941 through 14 January 1942 in Washington. The American Chiefs of 
Staff, lacking an experienced and unified command structure, such as Britain's 
Ministry of Defence, were ill-prepared to cope with such an abrupt entry into war. 
With the nation reeling after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, with a public clamoring for 
revenge, American administrative procedures were criticized by an incredulous Dill. 
Writing to his superior, Brooke in London, Dill said, 
They have no joint planners and executive planning staff-Then there is 
the great difficulty of getting the stuff over to the President. There are no 
regular [Joint Chiefs of Staff] meetings, and if they do meet there is no 
secretariat to record them. He just sees the JCS at odd times, and again 
no record. There is no such thing as a Cabinet meeting, and yet the 
Secretaries for War, Navy, etc. are supposed to function... Eventually 
they will do great things... 39 
Even before the ARCADIA Conference began, Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, 
traveling from Britain aboard HMS Duke of York, telegraphed the Americans that they 
wished to discuss the following five main topics: 
1. Fundamental basis of joint strategy 
2. Interpretation of the joint strategy in terms of immediate military 
measures 
3. Allocation of joint forces to conform with (1) 
4. Long-term program based on (1), including forces to be raised and 
equipped. 
38 CAB 79/13,19 Aug. 11)41. 
31) Sir A. Bryant. Turn of thu' Tide, (London. 1957), p. 234. 
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5. Establishment of joint machinery for implementing (2) and (3), and 
(4), 40 
Churchill had reason for traveling to Washington so soon after Pearl Harbor. He 
needed reassurance that Roosevelt and Marshall would remain steadfast to their 
RAINBOW 5 strategy even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During United 
States neutrality, he had said to his son, Randolph, in the summer of 1940', 1 shall 
drag the United States in. 141 Now, he hoped that wooing the Americans no longer 
required his previous customary caution, stating that, `Now that she is in this harem, 
we talk to her quite differently. ' 42 
Desperate for American assistance, a determined Churchill wished to discuss future 
collaborative ventures in the Mediterranean and French North Africa, a reiteration of the 
defensive Anglo-French basic war plan of 1939. In turn, American strategists viewed 
German control of West Africa as a major threat to American Atlantic communications 
lines. The American strategists, in 1941, still considered such `peripheral' areas as 
Brazil, the Azores, Morocco, and Dakar as posing a more immediate threat to American 
security than a German victory in Europe. 43 
At ARCADIA, the American position was finally and clearly enunciated: joint war plans 
recognized the North Atlantic as the principal theater of operations. The first essential 
of which was the preservation of communications across the North Atlantic using the 
British Isles as a fortress covering the British Fleet. The decision to establish an 
American force in Britain was immediate. 44 
Withal, the Prime Minister's proposals relating to a combined British and American 
amphibious operation in North and West Africa (GYMNAST) in 1942 interested the 
President. He considered operation SUPER-GYMNAST, the final development of 
operation GYMNAST a distinct possibility. This would focus the attention of the 
40 COS to JCS, `HMS Duke of York', Washington, 18 Dec., 1941, RG. 165, Exec. 10. 
41 M. Gilbert, Finest Hour, Winston S. Churchili 1939-1941, (London, 1983), p. 358. 
42 Sir A. Bryant, Op. cit., p. 225. 
43 T. Wilson, Op. cit., p. xii. 
44 H. Simpson & M. Bundy, Op. cit., p. 213. 
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American people, bruised and angered by Pearl Harbor, on their troops in action, 
thereby raising their morale and giving them a sense that they were in the war. 
Discussions of the British agenda and the American paper, `Estimate of the Military 
Situation' did not result in a detailed plan of operations at ARCADIA, but a 
comprehensive memorandum entitled `WWI' which emerged before the conference 
closed in March 1942.45 ARCADIA was a most difficult conference with little pattern, 
because a new alliance was being forged, an amalgam of partners meeting soon after 
Pearl Harbor as so-called equals. The resulting discussions were long and 
wearisome. 46To defeat the Axis in Europe, the following were thought necessary: 
1. To achieve an armaments program for victory, the utmost priority is 
to be given to the areas of production, which are to be held secure and 
protected, i. e., the United States, England and Russia. 
2. The U-boats are to be defeated, thereby assuring lines of 
communication and supply. 
3. The ring around Germany is to be closed and tightened, as expressed 
by supporting the Russian front, supplying Turkey with arms and 
military supplies, increasing our strength in the Middle East, and 
retaking all of the North African coast. 
4. German resistance is to be warn down by air bombardment, 
blockade, subversive activities and psychological warfare. 
5. The inexorable goal of offensive action, even though it can not be 
achieved on the scale in mind for 1942, may become a reality in 1943 as 
exemplified by a return to the Continent, a). via the Mediterranean, b). 
from Turkey into the Balkans, or c). by landings in western Europe. 47 
Preoccupied with the latest events in the Pacific, the Americans were ill-prepared to 
question the British proposals. Although they had signed the document, having made 
only slight changes, it remained largely a British in design. The Americans were 
uneasy, and in the ensuing months their uneasiness was to increase. 48 
45 Sir B. Liddell Hart, `Notes of Discussion with Major Gen. Sir Ian Jacob', Liddell Hart Papers, 
15/15/1, London, 31 Mar. & 15 Apr. 1948. 
46 J. Leasor & Gen. S. Hollis, War At The Top, (London, 1959), p. 29. 
47 COS to JCS, 'American-British Strategy', Washington, 22-24 Dec., 1941, Arcadia Papers, RG. 
165, Exec. 4. 
48 Sir M. Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, (London, 1968), pp. 19-20. 
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Strategy and the New System 
Marshall believed that the military should be in charge of its own supplies: although a 
firm defender of civilian control of the military, he opposed the creation of a t« o man 
civilian resource board, as originally conceived by Roosevelt and Churchill, that could 
interfere with established military plans and operations. The Americans distrusted the 
British and, led by Marshall, refused to countenance this kind of organization which 
might have the power to control military activity. 49 The negotiated inter-allied 
preliminary agreement, which became permanent over time, favored Marshall's view. 
During a White House meeting at the end of the conference, Roosevelt recommended 
that in case of disputes, the civilian board members could appeal to the President and 
Prime Minister. Churchill reluctantly agreed to try it on a temporary basis. On 14 
January 1942, the Munitions Assignments Board became responsible for the allocation 
of munitions, under CCS supervision. 50 For the first time, finished war material would 
be allocated in accordance with strategic needs. The economic boards (Assignment, 
Shipping, Raw Materials, Production and Resources, and Food) were soon established 
under the direction of the President and Prime Minister, and co-ordinated with the 
military. 
If these new boards and committees were organized to successfully prosecute the war, 
to what extent did ARCADIA formulate a strategy that would set the wheels in motion'! 
Before and during the early phases of the Conference, the Americans were reluctant to 
define their position, because of the widening Japanese attack then in progress. If the 
Japanese could be held by a minimum of means, the President wanted to demonstrate 
Allied naval power in the Atlantic. Moreover, the British and Americans had 
independently concluded, then mutually agreed, that `holding the line' against Japan 
was in the interest of both nations. Its corollary was to defeat 'Germany-first'. The 
combination of interlocking global concerns and limited military resources dictated their 
49 `V. Kimball, (ed. ). 1. Op. cit., p. 31-6. 
50 'Higher Direction of War in ABD. -\ Area to ABC-4/5'. Washington. 14-28 Jan. 1942, RG. 165 
WDCSA. 
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choices. Problems demanding immediate attention were the need for basing an air force 
in Australia, increasing strength in the Pacific, reinforcing British troops in the Middle 
East, acquiring bases on the Atlantic Islands, Brazil, and Africa, and relieving British 
forces in Northern Ireland and Iceland. 51 The President and Marshall, disagreeing over 
priorities, waited until they had an opportunity to talk with their British counterparts. 
Churchill and Roosevelt exchanged ideas: the President wanted American troops in 
action during the year, and the Prime Minister sought to avoid any future action that 
would echo the attritional battles of the previous war. ARCADIA represented the 
beginning of a concerted search for a practical European invasion plan. 52 The spectrum 
of thought ranged from British `peripheral strategy' ('closing the ring', `liberating 
populations', and a `final assault on the German citadel') to the American `cross- 
Channel assault'. 53 At this time, neither side could predict how increased American 
concern for the Pacific or additional British interest in the Mediterranean would 
influence strategic deliberations. 
Active Participation of the CCS 
Within the same period that the political leaders conferred, the American and British 
Chiefs of Staff met twelve times. Not surprisingly, the two air chiefs, Arnold and 
Portal, were proponents of winning through air power and stood agreed. The two 
admirals, Pound and King, were fighting two different naval wars - one in the Atlantic 
against the U-boats, the other in the Pacific against the Japanese advance; therefore, 
they had different strategic priorities and little in common. As indicated, the army 
strategists were preoccupied with a `peripheral' versus `direct approach' controversy. 
Marshall was yet to meet Brooke who had recently taken over from Dill. He was to 
find Brooke's view of strategy quite different from his own; and in the 30 month long 
invasion debate culminating in ANVIL, it was again Dill who eased many CCS policy 
misunderstandings. 
51 Gen. G. Marshall. 'Notes GCM', Washington, 23 Dec. 1941. RG. 165 WPD 4402-136. 
52 Col. C. Bundy. 'Memo for CoS', Washington, 24 Oct. 1941. RG. 165 ACOS WPD. 
53 COS to American COS', Washington, 22 Dec. 1941, RG. 165 Exec. 4. 
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Marshall and Brooke's differences reflected their different backgrounds and military 
experience, the outcome of which was Marhall's interest in logistical and organizational 
considerations in support of an eventual concentrated effort across the Channel. and 
Brooke's interest centered on battle experience, understanding the Wehrmacht's 
abilities, and the traditional British maritime strategy of `closing the ring'. 
During the conference, the British oft repeated the strategic theme first expressed at 
Placentia Bay the previous August: the destruction of Germany's ability to fight. its 
collapse, followed by landings of armored forces supported by an armed popular 
uprising by the occupied population on the European Continent during the summer of 
1943. Churchill stated, 
In principle, the landings should be made by armoured and mechanised 
forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by 
landing-craft or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The potential 
front of attack is thus made so wide that the German forces holding 
down these different countries cannot be strong enough at all 
points... expeditions should be marshalled by the spring of 1943 in 
Iceland, the British Isles, and, if possible, in French Morocco and 
Egypt. The main body would come direct across the ocean. 54 
The majestic sweep of Churchill's sense of strategy is noted in the above quotation, 
because it not only contained the essence of future amphibious operations, but included 
expectations far beyond the scope of Allied ability, even at full mobilization and 
production capacity. Claiming to be a proponent for an invasion of northwest Europe, 
Churchill could point to his own definitive role in the pioneering and development of 
landing craft, although his support of the landing shifted precariously as the war 
progressed. 55 No wonder that the Americans remained skeptical of his strategic 
concepts and usually feared the worst when he and the President met in closed session. 
Even though they were both highly talented, each man required the balancing restraint 
of carefully organized staff advice, which they avoided at times. 56 Under Churchill's 
guidance, Roosevelt usually succumbed to the Prime Minister's strategic rhetoric, 
leaving much to be undone by a concerned American Chief of Staff. For instance, on 
`a W. Churchill, Op, cit., The Campaign of 1943'. 18 Dec. 1941, pp. 657-658. 
55 Cmdr. K. Edwards. Operation Neptune, (London, 1946). p. 23. 
56 H. Stimson & M. Bunde, Op. cit., p. 87. 
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Christmas Eve, 1941, Roosevelt agreed to a Churchill suggestion for 1942 Pacific 
operations, that if a convoy of American reinforcements and planes sent to the 
Philippines could not break through the Japanese blockade of the islands, it should he 
re-routed to Singapore, described by the Prime Minister as an 'impregnable fortress'. 
Marshall, upon receipt of this memo, fearing a dangerous precedent, protested its 
method and content to Stimson. Shocked and angry, the Secretary of War considered it 
improper to discuss such matters with another nation while the fighting in the 
Philippines continued. Protesting to Harry Hopkins, he argued that if the President 
continued to make such arbitrary decisions on matters of extreme urgency without 
benefit of his Chiefs of Staff present, he and other top-level War Department personnel 
would resign. Faced with the actual British report, advised by Hopkins to be careful 
about the formality of his discussions with Churchill, the President recanted and never 
bypassed Marshall again. 57 
Global War, a Supreme Commander and British Misgivings 
Stung by the President's incursion into strategy without consultation with his Chief of 
Staff, Marshall proposed that a supreme commander be designated for the Pacific. 
Negotiations between the British and American Chiefs of Staff began immediately and 
resulted in the existing British-American Chiefs of Staff committee, headquartered in 
Washington, being installed as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Brooke thought it a bad 
idea, criticizing false arrangements made in Washington. 58 It was created not to 
originate, but to inform and assist both political leaders on strategic requirements, 
prosecute the war on a global scale, and to direct the ABDA theater commander in 
timely fashion. The Combined Chiefs were not the ultimate decision-makers, that 
prerogative was reserved for both Roosevelt and Churchill, but it served them as a 
decision making body. 59 Representing the strategic will of both countries, it was 
expected that the theater commander would follow its directives. Not only would it 
57 H. Stimson. Op. cit., 'Diary (MS)'. 25 Dec. 1941. 
58 Sir A. Bryant. Op. cit., p. 254. 
59 A. Wilt, Op. cit., pp. 40-1. 
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issue orders to all theater commanders, but it would allocate vital supplies as needed 
through the Munitions Assignment Board, functioning under its control. Marshall said, 
We had to come to this in the First World War, but it was not until 1918 
that it was accomplished, and much valuable time, blood, and treasure 
had been needlessly sacrificed. If we could decide on a unified 
command now, it would be a great advance over what was 
accomplished then. 
It was a vital achievement for Marshall, and Stimson hoped that the Pacific example 
could be applied to other theaters of operations. 61 The British thought otherwise, 
calling the proposal `wild and half baked'; Brooke felt its emphasis on the western 
Pacific rather than the Indian Ocean was misplaced; the more the COS looked at their 
task the less they liked the American proposal; even the British Cabinet doubted its 
value. 62 To counter the American stroke, Brooke sent well-instructed British 
representatives to Washington to present the British staff's case. Under similar 
circumstances, this procedure of direct confrontation by London-based military 
emissaries was not always carried out subsequently. Brooke sought London as the 
base for military planning and strategy, not Washington, at this stage of the war. 63 
Ever since Portal and Pound came back from the USA, I have told them 
that they `sold our birthright for a plate of porridge', whilst in 
Washington, they had up to now denied it flatly. However, this 
morning they are at last beginning to realise that the Americans are 
rapidly snatching more and more power with the ultimate intention of 
running the war in Washington. However, I now have them on my 
side. M 
Dill feared that it would be fatal to have a British commander responsible for the 
disasters looming in the Pacific. 65 Roosevelt and his military chiefs, concerned more 
with Western Hemispheric protection attacking Germany from Egypt and Morocco, 
disagreed between themselves and surprised the British. Both the President and 
Marshall agreed that the first American combat venture against the Germans had to 
succeed, because failure would have an extremely adverse effect on the morale of the 
60 `Second Mtg., COS Conference', Washington, 25 Dec. 1941, RG 165 `ABC 337'. 
61 Ibid. 
62 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 2/V, p. 45. 
63 Ibid. 3/A/V, p. 355. 
64 Op. cit., 2N, pp. 46-48. 65 Dill to Brooke', 28 Dec. 1941 quoted in F. Pogue, Op. cit., p. 281. 
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American people, particularly in an election year. 66 Seeking to assist the Russians. 
Marshall viewed the North African operation as a threat to his idea of pushing as many 
men and arms across the Atlantic in 1942, preparatory for a cross-Channel attack. He 
believed that the battle of northwest Europe to be final battle of the war; therefore. the 
Mediterranean theater was viewed as a subsidiary theater in which the enemy was to be 
`held' and not logistically overwhelmed at the expense of plans soon to be identified as 
BOLERO and ROUNDUP. 67 Rather than win by bleeding one's opponent to death 
while almost doing the same to oneself, rather than fight a war of attrition when one 
had the wherewithal to fight a war of annihilation, American planners were determined 
to apply the concepts of mass and concentration in the manner of American Civil War 
General Ulysses S. Grant. A stalemated war was unacceptable to them. 68 
Before negotiations ended, the British gave way on two counts: rather than an 
integrated command structure, they wanted theater commands and staff to be composed 
of one nationality and the war perceived as a whole unit, thereby eliminating 
geographical divisions based on national responsibility. The Americans refused. The 
British Chiefs of Staff wrote the following memo and sent it to Washington, 
This system, arbitrarily laid down on a geographical basis, would be 
dangerous and wrong.. . The strategy of war must 
be looked at as a 
whole, and predominant roles in the fields of operation allocated in 
accordance with the general strategic situation and the resources of the 
allies. 69 
During the conference's sessions the British seemed highly organized, experienced, 
and able; the Americans were unsure, ill at ease, and traumatized by events in the 
Pacific. Naval captain, John L. McCrea, one of the President's aides, wrote of the 
British, `They all talked exceedingly well and made much sense. The staff organization 
was superb as well. '70 Although the British were less suspicious of American aims. 
most of the American planners distrusted British strategy, believing it was based on an 
66 'ABC 337'. Op. cit. 
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ulterior design, the preservation of the British Empire. Unperturbed, the British may 
have thought that the Americans were not smart enough to worry about. 71 Laurence S. 
Kuter, a talented young American Army Air Force colonel, observed at a number of 
meetings, that if a controversy reached boiling point between the participants a few 
cooler heads prevailed: 
... with 
Admiral King red in the neck and inarticulate, General Arnold 
apparently furious but quiet, Brooke equally red-faced and inarticulate, 
it was Portal on the British side and General Marshall on the American 
side that calmed things down in very simple language: `We can't blow 
up on things like this. Something has to be done... let's get on with it. 72 
Divergent Views of GYMNAST 
Preliminary planning for the North African operation, code-named GYMNAST, 
reached impasse, because of the divergent views expressed by either side regarding, 
1. ) the size of the force 
2. ) the level of French assistance and German reaction 
3. ) air support 
4. ) the practical use of Casablanca as a seaport 
Maximum forces that could be landed after the initial embarkation totaled approximately 
180,000 evenly divided. 73 Shipping, particularly cargo vessels, was the critical factor; 
in short supply, these ships were needed to stem the Japanese in the ABDA theater. 
The desperate need for cargo shipping at this stage of the war was similar to the landing 
craft shortage that followed, and both injuriously limited and delayed operations. Once 
the Pacific crisis was past, the President and the Prime Minister wanted North Africa 
revived. 74 
ARCADIA succeeded in creating needed administrative structures. The Combined 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the US Joint Planning System, a 
unified theater command structure, division of responsibility among theaters, a fixed, 
71 F. Pogue. Op. cit., Interview with Gen. G. Marshall, 29 Oct. 1956. 
72 Ibid. Interview with Gen. L. Kuter. 10 Nov. 1960. 
73 'Operation SUPER-GYMNAST, Washington, 10 Jan. 1942 RG 165 `ABC 337'. 
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but not necessarily rigid, distinction between the terms `Joint' and `Combined' were 
created or defined during the conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff. assigned to 
meet continuously rather than periodically, were to be served by several subordinate 
and permanent staff sections identified by `combined' as the first word in their title: 
Planning Staff, Intelligence Committee, Secretariat, and the Military Transport 
Committee. 
Churchill's Domination at ARCADIA 
ARCADIA closed with Churchill's domination of allied strategy, both in theory and 
practice: bombing, blockade, aid to Russia, and clandestine European operations were 
emphasized. Co-operative allied naval ventures in the Atlantic, exchanges of American 
for British units at various locations, such as Iceland and Northern Ireland, were 
organized, against the background of an inexorable war. For the Americans, harsh 
reality outstripped wishful thinking. Ill-prepared to fight a global war, it would take 
more than a year after Pearl Harbor to mobilize, equip, train, and deploy its forces in 
any appreciable numbers. 75 No agreement had been reached to use Britain as a base for 
future amphibious operations. The American desire for direct offensive action was 
subordinated to British strategy that operated at the circumference, as the only practical 
alternative. Marshall's plan for a cross-Channel attack to relieve Russia in 1942 was 
substituted for a blocking action against a possible German threat to Spain, Portugal, 
and Morocco. The CCS asserted, `In 1943 the way may be clear for a return to the 
Continent, across the Mediterranean from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in 
western Europe. '76 Continuing strategic differences between the Allied Chiefs of Staff 
increased their antagonism. 
Roosevelt and Churchill had told little to their Chiefs about national policy on which 
strategy could be based. 77 Killing more and more Germans, victory at all costs, and 
75 C. Kirkpatrick. Op. cit., pp. 114-16. 
76 CCS 11 Meeting. Washington, 2 Feb. 1942. Reel III. 
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demanding total enemy capitulation were not war aims on which an improved and 
peaceful post-war world could be built. Strategic planning suffered, because Allied 
political objectives remained unclear. 78 Politically, the conference produced the 
Declaration of the United Nations, which reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter: the war was being fought to defend and perpetuate life. liberty, justice. and 
human rights throughout the world. No nation would make a separate peace, and the 
resources and energy of all were to combine until the enemy was defeated. Twenty-six 
nations signed on 1 January 1942.79 
General Sir Leslie Hollis, second in command of the Prime Minister's Defence Office, 
considered the ARCADIA Conference to be, 
... the most 
difficult of all conferences, for the Anglo-American alliance 
was still untempered steel. The Americans were reeling under the 
disaster of Pearl Harbor, and possibly a little nervous that the war-tried 
British might try to tell them what to do. We, on the other hand, were 
anxious to show that we had no desire to act as senior partners in the 
new formed alliance, but as equals. We had no pattern to guide us, and 
the discussions were therefore long and wearisome. 80 
General Hollis who collaborated with the author, James Leasor, after the war, was 
correct regarding American reactions during the conference, but naive to think that the 
British, from the Prime Minister on down, did not want to impose their will upon the 
new-comers regarding strategy and experience. At the conference's close, the British 
had their way with the Americans who were devoid of a tactical plan on which to base 
their `Germany-first' policy. 
`Trust me to the bitter end', were Roosevelt's parting words to Churchill at the end of 
the conference; 81 that trust was to be sorely tested, as the war intensified. 
78 Gen. A. Wedemevcr. Op. cit., pp. 88-92. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Events Leading to a June Washington Conference 
Prior to the 19-25 June 1942 Washington meeting, top-level conversations were held in 
London, Washington and at Hyde Park, New York, the President's home. First 
Churchill in London, then Roosevelt in Washington, met with V. M. Molotov, Stalin's 
Foreign Commissar. Mountbatten, Churchill's emissary, conferred with the President 
ten days before the Prime Minister arrived. Regarding Anglo-American-Russian 
relations, two disparate points emerged from conversations with Molotov: Britain was 
prepared to meet its obligations under the Second Protocol, an Anglo-American Lend- 
Lease agreement extending aid to Russia, but remained non-committal on a second 
front. Refusing to guarantee that a landing would take place in September 1942 on the 
Continent, the best Churchill was willing to offer was to continue planning for one. ' 
Interpreting this as Churchill's intention to abandon a second front, Molotov cabled his 
views to Stalin, `... consequently the outcome is that the British Government does not 
accept an obligation upon itself to establish a second front this year; and declares, and 
that conditionally, that it is preparing some kind of experimental raiding operation. ' 2 
Doubting they could fulfill supply obligations to the Soviets under the agreement, due 
to shipping losses on the Murmansk run to Russia, Roosevelt, in contrast to Churchill, 
promised to open a second front in 1942, if Russia would accept a reduction in 
tonnage. After Molotov's visit to Washington, a communique issued on 12 June 
indicated that he and Roosevelt had reached full agreement regarding the establishment 
of a second front in Europe in 1942, notwithstanding a landing craft shortage that 
plagued Marshall. 3 The second reason was that future Anglo-American strategy for 
'Future Operations', 2 July 1942. WP (42) 278. 
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1942 and 1943, remained inconclusive. 4 The JSM had warned the COS that progress 
towards the formulation of an acceptable Anglo-American strategy had proved 
disappointing. One cause centered on American unwillingness to pursue the strategic 
argument to any logical conclusion, specifically that one theater of war was more 
important than another. 5 To settle these problems and any other difficulties that could 
not be satisfactorily dealt with by correspondence, Churchill decided on another 
personal visit to Washington. 6 Roosevelt agreed to meet between the 17-21 of June. 
As will be seen, later in the war, this concept of `face-to-face' confrontation was not 
followed during the ANVIL debate of 1944. 
Mountbatten's Meetings with Roosevelt 
Mountbatten's conversations with the President represented Churchill's views 
concerning Britain's disenchantment with SLEDGEHAMMER, a proposed landing on 
the Norman coast of France in 1942, and advanced a method of private military 
diplomacy whose express purpose was to convince the President to accept 
GYMNAST. By choosing to confer alone with Mountbatten, a favorite of Churchill's, 
the President not only circumvented the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also put himself at a 
disadvantage. Having learned of the meeting and its agenda, Marshall and King both 
expressed concern over the President's failure to include them in his forthcoming 
strategic discussions with the head of Combined Operations.? 
Fascinated with royalty, Roosevelt was infatuated with Mountbatten, the King's 
cousin, who had been a social success on his last trip. The newly appointed Chief of 
Combined Operations, holding exalted rank in each service, an ambitious Beaverbrook 
protege and a Churchill 'front-man', was considered to be more skilled in public 
4 'Confidential Protocol of Conference of Allied Representatives'. Washington, n. d.; `Draft of Joint. 
Statement with Draft of Second Protocol', 19 Apr. 1942, RG 165 ABC 400.3295. 
5 JSM to COS, 11 May 1942. COS (42) 60th meeting (0) Min. 2. 
6 W. Churchill, 20 June 1942 PM/402/3. Argonaut Diary. 
7 FRUS. Op. c"it.. Washington, pp. 582-583: M. Sommers. `Why Russia Got the Drop On Us', 
Saturday Evening Post. 8 Feb. 1947, p. 25. 
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relations than in naval operations by the COS. 8 As a master in verbal gymnastics and a 
consummate weaver of epic tales, Mountbatten captivated the American president by 
suggesting that a 1942 TORCH (formerly GYMNAST) was a fair exchange for a 19433 
ROUNDUP. The stakes were high. If he failed to convince the President, British 
would lose its influence over war production and weapons allocation. 9 
Mountbatten's reasoning for the British decision to abandon SLEDGEHAMMER. as a 
strategic operation focused on its small size. He argued that it was limited by a 
shortage of landing craft and short-range fighter aircraft arrayed against a powerful 
enemy force of twenty five divisions. Placed in extreme jeopardy, this stunted Allied 
force would fail to take pressure off the Russians. Even if the technical and production 
problems could be overcome by delaying the operation a few months, the deterioration 
of Channel weather and the onset of winter would lessen the possibilities of 
maintaining the bridgehead or seizing a port such as Cherbourg. These efforts were 
beyond the abilities of the force engaged. Before Mountbatten's arrival, the President 
had begun shifting his support from SLEDGEHAMMER, as advocated by Marshall 
and Stimson, to GYMNAST. Accepting Mountbatten's views without the benefit of 
those of his Joint Chiefs, the President compounded their sense of isolation and 
ineffectiveness by neglecting to inform them of the meeting. 
Mountbatten, after favorably impressing the President, sent a summary of the meeting 
to his superiors in London, who in turn, relayed it to the Joint Staff Mission in 
Washington. This information was then revealed to the American Chiefs at a 19 June 
CCS meeting by their British counterparts. Roosevelt remained silent. 10 Previous 
studies of this period have omitted the CCS meeting of 10 June at which Mountbatten 
had participated. He addressed the committee by giving a summation of his five hour 
meeting with the President, failing to reveal his aversion for SLEDGEHAMMER. 
Representative of the British position, he strongly advocated other operations. 
FM Lord Alanhrooke. Op. cit., 2N, 4-9 Mar. 1942. p. 367. 
9 COS. meetings related to `Mountbatten, SLEDGEHAMMER, GYMNAST and ROUNDUP'. COS 
meetings on 5.11.27 May. 1,25.30 June. 1 July 1942. 
10 CCS 27 Meeting. Washington, 19 June 1942. Reel III, pp. 1-3. 
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Mountbatten had explained the SLEDGEHAMMER operation to the President as if it 
were an accepted and viable plan. " To the American members of the CCS, he had 
been economical with the truth, which would increase their entrenched suspicions of 
British intent and purpose. From Dill's intelligence, Marshall and the JCS were well 
aware of Mountbatten's dissembling, having received two views of his meeting with 
the Roosevelt: Marshall had a copy of Mountbatten's letter to the President. which 
included a summary of their talk, and an account of their conversation from Hopkins. 
In this case, Dill, an honest broker, was trying to prevent something stupid from 
happening that would not only prolong the war, but disrupt the fragile sense of Anglo- 
American unity. 12 
Roosevelt's Desire to Help the Russians 
Moreover, Dill, as Churchill's agent, informed the COS of a conversation he had with 
Hopkins, the substance of which included the President's desire to help the Russians 
by engaging American troops for that purpose in 1942, possibly in a North African 
operation. 13 Even before Churchill arrived, Marshall guessed from Dill's information 
that Mountbatten had influenced Roosevelt for GYMNAST and against 
SLEDGEHAMMER. Both Marshall and Stimson, restated their positions to the 
President by letter, in which they attacked GYMNAST and recommended 
SLEDGEHAMMER; to add weight to their arguments, Stimson and Marshall enclosed 
a `letter of concurrence' signed by informed members of their staffs. Hopkins, 
discouraged by Roosevelt's change of mind, thought that the United States deserved to 
get into the war on the basis of its growing military strength. 14 Mountbatten, ordered 
by Churchill to convince the President that the entirety of allied strategy needed re- 
thinking, considered this to be his most important assignment of the whole war-15 
It CCS 24 Meeting, Washington, 10 June 1942. Op. cit., p. 4. 
12Dill to Montgomery-Massingberd, 19 Sept. 1941. Montgomery-iwassingberd Papers, 160/23a. 
13 Dill to COS. 15 June 1942, CAB 105/39. 
14 H. Stimson, Op. cit., 17.15,19, Jan. 1942: R. E. Sherwood. Op. cit., pp. 580-581: `Winant to 
FDR'. 3 June 1942, PSF, FDRL. 
15 J. Terraine, The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten. (London, 1968), pp. 94,506. 
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CCS Meetings in Opposition 
The results of the President's meeting with Mountbatten at the White House and later 
with Churchill in Hyde Park were in direct opposition to the results of the CCS series 
of meetings held concurrently in Washington. Brooke, who disliked 
SLEDGEHAMMER and feared any North African amphibious operation that would 
draw supplies away from the threatened Middle East, thought it worthwhile to continue 
planning for a 1943 landing in Northwest Europe. Failing to convince Brooke of 
SLEDGEHAMMER's immediate value, Marshall agreed with the British Chief oC Stal't' 
that GYMNAST was not a viable operation in 1942, because of the successive Russian 
defeats. BOLERO's strategic reserves in Britain required strengthening and the British 
Eighth Army's retreat in the western desert had to be checked. The Combined Chief's 
concluded that even if amphibious attacks against Hitler's western European fortress 
contained certain hazards, justified for compelling reasons, they would be preferahle to 
GYMNAST. 16 Even if this report had been sent to the President and the Prime Minister 
meeting in Hyde Park, it is doubtful whether it would have affected their deliberations. 
Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that BOLERO served two purposes: as a bulwark 
against a German invasion of Britain or a launching pad for an invasion of the 
Continent, the application contingent upon the battles in Russia. Allied Intelligence 
estimates indicated that by early winter Russia would either thwart German aggression 
or be defeated. The Prime Minister hammered away at the President by asking, 
But in case no plan can be made in which any responsible authority has 
good confidence, and consequently no engagement on a substantial 
scale in France is possible in September 1942, what else are we going to 
do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic Theatre during the whole 
of 1942? Ought we not to be preparing within the general structure of 
BOLERO some other operation by which we may gain positions of 
advantage and also directly or indirectly to take some of the weight off 
Russia? It is in this setting and on this background that the operation 
GYMNAST should be studied. 17 
16 CCS 27 Meeting. 19 June, 'CCS 83, Offensive Operations in 1942 & 1943', Washington. 21 June 
1942. Red III. 
17 Churchill to Roosevelt. `Washington, 20 June 1942. quoted in FRLTS. Washington, 1941-42, pp. 
461-462; W. Churchill, IV, pp. 381-82. 
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Churchill insisted that he was willing to listen any alternative American plan whose 
immediate employment would achieve similar results as GYMtiAST. Divided between 
Atlantic and Pacific operations, the Americans had only SLEDGEHAMMER to offer. 
which was moribund. Roosevelt, politically committed to the Russians, refused to wait 
for a 1943 BOLERO/ROUNDUP, even though a cross-Channel invasion of such 
magnitude might have been the most expeditious means of winning the war. 18 Both 
Allied leaders refused to have their ground forces stand idle until 1943. King, and 
Arnold were ready to supply sufficient naval and air forces for a North African 
operation to meet the President's criteria. However, King, speaking to Pound at a CCS 
meeting in June, voiced his opposition to any North African operations in 1942.19 The 
Americans failed to question Mountbatten's opinions about landing craft availability for 
GYMNAST, but not for SLEDGEHAMMER. Unlike GYMNAST, a diversionary 
SLEDGEHAMMER, even as a threat, would have directly helped Russia. Similar 
traps, to bleed an enemy white, were laid by the Germans at Verdun in 1916 and later 
by the Allies over German air-space in February 1944. Scarcity of manpower was not 
an overriding problem for Marshall, in the long term, as it was for Brooke. The 
Americans could absorb the losses attendant to a sacrificial operation, even if the odds 
were unfavorable; the British could not in any case. 
Martin Blumenson, in a recent journal article, criticizes the coalition for concocting a 
strategy whose primary purpose was to liberate territory rather than destroy the German 
Army in France during 1942. Doubting the quality and effectiveness of their own land 
forces, fearful of a direct confrontation with German forces in northern France, they 
chose a Mediterranean strategy, which, he concluded, prolonged the war beyond 1944. 
Blumenson failed to define the Anglo-American strategic controversy, as considered 
here, which resulted in an additional move to the periphery. 20 Moreover, by failing to 
draw a distinction between the British and American strategic positions, as did Michael 
18 K. Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War. (London, 1994), pp. 24-27,180. 
19 CCS 28 Meeting. Washington, 20 June 1942, Reel III. 
20 M. Blumenson. `A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War II'. 
Parameters, U. S Arinv War College Quarterly. XXIII 2. Summer (1993), pp. 16-27. 
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Howard, Blumenson disregarded Churchill's awareness of the prevalent American 
attitude: its military leaders, suspicious of British intentions, favored a massive cross- 
Channel attack and suspected that GYMNAST (renamed TORCH) would serve to 
protect British interests rather than to defeat Germany. Churchill pressed Roosevelt for 
a full and irrevocable commitment to British strategy. 21 
The Americans realized that the British would maintain their position, even in the face 
of a Russian collapse in 1942.22 Within a military context, the divided JCS aside, 
Marshall might have argued that if SLEDGEHAMMER and IMPERATOR (a divisional 
strength three day hit-and-run raid in France) were abandoned, there was little to 
convince the Germans (or the Russians) that a second front landing was imminenta23 
The German High Command, free from the threat of a cross-Channel attack, could 
transfer more of their ground and air reserves to the Eastern Front with impunity. 
Defining a second front in the broadest practical terms, Roosevelt concluded that 
American forces could be in action sooner and in greater strength in the Mediterranean 
than in northern Europe. The benefit of employing green American troops and 
inexperienced leaders against German positions there afforded them the opportunity to 
gain combat experience on more favorable terms. German combat strength and 
fighting-power in North Africa was only a fraction of what it wielded in Europe. 
Moreover, by engaging German troops gradually and in relatively small numbers, 
American troops would gain in experience while taking fewer casualties. However 
distant from the main theater of war, German defeats in the Mediterranean just might 
affect the stability of the German regime. Thus, by engaging American troops in 
combat before 15 September in a relatively safe operation set in French North Africa, 
Roosevelt surmised that he would gain public support for the war effort, lessen the 
21 H. Loewenheim, M. Jonas, H. Langley (eds. ), Op. cit.., pp. 254-256; Marshall to Dill 'CCS-94' 
Washington, 14 Aug. 1942, RG. 165 Exec 10 Box 59; Sir M. Howard, Op. cit., pp. 122-140. 
22 Churchill to Roosevelt, `Second Front', London, 28 May 1942, Churchill-Roosevelt 
Correspondence, pp. 495-500, FDRL. 
23 P. Ziegler, Mountbatten, (London, 1985), p. 184. 
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strain on Russia, and win the November congressional elections for his political 
party. 2A 
America had only been in the war eleven months, beginning with scant, archaic 
equipment and a small peacetime military cadre. With such meager beginnings, 
transforming them into a large, modern and aggressive fighting force capable of 
amphibious operations under combat conditions was daunting. 2 Marshall «-as to say 
in 1956, 
We failed to see that the leader in a democracy has to keep the people 
entertained. The people demand action. We couldn't wait to be 
completely ready. Churchill was always getting into side shows. If we 
had gone as far as he did we never would have got out. But I could secs 
why he had to have something. 26 
By having the President's ear and dramatically arguing for the acceptance of 
GYMNAST, as the centerpiece of British strategy, Mountbatten and Churchill 
succeeded in turning the weaknesses of the American system to their own advantage. 
Roosevelt's manipulations precluded the use of balanced inquiry, and inadvertently 
contributed to the outcome his visitors were seeking. Moreover, even before the 
British arrived, the President was biased towards a French North African operation. 
Banished from these meetings, the American Chiefs were frustrated and confused. The 
foregoing informal American process, seemingly flexible and expeditious was defined 
by a President capricious in his decision-making, who discounted the participation of 
qualified observers and advisers appointed to safeguard the nation's strategic interests. 
Marshall recognized that the source of the problem stemmed from the President's 
interpretation of his role as Commander-in-Chief and his intermittent use of the JCS. 
Where the British COS were the military advisers to a small ministerial body, the JCS 
were held accountable to the President, a military leader with no military experience, as 
C-in-C of the American Army and Navy. 27 
24 R. Steele. 'Political Aspects of American Military Planning, 1941-1942', Militant' Affairs, XXXV. 
2. (1971). pp. 68-69.71-72. 
M. Stoler, Op. cit., pp. 53.63. 
26 F. Pogue. Interview with Gen. G. Marshall, 13 Nov. 1956. 
=7 CCS 38 Meeting, Washington, 28 Aug. 1942, Op. cit., p. 3. 
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Lack of Administrative Accountability 
Unfortunately, the President did not take Churchill's argument under advisement, as a 
means of buying time, even though it had been previously agreed that planning would 
take place in London, not Washington. As a military non-professional, a poor second 
to Churchill who had benefited from a military education, however archaic, the 
President made military decisions for political reasons without the benefit of 
professional advice. Two months later, to avoid a recurrence of this error, the Joint 
Chiefs recommended to the Combined Chiefs that where military and political 
considerations were both involved, it must be accepted that no military commitment 
should be entered into on the political level without prior consultation with the CCS. 28 
With SUPER-GYMNAST neutralized by the loss of Tobruk, with BOLERO, not an 
action in itself but the logistical build-up that would lead to an action across the 
Channel, with SLEDGEHAMMER failing because of a lack of resources, GYMNAST 
was revived. Two years later, shortages of landing craft continued to plague the Allies. 
In a telegram to Marshall, Churchill remarked that, `history would never understand 
how the plans of two great empires should be so hamstrung and limited by a hundred 
or two of these particular vessels. '29 
Marshall, dismayed over what he considered to be a wasted effort in an inconclusive 
theater, was strongly opposed to GYMNAST. He and King argued in a memo sent to 
the President that `the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the GYMNAST 
plan as compared to other operations, particularly 1942 emergency BOLERO 
operations, leads to the conclusion that the occupation of Northwest Africa this summer 
should not be attempted... ' 30 During an August meeting of the CCS, Cunningham 
stated that GYMNAST, renamed TORCH, was intended to relieve German pressure on 
the Russians by clearing the Mediterranean for Allied shipping, relieving the threat to 
Malta, and by securing Egypt. Once this was achieved. North Africa would become a 
28 Ibid. 
2) Churchill to Marshall. Washington, 16 Apr. 1944. RG 165, Item 16 Exec. 8. 
30 Marshall & Adel. E. King to Roosevelt, 'Gymnast Operations'. 28 July 1942. PSF. FDRL. 
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departure point for the invasion of Europe. King and Marshall disagreed with 
Cunningham's interpretation. They believed that the British had designed TORCH to 
relieve the Middle Eastern convoy routes and to deny naval bases to the enemy from 
which they could attack Allied South Atlantic convoy routes. Moreover. the Americans 
subscribed to the Russian view, that only a cross-Channel attack in 1942 could provide 
the relief Russia sought. BOLERO leading to SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942 and 
ROUNDUP in 1943 were the operations required; anything else was a dispersion of 
force, an abuse of resources and tangential to Russian demands and needs. 
If the landings were compared, TORCH was less fraught with danger than 
SLEDGEHAMMER, because the bulk of German military strength lay primarily in 
Russia, along the northern coast of Europe, and not in Vichy controlled French North 
Africa. Approximately 200,000 German troops were stationed in Tunisia, but only a 
small German Armistice Commission was based in Algeria and French Morocco. 31 
Moreover, Marshall, arguing against TORCH, revealed that its failure would bring only 
ridicule and loss of public confidence, while a failure in SLEDGEHAMMER, for 
which the public had been adequately prepared, would have been more acceptable. 
This did not square with Roosevelt and Churchill's mutual conception of the Channel 
being made red with the blood of Allied dead, if a landing were attempted. 32 Leahy 
concluded that since the reputation of the American armed forces was at stake, success 
in TORCH was essential. If they failed, he warned, plummeting American prestige 
would result in appalling political consequences for the patriots and peoples of China 
and Russia. Leahy did not raise similar concerns for SLEDGEHAMMER. " Both 
Chiefs of Staffs extolled the virtues and discounted the hazards of their pet operation, in 
an attempt to sway the other, all to no avail. Marshall had no alternative to offer. 
31 Battle Summary No. ; S. Operation Torch. (London, 1948). pp. 104-5. 
'= R. Sherwood, Op. cit., p. 581. 
?1 CCS 3y meeting. Washington. 28 Aug. 1942. Reel III. 
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MODICUM 
The Washington Conference was representative of the British attitude towards 
negotiations, in which the application of the 'Yes/But' method was applied. The 
following is an example: 
... Plans and preparations for the operations in this theater (western Europe) are to be pressed forward with all possible speed, energy and 
ingenuity... If a sound and sensible plan can be contrived. we should not 
hesitate to give effect to it. If a detailed examination shows that despite 
all efforts, success is improbable, we must be ready with an 
alternative. 34 
The wording smacks of double-talk, with the unmentioned alternative, GYMNAST. 
preferred. Mixed messages on `Grand Strategy', as related above. contributed to the 
conference's inconclusive outcome. It was moot in any case, as Churchill knew that 
Roosevelt favored GYMNAST, as a means of hustling American troops into action. 
Before GYMNAST became formalized, however, the President sent Marshall, King 
and Hopkins to London once again - their mission: to settle the controversy on which 
Allied strategy had foundered. It seemed as if he were directing them to perform in a 
calculated charade of his own making, since the President had secretly decided upon 
North Africa beforehand. The difference between the two American visits to London, 
within the space of four months, must have been apparent to them and a cause for 
concern, as they flew across the Atlantic. 
Marshall and Hopkins had previously flown to London in early April 1942, taking with 
them a plan, originally conceived by Eisenhower and his operations staff and re-shaped 
by Marshall; it defined an operation that would threaten the Germans directly in 
Northwest Europe and relieve pressure on the Russians. Known as the `Eisenhower 
Memorandum' of 25 March, it emerged with modifications in its final form, as the 
'Marshall Memorandum' of 1 April. 35 The plan. presented by Marshall at a White 
House meeting the following day, was supported by Stimson and Hopkins. and 
34 Office of American Secretariat, 'Offensive Operations for 1')42-43', Washington, 21 June 1942. RG. 
165 WW'PD Exec. 1 Item 4. Ismay Paper included. 
COS ()42) 97(0), Washington, 13 Apr. 1942. RG. 165, Exec. 1. 
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approved by the President, who immediately authorized both his Chief of Staff and 
Chief Advisor to bypass the newly organized CCS, `where it would simply be pulled to 
pieces and emasculated. ' 36 Taking it directly to Churchill and the COS in London, 
Marshall would negotiate in the name of the President. 37 The CCS, an organization that 
Marshall created was discounted in the name of expediency. The circumvention failed, 
because Dill notified his superiors in London on 5 April that, `You may shortly be 
seeing a paper from a high US source operations in western Europe which we have 
today been able to glance at unofficially. ' 38 
The name of his source was omitted, but it did contain a summary of the American plan 
three days before Marshall and Hopkins arrived, time enough for Churchill and the 
COS to explore it thoroughly and prepare for their rebuttal. Alex Danchev, in his 
biography of Dill, attributes certain appellations to him, but `operative'39 is not one of 
them. At the same time, both American representatives were buoyed by the prospect of 
not only showing something new to the British, but having it approved. The author, 
Brian Loring Villa, wrote: 
The arrival in April of General Marshall and his advisors, who were 
determined to keep alive the possibility of an emergency landing in 
Europe in 1942, gave Mountbatten his opportunity by reopening the 
question of what operations should be undertaken in that year. What 
followed turned out to be the most important strategic debate of the 
war. 40 
Soon after arriving on 8 April, the Americans entered in a series of meetings, called 
MODICUM, with their British hosts. The general concept of `closing the ring' 
advocated in the First World War had now been drafted by the Americans into two 
specified cross-Channel attacks separated by time and magnitude. Differing from 
earlier British SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP proposals, which depended upon a 
severe German collapse before attempting a Channel landing, the American proposal 
36 H. Stimson & M. Bundy, Op. cit., quoting Hopkins, pp. 214-215. 
37 Gen. D. Eisenhower to COS, `BOLERO and Plans for Operations in Northwest Europe', 
Washington, 25 Mar., 12 Apr. 1942, RG 165 Exec. 1 Box 1 OPD 381. 
38 Dill to War Cabinet, `Operations in Western Europe', Washington, 5 Apr. 1942, CAB 105/39. 
39 A. Danchev, Op. Cit. He used titles such as `Broker', `Fixer' and `Agitator' for his chapter 
headings. 
40 B. Villa, Op. cit., p. 174. 
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recommended forcing that collapse with their own military formations. "l There were 
two main considerations: first, the continuance of Russian resistance: and second. that 
northwest Europe was the place where the expanding American Army and Air Force 
could engage in active operations and gain war experience. To the Americans. 
ROUNDUP was their major war effort, and, once agreed upon was considered 
irreversible. The plan described the following operations: a. ) BOLERO, a logistical 
build-up in Britain of thirty American divisions, plus air power within 12 months, and, 
b. ) ROUNDUP, the deliberate invasion of Europe by 30 American and 18 British 
divisions in Normandy, supported by 5,800 combat planes in 1943. 
Marshall gave his reasons for the choice of western Europe: 
1. ) The shortest route to the heart of Germany passed through France. 
2. ) The theater in which the first major Allied offensive could be staged. 
3. ) Effective results could be obtained more rapidly than elsewhere. 
4. ) Nowhere else could the Allies attain the overwhelming air 
superiority vital to success. 
5. ) The United States could concentrate and maintain a larger force in 
that area than it could in any other. 
6. ) Combined Allied combat power could be employed, and maximum 
support given to Russia in 1942. 
7. ) SLEDGEHAMMER, an emergency landing of approximately five 
divisions with supporting air on the Cotentin peninsula on 15 September 
1942.42 
The British were skeptical, setting the stage for a prolonged Anglo-American strategic 
debate that began here and reverberated throughout the war. Although the British 
found the American ROUNDUP acceptable, they harbored reservations, doubts and 
objections regarding SLEDGEHAMMER's practicality and timeliness in 1942, but 
remained non-committal regarding its defects. Brooke. transcribing from his diary, 
wrote, `With the situation prevailing at that time it was not possible to take Marshall's 
41 Gen. B. Paget. Adm. Lord Mountbatten. AM S. Douglas. `Re-entry into France'. 21 Mar.. 19422. 
CAB 79/11). CAB-JPS Study. 9 Dec. 1941. `Operations on Continent in Final Phase' CAB 79/17, 
JP(41) 1028. 
42 CAB 79/19 (42). 112.9 Apr. 1942. 
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`Castles in the Air' too seriously. His strategic ability was of the poorest! It must be 
remembered that we were literally hanging on by our eye-lids !'4 
A British Ruse 
Fearful of an American move towards the Pacific, the British resorted to subterfuge, 
while at the same time seeking to irrevocably involve America in defeating 'German }- 
first'. An agreement would establish an American concentrated production effort, an 
increased material allocation program, an intensification of training and Britain bound 
troop movements, a contribution specifically geared to fighting directly across the 
Channel. All the British had to do to achieve their goal of supply and theater priority 
was to accept Marshall's proposals. By comparison, Marshall considered British 
operations in the Far and Middle East secondary and diversionary to the primacy of 
future operations in Europe. He relied on BOLERO, as it gathered momentum, to 
refocus British interests and eliminate such dispersions. Marshall urged that operations 
on the Continent `not be reduced to the status of a residuary legatee. '44Measured 
against this main effort were the calculated risks to be taken by the allies at the expense 
of the Middle East and the Pacific. Further Japanese incursions would have to be 
stopped with the current level of resources. 45 
On 14 April the COS accepted the American proposal `in principle', agreeing that 
planning in London should begin immediately for a major offensive in Europe in 1943 
and for an emergency landing, if necessary, in 1942.46 However, the British wavered 
over SLEDGEHAMMER. The inclusion of the phrase `if necessary' in the agreed 
document signaled that the COS considered SLEDGEHAMMER subject to further 
negotiations, if future conditions demanded other alternatives. Marshall knew that the 
substantive 'agreement in principle' remained a treacherous problem with regard to 
43 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 2N, 12-15 Apr. 1942. p. 383. 
44 Marshall. 'Notebook'. Washington, 13 Apr. 1942. RG 165 Exec. I Item 5d. 
45 JCS 6 fleeting. Washington. 16 Mar. 1942. Reel I. 
46 COS-USCOS Meeting, 'Minutes'. London, 14 Apr. 1942. RG. 165 OPD, Exec I Box I ABC '81 
BOLERO. 
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SLEDGEHAMMER. Churchill's post-war memoirs reveal that the Prime Minister 
harbored grave doubts regarding SLEDGEHAMMER's feasibility, but chose to say 
little regarding the plan during the meeting. Butler. writing in the British Official 
History, ascribed an unreserved concurrence: 
British officers gathered that in spite of our efforts and intentions to do 
the contrary, the Americans thought we did not mean to really do 
business on their plan - this because of our insistence on the seriousness 
of the situation developing in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. 47 
This does not square with the feelings of the British planning staff who advised the 
COS. They considered the Marshall Memorandum to be strategically ridiculous, a pipe 
dream of colossal proportions, produced in a mood of totally unjustifiable self- 
confidence. They concluded that he was far too optimistic in thinking that American 
troops could face the Germans and do well in an action of major proportions in late 
1943 or even early 1944.48 Ralph Kilner Brown, one of the British planners, said in a 
1993 interview, 
The month of June 1942 saw the relationship between the British and 
the Americans strained and stretched almost to the breaking point. It 
was only the personal friendship between Roosevelt and Churchill, and 
the admiration each felt for the other, that enabled them to overcome the 
mutual suspicion which existed between the British and American 
service Chiefs, to build upon the shaky foundations of the Allied war 
effort... 49 
Part of the discussion centered on the landing sites and the variations of German 
strength in each locality: for SLEDGEHAMMER, the COS opted for the Pas de Calais. 
the Americans for Cherbourg; for ROUNDUP, the COS opted for Normandy, the 
Americans for the area between Dieppe and Le Havre. However, could the expected 
German reaction to a sacrifice landing lead to the destruction of the Luftwaffe above the 
beach area'? 
The British behaved in a disingenuous manner. Motivated by their need for American 
supplies, filled with doubts regarding the American plan and fearful of their reprisals if 
expressed. Churchill and the COS defaulted. Marshall and Hopkins were led to believe 
47 W. Churchill. Op. cit., pp. 32'3-324.. J. Butler. Grand Stratege. III. (London, 1964), p. 577. 
48 Sir R. Kindler Brown, Top Brass and No Brass. (Lewes. 1991). pp. 68.69.77. 
49 Interview with Sir R. Kilner Brown. London, 24 Sept. 1993. 
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that a military settlement had been reached. Remaining unresolved were the problems 
of shipping, landing craft and experienced troop manpower shortages (problems which 
were well known to the British), which were far more crippling to SLEDGEHAMMER 
than the Americans envisaged. 
Air Power in Support of SLEDGEHAMMER 
This was defined as a combined Anglo-American air offensive beginning in mid-July 
1942, followed by a landing in Normandy six weeks later by five divisions with the 
aim of destroying all German forces in that part of France. Once fixed firmly ashore. 
air and ground bases would be established to press the attack towards Germany. 5° 
Before the effect of the Victory Program could be felt, the British would have to supply 
the bulk of the forces in an operation in which they did not believe. The Americans 
could send 700 aircraft and four divisions to Britain by September 1942. These ground 
formations, having had minimal training and no combat experience, could not be 
expected to do well against the German defences. This was the cost of trying to 
conscript a citizen army in the shortest possible time. Accepting these constraints, 
Marshall created his army on engineering principles, training men who could serve their 
weapons automatically, without thought. As its goal, men were to be mass-produced 
in assembly-line fashion, in the same cold manner that Henry Ford produced 
automobiles. To support this inexorable movement, stood a political and economic 
system, which was enormously productive, but it tended to turn men into adjuncts of 
their machines, relying more on the machines than in themselves. 51 
Specific to SLEDGEHAMMER, The British, having failed to discuss most of its 
problems openly with the Americans, not only evaded their responsibility to the 
alliance, but helped to distort and perpetuate American delusions by their duplicity. The 
Americans believed SLEDGEHAMMER to be possible and necessary. The British did 
50 'Strategic Deployment of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces of the US'. Washington, 6 Mar. 1942. RG 
165 OPD. JPS 2/6. 
51 M. Crefeld. Figluing Power, German and US Arm, Performance, 1939-1945. (London. 19S3). pp. 
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not, but feared the Americans would abrogate the 'Germany-first' agreement and turn 
unilaterally towards the Pacific, leaving Britain to fight on alone. Eisenhower had 
recommended a Pacific alternative if the British rejected the 'Marshall Nlemorandum. 52 
During the evening of 14 April, at the end of a War Cabinet Defence Committee 
meeting attended by the Americans, Churchill formally accepted Marshall's proposal. 53 
The Americans had been frank, the British had not. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on 17 
April, `We wholeheartedly agree... ' as the meetings in London concluded. 54 There 
would be no more thrashing around in the dark, or so it seemed. 
The British conferees in London deliberated over SLEDGEHAMMER from the time the 
Americans had left in mid-April and on 8 July they reached a decision. The Prime 
Minister informed the President by letter, the first paragraph of which read, 
No responsible British General, Admiral or Air Marshal is prepared to 
recommend SLEDGEHAMMER as a practicable operation in 1942. 
The Chiefs of Staff have reported `The conditions which would make 
SLEDGEHAMMER a sound sensible enterprise are very unlikely to 
occur. 155 
Marshall was dispirited by Churchill's repudiation of the April agreement. Ismay said 
of that time, 
Our American friends went happily homewards under the mistaken 
impression that we had committed ourselves to both ROUNDUP and 
SLEDGEHAMMER.. 
. 
When we had to tell them that we were 
absolutely opposed to it (SLEDGEHAMMER), they felt that we had 
broken faith with them.... 56 
We should have come clean, much cleaner than we did, and said, `We 
are frankly horrified because of what we have been through in our 
lifetime.. 
. you see, we are not going 
into this until it is a cast-iron 
certainty. ' 57 
While the British equivocated, the Americans were forthright. If Marshall was 
strategically naive, Churchill and Brooke were less than candid, avoiding any direct 
confrontation. Between Marshall and Brooke there was always something of a 
52 Eisenhower. `Memo for COS', Washington, 25 Mar. 1942. Op. cit. 
5; COS-USCOS Meeting, Op. cit. 
54 H. LoeNvenheim cat al, Op. cit., p. 206. 
55 Ibid., p. 222. 56 Ismay. Op. cit., pp. 249-250. 
57 F. Pogue. Interview with Gen. Lord H. Ismay. 18 Oct. 1960. 
121 
temperamental barrier, the British general reserving his true feelings over 
SLEDGEHAMMER for his diary. By not arguing for his strategic beliefs, he missed 
an opportunity to ensure the cohesiveness of the coalition by being forthright with the 
Americans, i. e., `agreement in principle' only applied to ROUNDUP and not to the 
plan as a whole, as they believed SLEDGEHAMMER required further study. On ?9 
April Churchill, unknown to Marshall and Hopkins, said to the War Cabinet. 'While 
preparations should proceed on the basis that we should make a resolute effort to 
capture a bridgehead on the Continent in the late summer (of 1942). we were not 
committed to carrying out such an operation. '58 
The War Cabinet agreed. Thus the euphoria of a `noble brotherhood of arms' 
disintegrated into an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust. There was grave 
danger that the coalition would disentangle. The differences between British and 
American thinking were analogous to those of Sherman and Grant during the American 
Civil War. Comparing Grant with himself, Sherman said, 
I'm a damn sight smarter man than Grant.... but I'll tell you where he 
beat me and where he beats the world. He don't give a damn for what 
the enemy does out of his sight but it scares me like hell ... 
I am more 
likely to change my orders or to countermand my command than he is. 59 
To get on with the war, qualified men, predisposed towards co-operation, good faith 
and action were needed to negotiate on behalf of the coalition, rather than for their own 
nation's interests; both Hopkins and Churchill thought they were qualified, 60 
unfortunately they were not; and MODICUM ended by re-defining itself as a `trifle' 
with indeterminate results. 
Before Marshall's second journey to London on 16 July, accompanied by his two 
colleagues. Hopkins and King, the President insisted that if SLEDGEHAMMER was 
definitely canceled, Marshall had to find another place where American troops could 
ficht in 1942. The American conferees were instructed to work for an absolute co- 
58 CAB. 65/30,28,29 Apr. 1942. 
59 L. Lewis. Sherman: Fighting Prophet. (New York, 1932), p. 424. 
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ordinated use of British and American forces. Roosevelt was convinced that only a 
second front would ease the German pressure on Russia: he said. 
It must be constantly reiterated that the Russian armies are killing more Germans and destroying more Axis material than all the twenty-five 
united nations put together. Therefore it has seemed wholly logical to 
support the great Russian effort in 1942... to develop plans aimed at diverting German land and air forces from the Russian front. 61 
Nevertheless, in late June the President doubted if a second front could be established 
with the means available before the November congressional elections. Time was 
running out. The President, lacking viable alternatives, either in the Pacific or the 
Middle East, leaned towards GYMNAST as the only economical choice in the war 
against Germany. Churchill and Brooke knew that Roosevelt secretly wanted a 
September GYMNAST, and that the American conferees were strategically in disarray: 
King preferred action in the Pacific, Hopkins in Africa and Marshall in Europe. 62 The 
concatenation of events in Russia and divergent American attitudes proved 
insurmountable to Marshall. If Churchill and Brooke remained steadfast, and at the 
same time supported BOLERO, GYMNAST would become a reality. 63 
Churchill and the COS prepared and agreed upon a tactical plan to use against the 
Americans. United against SLEDGEHAMMER, the British would not mention 
GYMNAST, but allow the Americans to make their case for the cross-Channel attack. 
The British believed that once the plan was rejected, the Americans, charged to follow 
Presidential instructions, would agree to GYMNAST. Meeting in closed session, the 
American conferees and their London staffs, seeking ways to overcome British 
reticence, revised SLEDGEHAMMER to mean a landing on the Cherbourg peninsula. 
The British had prepared a revision of their own, i. e., their government required 
permanent landings, a condition that the COS believed impossible to satisfy. Alone. 
this condition would defeat Marshall. 
I1Roosc elt to COS and Hopkins, Washington, 6 May 1942, PSF.. FDRL. 
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GYMNAST Prevails 
The meetings began on 20 July and lasted four days. The Americans presented their 
case, the theme of which was support for Russia in the guise of a cross-Channel attack 
either as a `sacrifice operation' or the `first-stage' of ROUNDUP; the British 
considered that a `sacrifice' operation against the Pas de Calais, if it were to absorb 
German forces and help the Russians, would end in disaster with the loss of six 
divisions, and furthermore, as a `first-stage' operation, the landing could not be 
maintained, because of rapid German military intervention and poor Channel weather 
after September. Marshall admitted that there was little time to activate 
SLEDGEHAMMER as a `sacrifice' operation, but he persisted in arguing for it as a 
`first-stage'. With 15 German divisions available along the Channel coast, with 
Cherbourg as the chosen port at the limit of fighter support, and the usual weather 
deterioration to come, the British rejected the American proposal as unrealistic. 
Churchill, sure of success, requested that the Americans inform Roosevelt of the 
impasse, as a means of opening the way for conversations on alternative operations» 
The President replied a few hours later, instructing his American representatives to 
reach consensus quickly. British concerns were dispelled during the stalemate, when 
Roosevelt requested that GYMNAST be considered for immediate consideration. 
Roosevelt compared an Allied invasion of North Africa with the German invasion of 
Norway, an operation that returned a large dividend on a small investment. Marshall 
was under no illusions; GYMNAST would have little or no direct effect upon any 
critical front of the war, but it did have the full support of both the President and Prime 
Minister, controllers of vast supplies and forces. He and King maintained that, 
... 
Great Britain is the only area from which the combined strength of the 
United Nations can be brought to bear against our principal enemy - 
Germany, so that no avoidable reduction in our preparations for 
ROUNDUP should be considered as long as there remains any 
reasonable possibility of its successful execution. 65 
f'`t Churchill to Roosevelt. London, 23 July 1942. CAB t, 5/31, p. 26. 
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Roosevelt responded to a second cable by Hopkins, indicating that he wanted an 
invasion date no later than 30 October, including orders of `full speed ahead'. 66 The 
American conferees noted that without active Russian participation and the continuation 
of BOLERO, it would be impossible to attain a continental operation in 1943. The only 
option left was a defensive line of action against Germany. The British insisted that 
GYMNAST, now renamed TORCH, did not break with ABC-1's combined strategic 
concept of sea blockade and air operations. The Americans disagreed, because 
GYMNAST was a defensive operation and ROUNDUP was not. They were also 
concerned that approval of TORCH would delay a 1943 ROUNDUP until 1944, a 
conclusion already reached by the British chiefs. On 24 July although Marshall had 
complied with his Commander-in-Chief, and both sides had agreed that a second front 
in Europe should be postponed until 1943, 'CCS-94', the combined statement of 
policy, read as if it were Marshall's creation: 
... 
if the situation on the Russian front by 15 September indicates such a 
collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make ROUNDUP 
appear impracticable of successful execution, the decision should be 
taken to launch a combined operation against North and North West 
coast of Africa at the earliest possible date before December 1942... 67 
As long as SLEDGEHAMMER did not interfere with TORCH, preparations for it 
should continue for the purposes of deception or exploitation, if either an emergency 
arose or the Germans collapsed. In addition, he persuaded the British to agree to the 
withdrawal from BOLERO of 15 groups of the US Army Air Force and a division's 
worth of assault shipping for use against the Japanese. 68 Because it would take over 
thi-cc months of planning and preparation to mount a North African operation, Marshall 
and King sought a definite decision on TORCH from the President and Primc Minister. 
Contrary to Marshall and King's thinking, Dill and Leahy thought that both political 
leaders had decided favorably. However, the two American Chiefs believed that by 
choosing TORCH, both Roosevelt and Churchill would have to acknowledge the 
11 Roosevelt to Hopkins, Marshall and King, 
81,1 (SS). 
('7 CCS 32 Meeting. 'CCS-94'. Washington 
68 Ibid. 
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consequences of dooming ROUNDUP: left unchallenged in the West, free from a 
cross-Channel attack for at least a year, the Germans could arrange their forces 
elsewhere at little cost to themselves. Consequently, TORCH would increase the strain 
on limited Allied resources because of longer shipping distances, additional tonnage 
requirements and repetitive shipment of manpower between Britain and the 
Mediterranean. 69 Marshall and Stimson tried to prolong the strategic debate as long as 
possible by accepting GYMNAST as the operation of last resort, i. e., if a Russian 
collapse led to an overflow of German troops into the West, GYMNAST would 
supersede ROUNDUP for 1943. As recorded by General Walter Bedell Smith, 
Roosevelt ended all speculation at a White House meeting attended by the JCS on 30 
July: 
The President stated very definitely that he, as Commander-in-Chief, 
had made the decision that TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest 
possible date. He considered that this operation was now our principal 
objective and the assembling of means to carry it out should take 
precedence over other operations as, for instance, BOLERO.. . we are 
now committed to the provisions of 'CCS-94', which calls for the final 
decision to be made by September 15.70 
The After-Shock of Roosevelt's Decision 
The President's approach in making his decisions continued to be cavalier. As usual, 
none of the major American participants were taken into his confidence. Rather than 
discussing the relative merits of his position with his Chiefs in London or with their 
surrogates in Washington, he informed them of his decision after the fact. Contrary to 
Marshall and King's thinking, Roosevelt, ignoring the need for further inquiry, insisted 
that his TORCH decision would not prevent ROUNDUP in 1943.71 Although 
Churchill and Brooke had been initially divided on GYMNAST, by 17 June after 
further conversations held between them, the other Chiefs of Staff and the War 
Cabinet, they agreed that the North African operation offered the only alternative for an 
69 T. Higgins. Winston Churchill and the Second Front. (New York: OUP, 1957), pp. 134-35.144. 
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allied offensive that year. 72 Taking comfort in their unified viewpoint, supported by 
Dill's confidential information, they could exploit American strategic fragmentation to 
their own advantage, which they did throughout the conference. Frustrated, Marshall 
and King sought refuge in 'CCS-94', in an attempt to lessen the effects of the decision. 
No sooner had the agreement been reached, that Marshall and King considered `taking 
up their dishes and going away', a figurative description of an increased American 
presence in the Pacific, and a de-emphasis of ABC-1.73 Although the President had 
contributed to the scuttling of both SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, he refused to 
allow any such reprisal, proclaiming that TORCH remain pre-eminent. Marshall 
considered it to be a momentous change in grand strategy and Eisenhower considered it 
to be the blackest day in the history of the war. 74 
During the controversy in London, the Pacific theater was in no way being treated as a 
back-water. The Americans increased the intensity of the conflict in the Pacific to such 
an extent that the Japanese realized that the Americans had the means and determination 
to defeat them. As the British could not be held directly accountable or liable for 
abrogating the SLEDGEHAMMER agreement, the Americans could not seek redress in 
binding arbitration. However, they could exact penalties. Direct sanctions applied 
against an ally were unconscionable, but with rearranged priorities and limited 
shipments to Britain, the effect was the same. For the rest of the year, resources 
flowed as fast to the Pacific as they did to the Mediterranean; while supplies to Britain 
slowed to a trickle. 75 As a result of the TORCH decision, the Army had more troops 
deployed against Japan by the end of 1942 than deployed against Germany. Both in an 
attempt to limit the feared dispersion of forces and in the belief that the turnabout was 
fair play, Marshall and King adopted to the British technique of interpreting a contract 
on the basis of `agreement in principle' (in spirit) rather than on `formal interpretation' 
72 CAB 79/22,24 July 1942. 
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(the letter). Dill made the distinction in a personal letter to Marshall, `To what extent 
does 'CCS-94' alter ABC-4/CS. 1 ?... it certainly covers TORCH... At present, our 
Chiefs of Staff quote ABC-4/CS. 1 as the Bible, whereas some of your people, I think. 
look upon 'CCS-94' as the revised version! '76 
Although Brooke admitted that an African operation involved a necessary dispersion of 
forces which would otherwise have been available for ROUNDUP, he felt TORCH 
was the only worthwhile operation: he stressed that strong forces were always needed 
in Britain, and plans should be made for them to re-enter Europe as soon as possible. 77 
When that would happen was questionable, but as late as 27 July, after the agreement 
had been reached, Churchill telegraphed Roosevelt: `... as I see it this second front 
consists of a main body holding the enemy pinned opposite SLEDGEHAMMER and a 
wide flanking movement called TORCH... '78 
The TORCH plan, even the later cautious American version, based on concerns over a 
shortage of shipping, mistrust of Spanish intentions and a reluctance to commit their 
green troops to a fierce initiation fitted easily into British strategy, whereas American 
strategy had to be fitted into TORCH. 79 Some of the more cynical amongst the 
American planners felt that they had been deceived by 'perfidious Albion'. They 
thought that Britain, leaving the defence of her island to the Americans, was free to 
pursue its imperial policies and post-war settlements elsewhere. Stimson, embittered 
over the decision to land in North Africa, forcefully expressed his dissatisfaction to the 
President. The Secretary's behavior encouraged army officers in the War Department 
to reveal their doubts and opposition to this change in strategy. Roosevelt's response 
was swift in coming: the Secretary was ostracized for several months. The importance 
of the London negotiations were expressed by Brooke at the end of the conference, `It 
has certainly been a trying week! The major strategy of the war had been at stake, and 
76 Dill to Marshall, Washington, 14 Aug. 1942. RG. 165 OPD WDCSA. 
77 B. Wynter. Op. cit., p. 440. 
78 H. Loewenheim. et al, Op. cit.. p. 227. 
79 Sir M. Howard, Op. cit., pp. 33-35. 
128 
the Americans intent on carrying out an attack that could only result in disaster. and 
might well vitiate the whole of our future strategy. '8° 
Churchill's Meeting with Stalin 
Approximately one month later, Churchill met with Stalin in Moscow to report on the 
TORCH agreement reached in London. Stalin's reaction differed from Brooke's. The 
Soviet leader concluded that his western allies had invalidated their arrangement with 
him for an Anglo-American landing in northern France. He said on 15 August 1942: 
... the refusal of the Government of Great Britain to create a second front in 1942 in Europe inflicts a moral blow to the whole of Soviet public 
opinion... prejudices the plan of the Soviet Command... deteriorates the 
Military situation of England and all the remaining Allies .... most favorable conditions exist in 1942 for a second front in Europe, because 
almost all the forces of the German Army have been withdrawn to the 
Eastern Front 
... the creation of a second front in Europe is possible and 
should be effective.... 81 
TORCH not only delayed the cross-Channel invasion until the spring of 1944, but 
exceeded its original operational estimates because of Hitler's decision to fight for 
Tunisia and denuded the European theater of operations of men and material - leaving it 
as a standby theater manned by a skeleton crew. 82 If it were Roosevelt's intention to pit 
American combat units against the Germans, he failed. French, not German, troops 
opposed the Americans during the TORCH landings in November 1942. TORCH not 
only failed to give Stalin the relief he needed, but it allowed Hitler to move twenty- 
seven divisions, including five armored divisions, from Northwest Europe to Russia. 83 
With the Allies failure to execute SLEDGEHAMMER, either as a landing or the threat 
of one, the Russian Army, which represented the only force capable of defeating or 
containing the German Army, faced near destruction. The twenty-five German 
divisions in France would have contained and eliminated a 1942 SLEDGEHAMMER, 
but the threat almost certainly would have 'contained' those twenty-fivc divisions. 
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While the German armies in Russia intensified their unrelenting pressure on the 
Soviets, the Germans in Tunisia were preparing to teach the Americans an unforgettable 
combat lesson, but not before another summit conference ended at Casablanca, 
Morocco in late January 1943. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The SYMBOL and TRIDENT Conferences 
On 7 January 1943, one week before the Casablanca Conference. Roosevelt convened 
a meeting of the JCS at the White House to discuss future strategic options. He asked 
if they were united in advocating a cross-Channel operation. He discovered that not 
only were there differences of opinion regarding the issue between the members of the 
JCS, but also between their planners and the Chiefs themselves. Marshall discounted 
further Mediterranean action on the basis of logistics and shipping demands, advocating 
a cross-Channel attack. 
The losses in northwest France would be in troops, but to state it 
cruelly, we could replace troops, whereas a heavy loss in shipping 
which would result from the BRIMSTONE (Sardinia) operation, might 
completely destroy any opportunity for successful operations against the 
enemy in the near future. ' 
Marshall had failed to raise this argument during the two London meetings of April and 
July 1942, when he had proposed SLEDGEHAMMER as a sacrificial operation to 
satisfy both Russian demands and American military thinking. By acknowledging the 
scarcity of American troops and the appalling Allied shipping losses to U-boats, 
Marshall's lobbying for SLEDGEHAMMER might have either exposed or limited 
British dissent. Timely, binding agreements were nearly impossible to attain throughout 
1942 and 1943, largely because the President continued to equivocate on the issue of a 
European grand strategy. The impasse between the British and American strategies 
was described, `as one thing or the other with no alternative in sight'. Roosevelt 
remained uncommitted under the circumstances, deferring decisions, seeking 
compromise, and allowing events or the British to take charge, rather than giving the 
JCS the clear direction it needed. As Commander-in-Chief, only he could choose 
between European and Mediterranean strategies on which policy could then be based. 
'White House Meeting. 7 January'. `Washington, 7 Jan. 1943. Rg 165 OPD. Minutes Meeting at 
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but he felt vulnerable and was wary of public criticism and his domestic political 
adversaries who could easily turn questions of foreign affairs into partisan politics. 
This he had learned from President Wilson's ill-fated attempts to dictate public opinion: 
he chose to obfuscate instead. He warned the JCS that the British would have a 
comprehensive plan at Casablanca, but he offered nothing comparable to his own staff. 
Disadvantaged, disorganized and disunited, all they could do was to fight a rear-guard 
action against the British. 2 
Casablanca was the `watershed' conference of the war. It was here that decisions were 
made to politicize the war in an utterly irretrievable manner3 and to develop a military 
strategy based on attrition rather than on maneuver, on the acquisition of space rather 
than the elimination of the German Army. 4 The outcome was stalemate. Incompatible 
differences increased the tensions between the British who advocated a war of attrition 
ending with a landing in France as the coup de grace and the Americans who advocated 
a war of concentration beginning with a collision of forces. 
Roosevelt, Churchill and their staffs, with Marshall and Brooke as the chief 
protagonists, met at Anfa, near Casablanca from 13 to 23 January 1943. Roosevelt's 
mood was optimistic and carefree, as if he were delighted to be out of the intemperate 
politics and cold weather of Washington. Sub-tropical Casablanca offered superb 
accommodations to the visiting dignitaries. Harold Macmillan wrote soon after 
arriving, 
... I christened the two personalities 
[Prime Minister and the President], 
the Emperor of the East and the Emperor of the West, and indeed it was 
rather like a meeting of the later period of the Roman Empire ... there was 
a curious mixture of holiday and business.. . in these 
fascinating 
surroundings. 5 
During the life of the Conference, the major participants attended thirty one meetings, 
some of which were presided over by the President and Prime Minister. Stalin had 
2 Ibid 
3 A. Wedemeyer, Op. cit., p. 169. 
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declined his invitation, because of the critical situation in Russia. The British arrived at 
the conference more united and better prepared than the Americans, having learned that 
the JCS had approved their agenda with minor modifications. To be discussed were 
issues of Anglo-American global strategy and future operations within each theater. In 
addition, a daunting agenda of force structures, logistics, training. area commands, 
Lend-Lease and assistance to Allies were to be considered. 6 
After the conferees assembled, the CCS agreed to thrash out the problems of combined 
strategy first, and then inform the Prime Minister and President of the work in progress 
later. Between the meetings of the CCS, the British and American Chiefs of Staff met 
separately to consider the points raised at the combined meetings. Churchill felt that it 
gave the representatives of both nations ample time to discuss and explore the various 
problems and possibilities based on personal contact. For the summit meetings at least, 
gone was the arrangement that separated the two Chiefs of Staffs Committees who 
depended upon the exchange of trans-Atlantic cables to resolve their strategic 
differences.? 
While the British were outwardly unified, portraying a firm and consistent line, the 
Americans suffered from an absence of unanimity. Since Dill had informed his 
superiors in London that the Americans lacked a `united front', Churchill decided to 
apply the same inexorable approach at Casablanca that had worked so successfully 
during the previous July in London. With the meetings following no set program, he 
waited until the Americans exhausted themselves talking, before applying the logic of 
British Mediterranean strategy. 8 The British conferees arrived with a headquarters 
ship, the HMS Bulolo, containing a full planning staff with elaborate secretarial. tele- 
communication, library and cipher facilities; the preparation of factual basis reports for 
the meeting was compiled by the GHQ Planning Staff in conjunction with Combined 
Operations Headquarters. Organized to present the British position and to counter 
6 CAB 122. CAB I 3'S. JSM 673 'Major Topics for Discussion at Casablanca', London. S Jan. 194',. 
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American arguments, Brooke's personal staff officer. Brigadier Guy Stewart, the 
Director of Plans at the War Office, headed a staff of specialists that supplied timely 
information to the British conferees upon request. 9 
By contrast, the American contingent, its preparations incomplete, was at a 
disadvantage; with no comparable infrastructure, and only three planning consultants 
on whom to rely. They were demonstrably out-classed at the conference table. 10 
Brigadier Ian Jacob, military assistant secretary to the War Cabinet, intimated that he 
never could have foreseen a result so comprehensively favorable to British ideas which 
prevailed almost throughout. " 
Both Marshall and King were of the opinion, to Churchill's surprise, that TORCH 
would delay the cross-Channel invasion until 1944, thereby eliminating the assistance 
Russia so desperately needed. 12 Churchill expected ROUNDUP in 1943. Fearing that 
Russia might collapse or sue for a separate peace and concerned about the defence of 
the British Isles, Churchill pleaded concurrently for greater allied activity in the 
Mediterranean and a rapid BOLERO build-up at home. Since BOLERO's place had 
slowed as the American shift to the Pacific increased, he concluded that Marshall was 
penalizing him for abandoning SLEDGEHAMMER, postponing ROUNDUP and 
promoting TORCH: late November War Department directives decreed that Lend-Lease 
supplies and materials formerly ear-marked for BOLERO's expansion were being cut- 
back. Concurrently, British construction costs and building responsibilities were 
increased in Britain, as the United States decided to lessen its financial burden there. 
Churchill, as a junior partner, had to plead his case with Roosevelt on 24 November 
1942. 
... 
This has caused us very great concern, not so much from the 
standpoint of Lend-Lease but on the grounds of grand strategy. We 
have been preparing under BOLERO for 1,100,000 men, and this is the 
first intimation we have had that this target is to be abandoned...! do beg 
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of you, Mister President, to let me know what has happened. At 
present we are completely puzzled. ' 3 
At a 16 January presidential meeting, King, doubtful of British strategic intentions, 
informed the President that the JCS had attempted and failed to obtain the COS's 
concept of how the war should be won. He concluded that the British had definite 
ideas as to what the next operation should be, but doubted that they had an overall plan 
for the conduct of the war. 14 Later the same day, during a CCS meeting, King 
continued his inquiry before the British. How was the war to be conducted`? What 
were the overall plans for the defeat of Germany, of Japan? What percentage of the 
war effort was to be applied to Germany, to Japan? Was Russia to carry the burden as 
far as the ground forces were concerned? Do we decide on a planned step by step 
policy or do we continue to rely on seizing opportunities? Since Europe was in the 
British area of strategic responsibility, he needed answers to these questions. " 
Although Churchill admitted that TORCH was no substitute for ROUNDUP, and 
agreed that it ought not be abandoned, he and his Chiefs offered the Americans the 
strategy they had recently constructed, which identified an Italian defeat as the first 
priority for 1943. Their list placed BOLERO and ROUNDUP seventh in a field of 
seven. Even though the British plan was riddled with contingencies and ineffectual 
compromises, the COS hoped that its design might eliminate the need for Roundup 
altogether. The British view, as recorded on 31 December 1942, obtained with some 
minor changes, i. e., action in the Mediterranean would have top priority, but sufficient 
resources would be allotted to the Pacific, and BOLERO would be slowly 
resuscitated. 16 The British seemed obsessed with preventing ROUNDUP. On 22 
January, the British Joint and Combined Planning Staffs offered two position papers. 
'CCS-167' and 'CCS-169'. 'CCS-167' examined various cross-Channel operational 
landings in the light of existing German morale and levels of disintegration, with a 
13 H. LoeNvenheim. et al. Op. cit., pp. 284-285. 
14 `Anfa Camp Conference Minutes. Casablanca', Washington. 16 Jan. 1943, Reel I. 
15 Ibid., CCS 5S Meeting, Washington. 16 Jan. 1943. Reel III. 
16 Casablanca Conference, Papers and Minutes of Meetings. CCS-151, Office of the CCS. Jan. 1943. 
pp. 18-19; W. Churchill. IV. p. 606. 
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target-date of August. The second paper, 'CCS-169' proposed an organization of 
command, control, planning and training for a cross-Channel operation in 1943. Raids 
would be considered on a contingency basis, but, as predicted, ROUNDUP «was 
declared dead for 1943. However, it recommended that preparations and planning 
continue. '7 No American paper was offered in rebuttal. The results of the Conference 
conformed to Wedemeyer's view. As one of the attending American planners, he 
wrote: 
We had gone to Casablanca without an agreed or clearly defined 
position among the American Army and Navy representatives. Nor did 
the President Roosevelt bring mature leadership to our own JCS. While 
permitting them freedom to state their personal views, he seldom gave 
them any specific knowledge of his own plans and policies. So once 
again we had no assurance that the President would support our own 
choice of concentration, and, on the military level, we were without 
agreement among ourselves as to how to convince the British of the 
danger of frittering away our combined resources on indecisive, limited 
operations. 18 
Wedemeyer paid tribute to Dill's ability to state the American position on innumerable 
occasions during the Conference; he described him as a friend rather than, as he once 
implied, a British informer. The following is an example of how Dill, before his 
reclamation, reported the American position to Churchill, as if the Field Marshal were 
part of the JCS and privy to its intimate thoughts. 
15 July 1942... Marshall is convinced that there has been no real drive 
behind the European project. Meetings are held, discussions take place, 
and time slips by... King's war is against the Japanese... May I suggest 
with all due respect that you must convince your visitors that you are 
determined to beat the Germans, that you will strike them on the 
continent of Europe at the earliest possible moment even on a limited 
scale, and that anything which detracts from this main effort will receive 
no support from you at all? 19 
Wedemeyer wondered how Dill, who clearly described the American position, 
procured this classified material. Alex Danchev, one of Dill's biographers, discounted 
Wedemeyer's suspicions as nothing more than the response of a planner protective of 
American interests. 20 By contrast, at the Chiefs of Staff level, if Marshall perceived 
17 66 Meeting, Ibid.. Washington. 22 Jan. 1943, 'CCS 167 & 169'. 
18 A. Wedeme e-er, Op. cit., p. 185.188. 
19Ibid.. pp. 165-167. 
20 A. Danchev. Op. cit.. pp. 96-97. 
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Dill as doctrinaire, rather than as an 'honest broker', Dill's influence and credibility 
would have been damaged. Wedemeyer failed to explain his changed opinion of Dill 
and the Briton's newly acquired prestige. In fact, Dill was now portrayed as a man 
who garnered immense respect and affection in Washington for his efforts to state the 
American case. Wedemeyer lamented, `We had no Dill of our own in London. Even 
had we had one, it is doubtful that he could have penetrated the glacis set up by the 
British conviction that their decisions were beyond argument. ' 21 
General John Kennedy, Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had written of 
the Conference that, 
On the afternoon of the first day, the British Chiefs held a short meeting 
to enable Dill to bring us up to date about the Americans' point of 
view.... They were still opposed to operations across the 
Mediterranean.... This estimate of the American attitude was what we 
had expected. We were still convinced that they were wrong and we 
were right. Now our problem was to get them to accept our strategy. 
without causing them to lose interest in the priority of operations against 
Germany. We all felt that the Americans had bigger ideas than ours and 
more drive; but we had as yet no great respect for the quality of their 
staff work, and did not regard their strategical conceptions as being 
based on realities, but we found the American officers difficult to 
know. 22 
A concerned Kennedy reported that the following day's meeting went round in circles. 
Both sides stuck to their guns; and for the first week, no progress was made. 
Opposing arguments were repeated ad nauseam. 23 King, with Roosevelt's approval, 
indicated that some modifications to the `Germany-first' policy had to be included in 
any bilateral agreement. The Americans sought to shift to the offensive against Japan. 
and as soon as United States productivity increased, more and more resources would 
flow to the Pacific. 24 This was worrisome for the British conferees, who knew that 
neither ally could afford to delay the assault on Germany, because of Britain's 
diminishing resources and the American public's demands for revenge in the Pacific. 
=t A. Wedemeycr. Op. cit.. P. 1 S5. ISS. 
22 Sir J. Kennedy Op. ('I'[. - pp. 
2S01-28,1. 
23 Ibid., pp. 'S(1-281. 
24 K. Greenfield. Op. cit., p. 72. 
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On 15 January, opposing position papers were read, expressing each side's strategic 
views. The American paper emphasized increased action in the Pacific. while the 
British paper continued to assign the top priority to a `Germany-first' policy. The 
differences seemed irreconcilable and pointed to the papers' underlying message: How 
did each side perceive the adequacy of resources, their availability and distribution? To 
the Americans, the cup was always half full: they could supply both theaters. To the 
British, it was always half empty: enough was never enough. To the Americans, living 
in the `land of plenty', shortages were an easily overcome inconvenience; but to the 
British, living in a land of limited resources, shortages were a hard learned lesson of 
war. To them resources of every kind would always be limited and insubstantial, 
creating difficulties in every theater that demanded them. - King resented British 
attempts to review American naval strategy in the Pacific and inquired, 
... who was going to 
bear the principal burden of defeating Japan once 
Germany was defeated? If you are afraid that we would become totally 
absorbed in the Pacific to the exclusion of Europe, we can not shake off 
the suspicion that the you might run out on us altogether once the war in 
Europe had been, largely by use of American resources, brought to an 
end. 26 
King's questioning hid his true intentions, that of keeping British naval power out of 
the Pacific, where he chose to remain dominant. Coupled with Marshall's avowed 
distaste for further Mediterranean excursions, King's accusatory approach could have 
been an attempt to extract strategic concessions from the British. Admiral Sir Percy 
Noble, a member of the JSM in Washington, had this to say about King, in a letter to 
Cunningham, 
... they would 
like to feel that they could take on the Pacific without any 
assistance from us... I have a feeling that King does not want to see too 
powerful a British fleet in being when peace eventually comes. To sum 
up. I believe that if Admiral King were to speak his mind for once. he 
would say something like this: `Blast these British, they scrounge round 
getting everything they can out of us and have let us down 
repeatedly... '27 
25 Sir M. Howard. Grand StrateLýv. IV. (London, 1972). pp. 24S-249. 
26 CCS 55 Fleeting, Casablanca, 14 Jan. 1943, Reel III. 
27 Aim. Sir P. Noble to AF Viscount A. Cunningham, London. 12 Jan. 1944. Cunningham Papers. 
MSS. 52571.72. BL. 
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British policy had by no means been decided before the Conference. but there was 
general agreement between members of the COS that some Mediterranean operation 
should be mounted. Increasingly focused in the Pacific, if they considered Europe at 
all, the Americans preferred a landing in northwest France, rather than face possible 
entrapment in the Mediterranean. When enough steam had been blown off, Brooke 
wrote of the Americans, 
It is a slow and tiring business, which requires a lot of patience. They 
can't be pushed and hurried.... It is a slow and tedious business, as all 
matters have to be carefully explained before they can be absorbed.. .1 was in despair and in the depths of gloom.... It is no use, we shall never 
get agreement with them. 28 
Dill helped Brooke recognize that an agreement was closer than he realized, and that the 
time had come to produce a draft statement of strategic policy. According to Dill, it 
would be a mistake to allow a catalogue of unsolved problems to fall into the hands of 
the President and the Prime Minister. If Brooke were willing to demonstrated some 
flexibility, he could break the stalemate and secure the agreement he sought. Brooke 
agreed. 29 The statement that followed was translated by the combined planners into a 
definite program for consideration. Surprisingly, the CCS accepted it the following 
day with only a few trifling changes, allowing practical planning to begin. 30 Dill's 
ability to perform both as a consultant and an interpreter of American and British 
intentions to both Brooke and Marshall eased some of the tensions. Selflessness aside, 
because final responsibility lay elsewhere, armed only with the power to influence and 
persuade, he was well-equipped and in a position to play the `honest broker'. Marshall 
held Dill in high regard and praised him in a memo to the President. 
Dill accompanied me to the Casablanca conference at my suggestion.... 
His presence there I believe was of vital importance and at one time 
practically prevented a complete stalemate regarding the differences 
between Admiral King and Sir Alan Brooke over the Pacific-European 
issue. Throughout the conference it was apparent that after each 
difficult meeting a great deal was done by Dill to translate the American 
point of view into terms understandable to the British, also the fact that 
28 Fiji Lord Alanbrooke. 3/. /VIII. 16-18 Jan. 1943. pp. 600-608. 
29 Ibid., p. 603: CCS 66 Meeting. 22 Jan.. 'CCS ' 155/1 Conduct of the War in 1943'. Casablanca, 19 
Jan. 1943. Reel III. 
30 Sir J. Kennedy, Op. cit., p. 281. 
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in certain matters there could be no compromise. It was useless for 
them to further complicate the discussion. 31 
Nevertheless, the negotiations ended in unsatisfactory compromise, because both sides 
failed to agree on the percentage of resources required for each of the major theaters. 
King, Pound, Arnold and Portal mirrored what Churchill and Roosevelt wanted. a 
strategy that would open the Mediterranean to shipping, employ an expanding army and 
establish air bases from which southern Europe could be attacked. Moreover, so many 
conditions had been placed on ROUNDUP that the Americans began to suspect that the 
British lacked commitment. The British learned that the threatened increase of 
American action in the Pacific was not only used to extort a cross-Channel attack 
agreement from the them, but to satisfy the needs of an American public more angry 
with Japan than Germany. Withal, the British prevailed: Japan would be held in check 
with the existing forces in the Pacific, with limited aggressive action planned, while 
Germany was defeated. 32 Although Marshall submitted without rancor, he still 
believed that only a head-on collision of forces would eliminate the Germans from the 
war. He felt `land-liberation' was both more costly and more time-consuming than 
'force-concentration'. 
The three major aspects of an emerging British Mediterranean strategy were as follows: 
it was essentially opportunistic, politically as much as militarily, it provided the battle 
ground on which to defeat the Germans, and it would relieve the Russians of German 
pressure. The Mediterranean would gain prominence as a theater in which 
opportunistic military operations after Torch would continue. Wedemeyer felt that the 
British test of friendship placed limited value on loyalty and reciprocity, more on 
enticement and manipulation. He blamed the British for their lack of flexibility. seeking 
to take more than they gave, as epitomized in negotiations by the voluble Prime 
Marshall to Roosevelt. Washington, 20 Feb. 1943. FRUS: Washington and Casablanca, p. 721. 
J. Grigg. ()p. cit., pp. 72-76. 
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Minister and his sensitive Chief of Staff. 33 In turn, Wedemeyer, as Marshall's chief 
military planner, criticized the American chain of command: 
There were several weaknesses in the planning work of the American 
staff: we lacked pre-prepared studies, and were forced to rely on 
memory. Our Army and Navy should have scrupulously avoided airing 
their differences in the presence of foreigners. The President should 
have been better briefed on the logic of our proposals. 34 
Wedemeyer was impressed with the large and well-organized British delegation: 
They swarmed down upon us like locusts, with a plentiful supply of 
planners and various other assistants, with prepared plans to insure that 
they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with 
fair promise of continuing in the role of directing strategy the whole 
course of this war.... They had us on the defensive practically all the 
time. 3s 
The American Handicap 
Even it the Americans had come to Casablanca with a well-conceived strategic plan, 
and equipped with an excellent administrative structure, it is unlikely that they could 
have recommended ROUNDUP as a viable option in 1943. Roosevelt, seeking further 
operations in the Mediterranean, was against it and Marshall's planners disagreed over 
ROUNDUP's feasibility. Eisenhower, deliberating further, believed ROUNDUP 
could not be staged before August 1944.36 After post-Torch conversations with 
Eisenhower, Marshall considered fighting a strong rearguard action in ROUNDUP's 
defence rather than risking a direct confrontation the British and the reluctant members 
of his own team. However, Roosevelt and Churchill took even that option from them: 
they did not believe the Allied armies in North Africa should remain idle, awaiting the 
amalgamation of men and supplies needed for a Channel crossing, when the Russians 
Nvcrc engaged in titanic battles in the East. Inaction in 1943 would not, indeed could 
not, he tolerated. 
3; A. \Vedemeyer. Op. cit., p. 188. 
34 11yid.. p. 191-192. 
35 Ibid.. p. 192. 
36 `Eisenhower to Gen. T. Handy', A. Chandler. (ed. ). The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
(Baltimore. 1970): M. Matlotf. Op. cit.. pp. 75-76. 
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American airmen, including Arnold, joined their British counterparts in advocating the 
need for Mediterranean air bases from which to bomb southern Germany and Romania. 
These would have to be taken by force of arms. Marshall and his compatriots may not 
have been overcome or out argued by the British, or even forced to accept their 
decisions reluctantly. A kinder interpretation is that their thinking at Casablanca may 
have reflected American open-mindedness and flexibility. This was in sharp contrast to 
Wedemeyer's position, who represented a view far more complex than simply coming 
to terms with the military realities of 1943.37 Privately, some top American officers had 
lingering doubts about British intentions, and they expressed little appreciation for 
Britain's war effort, battle experience and strategic planning. If differences of opinion 
between the Americans had not weakened their negotiating position, and if Brooke 
were less formidable and convincing at the conference table, the results at Casablanca 
might have limited future Mediterranean operations, thus benefiting ROUNDUP. 38 
At the highest civilian level, there were problems at Casablanca. On 24 January, 
Roosevelt demonstrated a form of state-craft that was at best casual and at worst 
irresponsible. His controversial policy of `unconditional surrender', consented to by 
Churchill with feigned surprise, was proclaimed to the world at the final press 
conference. For Stalin, King, Marshall and Hull, the surprise was genuine. They had 
not been consulted or notified beforehand. The President would have been wiser to 
gather his thoughts and to disengage from people holding conflicting points of view, 
particularly during an overburdened and stressful summit, before announcing his policy 
to the world. The President first aired his notion, which had the quality of Churchill's 
personal and unofficial free-floating `Morning Thoughts', at a White House Meeting on 
7 January. 39 No discussions followed at the White House concerning the political- 
military ramifications of the formula. Subsequently, Churchill, members of the War 
Cabinet, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Eden were notified between 19-21 
37 Sir M. Howard, Op. cit., IV, pp. 243-244. 
38 B. Pitt, Churchill and the Generals, (Newton Abbot, 1988), pp. 155-158. 
39 'Morning Thoughts' represented Churchill's personal views and were not a product of full 
consultation with the War Cabinet. 
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January. They responded approvingly, but objected when the formula failed to include 
Italy. 40 
`Unconditional surrender', immortalized by Union General Ulysses S. Grant during 
the American Civil War, could be argued to be the appropriate tactic for that war - 
particularly for the siege of Ft. Donelson. To appropriate the term as a slogan eighty 
years later did not suggest a sound strategic policy, however dramatic. 41 Churchill 
notified the War Cabinet and offered his interpretation: the Germans had forfeited their 
rights to any particular form of treatment They were to be completely disarmed and 
deprived of the power to re-arm. They were to stand trial for atrocities and prohibited 
from all uses of aviation. In addition, Germany was to be broken up into separate 
states and some of its population shifted. Prussia, always the heart of German 
militarism, was to be erased from the map of Europe. Germany once again had to pay 
reparations. The entire German Army and its General Staff were to be disbanded. 42 
Goebbels called it `total slavery' and `castration for the whole male population. ' And 
the German population believed him, accepting that a total war was being waged 
against the German nation, not just the Nazi party; and consequently, the formula 
nearly destroyed six years of work by the anti-Nazi opposition. 418 Eisenhower would 
look for a softening of the formula when his armies were poised to attack the Germans 
on the continent. 43 
During Congressional Subcommittee hearings in May 1942, members concluded that 
while `unconditional surrender' would undoubtedly be preferred, if the military 
situation permitted, study should also be given to the possibility of an armistice and a 
negotiated peace. Taking into account the Russian position, the President chose 
`unconditional surrender' over these options, after being informed of the 
40 M. Balfour, Te Origin of the Formula, Unconditional Surrender in World War II', Armed Forces 
and Society, 5,2, (1979), p. 283. 
41 Sir B. Liddell Hart, `The Background of Unconditional Surrender', 31 July 1943, Op. cit., 
11/1943/50. 
42 R. Lamb, The Ghosts of Peace, 1935-1945, (London, 1987), pp. 226-227, `Note by the PM to the 
War Cabinet', London, 15 Jan. 1944. 
43 A. Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender, (Westport, CT, 1974), pp. 249-262; M. Matloff, Op. cit., 
p. 431. 
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subcommittee's findings. 44 Moreover, experts on political warfare, specialists on Axis 
internal affairs, or `post-war planners' in London and Washington were not asked for 
their opinions. Alan Wilt, in his journal article on Casablanca simply reported 
Roosevelt's choice without further analysis. 45 The President's abhorrence of the Axis 
narrowed his war aims to simple destruction of the enemy regime, and discouraged 
consideration of policy once the fighting stopped. The United Nations, controlled by 
the victorious `Big Four', would supersede the previous balances of power in the post- 
war world. Winning the war and punishing the enemy became his administration's 
eventual political and military objectives, with all other political considerations 
becoming irrelevant. Churchill and Eden were willing and enthusiastic collaborators. 46 
The President remarked that he as `Dr. Win-the-War' had replaced `Dr. New Deal'. 47 
Author, Stephen Ambrose wrote that, `Unconditional surrender was a brilliant stroke of 
policy, because by keeping this and other war aims vague, Roosevelt prevented 
bickering among the Allies. '48 This observation is debatable, because even before 
Roosevelt's announcement, the Allied leadership was already treating each other with 
doubt, suspicion, and mild contempt. The evidence suggests that the President's views 
on policy were vague all along; and his decision to speak out, without prior 
consultation, was a manifestation of that vagueness. Was this proclamation the means 
of unifying uneasy partners? The unconditional surrender statement can only be 
understood if such `bickering' is seen as analogous to `appeasing', i. e. as a means of 
reassuring Stalin. However, Roosevelt failed, because Stalin could not be assuaged 
with words alone, particularly when an Anglo-American second front remained still- 
born. A more plausible reason emerges, that of soothing an American public outraged 
over Eisenhower's dealings with Admiral Jean Darlan, commander of all Vichy forces 
in French North Africa, which resulted in the French agreeing to a cease-fire. Even 
44 N. Davis, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945, (Washington., 1949). 
45 A. Wilt, `The Significance of the Casablanca Decisions, January 1943', JMH, 55,4, (1991), pp. 
517-529. 
46 T. Ben-Moshe, The Origins of the Declaration of the Policy of Unconditional Surrender- A New 
Interpretation, unpublished, (Hebrew University, 1981). 
47 P. Seabury & A. Codevilla, Op. cit., p. 92. 
48 S. Ambrose, Op. cit., p. 25 
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though the agreement saved American lives, an anxious public considered Eisenhower 
to be politically naive, and the President to be losing sight of the war's purpose. 
Within the context of `total war', an explanation of `unconditional surrender' was 
superfluous, unless it was needed to project an ulterior motive, that of softening 
American public opinion. Recognizing that to jump too far ahead of his constituency 
was politically dangerous, Roosevelt pitched his declaration to the folks at home and 
achieved the desired result. 49 
The Allied leaders lost an opportunity to deeply reflect on the question of `whether total 
victory is necessarily the surest foundation for a lasting peace' over the Hitler regime. 5° 
Understanding Russian intentions regarding Roosevelt's notion was difficult to assess, 
but ten months later, in late October they acceded to its principles. `Unconditional 
surrender', made public as an Allied war aim, had deleterious effects: it stiffened the 
enemy's will to resist, it delayed Italian armistice negotiations at a most critical time, 
and it contributed much grist to the German propaganda mill. If the `unconditional 
surrender' document formalized the destruction of Germany and precluded the 
existence of a German government with which to negotiate, what was its purpose? 5' 
The argument is circular. Whatever Roosevelt's deeper reasons, e. g., to avoid a 
repetition of Wilson's `Fourteen Points', to quiet the public over the Darlan deal, to 
change the geographical and social map of Germany, to convince Stalin that his western 
allies were not intending a separate peace with Germany and to prevent him from doing 
the same, it smacked of vengeance. However, if it had been Allied policy (rather than 
Roosevelt's), negotiated in conference by qualified staff and applied to Germany alone, 
`unconditional surrender', with modifications, could have contributed to the attainment 
of security from post-war German ambitions. William Cavendish-Bentinck held a 
senior position in the Foreign Office in 1943. He stated, 
When news of the unconditional surrender formula came through from 
Casablanca I told Cadogan, `There are two old men out there who have 
49 A. Campbell, `Franklin Roosevelt and Unconditional Surrender', R. Langhorne, (ed. ), Diplomacy 
and Intelligence during the Second World War, (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 222-225. 
50 Sir M. Howard, Op. cit., p. 285. 
51 The term `Unconditional Surrender' was meaningless in the Spring of 1945, because there was no 
real German Government in existence. 
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done this without thinking while they were full up with rough red 
Moroccan wine. ' Later my view was that this formula did make the 
Germans fight harder; on the other hand it led to the complete break-up 
of the German officer corps and their being absolutely discredited. 52 
It failed even to demonstrate that the war's mission was for `good' to triumph over 
`evil', because the inclusion of Stalinist Russia as part of the Grand Alliance had 
already corrupted that perception. 53 The time to fight a different kind of war for 
different ends was long past because primary war aims with regard to Germany had 
never been clarified, and both the Britain and Russia had hidden agendas. 
Nevertheless, the scourge of Third Reich had to be obliterated, and if Russia was the 
vehicle with which to proceed, Churchill and Roosevelt recognized that her 
participation was crucial. 
On 10 March 1944, The JSSC enclosed a proposed memorandum, `Effect of 
Unconditional Surrender' Policy on German Morale to be approved and forwarded by 
the JCS to the President. The committee recommended that the President make a 
statement, following a large scale bombing raid and before OVERLORD, that would 
reduce the existing level of German morale increased since the original formula was 
announced more than a year before. Hopefully, it would separate the Nazis from the 
German people, free the population from its criminal leadership and ease Allied entry 
into Germany. 54 Roosevelt refused. 
The Notables' Reaction 
Impressions at Casablanca hardened rather than softened Roosevelt's opinion of 
Churchill. `On specific issues, [Roosevelt] could also be more acerbic toward the 
Prime Minister than he was toward Stalin. '55 Roosevelt had concluded earlier that 
Churchill was an old fashioned imperialist bent on protecting the Empire. With a 
certain disregard, he decided that it was pointless to discuss political issues with him, 
52 R. Lamb, Op. cit., p. 223. 
53 J. Grigg, Op. cit., pp. 72-75. 54 JSSC, `Effect of `Unconditional Surrender' Policy on German Morale', Washington, 10 Mar. 1944, 
RG165. 
55 H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York, 1994), p. 401. 
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and only did so when there was no other choice, i. e., the Giraud-de Gaulle French 
leadership problem. 
The President and de Gaulle, leader of the fighting Free French forces, met for the first 
time in Casablanca. Roosevelt was already prejudiced against him, because of his 
involvement in the ill-fated Dakar expedition and his involvement in seizing Vichy held 
islands off the Canadian Atlantic coast. Little is known of what de Gaulle said when 
they met in private, because he spoke in low tones, recorded as grunts by both Elliot 
Roosevelt and Captain John L. McCrae waiting outside. 56 In this, Churchill colluded. 
sometimes behaving as Roosevelt's henchman against de Gaulle. 57 Putting both 
French generals together at Casablanca, in what seemed to be a `shotgun wedding', 
turned out to be a poorly staged-managed affair, that soon ended in divorce. Roosevelt 
commented in a letter to Hull, 
We delivered our bridegroom, General Giraud, who was most co- 
operative on the impending marriage, and I am sure was ready to go 
through with it on our terms. However, our friends could not produce 
the bride, the temperamental lady de Gaulle. She has got quite snooty 
about the whole idea and does not want to see either of us, and is 
showing no intention of getting into bed with Giraud... 58 
Thinking that Giraud, High Commissioner of French Africa, and de Gaulle would 
accept and execute an Allied policy concerned with those parts of the French Empire 
free of Vichy control, both the President and the Prime Minister failed to realize that an 
insurmountable political and military gulf existed between the Frenchmen. The 
meeting, at which the two generals posed shaking hands, was nothing more than a 
charade that ended with a vague declaration of Gallic resolve. Grudgingly, the Prime 
Minister knew that de Gaulle would not sacrifice his country's dignity in his dealings 
with the President the way he had over TORCH. This combination and interplay of 
Sh Adm. J. McCrea, 'Roosevelt-de Gaulle Conversation - President's Villa', Casablanca, 22 Jan. 1943. 
Unpublished papers of J. L. McCrea, FDRL; Sir M. Howard, Op. cit.. Grand Strategy, pp. 279- 
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57 Gen. C. de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre, (Paris. 1954-1959), p. 256. 
58 Roosevelt to C. Hull. Washington. IS Jan. 1943. PSF. FDRL. 
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prejudicial attitudes and concrete intransigence between Roosevelt, Churchill, and de 
Gaulle added little to the speed of French revival or getting on with the war. "' 
Although Roosevelt was a steadfast ally in the war against Hitler. he opposed rather 
than shared Churchill's `imperial' point of view. When the Atlantic Charter was being 
formulated, Roosevelt wanted it to apply, not only to Europe. but everywhere, 
including the colonial areas. Churchill and the British War Cabinet rejected the 
suggestion out of hand, insisting that the Charter was not intended to deal with the 
internal affairs of the British Empire.. . or the 
Philippines. 60 Roosevelt commented to 
his son, Elliot, at the conference, `The English mean to maintain their hold on their 
colonies. They mean to help the French maintain their hold on their colonies. Winnie 
is a great man for the status quo. He even looks like the status quo, doesn't he? '61 
Attritional Warfare 
Setting aside his respect for and adherence to military-civilian doctrine, and his oath as 
an officer, Marshall failed to convince the President, before complying, that 
ROUNDUP was worth defending. Although against attritional wars and 
inconsequential operational `pin-pricking' stabs, Marshall sacrificed ROUNDUP, 
because the President and the JCS had abandoned his policy. Hypothetically, if 
Marshall had disputed Brooke's Mediterranean strategy again, while advancing his own 
theories for a 1943 ROUNDUP, he might have persuaded the opposition on both sides 
to join him. 
Failing to do this, fighting a lonely rearguard action, Marshall's only recourse was to 
agree to the reduction of the Tunisian bridgehead from which no armed forces were to 
he deflected. 62 Its destruction was given `top priority' at Casablanca, thereby 
eliminating any consideration for other timely, more rewarding. opportunistic actions 
`" Gen. C. de Gaulle. Op. cit., pp 241.251. J. Grigg, Op. cit., pp. 156-160. 
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with a higher rate of profitability. Commenting on the allied failure to capture Tunis in 
late 1942, Liddell Hart wrote, 
This failure turned out to be one of the biggest blessings in disguise that 
could have happened. For without such a failure Hitler and Mussolini 
would not have had the time or the encouragement to pour very large 
reinforcements into Tunisia and build up the defence of that bridgehead 
to a strength of over a quarter of a million - who had to fight with an 
enemy-dominated sea at their backs, and if defeated would be trapped. 63 
Failure to take Tunis might have been a blessing, but plans for its reduction were not. 
Opportunities for victory were missed. For example, if after sealing off the bridgehead 
by the convergence of and the co-operation between the Allied air, naval, and ground 
forces, and after ringing the bridgehead with a minimum force, threatening but not 
activating large-scale ground combat, the Allies could have employed the bulk of their 
forces in strategic operations elsewhere. Moreover, potential operations in Northwest 
Europe and Norway would have loomed large. Diminished in power, cut off, 
weakened by losses, starved of reinforcements and supplies, the German Afrika Corps, 
as if by decree, could only wither in Tunisia and surrender anyway. The projected date 
of collapse, according to statisticians, was 1 June. The predicted demise of the Afrika 
Corps could have been achieved by an economy of effort, with patience, and an 
intelligent use of manpower, but this was not to be. Allied victory in the deserts of 
Tunisia followed victory in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, and not the other way 
around. Once applied, a strategy for action elsewhere, relegated Mediterranean 
operations as `a threat only' 
The Chances of a Normandy Invasion in 1943 
The final defeat of the Axis in North Africa was a singular and unimaginative opcration, 
imprinted on Brooke's strategic flag. Most Allied theater forces were involved. 
because of the tactics employed, which resulted in a final battle, insensitive tc time and 
alternate opportunities. According to historian, John Grigg. Axis action in the 
bridgehead ceased to exist on 13 May and, for eight months. from January to August 
63 Sir B. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War. (London. 1970). pp. 450-455. 
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1943, most troops and landing craft that could have been used in assaulting Normandy 
from England, engaged in reducing the bridgehead or achieving results, if the 
alternative strategy obtained, best left to others. Grigg concluded that the Germans 
defending the bridgehead, gained the time needed for their countrymen in Northwest 
Europe to construct and improve Channel fortifications along the French coast. With 
impunity, they transferred seventeen divisions from western Europe between 
November 1942 and February 1943 which added, not relieved, pressure on the 
Russians. American disunity, portrayed at the conference table, the President's 
inability to clarify his aims, precluded closing in on and attaining an important 
`glittering' prize, the reasonable possibility of winning the war one year earlier. 64 
Grigg's view is an oversimplification, albeit with some merit, because TORCH, 
regarded as the first major amphibious assault planned and executed by the Allies, 
posed problems of unknown dimensions. The whole range of amphibious procedures 
and the utilization of inter-service communications, air power, close-in naval 
supporting-gunfire, regimental combat teams, combat-loading logistics, controlled by 
an overall commander were in their infancy and lacked the proficiency a Normandy 
invasion demanded. Some experience from and evaluation of two recent smaller 
amphibious operations could be drawn. Guadalcanal, an island in the South Pacific, 
and Dieppe, a French port on the English Channel, were stark reminders if the enemy 
in North Africa had been preponderantly Japanese or German. Grigg erred again when 
he wrote the following: 
Those who persist in arguing that an invasion of France had been out of 
the question in 1943, because the Allies did not yet have enough 
landing-craft for such an enterprise, should note carefully that in the first 
stage of Husky nine divisions were simultaneously afloat - two more 
than in the first stage of Overlord the following year. Marshall might 
have fought harder for Roundup 1943 and won, if those around him 
had remained steadfast. 65 
Although Grigýg's plans for the reduction of the North African salient. its aftermath and 
post-TORCH operations in 1943 remain a valuable theoretical contribution, it does not 
64 J. Grigg. Op. cit., pp. 7S-80. 
Ibid.. p. 91. 
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follow that a released Mediterranean Allied force could have accomplished a beachhead 
in Normandy from which to breakout and pursue, any more than Marshall could have 
convinced the President to exchange 1943 Mediterranean operations for ROUNDUP. 
Even though Sicily was the largest amphibious assault in history, an operation which 
included 3,000 ships, over 200 air squadrons. upwards of 500,000 men and two 
airborne divisions, there were only 200,000 Italians soldiers and 62,000 assorted 
German troops of questionable fighting ability on the island to offer resistance, a far cry 
from the 15 to 30 German divisions obstructing entry into northwestern France. 
Unlike Normandy, the loss of Sicily, in the long term, presented no threat to Germany, 
regarding the outcome of the war in the West. 66 
Grigg's assessment failed to compare Sicily with Normandy: the requirements of each, 
and the levels of German response to either landing were not seriously considered. He 
believed that if Normandy had been chosen over Sicily and Italy, it could have been 
accomplished according to American doctrine at an earlier date. No doubt, but at what 
expenditure`? Grigg's recommendation for a 1943 cross-Channel attack is plausible if 
viewed as a sacrificial SLEDGEHAMMER operation to assist the Russians, regardless 
of cost; otherwise, OVERLORD demanded time, will and technology in order to 
succeed. Lt. General Frederick Morgan's directive of 15 July 1943, addressed to the 
Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee at the QUADRANT Conference made the 
comparison between the two operations: 
Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct 
comparisons between operation HUSKY and operation OVERLORD. 
No doubt the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will 
prove invaluable when the detailed planning stage for OVERLORD is 
reached, but viewed as a whole the two expeditions could hardly be 
more dissimilar. In HUSKY the bases of an extended coastline were 
used for a converging assault against an island: whereas, in 
OVERLORD it is necessary to launch an assault from an island against 
an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore, while in the 
Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather reasonably 
reliable, in the English Channel, the tidal range is considerable and the 
weather capricious. 67 
66 T. Higgins. Op. cit., pp. 76-87. 
67 Lord Ismay. 'QUADRANT Directive'. London, 15 July 1943. Op. cit., V16/13. 
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War is chaotic even when the best of plans are made. The tactical lessons learned off 
the North African shore and on its beaches may have prevented greater loss of life in 
subsequent operations such as HUSKY. Competence demanded that failed 
procedures, unreliable equipment and poor leadership be changed before the next 
amphibious operation. The aftermath of TORCH revealed that the operation was 
hastily organized and carried out under very difficult sea conditions, that the troops 
were inadequately trained and that planning was more theoretical than practical. The 
odds favor the defender, particularly when they enjoy the benefit of superior weaponry, 
advanced land mobility and land-based air power. 68 Only seven percent of the Allied 
military were at the `sharp end' of the fighting in the Second World War, they deserved 
the highest standards of leadership and technology, if only for the reason that 
experienced combat soldiers were difficult to replace. 
During the summer of 1943, General James Christiansen, Army Ground Forces COS, 
was sure that when Marshall decided to freeze the Army at 7.7 million with 3.2 million 
of the `best and the brightest' allocated to the Air Force, he had made a fateful decision 
i. e., that an Anglo-American air offensive plus a Russian ground war would produce a 
decisive victory. Marshall's revision of the Victory Program increased the immoderate 
pressures facing the regimental combat teams, revealed a flaw in his expectations and 
questioned his commitment to a head on collision with the enemy. By reducing the 
Army from 200 divisions to 80, he gambled with the future of the United States and 
placed the responsibility of success on 750,000 front line soldiers. 69 The replacement 
problems in northwest Europe, during the fall and winter battles of the campaign. under 
extenuating circumstances, would reveal this gross error in judgment: `In Lorraine. 
General George Patton 'drafted' five percent of army and corps troops for retraining as 
68 J. A. Islet/ & P. Crowl, The US Marines and . amphibious War, (Princeton. 1951), pp. 
37-3S: Brig. 
A. Head. 'Amphibious Operations', RUST. XCI, (1946). pp. 485-4')4. 
69 'Interview with J. G. Christiansen', Washington. 12 May 1944. RG 319. Box 19. 
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infantry, and when bloody fighting along the Westwall sent infantry losses soaring, he 
`drafted' an additional five percent. 170 
The Results of the Conference 
The Casablanca conference ended in enfeebled compromise, resulting in the British 
feeling satisfied and the Americans disappointed. Churchill and Roosevelt felt that the 
agreement fell short of great-power capabilities, although British strategy remained pre- 
eminent. Stalin's demands for a second front were once again delayed. King self- 
righteously denounced British attempts to review operations in the Pacific; he failed to 
uncover the COS's plan for winning the war and concluded that, although the British 
had definite ideas concerning the next operation, they lacked an overall strategic plan. 7' 
Remaining unsettled were the strategic differences between the two Allies that slowed 
agreement. The Americans were haunted by conflicting plans, disunity, poor 
administration and distrust of British intentions. A talented black baseball pitcher, 
Satchel Paige's adage, `Don't look back, somebody might be gaining on you', was an 
apt description of the avoidance and compulsion procedures used by the Allies to delay 
the Northwest European campaign on the one hand and to further Mediterranean 
operations on the other, while they both assiduously debated and defended the ends and 
means of either. The President, having continued to occupy a military position half 
way between Marshall and Churchill, looked favorably on action in the Mediterranean. 
Both Allied leaders insisted on it, and General Marshall and the JCS agreed to a Sicilian 
operation, defined as an expedient action dictated by current circumstances. 
The Specifics of the Casablanca Agreement 
On 19 January the essentials of the agreement were revealed: 
1. ) To assault and occupy Sicily, allowing for the safe and economical 
passage of shipping through the Mediterranean. 
'O C. Gabel, The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944. (US Army Command 
and Gen. Staff College, 1985). p. 30, Combat Studies Institute. 
71 'Anfa Camp Conference Minutes'. Washington. 16 Jan 1943, Reel I. 
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2. ) To force Italy to leave the war, thereby increasing pressure on 
Germany to fill the Italian vacuum. 
3. ) To divert German pressure from the Russian Front. 
4. ) To seek Turkey's active support. 
5. ) To Increase the bombing of Germany from Britain, and to prepare 
for re-entry on the Continent, if Germany weakened. 
6. ) To defeat the U-boat and win the war at sea (adequate forces should 
be allocated to the Pacific and the Far East). 
7. ) Due to a shortage of landing craft, time constraints, and inadequate 
planning, HUSKY, the code-name for the Sicilian assault, not 
ROUNDUP, was the landing of choice. 72 
The Americans considered the above agenda as defensive `pin-pricking'. the British as 
aggressive action. 73 In addition, the agreement divided the Mediterranean into two 
commanded structures, one British, one American, which were to prove impracticable. 
Further Reactions and Considerations 
According to Michael Howard, not all American ideas suffered: the British delegates 
approved of Admiral King's Pacific policy and General Arnold's bombardment 
program for Germany. Even though ROUNDUP 1943 was a major loss to Marshall 
and tacitly dead, Morgan was designated Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied 
Commander (COSSAC) and a special Allied Inter-Service Planning Staff was created to 
plan for the execution of a cross-Channel attack, with the vague proviso, `as soon as 
circumstances allowed. '74 Brooke summed up British policy to include continuing 
actions in the Mediterranean, and proposed returning to the Continent en masse in 
1944. This subject reminded some Americans of SLEDGEHAMMER's loss and the 
meetings held in London the previous July. 75 According to author Barrie Pit, `the 
results were remarkable, far better than many had thought likely before the conference 
began, infinitely better than had seemed possible at some of the more difficult phases of 
the conference itself. '76 
72 Sir M. Howard. Op. cit.. pp. 251-255. 
7; hi. Matloff. Strategic Planning for Coalition «'arfare, 1943-1944. (Washington, 1959), p. 25. 
74 CCS 67 Meeting, Washington. 22 Jan. 1943; 3rd Anfa Meeting. 23 Jan. 1943. Reel III. 
75 M. Matloff. Op. cit.. pp. 254.278. 
76 B. Pitt, Op. cit., pp. 15S-159. 
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If this be true, why were `sops'77 offered to King and to Marshall by the British? 
King's was in the form of a British recapture of Burma: Marshall was offered two. 
both pertaining to BOLERO and ROUNDUP, although time constraints were v-a(ue. 78 Ztý 
Pitt's assessment glosses over the resentment felt by Marshall and the American 
planning staff. Michael Howard, in the official British version. reported that in five 
days of hard bargaining the British reached an agreement with the Americans over 
fundamentals. 79 He does not describe the American reaction. Nonetheless. 
Wedemeyer's response to British negotiating techniques and concepts were interpreted 
in this manner: `We came, we listened, and we were conquered. ' 80 
The American Chiefs recognized their ineffectiveness when arguing their case against 
British logic, reality and preparedness; a sense of one's own inferiority does not lend 
itself to co-operation and good-will even while co-signing with other signatories. 
British General Sir Ian Jacob, Ismay's deputy, stated, 
They had left most of their clubs behind.... On thinking it over, I do not 
believe that this was an unreasonable result. After all, we were not two 
business opponents making a deal in which one was bound to profit at 
the other's expense. We were partners, trying to hammer at a common 
line of action. 81 
Having to submit, and not admit that British Mediterranean strategy seemed more 
appropriate than American Northwest European strategy in 1943, increased the 
difficulty of acceptance. Brooke wrote in his diary in May, 
... the 
Americans are taking the attitude that we led them down the 
garden path by taking them to North Africa. That at Casablanca we 
again misled them by inducing them to attack Sicily. And now they do 
not intend to be led astray again. Added to that the swing toward the 
Pacific is stronger than ever, and before long they will be urging that we 
should defeat Japan first. 82 
The Americans regarded Churchill's Mediterranean intentions with increased suspicion 
as the year progressed. The more he shoved Brooke's Mediterranean policy at them, 
77 Aptly described as `something given to a formidable or troublesome animal'. Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, (London, 1964), p. 122 1. 
78 Gen. Sir W. Jackson, Otivrlord: Normandy 1944, (London: 1978), pp. 70-71. 
79 Sir M. Howard, Op. cit., p. 244. 
A. Chandler. Op. cit., no. 796. 
81 E. Larrabee, Op. cit., p. 185.; B. Liddell Hart, Op. cit.. 15/15/1. 
82 J. Gregg. Op. cit., p. S4. 
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the more they attributed his aggressive behavior to be a manifestation of self-serving 
imperialistic designs. Sometimes, he could be withering, as he was towards 
Eisenhower. 83 Frustrated, the Americans were as irritated with themselves for 
succumbing to British pressure as they were with the British. whose blandishments did 
little to soften the inevitable. Howard, although even-handed, cannot deny the 
American feeling of being gulled at Casablanca, a feeling which remained persistently 
long after the event. Marshall was convinced, `that every diversion or side issue from 
the main plot acts as a suction pump. '84 
Marshall's metaphor of the Mediterranean as a `suction pump' comes close to 
Howard's conclusion that Casablanca legitimized attritional warfare. 85 Marshall 
strongly opposed any campaign that would absorb untold amounts of men and 
equipment, that could result in unacceptably high casualties, exhaustion, and wastage. 
War is an act of attrition in absolute terms, but, in relative terms, a war can he defined 
either as a war of attrition or one of maneuver. Both sides must determine what is an 
acceptable level of attrition when measured against its strategic goals. Any commander 
must ask himself whether the attrition he is imposing on the enemy will be worth the 
attrition he is imposing on his own forces. 86 What seemed to be agreed, Allied 
unanimity of purpose at Casablanca, was a fantasy. 
Brooke's diary account, quoted above, indicated that attacking Northwest Europe was 
the corner stone of American belief and strategy; to forgo their own plan in exchange 
for something British meant a great deal to them in 1943. Both American and British 
official histories as reports are informative, but they fail to interpret the interplay of fact 
and feeling between the participants and the events at Casablanca. The American 
historians Matloff and Snell have alluded to the aftermath with a mixture of reticence. 
reprimand, and renovation. The use of 'rearguard', and 'counteroffensive' are 
83 Ibid., p. 85. 84 CCS 5S meeting, Anfa, 16 Jan. 1943, Reel 111. 
8 Sir N1. Howard, Op. cif. p. 35. 
86 P. Seaburv & A. Codevilla, Op. cit., p. 120. 
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battlefield words associated with action against enemies, words not necessarily 
descriptive of actions around the negotiating table amidst partners: 
The indecisiveness of the Casablanca Conference on basic strategic 
issues - which appeared to the American staff to be a victory for the British Chiefs - brought home to the Army strategic planners the need to 
adjust themselves to a new phase of coalition warfare. The effect of 
General Marshall's rearguard action at the conference was to give them 
the time they badly needed to regroup for a `counteroffensive' in their 
dealings with the British in 1943.... To this task of analysis, similar to 
that the British staff had long since made for the `British position', the 
American planners would have to address themselves... the Army 
strategic planners would have to start anew in 1943 to plan for victory. 87 
Casablanca revealed the weaknesses of the existing American command structure, as a 
military-politico body. The JCS, as conceived by Roosevelt, not only had to grapple 
with the President's failure to define policy, but it had to plan strategy out of the 
policy's amorphous nature. Little was known of the nation's objectives and war aims 
because of the President's vagueness. `In many ways, the Casablanca conference was 
a low point in the co-operation between the President and his military advisers. ' 88 In 
sum, the Americans were handicapped in negotiating with the British for most of the 
war. 89 
Nevertheless, the Casablanca Conference tolled the death knell for the American `either- 
or' school of strategic thinking. It was now `this-and-that'. No longer would 
considerations, choices, and decisions be as simplistic as they once were prior to the 
conference, i. e., a Mediterranean versus a northwest Europe policy. From now on the 
strategic view would encompass all theaters, and would therefore be global in reach. 
Each theater, considered as part building-block of the total, would be connected and 
interrelated, its problems surveyed, its needs assessed. Precise relationships involving 
the combined air offensive, and the European and Mediterranean theaters. however. 
would remain the lynch pin and have top priority in American strategic planning. The 
JCS would determine the range of choices, the levels of commitment, and the resources 
87 M. Mattoff & E. Snell. Op. cit., p. 382. 
88 W. Emerson, Op. c"it., p. 199. 
89 P. Se'aburv & A. Codevilla, Op. cit., pp. 221-123. 
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and logistics required throughout to achieve victory. The strategic 'lode star' remained 
as always, the cross-Channel attack in 1944.90 
The Americans left Casablanca believing that yet again they had been outwitted and 
outmaneuvered yet again by the British. They were determined never to let it happen 
again. In preparation for future meetings at Washington. Quebec, Cairo and Tehran, 
they would achieve negotiating equality by honing their skills with which to anticipate 
and counter every imaginable British strategic argument. American experts, armed w i. th 
studies and statistics, stood behind the first rank. Their goal was presidential 
approbation in their quest for an inescapable British commitment to a cross-Channel 
invasion in 1944.91 The counter-attack had begun. 
American Attempts to Break the Casablanca Agreement 
Dispirited, Marshall and King tried to thwart the enactment of the Casablanca 
agreement. During a CCS meeting in late April 1943, the JCS presented a paper, 
'CCS-199', prepared by the US JSSC, which sought to clarify the decisions reached at 
Casablanca. According to the Americans, 'CCS-199' was to serve as a guide for future 
American actions. The key to the paper was the so-called differentiation between 
`commitments' and `undertakings' . 
92 The COS was perplexed, since the precise 
wording of the agreement, 'CCS-155/1', had been discussed with meticulous care and 
unanimously approved at Casablanca. Although both nationalities used the same 
language, the British admitted that shades of meaning were sometimes interpreted 
differently, requiring additional discussion. Having resolved similar problems at past 
conferences, the British failed to understand why an entirely new document was 
required, unless the Americans wanted to change something in the mutually approved 
strategy. Unlike their American colleagues, the British understood 'CCS-1551 1' quite 
clearly. The paper's integrity, if necessary, could be safeguarded by a line by line 
90 NI. Matloff, Op. cit., p. 30. 
`)I K. Greenfield. Op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
92 JCS 71 Meeting, Washington. 30 Mar. 1943. p. 6, Reel 1. 
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interpretation or by agreed textual amendments. The COS affirmed that nothing would 
be gained by the production of a new paper, which could hardly fail to have its own 
shades of meaning different from those of the original paper. If changes were made in 
the existing manifesto, the British needed time to carefully consider any new 
interpretations and proposed amendments; these changes, in turn, had to be agreed by 
the CCS before being referred to their political masters, the President and the Prime 
Minister, for approval. 93 
Although `agreements in principle' represented the `spirit of the law' and `formal 
interpretations' represented the `letter', an ally could not be compensated to the 
aggrieved other's satisfaction, if a contract was breached. Much to the consternation of 
the aggrieved party, feelings as a cause for change were inadmissible. To this extent 
the partnership was weakened. The interplay between either country's military ethos 
and the contractual behavior it employed could be used to modify, if not abrogate, an 
existing agreement, as in the case above. Unlike disputes in civil law, neither party had 
recourse to binding arbitration or redress at the appellate judiciary level. Free of 
sanctions, neither side was immune to re-interpreting an agreement when it suited its 
purpose, whether it was the Americans over the Casablanca arrangement or the British 
over SLEDGEHAMMER. 94 Contractually, on the one hand, the British regarded 
American determination as inflexible behavior, exaggerated and insufferable. On the 
other, the Americans regarded British flexibility as equivocal, lacking both assurance 
and commitment 
TRIDENT 
Five months passed before another major conference, code-named TRIDENT convened 
in Washington, to confirm earlier decisions, to clarify Anglo-American planning and to 
specify long-term military goals. As the conferees gathered, they were informed of 
93 CCS 81 Meeting, Washington, 23 Apr 1943, `Supplementary Minutes', p. 2, Reel III. 
94 Sir W. Jackson, Op. cit., pp. 56-57. 
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Allied dominance in North Africa, the Pacific, the Aleutians, at Stalingrad and in the 
Atlantic. The conference, originally suggested by Eden, recommended by Churchill 
and confirmed by Roosevelt, convened on 12 May; in attendance were the President, 
the Prime Minister and their military staffs. Brooke, representative of his British 
colleagues, was apprehensive of the American drift towards the Pacific since the 
Casablanca Conference, and in Washington would seek reassurance that the `Germany- 
first' formula remained intact. Nor did he envisage an easy time of it, because, in his 
view, King continued to divert large forces to the Pacific, with Marshall's implicit 
support. Brooke dreaded the up-coming meetings, knowing that they would entail 
hours of argument with an ally trying to depart from the agreed basic strategy. Strained 
and depressed at the thought, he reasoned that if the Americans were allowed to 
succeed, if the Pacific were to absorb the bulk of the Allied effort, the war could go on 
forever. 95 Even though the Americans disagreed with his Mediterranean strategy, 
Marshall counted on Brooke to blunt some of Churchill's impractical schemes and 
Roosevelt was determined to see `Germany-first' through to the end. 96 
The Americans Continue to Reorganize 
Prior to TRIDENT, the American military establishment was in the midst of a major 
administrative reorganization, which, it was hoped, as one of a number of outcomes, 
would manifest itself in a more favorable negotiating stance against the British. 
Innovative procedures were applied by the military and business communities, both 
understanding that mobilization and production had to be linked to national policy and 
strategic planning. Since scientific management was first developed and widely applied 
in the United States early in the century, experience determined the appropriate mix of 
management, machines and manpower, the combination of which improved and grew 
as the war continued. 97 However, certain army doctrines impaired military 
effectiveness, specifically, the emphasis on daylight bombing and the de-emphasis of 
95 FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/IX., 10 May 1943, p. 86. 
96 F. Pogue, Op. cit., p. 310 `Brooke Interview', 18 Apr. 1961. 
97 T. Wilson, The United States Leviathan', Allies At War, W. Reynolds & A. Chubarian, (eds. ), 
(London, 1994), pp. 186-188. 
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infantry, as evident in the European air and ground campaigns that followed. Martin 
Van Creveld overstated the drive towards industrial efficiency as robotic when he 
wrote, `America, after all was the home of Taylorism; a system of management that 
tried to foresee and dictate the operative's very movement with the aim of turning him 
into a human machine as reliable as the mechanical ones he attended. '98 The French 
considered Taylorisme, the wickedest word in their dictionary, dehumanizing and 
stubbornly resisted. '99 
Van Crefeld's assessment is not only misleading but nave, because Frederick Taylor, 
an American 19th century management engineer, equating men with machines, failed to 
consider the social, biological and psychological aspects of the worker, thereby 
rendering his theory both inappropriate and inapplicable, particularly in an American 
wartime economy. British studies of the effects of monotony and fatigue on World 
War I munitions workers demonstrated the fallacy of Taylor's views of motivation and 
compliance even before the First World War ended. Between the wars, new scientific 
theories of management evolved, founded upon `human-factor psychology', a 
dimension missing in Taylor's bizarre conception of man as an indifferent machine. 100 
During The Second World War, the American government, recognizing the need for a 
centrally co-ordinated wartime economy of maximum productivity, realized that the 
factory worker and the soldier would become its most importantly studied subjects: 
what were the bio-psychological restraints and limitations on their performance? As 
part of the overall effort, increased efficiency demanded that the JCS authorize studies 
covering standard policy procedures for all of its sub agencies, i. e., the Joint 
Administration Committee, Munitions Assignment Board, War Shipping 
Administration, Office of War Information, Joint Committee New Weapons and 
Equipment, etc., each with plenary powers. Moreover, it instructed the Joint Staff 
98 M. Crefeld, Fighting Power, German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London, 1983), pp. 
36-37; F. Taylor, The Principles of Scienti, fic Management, (London, 1972) 
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Planners to prepare, recommend and submit a study on the organization of a Joint 
General Staff to function under the JCS. 101 
A Plethora of Committees 
Although the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), led by Embick, 102 had been 
established in November 1942 to advise the JCS on broad, long range strategic 
planning, steps were taken to improve the effectiveness and co-ordinating functions of 
the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), related to strategy. 103 In May the newly created Joint 
Administrative Committee, soon to become the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC). was 
authorized to deal with logistics and material on a full time basis. 104 The Joint War 
Plans Committee (JWPC), established in April, was subordinate and responsible to the 
JpS. 105 The JWPC was empowered to negotiate inter-service agreements on 
deployment and employment of American forces and to develop joint outline plans, 
papers and studies for future operations. These recommendations were to serve as a 
basis of agreement for the JCS, on which unified policy could be reached, defended 
and addressed in consultations with the British. 
Marshall acknowledged how closely knit were the COS, its Secretariat, War Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister, to a Congressional sub-committee. Many of the impending 
changes were directed toward offsetting the COS. 106 With TRIDENT only a month 
away, The JCS directed the JWPC to compose the strategic papers and plans needed 
for the conference; this process was to become the template for all prospective coalition 
conferences. 
The Americans learned that the British party consisted of ninety-four people, including 
Wrens, ciphering clerks, and Marines for security. During a JCS meeting on 8 May, 
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four days before the conference convened, the Americans refined their negotiating plans 
and expressed their apprehension in reaction to the efficiency of British inter-service co- 
ordination coupled with the abilities of its negotiators. A composite of pre-conference 
JCS meetings revealed that the American Chiefs continued to suffer from inferior 
negotiating skills and limited cohesion. Time was spent searching for the most 
effective method with which to overcome those defects, during the overall 
reorganization. The recommended line of action was as follows: the JCS agreed that it 
must stick to fundamentals and eliminate as many of the details as possible in order to 
avoid complications. However, if it could be anticipated that the British would raise the 
question of escorts and convoys, for example, the technical agencies concerned should 
be forewarned to have pertinent data readily available. Wedemeyer contended that the 
JCS remain non-committal on global strategy until the British revealed their intentions 
regarding post-HUSKY (Sicily) operations and European strategy in general. At the 
same time that Leahy urged that global strategy be discussed immediately, Marshall 
agreed to argue the JCS's point of view. Moreover, the JCS summoned its sub- 
agencies to compile papers with which to press home the attack with which to break 
down the COS's arguments. In addition, the JCS would seek presidential approval of 
these position papers at the earliest possible moment, to avoid previous breakdowns in 
consensus. The presented papers were to be brief, simply listing an opening 
recommendation, followed by a discussion. On the agenda were papers such as 
`Outline Plan for the Seizure of Sardinia' (JCS 289), `Conduct of the War in 1943-44' 
(JCS 290) and 'Invasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom', 1943- 
44 (JCS 291 Revised). 107 
The Barrier of a Common Language 
As a note of caution, King warned that for every subject introduced at Casablanca, the 
British had a paper ready. Wedemeyer suggested that the Americans should match 
every British paper with one of their own and recommended that the JSP edit its papers 
107 JCS 7S Meeting. Washington, 8 May 1943, Reel I. 
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carefully before disclosing them to the British. As a matter of urgency, any 
objectionable or critical statements and unnecessary commitments could be deleted 
before presentation. Moreover, Wedemeyer indicated that words like 'current' or 
`projected operations' would limit misinterpretation in context and should be used 
whenever papers were delivered to the British. He was firmly convinced that all of the 
papers should express the views of the JCS, and if they did not, they should be so 
amended. 108 
The JSSC recommended that the decisions of the coming conference be recorded in 
approximately the same form as 'CCS-199', which differentiated between strategic 
`commitments' and strategic `undertakings'. General Brehon Somervell, head of the 
Army's Service of Supply, concluded that as long as the definition of `commitment' 
remained unclear and inconsistent, difficulties between the JCS and the COS would 
persist. This anomaly, he added, required immediate resolution if the nation's full 
resources were to be utilized. 109 Why the usage of these words caused problems is 
difficult to fathom, because their meaning is not the same; simply stated, `commitment' 
is a promise, a guarantee, while `undertaking' is an endeavor, an enterprise. Accepting 
these distinctions, it would follow that an agreement could be concluded on usage, 
regarding future consultations and contracts. If American resources were held hostage 
to these words, Somervell's concern demanded serious study. 
Regarding the negotiations themselves, the principal American objective was to solicit 
British support for an early cross-Channel operation, for which the JCS had 
Roosevelt's backing for the first time. Even so, the difficulty of convincing the British 
of the operation's immediacy required a major change in their Mediterranean strategy. 
The Americans predicted that the British would respond half-heartedly to an incidental 
ROUNDUP tied to a German collapse. King, expressing irritation, said, `The British 
'limp along' with an attitude of expediency. Nothing will make us sure what 
108 JCS 80 Meeting, NVashington, 12 May 1943, p. 7. Reel 1. 
109 JCS 78 Mccung, Washington. 8 May 1943; JCS 79 Meeting, Washington, 10 May 1943. Rccl 1. 
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operations can be anticipated in 1944, unless there is a firm commitment to do 
ROUNDUP. '110 
After a conference at the White House on 12 May that included the major participants. 
both country's military advisors met the following day. Procedural arrangements 
remained high on the American agenda, attested by the following proposals: the JCS 
wanted a small grouping of JPS, JSSC and JLC officers present as advisors, who 
could quickly assist in solving the problems submitted for discussion. 111 
These were the assistants armed to anticipate and counter every imaginable argument 
whose briefcases bulged with studies and statistics. ' 12 Moreover, once the subject of 
global strategy had been considered in the first two sessions, the Americans requested 
that the Combined Planners prepare a detailed agenda. In addition, unless an `agreed 
decision' was recorded in the meeting's conclusions, no interpretation as such could be 
read into the minutes. Furthermore, any preliminary reports presented to the President 
and the Prime Minister were to be regarded as `tentative only' and in the final report 
L approved' 'existing' and 'prQjected strategic undertakings' were to be placed in their 
order of priority. If successful, the attempt to limit the wiles of its competitor was 
worth while, so they thought. 113 Much of the requests were approved, but as the 
conference continued, business sessions slowed, because the Americans had greatly 
increased their attending staff and the British had followed suit. At most sessions there 
were at least twenty staff members arrayed behind and on each side of the Chiefs who 
sat facing each other. 114 
The Strategies Clash Again 
The two delegations debated strategic issues for thirteen days. Roosevelt and Churchill 
met the CCS on six occasions at the White House, and the Chiefs usually met jointly or 
110 JCS 81 Meeting, Washington, 14 May 1943. p. 3. Reel I. 
III CCS S3 Meeting, Washington, 13 May 1943. Reel 111. 
112 K. Greenfield, Op. cit., p. 33. 
113 CCS 83 Meeting, ()p. cit. 
114 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., IX, 19 May 1943. p. 9. 
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combined three or four times a day at the Federal Reserve Building near by. Tlie mv 
sides were deeply divided and the meetings were acrimonious. The British stressed the 
elimination of Italy from the war in 1943, and the Americans underlined the 
intensification of Pacific operations and the planning for a second front in northwest 
Europe instead of further Mediterranean incursions. To break the impasse, the COS 
proposed that each side present a paper describing how it would pursue the war in 
Europe. The British called their paper, 'Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe 
(Elimination of Italy First)'; the Americans: 'Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe 
(Concentration of the Largest Possible Force in the United Kingdom)'. 
The Americans believed that, 
... the concept of 
defeating Germany-first involves making a determined 
attack against Germany on the Continent at the earliest practicable date; 
and we consider that all proposed operations in Europe should be 
judged primarily on the basis of the contribution to that end ... It is the opinion of the JCS that a cross-Channel invasion of Europe is necessary 
to an early conclusion of the war with Germany. 115 
Brooke read the British paper; in many respects its aims were similar to those of the 
Americans, i. e., supplying Russia, defeating the U-boats, conquering Sicily, securing 
Mediterranean communications, intensifying the pressure on Italy, enlisting Turkey as 
an active ally and expanding the bomber offensive. Little was surprising, because the 
combination of external threats required counter-measures and diplomatic assaults 
which were obvious; the conferees even agreed on a cross-Channel operation, but its 
purpose, timing and execution disclosed their strategic division. 
CCS have since approved a directive to General Morgan to prepare 
plans, among other things, for a full scale assault against the Continent 
in 1944 as early possible. -The assembly of the strongest possible force 
... in constant readiness to re-enter the 
Continent, as soon as 
German resistance is weakened to the required extent. 116 
Marshall's reaction to the British paper was immoderate. He was concemed that the 
landint', of ground forces in Italy would establish a vacuum in the Mediterranean, in 
which Britain would demand more and more American means and unqualified support. 
115 CCS S3 Meeting, Op. cit., 'Annex A'. p. 12. 
116 Ibid., 'Annex B. p. 13. 
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That outcome would preclude the assembly of sufficient forces in Britain required to 
execute a successful cross-Channel operation. If Mediterranean operations developed, 
except for air attacks on Germany, part of 1943 and virtually all of 1944 would be 
accounted for in that theater. The war in Europe would be prolonged, and thus delay 
the ultimate defeat of Japan, which the people of the United States would find 
intolerable. He said, 'We were now at a cross-roads ... if we were committed to the 
Mediterranean, except for air alone, it meant a prolonged struggle and one which was 
not acceptable to the United States'. 117 
When Brooke insisted that ending Mediterranean operations would prolong the war, 
contending that the Allies did not have the means to land and hold a Channel 
beachhead, thereby failing to assist the beleaguered Russian Armies, the strategic 
division between Marshall and him remained irreconcilable. The Conference verged on 
collapse. On 19 May Marshall set a precedent, amid an unmistakable air of tension, by 
recommending that the meeting should be cleared of all but the Chiefs of Staff, a 
procedure labeled as, 'going off the record'. Marshall and Brooke, in desperation, 
dismissed all the staff present and Ismay recalled the event, 'The arguments went back 
and forth, and occasionally got so acrimonious that the junior staffs were bidden to 
leave the principals to continue the battle in secret session. '118 
King, for example, who never trusted the British, was most Anglophobic during 
regular meetings, more conciliatory during 'off the record' ones. 119 'Going off the 
record', by meeting without staff and secretaries alike, did not insure an end to 
deadlock; it was an extreme procedure within a flawed system whose premise was 
adversarial rather than co-operative. Converting and reducing strategic differences into 
obligatory agreements, followed by mutual compliance was beyond the scope of the 
system. The following comparison between Allied negotiations and industrial 
bargaining highlights the problems that faced the Combined Chiefs: locked in a 
117 Ibid., p. 8. 
118 Gen. Lord H. Ismay, Op. cit., pp. 269,298. 
119 DiR to Alanbrooke, 9 February 1944, Alanbrooke Papers, 14/39/B, KCL. 
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continual political-psychological struggle, the British and Americans fought to dominate 
the other. Although Henry Kissinger was writing about the Napoleonic period. a 
qualified parallel exists between it and the period under discussion: 
As long as the enemy is more powerful than any single member of the 
coalition, the need for unity outweighs all considerations of individual 
gain ... But when the enemy has been so weakened that each ally has the 
power to achieve its ends alone, a coalition is at the mercy of its most 
determined member. 120 
Military versus Collective Bargaining 
All the pertinent issues relating to military bargaining were rarely settled at once and 
thorny issues were usually tabled. Records were not kept during 'off the record' 
meetings, a loss of information that could not be overcome. An agreement was either 
broken or subverted without penalty, for any reason, real or imagined, 1fit no longer 
served the state, which alone remained accountable. If an agreement were delayed, a 
State's entity, infrastructure and body-politic were not threatened, because labor and 
management were indivisible at that level. Lacking adjudication, disputes were difficult 
to resolve. Without a sense of good-will, co-operation during negotiations was 
transitory. 121 Because of mutual dissatisfaction, both parties were easily chagrined, 
expectations were dashed and the relationship exacerbated. The Anglo-American 
search for a combined strategic policy was affected by either side's perception of power 
and images of strength, which were as important as the material factors. British 
sensitivity increased as their power decreased, an element which could not be 
overlooked. The Allies behaved as if they were two rival companies, not partners. 
competing for commercial dominance within the same industry, or as if they were two 
identical subsidiaries of the same company vying for a greater share of resources Nvhile 
seeking additional autonomy. 122 The struggle in achieving an agreement related to the 
depth of commitment: the application of political judgment in assessing national 
1 10 H. Kissenger, A World Restored, (Boston, 1973). p. 109. 
121 C. Jcnkins & B. Sherman, Collective Bargaining, (London, 1977). 
122 H. Nicholas. The United States and Britain, (Chicago, 1975), p. 4. 
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interests. Based on his 'mind-set', each negotiator was committed to and protective of 
his country's welfare, but how this was interpreted affected the negotiations in process. 
Introduction to Collective Bargaining 
By contrast, in industrial collective bargaining, the strength of either side, its 
capabilities, contributions and the areas of expertise are different, identifiable and 
required: labor supplies a skilled work-force that manufactures the company's product. 
The company, on the other hand, offers the means of production and proficient 
management. The company operates widiin the confines of its nation's infrastructure 
and within a geographical area. Time and mutual gain are essential and desired. Labor 
seeks improvements in wages, benefits and conditions; management seeks continuity, 
greater sales and increased profits. The conflict over profits and benefits reflects an 
agreement in which profits are either optimized or maximized. Sometimes the 
negotiators are more effective than ethical, more interested in profit than lives. These 
are the risks and manifestations of industrial ends and means working in an open 
society. If negotiations stall, unemployment and company contraction looms. Both 
sides can appeal to the government for understanding and to the public for support, but 
binding arbitration quickly settles most disputes, and the contract is signed. 
Agreements and portions thereof can not reopen without mutual consent. 123 
Common to both forms of bargaining are 'belief systems'. However, each Aflied 
negotiator's belief system influenced bargaining strategies in such a way that 
agreements, in contrast to those in the civilian sector, rarely did more than codify some 
aspects of the status quo. There were numerous factors that influenced the choice of 
bargaining strategies. Some were fairly immutable, such as the relations within and 
between the parties. Others were mutable, such as the conditions under which 
negotiations occurred, the formality of the setting, the number of participants, the 
issues at stake and the stress of time and outside events. Belief systems were powerful 
123 I'he following 'collective bargaining' portion was based upon eight company contracts that the 
author helped negotiate over a 20 year period from 1969-1989. 
169 
determinants of bargaining policy: how the facts were perceived, the identification of a 
pay-off structure, the interpretation of the adversary's proposals, the differentiation 
between capabilities and rhetoric and how previous negotiations were remembered and 
analyzed. Talbott characterized five mind-sets within the belief system category, the 
'manichean', 'confrontational', 'competitive', 'co-operative' and 'pacifist'. King 
represented the first, with Brooke, Portal and Marshall, representing the second, third 
and fourth categories, in varying degrees, and Pound and Arnold, the last. 124 
Each side failed to convince the other, because they bargained for and were locked into 
fixed opposing positions, e. g., the cross-Channel attack versus the Mediterranean. The 
more the Americans had to defend their position against attack, the more committed and 
identified they became to it. The more the British tried to convince the Americans of the 
impossibility of changing their position, the more difficult it became to do so. If each 
side had accepted the legitimacy of the other and recognized a common interest that 
threatened neither, the range of possibilities, although limited, could have been greatly 
increased. Difficulty intensified as attempts were made to reconcile future action with 
past positions, e. g., future Mediterranean operations versus increased Pacific activity, 
making it less and less likely that any agreement would wisely reconcile the parties' 
original interests. Emphasizing positions accorded less attention to the underlying 
concerns of both sides, e. g., keeping Russia from collapsing. Agreement became less 
likely, because intransigence increased, e. g., American prevention of any operations 
east of Sicily. The result was frequently an agreement, compromised and less 
satisfactory to either side than it could have been. Fractious, recalcitrant behavior like 
'dragging one's feet' increased, as meetings lumbered on. Tactics such as this added to 
the time, risk and costs of reaching agreement. In contrast to position bargaining, the 
principled negotiation method of focusing on 'basic interests', 'mutually satisfying 
options' and 'fair standards', typically results in a wise agreement. Negotiating out of 
a position endangered the relationship and generated bitter feelings for a long time. 125 
124 S. Talbotý Deadly Gambits, (London, 1985). 
125 R. Fry & W. Ury, Getting to Yes, (London, 1991), pp. 3-6,13-14. 
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'Me two sides suffered from commitments to certain positions bound by rigid 
instructions. The greater degree of role obligation demanded of the negotiators, the 
greater were the constraints on concession-making and the greater the probability of 
deadlocked outcomes. 126 
0- 
For example, to stress the need for elasticity while negotiating, Lord Halifax, during 
his tenure in Washington as the British ambassador, compared the negotiating stances 
of Hull, Roosevelt and Wilson: 
What has characterised the talks throughout has been Mr. Hun's acute 
and abiding consciousness of the disasters of 1918-19, and consequent 
efforts to avoid, at any rate, Wilson's errors. In particular, both Hull 
and the President have successfully avoided such defects in Wilson's 
handling of a similar situation, as his obstinate adhesion to a cut and 
dried plan, with rigid opposition to attempts either by the opposition 
party at home or by allied statesmen in Paris to modify it. 127 
Alone, the eight Chiefs had a 'heart to heart' talk, analogous to 'going off the record'; 
the exclusion of staff implied a need for privacy, which suggested an attempt at 
forthright conversation, hitherto unattainable, and the inclusion of admissible feeling. 
Newspaper reporter, Ernest Hemingway, when covering the Genoa Conference of 
1922 at which David Lloyd George demonstrated his diplomatic mastery, observed that 
the ebb and flow of human emotions were less important than the decisions obtained, 
the best of which were often made on the basis of mutual interest and rigorous logic. 
Passion had no place in military-diplomatic affairs. 128 By force of circumstance, what 
emerged from this closed meeting led to the most important single decision of the 
conference, as stated in the paper, 'CCS-242/6', authorizing the Allies to launch a 
major offensive across the English Channel on 1 May 1944 with twenty-nine divisions, 
an operation originally called Operation ROUNDHAMNER, later changed to 
OVERLORD, that Churchill had resisted for over a year. 129 
126 B. Spector, 'Negotiation as a Psychological Process', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21,4, 
(1977), pp. 613-4. 
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Churchill's Attempts to Modify the Agreement 
Concurrently, the paper stipulated the following: the transfer of seven divisions from 
the Mediterranean to Britain beginning I November 1943, re-arming the French and the 
continuance of Mediterranean operations and the bombing of Germany. 130 The 
concluding agreement reflected a mechanical splitting of the difference between final 
positions rather than a solution carefully crafted to meet the legitimate interests of the 
parties. Although the agreement was ratified by Roosevelt and Churchill at a White 
House meeting on 19 May, Churchill, having second thoughts two days later, tried to 
repudiate at least half of the paper, which had omitted the 'glittering' prize of an Italiaii 
campaign after Sicily and how twenty-nine divisions would be employed between 
August 1943 and May 1944. With the credibility of the COS at stake, Brooke advised 
him not to tamper with the agreement's particulars because of the increased American 
distrust it would engender. Apprised by Brooke and warned of Roosevelt's 
disapproval by Hopkins, Churchill desisted; and after altering some of the wording, but 
not the principles, he let the matter rest for the moment. Later that month, Churchill, 
unilaterally reopened the agreement, and interpreted the meaning of 'to conduct 
operations best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the greatest 
number of Gen-nan forces' '131 to advance his Mediterranean objectives. He implored 
Eisenhower and Marshall, who, for their own reasons, grudgingly accepted his 
supposition, that operations after Sicily, against either Corsica, Sardinia or southern 
Italy, were viable options. His lobbying behavior would have been unthinkable and 
unacceptable in collective bargaining negotiations after agreement had been reached. 
Although Brooke's Mediterranean strategy reaffirmed the Casablanca decisions and had 
ox, ercome American objections, Churchill's behavior demonstrated that the use of fixed 
positions could never serve in the place of basic interests or be as rewarding. 
130 Ibid. 
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Moreover, Brooke was sure that the Prime Minister was unaware of how near they had 
come to failure. 132 
At the conclusion of the Conference, Brooke proposed that the Combined Chiefs re- 
confer at an early date, because the lapse of time between successive meetings was too 
long, to which the Americans concurred. The conferees agreed that Directors of Plans 
and JP teams should meet with greater frequency and that planning papers affecting 
combined strategy should be mutually exchanged. 133 During longer intervals, Brooke 
insisted, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent. 134 Suspicions 
and doubts remained, as manifestations of incompatible principles. Even after sixteen 
months as Allies, Marshall could still warn the JCS during the Conference, 
We should be quite guarded in what we say and act like a unit ... we must be very careful of casual commitments which might militate against 
us ... It appeared that the British want to win the war in the Mediterranean, that the Prime Minister had used the word 'little' in 
regard to Mediterranean operations. What was his definition of 
'little'? 135 
Disillusioned, aging and weary, Brooke concurred, admitting that each side's basic 
convictions remained unaltered. 136 Iftht these strategic convictions, if carried too far, 
border on myth? John Kautsky wrote, 
The point is that myths, no matter how untrue, do have very real 
consequences; that prophecies based on initially false perceptions can 
produce conditions that really exist (and thus fulfill the prophecy); that 
men react to symbols by real behavior, be it activity or quiescence. If 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. 137 
Without recognizing the premise and quality of their bargaining, even if frequent 
meetings seemed essential, there was little likelihood that any fundamental transactional 
improvement would occur. Although the Americans were better organized, more 
aggressive and more realistic at TRIDENT than at any other time, they won very little 
from the British at the conference table. Because victory in the Pacific was still 
132 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/A/VHI, 19 May 1943, p. 703. 
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dependent upon first defeating Germany, nothing in the agreement stipulated any 
change in strategy by which Gennany's surrender could be accelerated. Moreover. the 
Americans accepted that portion of 'closing the ring' in which continued Mediterranean 
operations, however vague, would lead to an eventual cross-Channel attack. 
Opportunism corrupted strategy, but within this constraint. logistics, resources and 
manpower were dealt with adequately at the operational level. At least in the Pacific 
wastes, controlled as they were by the Americans, there was to be no 'limping along', 
because King's view prevailed. After the debacle that followed the 1942 Magnet 
Conference, how could the American contingent believe that the British would strive to 
make the cross-Channel attack a reality on I May 1944? 138 At the end of the 
Conference, Brooke, operating on will-power alone, manifesting signs of weariness 
and depression, could record that his Mediterranean strategy remained intact, but at a 
price. 
... 
in the light of the results that ensued the 'compromise' that emerged 
was almost exactly what I wanted! ... King, 
however. was the 
unconvertible one, and I knew well that shipping and landing craft 
would continue to be sucked up into the Pacific irrespective of the 
requirements for the war in Europe. 139 
Meeting in Algiers 
Churchill's lobbying for an invasion of southern Italy continued during meetings with 
Eisciihower, 140 in Algiers between 29 May and 3 June, with Marshall, Brooke and 
Montgomery all in attendance. Curiously, the British and American Navies were not 
represented, although any future operation would be amphibious. 141 Churchill tried to 
overcome American instinctive distrust of his Mediterranean strategy, exerting great 
pressure on Eisenhower to gain his acceptance. By attempting to circumvent the JCS, 
American distrust increased. Churchill, according to Marshall. predicted the strategic 
outcome, brushed aside all questions, and engaged in a monologue that seemed to go 
138 'Analysis of Trident and Anfa Conferences', Washington, 25 May 1943, RG 165 OPD, Tab SS 
106, ABC 381. SS Papers 96-126/3. 
13'ý FM Lord Alanbrooke. Op. cit.. 3/A/Vlll'. 25 May. 1943, p. 705. 
140 Sir B. Liddell Hart. Ibe Higher Strategic Decisions of the War'. n. d., 15/15/24. p. 17. 
141 'Minutes ofthe Algiers Conference'. 7 June 1943, JCS Document, MR File. FDRL. 
174 
on long into the night Never had the Chief of Staff heard anyone talk like this before. 
Impressed with his own ideas, the Prime Minister was uninterested in other people's 
opinions, and Marshall, like Hopkins, avoided being drawn in. 142 Churchill, Brooke 
and a cautious Marshall agreed in principle that Eisenhower's decision to invade Italy, 
would be predicated upon the German reaction to the Allied invasion of Sicily. Fears 
among some of the American planners were aroused: a commitment for a major 
operation had been decided once again without CCS participation. 143 At this meeting, 
Eisenhower emerged as the conservative, cautious realist, a quality he displayed for the 
remainder of the war, obviating his determined willingness to fight on the Norman 
beaches in 1942.144 
Stalin's Reaction 
When Stalin was notified of the TRIDENT decision, he castigated both ChurchiR and 
Roosevelt on 11 June, in a message warning that the Soviet Union would experience 
exceptional difficulties by the postponement of the second front until 1944. Possibly 
even more to the point, he stated: 
As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this decision, 
which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any 
attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter and which 
may gravely affect the subsequent course of the war. 145 
Distressed, he withdrew his ambassadors from Britain and the United States. Soon 
after, Stalin accused Churchill of bad faith, but the troubled Prime Minister, attempting 
to mollify him in a lengthy reply, suggested a meeting of the three leaders at Scapa 
Flow that summer. Churchill did not know that Roosevelt had already fractured the 
4 special relationship' by excluding him from a scheduled mid-summer meeting with 
Stalin. When Churchill discovered the plot - it was Harriman who told him - he 
confronted Roosevelt in a letter on 25 June, in which he wrote, 
142 Lord Moran, Op. cit., pp. 121-122. 
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k 
You must excuse me expressing myself with all the frankness that our friendship and gravity of the issue wan-ant. I do not underrate the use 
that enemy propaganda would make of a meeting between the heads of Soviet Russia and the United States at this juncture with the British 
Commonwealth and Empire excluded. It would be serious and 
vexatious, and many would be bewildered and alarmed thereby ... 146 
Roosevelt lied to Churchill and wrote: 
I did not suggest to Uncle Joe that we meet alone but he told Davies that 
he assumed a) that we would meet alone and b) that he agreed that we 
should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary meeting .... to cover much of the same ground with him as did Eden for you a year 
ago ... 
147 
Even if Roosevelt believed that he and Stalin were better suited than Churchill to settle 
post-war issues, the President failed to consider the letter's impact upon the 'special 
relationship'. In American terms, Churchill was a man of the past, Stalin a man of the 
future. ChurchiH understood from previous experiences with the President that 
American attempts to reduce Britain's gold reserves in the United States, plots to take 
over Britain's Middle East oil interests, disputes over Argentine beef, claims to sixteen 
islands in the south Pacific owned by Britain and New Zealand required for post-war 
world air routes, and negotiations culminating in an air agreement with the Irish 
Republic without informing the British, demonstrated that the 'special relationship' was 
relatively non-existent between Allies in the world of power politiCS. 148 Churchill 
circulated a War Office paper which read, 'ranging from the establishment of a Pax 
Americana, in substitution for the Pax Britannica to a definite American imperialistic 
policy which aims at the building up of American power and prestige in various parts of 
the world. ' 149 
Instead of the Roosevelt-Stalin Conference, which never materialized, because of 
Stalin's disinterest, Churchill left for Quebec. Sailing from England aboard the Queen 
Mary to meet the American President in the French-Canadian city along the St. 
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Lawrence River, Churchill recognized that trans-Atlantic distrust persisted. The 




QUADRANT: THE QUEBEC CONFERENCE 
Preparations 
Preparations for the forthcoming 1943 Anglo-American QUADRANT Confereiice in 
Quebec, Canada, were preceded by a series of JCS meetings held between 6 and 10 
August in Washington. ' Offsetting the British influence was high on the American 
agenda. The mood was sanguine, with Marshall and his colleagues, veterans of two 
years of Anglo-American negotiations, believing that the time was ripe for a final 
decision on European strategy. One question demanding resolution, as part of JCS 
Paper 443 Revised, asked whether the main effort in Europe should be from the 
Mediterranean or from Britain. 2 A decision was necessary because, as Rear AdmMd 
Charles 'Savvy' Cooke, the top American Naval planner, indicated, Eisenhower's staff 
was already planning to eliminate Italy from the war and to acquire bases in the Po 
Valley from which to bomb Germany. According to General Carl Spaatz, Deputy 
Commander Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, it was crucial that Rome remained a prize 
of war rather than be declared an 'Open City', because its surrounding airfields would 
obviate the need for those farther north in the Po Valley and the land battle required to 
take them. From Rome's airfields, the bombing of Germany would be just as effective. 
As a result of conversations with Eisenhower's representatives, Cooke stressed that the 
JCS should choose between the two theaters and reach a decision as quickly as 
possible. King agreed, but he concluded that the British were doing much to prevent 
OVERLORD becoming a reality. For example, at TRIDENT the Americans were told I 
that 132 British controlled Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) and Tank Ships in the 
Mediterranean, needed by COSSAC for OVERLORD. could not sail to England after I 
1 JCS Menus 100-102. and White House. NVashington, 6,7,9,10 Aug. 1943. Reel 1. 
2 JCS 103 Mect-ing. 'Pre QUANDRANT: Agenda Priority'. Washington. 10 Aug. 1943., Reel 1. 
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October because some of their number had foundered in hea%, v winter seas during 
previous voyages. King took umbrage with the British notion, indicating that TORCH 
had been mounted on 8 November. He further disparaged British maritime efficiency 
and experience by insisting theirs was a defeatist attitude. 'Surely some nsk must be 
accepted', he complained, 'the consequences of which could largely be overcome by 
vigilance and good seamanship'. Moreover, King had gained the impression that 
Churchill and Brooke were taking counsel of their fears. He rejected the British idea 
that the Allies must wait until the German divisions in Normandy were reduced to 12 
before OVERLORD became acceptable. He mocked British policy as one that delayed, 
lingered, waited and did nothing, and challenged his colleagues to reach a firm decision 
at QUADRANT regarding OVERLORD, if a realistic operation was to be forthcoming. 3 
Secretary Stimson's Influence on Negotiations 
Stimson, having recently returned from a fact-finding tour of Britain, agreed, 
concluding that the Prime Minister and the COS were almost apathetic and certainly 
apprehensive about BOLERO. He mainudned that if OVERLORD were to take place at 
all, Roosevelt and his military commanders had to assume the responsibility of 
leadership, because the shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkirk hung too heavily over 
the imaginations of Churchil-I and his military commanders. 4 Generals Wederneyer and 
Kuter, Army and Air Corps planners, respectively, felt that if the seven battle 
experienced divisions consigned to OVERLORD were shipped from the Mediterranean 
to Britain in accordance with the TRIDENT agreement, it would reduce British pressure 
on the JCS for extensive operations in the Central Mediterranean. Eisenhower's chief 
planner, General Rooks, proposed that even without the seven divisions. he would still 
hm, c sufficient force to fulfill planned operations in Italy, north of Rome, Sardinia and 
Corsica, and have 14 divisions available for an invasion of southern France. If sewn 
ilew divisions replaced the seven veteran divisions, this excess would meet ý. vith 
3 jCS MCCLIlIgS 100-102. Op. cit. 
4NN'hite House Meeting, 'Letter to Roosevelt'. Washington. 10 Aug. 1943. 
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Churchill and Eden's desires for an invasion of the Balkans, but this expansion of 
Mediterranean operations would have a disastrous effect on the main effort from 
Britain. 5 
Seeking improved negotiating results at the forthcoming QUADRANT Conference. 
Marshall suggested that certain position papers must be abstracted for the President's 
quick perusal, a compromise should be considered only in the privacy of a recess, and a 
fixed attitude should be maintained toward upcoming matters. Lastly, knowledge of the 
issues to which the JCS was bound or wherein they could compromise would be 
helpful. 6 Liaison between the JCS and the President had improved since TRIDENT It 
is entirely possible that Roosevelt's general concurrence with his JCS at this stage wzLs 
influenced by Stimson's perceptions of Anglo-American strategic divergencies, 
reflecting deep differences in national character; and that he feared the possible 
dangerous repercussions of British Mediterranean strategy on American wartime and 
post-war relations with Russia. 7 Leahy informed his col-leagues that the President 
wished to see them before they left for Quebec to discuss questions relating to 
Mediterranean operations and other probable points of controversy and disagreement 
within the Anglo-American coalition. Stimson and the JCS met the President at the 
White House on 10 August. The President notified the JCS, on infonnation supplied 
by Stimson, that Churchifl was opposed to an operation against Sardinia, but favored 
one in the Balkans. He later reduced this to a supply operation against Eden's advice. 8 
The President indicated that the Britain was troubled by increased Russian mfluence in 
the region and wanted to get to the Balkans ahead of them. The President believed, 
however nafvely, that the Russians were more interested in establishing kinship with 
the Slavic people than enslaving them. In any event, he thought it unwise to plan 
5 Ibid. 
6 jCS MeCtilIgS. 100-102 Op. cit. 
7 Stimson Diary, Op. cl*t., May, Aug. 1943. 
8 White House'Niecting, 10 Aug. 1943. Washington Reel L 
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military strategy based on a gamble tied to political results, and remained opposed to 
any Balkan venture. 9 
Regarding the cross-Channel attack, King and the President requested plans to 
postpone, abandon, or carry out OVERLORD without British participation. Nlarshall 
responded, 'The trouble with the plan would be that it would greatly overlook the 
availability of 15 British divisions now in Britain. There is no other spot in the world 
where 15 divisions can be placed in operation without large export and supply 
problems. "O 
Before the meeting closed, the participants agreed upon or strongly advocated the 
following: 
1. ) an American commander to lead OVERLORD 
2. ) continuation of the present OVERLORD build-up 
3. ) no divergence from the main effort, and no future changes to be 
made in basic decisions except for minor modifications 
3. ) land approximately 15 divisions upon the French coast during the 
opening phases of OVERLORD, with several divisions to follow from 
Britain soon after 
4. ) avoid any secondary operations mounted on a 'shoe string'. 
As an organizer, Marshall alleged that any operational change has effects which reach as 
fI ar back as the Midwest in the United States, caused by the necessity for altering 
production schedules and special equipment for the loading of convoys. " 
Although Marshal-l admitted to and complained of the lack of shipping and munitions, 
he miscalculated his reserve of infantry divisions, believing that no serious problem 
cxisted. The scarcity of infantry replacements during the fall and winter months of 
1944, which caused havoc on the Western Front, forcibly disproved his presumption: 
the unknown author of an infantry regiment's printed account wrote, Ille group of 
repLicements that had come to us at Remiremont disappeared rapidly and our resources 
became low. We were weary and tired. Morale was ebbin(-,. ... 
Still we fought on. 




Rumors persisted, but the relief never came. '12 Assessing the information given to him 
by the JCS, the President believed that American ends and means were Nvell 
integrated. 13 
Proposing an Agenda 
Five days before the first QUADRANT meeting, the JCS completed its agenda for the 
Conference: they would first insist upon acceptance of the TRBDENT agreement ('CCS- 
246/2') relating to the I May 1944 cross-Channel landing. Few problems were 
expected on this account, as revealed in 'CCS-291/1'by their secretary, but the JCS 
was concerned that the COS faced difficulties viewing OVERLORD as part of a global 
strategy involving all theaters, with each theater affecting the other, preoccupied as they 
were with the Mediterranean. Regarding this theater, the JCS learned that the British 
were anxious to discuss immediate and specific operations, such as post-HUSKY, and 
then to fit them into agreements within the over-all picture later. The JCS favored a 
survey all of the Europe-African areas first. Which ever proposal was tabled first, 
Marshall affirmed that CCS agreements were predisposed toward AVALANCHE, the 
Salerno landing near Naples, after BAYTOWN, the landing in southern Italy was 
underway. Even though the Americans could be as opportunistic as the British when it 
suited them, as typified in the projected Italian landings, they were deten-nined to seek 
firm commitments on all implementations as applied to OVERLORD and Burma 
operations, because of time constraints. 14 
An exchange of paperwork between the Allied Chiefs revealed that the British's first 
priority was the elimination of Italy from the war, set forth by future Mediterranean 
opcrations. with defeat of Japan as the second ('CCS-228'). Whereas. 'CCS-228/1'. 
the American counter proposal, required that progress and planning reports for both the 
Euro-Mediterranean and the Pacific-Asia areas must be submitted before a decision %vas 
12 C. Pcck. (ed. ). Five Years, Five Countries, Five Campaigns, 141 Infantry Regiment, (Munich. 
194 S), P. 72. 
13 jCS meetings IM-102, Op. cit. 
14 lbill. 
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reached on projected operations within them. The American agenda was too 
comprehensive for the British, who recommended that the first QUADRANT meeting 
be limier to: 
1. ) composition of the agenda 
2. ) the order in which it should be taken up 
3. ) the procedure to be followed at the Conference. 15 
Both sides sought the best procedure with which to exploit the other during the 
meetings; this implied that positions had not softened since TRIDENT. The tenor of 
American pre-QUADRANT meetings indicated that the JCS was as suspicious of 
British intentions as ever, consistently wary of many of their proposals and plans. To 
the extent that their prejudice was sweeping, the JCS had difficulty differentiating and 
assessing the British point of view on a case by case basis. 16 
Negotiating and Psychology 
From one persuasive point of view, it can be argued that thinking and feeling are rival 
interconnected instruments of decision. Both are reasonable and internally consistent, 
but each works by its own standards. Thinking evaluates from the viewpoint 'true- 
false' and feeling from the viewpoint 'agreeable-disagreeable'. 17 'Intentionality', the 
ability to question and evaluate objectively one's motives and purpose, to know what 
one is doing, through all the phases of planning and negotiating. This could contribute 
to increased rationality during negotiations, 18but King rarely behaved in this manner. 
Being co-operative was more complicated than it seemed. When the two sides 
disagreed and personalities clashed, the result was usually deadlock. When the British 
and the Americans viewed the same facts differently, or did not consider the same 
possibilities, or did not foresee the same consequences, each had only an incomplete 
I- 
Knowledge of the problem. In a perfect world, required was a combination of four 
15 Nit, 'CCS 289' and '289/1, '242/6', 'CCS 300/1% 'CCS 303', 'JCS 443', 'JCS 442' & '442/1' 
(papers presented on Europe-an strategy during CCS meetings between 5-17 Aug. 1943), Reels III 
and IV. 
16 'CCS 381: Conduct of the War, 1943-1944', Washington, 17 May 1943 RG. 165 JWPC. 
17 J. Jacobi, The Psychology of C. C Jung, (New Haven, CT, 1968). 
18 C. Wilson, Introduction to the New Existentialism, (London, 1966), pp. 39-50. 
183 
processes: sensing to gather the relevant facts; intuition to see all measures that might 
usefully be taken; thinking to determine the consequences and feeling to consider the 
impact of these consequences on the people involved and the war as a whole. This 
might have been too much to expect considering the training, experience and 
personalities of the participants, including the planners, which either demonstrated a 
preference for organizing facts and principles related to a situation or organizing the 
situation itself and then to get it moving. Nevertheless, the pooling of their respective 
perceptions and judgments, however difficult, could offer the best chance of finding a 
solution valid for them each side. 19 
When Marshall disclosed that Allied operations against Italy were being planned, 
signifýing agreement, the American argument over British intransigence had to relate to 
OVERLORD alone. Brooke was not so sure, estimating '... that Marshall could not see 
beyond the tip of his nose and was maddening. 120 Although General Rook's evaluation 
of American force level sufficiency in the Mediterranean was wildly optimistic, the 
Americans had much to gain by attacking the Italian mainland in an opportunistic 
maneuver with the forces at hand. Trying to knock Italy out of the war could deter little 
from the BOLERO build-up, unless the object of the landings changed. 
Marshall and the JCS, Brooke and the COS and their staffs convened QUADRANT on 
14 August, at which procedural conduct became the primary subject The CCS agreed 
to the continuation of the TRIDENT procedures, with specific reference to the recording 
of decisions, approval of the minutes, reports to the President and the Prime Minister 
and the form of the Final Report. They also agreed to a limit of twelve conferees per 
side, and, as long as one planner was present, the others were not required to attend 
meetings. Closed sessions were acceptable when needed. 21 
19 1. Myers, Gifts Differing, (Palo Alto, CA., 1980), pp. 65,118. 
20 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/A/EK, 24 July 1943, p. 746. 
21 CCS 106 Meeting, 'QUADRANT Conference', Washington, 14 Aug. 1943, Reel IV. 
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Reports on Strategy and the Air War 
Turning aside from matters of protocol, Brooke reported on German-Italian 
dispositions in Europe. German divisions were 60 percent under strength and German 
manpower was stretched to the limit. Italian and satellite forces compounded 
Germany's problems by withdrawing from the Eastern Front. Some Italian divisioils 
of the thirty stationed in the Balkans and southern France had made surrender 
overtures, which posed manpower replacement problems for Germany. Portal praised 
the effective use of daylight bombing in POINTBLANK, the continuing British based 
Allied air operation by which complete mastery of the air above Germany would be 
achieved. Thus far, POINTBLANK had been a great success, but the establishment of 
strong offensive air forces in northern Italy would expose southern Germany and 60 
percent of its aircraft production to air attack, forcing the Luftwaffe to deploy hall- of its 
I ighter force on the Western Front to counter this new threat. 22 Regarding the European 
air battle, Portal warned, '... If German fighter strength was not checked in the next 
three months, the battle might be lost, since it was impossible to judge the strength 
which the German fighter forces might attain by next spring, if our attack is not pressed 
home. '23 
Arnold was less optimistic than Portal, and painted a gloomy picture of American air 
operafions over Europe: early estimates, based on the British experience of 
replacements for men and machines had proved too low in the case of Eighth AAF 
operations. The crews were 'war weary' and in short supply, i. e., planes 
outnumbering air crews by two to one (800 to 400). He hoped that by January 1944 
this discrepancy could be reversed by achieving a reser-ve of one air crew each for an 
ýiggrcgatc of 1,900 planes. Hc questioned the maximum use of Britain as a bomber 
22 lbid., pp. 2-3 
23 lbid 
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base in the winter months, because of losses due to bad weather m and believed that the 
North Italian air bases would prove valuable in this regard. 25 
CCS meeting 108 convened on 15 August and revealed that the rift and conflict over 
strategy remained. King believed that the COS had serious doubts as to the possibility 
of accomplishing OVERLORD. Brooke disagreed, insisting that if the three conditions 
formulated by Morgan in his paper were addressed and achieved, the COS would 
support OVERLORD: 
1. ) reduction in German fighter strength 
2. ) German strength and reinforcement in France and the Low Countries 
for the first two months must be kept at specified limits, and 
3. ) the problem of beach maintenance must be solved. 26 
Marshall responded as if he had not heard Brooke's statement, and if this were typical 
behavior, little could be accomplished in these sessions. Seemingly talldng at cross- 
purposes, Marshall questioned whether the required conditions for a successful 
OVERLORD solely depended upon increased strength in the Mediterranean. Only if 
enemy resistance were w,. =n- would he agree to the seizure of Italian territory and the 
occupation of the northern Italian airfields, although just as much was achievable from 
the Florence area. Marshall insisted that the seven Mediterranean divisions be shipped 
to Britain and OVERLORD be given overriding priority, otherwise it would become a 
subsidiary operation. General Barker, COSSAC's American planner agreed, 
considering it mere speculation to diink that an 'opportunist' operation would be 
cheaper in lives. He threatened: 
If we relied on this, we are opening a new concept which will weaken 
our chances of an early victory and render a re-examination of our basic 
strategy, with a possible readjustment towards the Pacific. 27 
The CCS should now take a decision that OVERLORD should have 
overriding priority and maintain this decision, in order that the success 
24 Interview with Lt. Gen. J. Doolittle, 14 Dec. 1981: When Gen. Doolittle assumed command of the 
8th Air Force in Jan. 1944, he instituted procedures to lessen air accidents over the UK and 
improved the manpower replacement system. 
25 CCS 106 Meeting, Op. Cit. 
26 Lt. Gen. Sir F. Morgan, 'Operation OVERLORD', QUADRANT Conference, appendix B, 
Washington, Aug. 1943, Ismay File. 
27 CCS 108 Meeting, QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 15 Aug. 1943, Reel IV. 
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of the operation could be insured. Any departure from this concept must 
entail a reconsideration of our basic strategy. 28 
Ilie British counter argument stressed that successful operations in France ricccssitated 
a preponderance of force, an essential element to avoid a catastrophe, vvhich could 
seriously delay ultimate victory. Success depended, not on the absolute strength of the 
Allied forces available for OVERLORD, but on the overall strength of the Germans. 
This relative strength could best be achieved by operations in Italy. aimed at containitig, 
the maximum Gen-nan forces there, and by air action from the best possible Italian 
bases to reduce the German fighter threat. The British were concerned that the 
withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean, risks taken in that theater could 
not only prejudice the success of OVERLORD, but prevent any chance of achievement. 
By fighting a weakened Allied Army to a standstill in Italy, Gen-nan reserves could be 
transferred to Normandy to threaten the landing. In the American view OVERLORD 
was the main operation and all operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting 
OVERLORD. 29 
The Maintenance of Irreconcilable Differences 
The irreconcilable positions, the question of emphasis, could not have been more 
clearly drawn. While the British viewed OVERLORD as the main operation, all 
operations in Italy were seen as assisting it. In the American view, OVERLORD would 
ilever materialize unless it was given overriding priority. Brooke wrote in his diary 
at I ter the meeting ended: 
It was a most painful meeting and we settled nothing. I entirely failed to 
get Marshall to realise the relation between the cross-Channel and Italian 
Operations. and the repercussions which the one exercises on the other. 
It is quite impossible to argue with him as he does not begin to 
understand a strategic problem! He had not even read the plans v"'orked 
out by Morgan for the cross-Channel operation and consequently was 
not even in a position to begin to appreciate its difficulties and 
requirements. 30 
2, ý Ibid.. 'CCS 303'. VCS 304'. 
29 Ibid. 
30 FNI Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/IX. 15 Aug.. 1943. p. 764. 
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The JCS reassembled on 15 August to consider the outcome of the last CCS meeting. 
Although Leahy expressed concern over the shifting of the seven battle-seasoned 
divisions without knowledge of the enemy situation, as advocated by the COS, 
Marshall disagreed. He argued that the seven divisions were not the problem, but 
British avoidance of TRIDENT was, an agreement they now found unacceptable. 
Since it would take six months to move those divisions from the Mediterranean to 
Britain in preparation for OVERLORD, the COS lack of adherence could delay the 
strategic time table. 31 
It was as if the COS were repudiating the TRIDENT agreement, much as Marshall and 
King had tried to repudiate MAGNET in 1942, suggesting that not only were either 
side's tactics similar, but there were only so many tactics from which to choose. Each 
involved permutations of avoidance and denial, in which one ingredient was some form 
of punishment, e. g. the withholding of supplies, the freezing of troop movements. 
The conduct of the war and the basic decisions achieved at prior conferences, all of 
which took months to accomplish, were at stake, and Marshall refused to become mired 
in another Mediterranean campaign not envisaged at TRIDENT, regardless of the 
British logic for doing so. 
Consensually, the American position was hardening against the British, as expressed 
by Admiral Russell Wilson, a member of the elite JSSC. He observed that the British 
were undermining OVERLORD by adopting a well-tried technique: emasculation. The 
result, he perceived, would unnecessarily prolong the war in the Atlantic and, 
consequently, in the Pacific. The Americans reacted in turn by deprecating British 
strategy: the British would not make a decision until it had been determined what the 
enemy proposed to do, that the British endeavored to meet an emergency before it arose 
and that the British would create an emergency which would retain the seven divisions 
in the Mediterranean. Moreover, in their arguments, they had ignored the effects of 
31 jCS 104 Meeting, QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 15 Aug. 1943, Reel Il. 
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Russian successes and those of the bombing offensive, and had made the whole 
success of OVERLORD dependent on creating a favorable situation in Italy. 32 
Wedemeyer took the JCS through a sequence of British positions, from Casablanca 
onwards, that revealed the capricious nuances of their Mediterranean strategy. He 
described how HUSKY's purpose, according to them, was to open the Mediterranean 
and cause Italy's collapse. At that time, the COS believed it unnecessary to mount an 
attack on the Italian mainland, charging that it would fall by air action alone. He was 
sure that they had equivocated since TRIDENT, arguing that occupation of Italy was 
necessary, offering the weak excuse that the Germans must be denied the northern 
Italian airfields. Wedemeyer insisted that it would do the enemy little good, since the 
Allies had overwhehning air superiority in the area. He indicated that lower-level 
British officers agreed with the American OVERLORD planners, but due to political 
considerations and political pressure from above, they had to disagree. 'The British 
leadership believe we are wrong'. 33 To discover the extent that Wedemeyer's behavior 
was sycophantic and tendentious is difficult to assess, because his views were 
influenced by Embick, his father-in-law and interlocked with Marshall's, the strategy to 
which the JCS now acceded; he offered no solutions but sought substantiation for his 
prejudice. During their meeting, certain statements by JCS members sounded more like 
clich6s: 
We should be firm in retaining the initiative and making the enemy 
conform to our decisions .... We must retain the 
initiative and call the 
tune .... The 
decision should be one that would be firm in order and that 
it could be vigorously executed .... 
We would meet with reverses, in 
which case more forces would be required to sustain our troops. 34 
Marshall affinned that the OVERLORD plan was based on contingencies, a condition 
the British needed to understand before acceptance. Polemics aside, it was Kuter v. 'ho 
suggested a substantive arrangement for settling the seven diNrision controversy, 
... that the 
British would carry out OVERLORD if the proNiso was put in 
'CCS-303'- that future movements of forces from the Nled would be 
32 Ibid. 
33 lb id. p. 3. 34 ibid. 
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subject to the approval of the CCS. This was about as firm an 
agreement as could be reached at this time. 35 
Marshall remained consistent to his need for planning, but he was concerned. as he had 
been over the TORCH decision, that Churchill and Roosevelt expected changes in plans 
to be made quickly and easily. Having little idea of how disruptive these changes could 
be, they were unappreciative of the far reaching results of change. True to his respect 
for civilian-military relations, he concluded that if the President and the Prime Minister 
decided on a Mediterranean strategy, he wished to receive a firm decision to that effect, 
so that definite plans could be made with reasonable expectation of their being carried 
oUt. 36 However, if Roosevelt needed an operation that would help him win political rc- 
election in 1944, OVERLORD would be the operation of choice; there was not an 
operation in the Mediterranean that could match it for sheer drama, scope or decisive 
resultS. 37 
POINTBLANK conversations continued; an operation related to the European air war, 
it was one of the topics under discussion when the conference continued on 16 August. 
Best Joint Intelligence Committee estimates revealed that German morale has been 
seriously affected, casualties were heavy and great destruction of factones and private 
dwellings had occurred. Estimates indicated that some 422,000 workers were rendered 
homeless and an additional 1.8 million people had suffered damage to their homes, 
which was irreparable, since the necessary consumer goods to replace those destroyed 
were unavailable. Further, the bombing had affected the outlook of the population 
with regard to the regime, the war effort as a whole and the willingness to hold out. 
The estimate warned that unrelenting pressure had to be maintained to insure victory in 
the autumn. If this were not done, Germany, by a conservation of its strength and by 
the development of new defensive measures, might be in an unassailable position by 
spring. 38 Arnold added his own cautionary note to the intelligence findings: 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.. p. 5. 37 J. Grigg, 01). cit., p. 105. 
"ý CCS 109 NICeLing. QUADRANT Conference. NN"ashington, 16 Aug. 1943. Reel IV. 
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... the losses suffered 
in the Ploesti raid were. of the one hundred 
seventy eight planes dispatched, fifty four, including fifty one creývs, 
had been lost ... the results had been excellent: of nine targets hit, fi%-c had been totally destroyed... It might be impossible to ask crews to 
sustain a loss of 33% in more than one operation. 39 
Great emphasis had been placed on air bombardment before the war as the economical 
and direct means of destroying an enemy's ability to continue fighting. but Roosevelt, 
like Portal, had lost faith init. 40Marshall and his adherents recognized that only 
OVERLORD, assisted by air, could actually do the job of defeating Germany. although Zý 
he had diverted half of the available manpower to the AAF and weakened the An-ny. 
The Americans played their Pacific threat card ad nauseam, warning that if OVERLORD 
were reduced to a subsidiary operation, it could lead to a possible reorientation of their 
efforts. 41 Therefore, they sought acceptance of the TRBDENT proposals without 
British qualifications and reservations. The JCS introduced a new word, 'indirection', 
at their meeting of 16 August, to underline COS intractability, i. e., the British approach 
to OVERLORD was by indirection; attacking the enemy via Italy was by indirection, or 
a possible movement into southern France through the north of Italy and the Alps, 
discounted by the JCS as slow and ineffective. 42Marshall recounted how Churchill telt 
differently now towards OVERLORD, proclaiming at dinner the night before, that 
every effort should be made to further it. Although Marshal-I proposed that the Prime 
Minister's inhibiting conditions remained unchanged, that of bolstering forces in Italy at 
OVERLORD's expense, Churchill responded, 'Give us time'. Marshall had informed 
Dill that the TRIDENT agreement needed to be fulfffled, that sudden changes in 
Churchill's plans after their meeting with Eisenhower in Algiers had resulted in 
convoys being diverted and 60,000 troops added to Eisenhower's forces, to accomplish 
those sudden changes. This was a condition the JCS would stand no longer. no further 
circumlocution, no further 'sucking in'. resulting in the hand to mouth handl-ing of 
30 Ibid. 'Arnold Report'. p. I 
40 N. Purish, Behind the Sheltering Bomb, (Nev 
41 CCS 108 Meeting. Op. cit. 
42 jCS 105 Meeting, QUADRANT Conference, 
York, 1979), p. 18. 
Washington, 16 Aug. 1943. Reel 11. 
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logistics. As Marshall saw it, Germany's only hope was either to divide, delay or play 
for an adjusted peace, but the Americans were going on the offensive. " 
The COS had accepted the viability of OVERLORD in 1944, but found the Amencan 
insistence of giving it overall priority too restrictive. Seeking to soften the American 
position with qualifiers, Brooke evoked a strong JCS response. His m. -crc 
seen as a British excuse to press for further Mediterranean operations or as a defence 
against being accused of breaking faith with their agreements. Aware that past British 
tagreements in principle' ended up being little more than debating devices, led Marshall 
and his colleagues to seek a final showdown with the British team. 44 Churchill had 
arrived on the fourteenth; on the seventeenth Roosevelt and Hopkins arrived, soon 
t ollowed by Eden. Although the President supported OVERLORD, the JCS, prior to 
his arrival, realized that after three days of intense debate, a compromise was 
developing in which the 'overriding priority' for the operation would be lessened. 45 
The CCS morning meeting on the nineteenth became so heated between the British and 
American delegations, between Marshall and Brooke, that half way through it, Brooke 
asked to go 'off the record' in an attempt to reconcile the Anglo-American differences. 
The room was cleared of the sixty odd administrative officers, an indication that the 
staff limits recommended at the beginning of the conference had been ignored. 
Our talk was pretty frank. I opened by telling them that the root of the 
matter was that we were not trusting one another. They doubted our real 
intentions to put our full hearts into the cross-Channel operations next 
spring, and we had not full confidence that they would not in future 
insist on our carrying out previous agreements irrespective of changed 
strategic conditions. 46 
According to the Americans, the British failed to realize the unprecedented complexity 
involved in properly arming and equipping forces that had to be carried thousands of 
43 lbi(I.. 1). 2. 
44 Gen. Sir NN, '. Jackson. Op. cit., pp. 104-105. 
45 CCS 110 Meeting. QUADRANT Conference, 'CCS 303/3 
Axis in Europe', Washington, 17 Aug. 1943. Reel IV. 
46 FM Lord Alanbrook-c. 3/A/IX, 19 Aug. 1943. pp. 439-433 
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miles to the theaters in which they would operate. Improvisation, though perhaps an 
attractive approach, could not take the place of timetables. 
The seriousness of the meeting was lifted somewhat by the introduction of a minor 
subject by Mountbatten. HABBAKUK, the code-name defining a floating seadrome 
or giant aircraft carrier, invented by Geoffrey Pyke, a British scientist, and constructcd 
of 'Pykrete', a material formed from a frozen mixture of diluted pulp and water. It was 
regarded as a Pacific project for the air bombardment of Japan by Arnold and Portal. 
Approached by Mountbatten, at the beginning of the session, Brooke, who considered 
HABAKKUK a folly, shouted, 'The hell with HABAKKUK, we are about to have the 
most difficult time with our American friends and shall not have time for your ice 
carriers. 147 
When the session aqjourned, Brooke, with Marshall's agreement, extended it, thereby 
allowing Mountbatten to perform his experiment. He aimed to fire his revolver twice 
into two separate cubes, one of ice and one of 'Pykrete', in order to demonstrate 
'Pykrete's' excellent armor-plate characteristics. Tle Combined Chiefs gathered behind 
the him; Mountbatten fired. The first bullet shattered the ice, the second rebounded off 
the 'Pykrete' and buzzed angrily around their legs. Brooke told the following story: 
It will be remembered that when the original meeting had become too 
heated we had cleared the room of all the attending staff. They were 
waiting in an aqjoining room and when the revolver shots were heard, 
the wag of the party shouted: 'Good Heavens, they have started 
shooting now! '48 
Perhaps the above vignette is apocryphal. It has been elaborated upon by Churchill, 
Arnold, Leahy and King and reflects the need to relieve difficult negotiations with a 
dash of levity. Adding to the humor and sense of unreality was the CCS agreement 
reached in order to continue HABAKKUK's research, development and construction. "' 
47 lbid., 'Notes For Nly Memoirs'. 2/Xl, 19 Aug. 1943, pp. 7-8. 
48 ibi& 
415 Ibid.. p. 2. 
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The Conception of the ANVIL Plan 
Operation ANVIL, as part of Operation OVERLORD was origmally conceived during 
the Conference and included in the Chiefs of Staff's 'Final Report'. of 24 August 1943. 
It stipulated that, 
Offensive operations against southern France (to include the use of 
trained and equipped French forces) should be undertaken to establish a 
lodgement in the Toulon-Marseilles area and to exploit northward in 
order to create a diversion in connection with Overlord. Air nourished 
guerrilla operations in the southern Alps will, if possible, be 
initiated 
.... The necessary resources would be drawn from the Mediterranean theater. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not 
less than a two division assault needed be pressed forward as fast as 
possible; if the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, 
consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional 
resources. 50 
The Results of QUADRANT 
At the end of the conference, the Combined Chiefs directed Eisenhower, serving as 
Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, to submit an outline plan for a 
possible operation in southern France. 51 Eisenhower's October report lacked 
enthusiasm, because there were not enough resources to launch a full scale attack. He 
reasoned that only one division, used as a feint, could be in the initial assault, because 
ofa shortage of landing craft. Even concerted operations in Italy might prove more 
valuable to OVERLORD than ANVIL itself, the report continued, the landing at best 
being a small-scale operation. 52 Morgan disagreed, asserting that OVERLORD and 
ANVIL must take place simultaneously if two of the German mobile reserve divisions. 
stationed in southem France, were to be tied down by formations under Allied Force 
Headquarters (AFHQ) control. He opposed Eisenhower's recommendation that the 
operation should be considered only as one of several possibilities. 53 British experts at 
die Conference disagreed with Morgan and at the first plenary session on 19 August the 
50 CCS 116 Niceting, 'CCS 319/5: Final Report to the President and Prime Minister'. Washington. 24 
Aug. 1943, Reel IV. 
51 '328/1: Directive to Gen. Eisenhower'. Washington, 27 Aug. 1943 RG. 165 OPD. 
52 CAB 79 (COS) 43 273 Meeting. 8 Nov. I Q43. 
53 J. Ehrman. Grand Strateij, V. (London. 195o). p. 9. 
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CCS presented the results of five days of continuous discussion to the President and 
Prime Minister: 
OVERLORD - target date, I May 1944, to land in France and strike at 
the heart of Germany and destroy her forces. Between OVERLORD 
and Mediterranean operations, the sharing of scarce resources to be 
distributed and employed to insure the former's success. 
Consideration of a northern Norway landing, (Operation JUPITER), 
only if OVERLORD is rendered impossible. Unremitting pressure on 
the German forces in Italy. southern France -a diversion and lodgment between Toulon and Marseilles, in conjunction with OVERLORD, with 
exploitation northwards. Air-nourished guerrilla warfare in southern 
France. Balkan operations limited to supply, special operations and 
bombing of strategic objectives. 54 
The Landing Craft Problem 
Churchill and Roosevelt accepted the paper with reservations related to OVERLORD. 55 
During the second plenary session on the twenty-third, the Prime Minister, favoring the 
OVERLORD concept for 1944, but fearful of excessive casualties, requested that a rulc 
be applied, as prepared by Morgan, that if there were more than twelve mobile Gen-nan 
divisions in France at the intended moment of the Allied landing, the landing would be 
canceled. He also insisted that the assault force, including landing craft, to be increased 
by 25 percent and Allied fighter superiority achieved before the landing. The perennial 
landing craft problem persisted, the shortages of which limited all prospective 
operations, including the passage to Italy. The two sides also disagreed over landing 
craft procurement. The British desired a definite allocation per month or a percentage of 
monthly construction, while the Americans wanted to allocate them as needed for 
specific operations. The Americans, whose Navy controlled landing craft production 
and distribution, refused to give the British Navy a 'blank-check', particularly when it 
was using the craft for net protection at Scapa FIOW. 56 Even though 204 Landing Craft 
Tank (LCT) and Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) were to be deployed against Gennany by 
54 Minutes. I st Meeting, CCS, 'President and Prime Minister'. QUADRANT Conference. 
Wýishington, 19 Aug. 1943. Office of the CCS. 
55 'CCS 319/5, 'Final Report. to the President and Prime Minister'. QUADRANT Conference. 
Washington, 24 Aug.. 1943. Reel IV. 
56 jCS 108 Meeting', Op. cit., p. A2. 
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December 1943,571acldng was an oversight bilateral committee to reduce the incentive 
for deception and manipulation and to insure proper apportionment. Concurrently, the 
inevitable Italian collapse, accelerated by the surrender of Sicily on 17 August, lured 
Allied forces toward Italy, certainly as far as Churchill suggested, beyond Rome to the 
Ancona-Pisa line and the norffiern afifields. 58 
Brooke's Deliberations 
Brooke felt the two teams had failed to arrive at the best strategy, but grew 
philosophical, concluding that when working with allies, compromises with all their 
evils became inevitable. 59 Compromises, however, need not be evil. They are not laws 
unto themselves. Most agreements are based on compromise, but when one side or 
another is forced to compromise to avoid stalemate, the result is less than even minimal 
expectations. Only the reduction of fixed positions can speed negotiations and only 
compliance can enforce an agreement. Once the latter goal is accomplished, no one 
need resort to subterfuge or act in a disingenuous manner, because the consequences 
are clearly marked. When this is not the case, penalties and sanctions can be applied 
without explanation and without warning, adding to further alienation and distrust. 
Unfortunately, almost all Allied agreements lacked this basic protection and could be 
broken with impunity, against which the aggrieved party would retaliate. During the 
two month period between TRIDENT and QUADRANT, the COS, their intentions 
dubious, unilaterally ordered the seven divisions reassigned to Britain to 'stand-fast 99 
thus breaking the TRIDENT agreement Being hoist with his own petard must have 
added to Brooke's desultory mood. Personally, he felt '... flat and depressed, weary of 
battling against difficulties, differences of opinion, stubbornness, stupidity, pettiness 
and pig-headedness. '60 The Americans were satisfied with the results at Quebec: they 
were mastering the art of military diplomacy, the JCS had the support of the President 
57 M. Matloff, Op. cit., p. 398. 
59 Minutes, 2nd Meeting: CCS, President and Prime Minister, QUADRANT Conference, Washington, 
23 Aug, 1943, Reel IV. 
59 FM Lord Alanbrooke, 3/A/IX, 
60 Ibid. 'Notes On My Memoirs' 
23, Aug. 1943, p. 775. 
, Op. cit., 24 Aug. 1943, pp. 8-10. 
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lk . 
who backed his Chief of Staff, and the Mediterranean would become more integrated 
with OVERLORD as the major operation (in conjunction with the bomhcr of t'Cnsl,, -c). 
and the COS disavowed interest in the Balkans. Marshall felt closer to his goal of' 
fighting a war with a minimum of loss, expense and time, as British power and 
influence were waning. Therefore, Brooke would be denied the most coveted 
command of the war, OVERLORD. That operation would fall to an American. With 
his role unchanged, Brooke was faced with making the most of British assets; 
moreover, it would behoove him to negotiate on the merits of a specific issue in order to 
establish a greater role for strategic principles as pitted against the raw physical and 
economic power of the United States. Nevertheless. Brooke had succeeded In kccping 
the bomber offensive intact and operations in the Mediterranean alive with the forces 
allocated at TRIDENT, to be applied according to the decisions of the CCS. Although 
the Americans chose to place OVERLORD above Mediterranean operations with regard 
to scarce resources, Brooke had prevented this from occurring. Instead, the CCS 
agreed that available resources would be distributed and employed as the means of 
ensuring OVERLORD's success. 61 QUADRANT was a critical conferencc in the 
evolufion of Anglo-American strategy in the war against Germany. If planning at 
Casablanca represented the beginning of coalition warfare's offensive phase, and 
TRIDENT the halfway mark, QUADRANT was the beginning of the end, even though 
negotiations at Quebec fell short of the final showdown desired by Marshall. 62 
Moreover French forces needed to be integrated into overall Allied planning, but the 
resolution of that issue would have to wait for another conference. 
JCS Formulation of Policy on Assumptions 
Whether Brooke needed any further corroboration regarding the quality of American 
thought processes and negotiating procedures concerning the formulation of policy. the 
following is a partial description of JCS Meeting 109: General Whitely reported that it 
61 'Papers and Minuics'. QUADRANT Conference, Washington, Aug. 1943, pp. 87.2-27,24, Reel IV. 
62 N1. Matloff, Op. cl*t., pp. 242-243. 
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was Eisenhower's intention prior to the receipt of any instructions resulting from 
QUADRANT to hit the Germans whenever and wherever possible. Kin, -, beheved that 
Eisenhower had never received final approval of AVALANCHE, the invasion of Italy, 
from the CCS. General Handy (Marshall's Chief of the Operations Planning DIN-Islon) 
had the impression that Eisenhower would mount AVALANCHE on 9 September. The 
Secretary had infonnation which stipulated that Eisenhower had never been specifically 
told to implement AVALANCHE. The CCS had notified Eisenhower that he should 
as far north in Italy as land-based aviation would cover his operations. Rooks was 
under the impression that Eisenhower had never received any specific directive. King, 
had understood that the CCS had never approved of Eisenhower's stated intentions. 
Arnold indicated it had never occurred to him that Eisenhower needed any further 
directives. 63 One senior British officer wrote of Anglo-American confusion and 
misperception this way: 
Some Americans are curiously liable to suspect that they are going to be 
'outsmarted' by the subtle British - perhaps because we sometimes do 
such stupid things that they cannot take them at face value but suspect 
them of being part of some'dark design'. 64 
While the JCS searched for an answer, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, General Walter B. 
Smith successfully concluded Italian armistice negotiations at Casibile, Sicily. The 
results of this truce would be simultaneously announced with AVALANCHE, on 9 
September. 
63 jCS 108 Meeting, Op. cit., p. 5. 
64 AM Sir J. Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections, (London, 1956), P. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TEHRAN: The Second Front, the French Resistance and the French 
Army. 
This chapter explores the relationship between the two amphibious operations, the 
tangled web of political-military procedures between the British, the Americans and the 
French; Russian demands, the emergence and role of the French Resistance and the 
creation of an 'Americanized' French Army. 
OVERLORD and ANVIL, projected amphibious landings for 1944, were considered as 
inter-dependent parts of the same operation, the hammer and the anvil that would crush 
the German Armies in western Europe. Their acceptance and activation, however, 
were dependent upon the attitudes and changeable moods of the major participants, 
particularly those of Roosevelt and Churchill. Stahn, by contrast, was completely and 
steadfastly set on the Anglo-Americans invading northern France. Churchil-l viewed 
tI urther Mediterranean operations as a means of countering Russian advances into 
central Convinced that the OVERLORD strategy, while satisfying a political expedient, 
he feared the result in defeat. I Roosevelt, however, remained unwilling to accept any 
delay or postponement beyond May 1944 to fulfill his second front promise to Stalin. 
Mounting a threat against southern France was first mentioned, then shelved at the 
TRIDENT Conference in May of 1943. The idea was revived by Eden in Moscow and 
accepted as a landing at QUADRANT 
Between 1939 and 1941, as the United States moved from ambivalent neutrality toward 
active belligerency, American and British policies toward Vichy France diverged. Thrs, 
disunity aggravated already delicate negotiations - particularly affecting ANVIL and 
Resistance activities. The integration of the Resistance into Alhed planning was 
J. Harvey, (ed. ), The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Han, ey, 1937-194o. (Eden's Sccrctary), (London. 
1970), pp. 313-314, FO 371/370,31 Oct. 1943: 20 Oct. F)43, PRENI 3/172/5. 
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dependent upon the decisions reached by Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin at the Tehran 
EUREKA Conference of November 1943. 
Stalin's unexpected enthusiasm for the southern France operation and pushing ahead 
the timing of OVERLORD, at the expense of the Italian campaign, exacerbated the 
already difficult Anglo-American strategic conflict Immediately accepted by 
Roosevelt, reluctantly endorsed by Churchill, the second front was characterized by 
Stalin as a giant 'pincer', composed of simultaneous landings in Normandy 
(OVERLORD) and Provence (ANVEL), with ANVIL assigned the subordinate role. 2 
The debarkation points of the 'pincer' would be 500 miles apart; and were, 
consequently, less Eke pincers than two separate fronts (with all that entailed). Marshal 
Voroshilov of Russia and Brooke considered them to be critically important military 
operations; he suggested that the landings entailed the technical problems that might be 
encountered with a 'river crossing'. Marshall disagreed and warned, 'The difference 
between a river crossing, however wide, and a landing from the ocean is that the failure 
of a river crossing is a reverse while the failure of a landing operation from the sea is a 
catotrophe. 13 
Tactical and logistical failures during the Italian winter and spring campaigns of 1943- 
1944, e. g., the transfer preparations of seven divisions to Britain after the Sicilian 
campaign, the Rapido River fiasco and the attritional, battles at Monte Cassino and 
Anzio, precluded the a cross-Channel attack on the prescribed date. 4ANVIL, the 
adjunct, was also delayed, its purpose and landing site repeatedly contested. At times, 
the operation verged on being canceled entirely. 5 
2 R. Lewin, Churchill as Warlord, (New York, 1973). 
3 The Documents of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, (Moscow, 1969), pp. 23-25. 
4 Gen. F. Walker, From Texas to Rome: A Gen. 's Journal, (Dallas, 1969), pp. 288-290; B. Holden 
Reid, 'Ile Italian Campaign 194345: A Reappraisal of Allied Gen. ship', Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 13 1, (1990), pp. 143-144. 
5 77te Documents of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Op. cit., p. 14. 
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Toward a EUREKA Agreement 
At a pre-EUREKA meeting on II November, the COS proposed (and were supported 
Eisenhower) that it was vital to maintain the momentum in Italy, capture Rome and take 
the airfields to the north without exhausting Allied armies. 6Unfortiinately, over the 
next five months, this decision would result in the loss of 7,000 troops killed, 36,000 
wounded or missing and another 44,000 hospitalized for various non-battle injuries and 
illness out of a total of 125,000 men who landed on the Anzio beachhead. The infantry 
suffered 80 percent of the casualties. Officer losses in the infantry battalions actually 
exceeded 100 percent. 7 In an aide m6moire, the COS stated, 
... We must not regard OVERLORD on a fixed date as the pivot of our 
whole strategy on which all else turns ... With the Germans in their 
present plight... we should stretch the German forces to the utmost by 
threatening as many of their vital interests and areas as possible and, 
holding them thus, we should attack wherever we can do so in superior 
force. 8 
Marshall was less enthusiastic and regarded this as a continuation of opportunistic 
British military policies in the Mediterranean. For him, OVERLORD was the decisive 
battle in support of the Russians, but he consented to defer further arguments until 
Russian needs were assessed at Tehran. 9 What the British sought was a postponement 
of OVERLORD for one to two months, the time it would take, they thought, for the 
Allied armies in Italy to reach the Pisa-Rimini line north of Rome. 10 Once the Pisa- 
Rimini line was reached, Allied forces would, it was assumed, be poised to attack 
toward Trieste, Austria, the Balkans or France. 
Conceding nothing to their two partners, the British knew that if this tactical move 
succeeded within the time allotted, the strategic importance to OVERLORD's launching 
would be invaluable. Rome's capture would be an added prize, a title deed to Italy, and 
a crowning public relations success in its own right. Stalin, concerned about the 
6 'Eisenhower to CCS', Washington, 24 Oct. 1943, RG. 165 NAF 486 WD Cable log. 
7 C. dEste, The Fatal Decision, (New York, 199 1), p. 413 - 8 J. Ehrman, (ed. ) Grand Strategy, V, (London, 1956), pp. 109-111. 
9 CCS 131 Meeting, Washington, 26 Nov. 1943, Reel IV. 
10 COS (43)(0). 'CCS 409: 'OVERLORD and the Mediterranean', EUREKA Conference., 
Washington, 25 Nov. 1943, Reel IV. 
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dispersal of Anglo-American forces, favored going onto the defensive in Italy and was 
willing to defer the capture of Rome. Instead, he concentrated on the landing in 
southern France; and catching the Anglo-Americans by surprise, he brushed asldc any 
suggestion of operations in the Balkans. " Stalin boldly proposed that divisions in Italy 
be moved to facilitate ANVIL and endorsed Marshall's idea that ANVIL precede 
OVERLORD by two or three weeks. Stalin argued against a dispersal of forces, 
advancing OVERLORD as the basic operation for 1944 and suggested that once Romc 
fell, all available forces in Italy be sent to southern France. 'Mese forces would then 
fuse with OVERLORD after the invasion, in what was considered to be the weakest 
spot on the German front, France. He declared that his armies would synchronize their 
attacks to coincide with those of the invasion forces and submitted that OVERLORD 
and ANVIL be launched no later than 31 May. OVERLORD, Stalin asserted, ought to 
be a maximum effort, and ANVIL a two divisional one. 12 
Churchill, no longer the dominant partner, appalled that he could not count on 
Roosevelt's support, fought on with undiminished vigor for Operation ACCOLADE: 
capturing Rhodes, taking the Dodecanese, bringing Turkey into the war and opening a 
passage to the Russian Black Sea ports. However, Roosevelt refused to accede to any 
change that would prejudice OVERLORD or jeopardize operations in Italy. 
Eisenhower and Wilson (General Henry Maitland Wilson then C-in-C Middle East), 
meeting on II October 1943 at La Marsa, Tunis, concluded that ACCOLADE should 
be postponed for similar, but more detailed reasons. 13 Moreover, to further the success 
of the French landings, the Allies proposed that all future plans for operations in the 
eastern Mediterranean should be suspended, and major resources be allocated to the 
two assaults or to the campaign in Italy. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander 
Mediterranean, by arrangement with the CCS, was directed to redistribute the assault 
shipping between OVERLORD and ANVIL. The conferees recognized that the vcry 
II The Docunients of the Tehran, Yalia and Potsdayn Conferences, Op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
12 Sir M. Howard. Op. cli.. pp. 55-58. 
13 'Aegean Operations'. 5-15 Oct. 1943. Map Room Papers 310, FDRL. 
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existence and magnitude of the operation was dependent upon the availabilltv of landing 
craft and shipping. 14 
The Americans favored ANVIL for various reasons: 
1. ) Roosevelt's promise to Stahn. 
2. ) After Operation TORCH, the Americans had diverted precious 
equipment from their own units to reorganise and rearm the French 
Army. 
3. ) American planners believed that the reconstituted French divisions 
could play an integral role in the new front in southern France. 
4. ) the operation was essential to protect OVERLORD's southern flank 
once German resistance in Normandy collapsed. 
5. ) By joining ANVIL to OVERLORD would effectively trap enemy 
formations to the south and west of the Loire River. thus allowing 
greater French participation in their country's liberation. 15 
With the ANVIL and OVERLORD forces linking up for an advance against the whole 
length of the Rhine, the greatest concentration of troops would form on a line between 
Switzerland and the North Sea; from which they could quickly break into the heart of 
Germany and meet the Red Arrny advancing from the East. 16 The ANVIOL plan of 1943 
may have been instrumental in Eisenhower's controversial choice of a 'broad' over a 
4 narrow' front concept in the fall of 1944. This was a choice which General Bernard 
Montgomery, Commander of the British 21st Army Group, and others strongly 
disputed. The CCS closed the conference with an unequivocal statement of intent: 
'OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried 
out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world 
which hazards the success of these two operations'. 17 
By reaching consensus, the Allies agreed that, 
Within the limits of available means and without preýjudice to maýjor 
operations, patriot forces everywhere within enemy occupied territory in 
Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct 
sabotage, propaganda, intelligence and guerrilla warfare. 18 
14 M. Stoler, Op. cit., pp. 143-154. 
15 R. Weigley. ()p. cIt.. p. 330. 
16 Ibid., p. 330. 
17 'CCS 426/1: Report to the President and Prime Minister'. p. 301,6 Dec. 1943. Reel IV. 
18 'CCS 398 Minutes and Papers'. EUREKA Conference. 18 Nov. 1943, p. 77, Reel W. 
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Anglo-American and Free French political-military leaders had defined and interpreted 
, I- -D X& * Uie Kesistance according to their own needs and purposes, and as a result, the 
]Resistance suffered. Moreover, Anglo-American planners viewed it with limited 
expectations and placed it in 'quarantine 9. 
During 1938, in the wake of the Munich Conference, Roosevelt originated and 
followed a bifurcated foreign policy: first, appeasement over trade, planned to coincide 
with Prime Minister Chamberlain's attempts to placate Hitler and then, economic 
deterrence mobilized in support of the British and French. 19 Rather than assuming an 
active role in Anglo-French war plans, Roosevelt envisaged the United States as an 
arsenal of democracy. If war came, the United States would produce the arms for 
Britain and France that would contribute to a quick German defeat -a maximum benefit 
to the American economy at a minimum cost in American lives. 20 Throughout 1940, 
Roosevelt chose to await the turn of events, defined as attentisme, i. e., waiting to see if 
Britain would survive the summer, waiting to test a change in American political 
opinion in the November elections and awaiting the political and economic ramifications 
of the events in France after the Armistice. 21 Britain expected and the United States 
assumed that France would survive and repel any German attack upon its territory. 
Even when the French collapsed in June 1940, Roosevelt clung to his foreign policy. 
However, American public reaction to the French debacle was severe, and Roosevelt 
was accused by Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota of being, 
... too neutral ... of having 'aided the manufacture of 
implements of 
destruction' that Russia used upon Finland, that Germany uses against 
the Allies, that Japan uses against China, that Italy uses against France. 
How belated is our now exclusive assistance to the Alhes. 22 
Anthony Biddle, former American ambassador to Poland, eventually politically 
neutralized by Roosevelt, stressed 'moral factors', 'a nation gone soft', 'a bankruptcy 
19 C. MacDonald, 'Deterrent Diplomacy: Roosevelt and the Containment of Germany, 1938-1940', R. 
Boyce and E. Robertson, (eds. ), Paths to War, (New York 1989), p. 300. 
20 Ibid., p. 323. 21 J. Hurstfield, America and the French Nation, 1939-1945, (Chapel Hill, NC, 1986), p. 13. 
22 ýGovernor Stassen Attacks the President', PM, 25 June, (New York, 1940). 
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of leadership', as the reasons for the demise of France. 23 Robert Murphy, First 
Secretary at the American embassy in Paris, soon to express bias against de Gaulle, 
entitled a chapter in his memoirs, 'Frenchmen Expect the Worst and GetjtI. 24 
Marshal P6tain's Vichy government was seen as an arena representing various political 
groups fighting for pre-eminence, through which Roosevelt hoped to influence French 
policy. The President assured Leahy, the newly appointed US Ambassador to Vichy, 
in December 1940, that since the French people and its government approved of the 
Marshal, continued American recognition of the Vichy government presented no 
immediate problems. 25 Roosevelt wrote, 'Certainly the rulers at Vichy desired closer 
relations with the United States. As a source of material supply, as a prop to Vichy's 
legitimacy, as an arbiter in the desired compromise peace, the United States could exert 
an altogether welcome influence. '26 
As a result of national experiences and perceptions, British and American policies were 
in opposition. Britain moved across a series of positions from its wartime alliance with 
the Third Republic: it had proposed political unification, experienced the French defeat, 
ended Anglo-Vichy relations, blockaded French Morocco, destroyed portions of the 
French fleet, opposed American economic aid (oil) to North Africa and (wheat) to 
Unoccupied (Vichy) France, and offered support to the alternative, rival Free French 
movement of General Charles de Gaulle. The United States, in contrast, shifted from 
providing moral and material aid to the Tbird Republic to economic aid to North Africa 
and recognition of the Vichy regime. 
De Gaulle, Anathema to Roosevelt, a 'Cross of Lorraine' to Churchill 
When de Gaulle failed to wrest the west African seaport of Dakar, presumed to be vital 
to American hemispheric and maritime defence, from Vichy, on 23 September 1940, 
23 Biddle to FDFý I July 1940, PSF 39, FDRL. 
24 R. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (New York, 1964), Ch. I 
25 FDR to Lzahy, Washington , 20 Dec. 1940, Op. cit., FRUS, Washington and Casablanca, 2: 425. 26 J. Hurstfield, Op. cit., p. 25. 
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the American administration dismissed him as an incompetent adventurer. 27 
Roosevelt's opinion of and animosity toward de Gaulle stemmed from this period and 
never wavered. The President's policy supported Vichy sovereignty in North Africa, 
appeased her colonial administrators, disregarded Vichy threats leveled at British and 
Gaullist forces and sought entrance into French mainland and colonial markets. 
Roosevelt believed that his policy would protect American hemispheric interests and 
lead to the liberation of French North Africa. Once a bridgehead was established there, 
the liberation of metropolitan France would follow. 
As long as Roosevelt could ensure that his policies would win the war in the shortest 
possible time, the public, poorly informed and plainly disinterested, was tolerant if not 
complacent. This kind of isolationism, defined as an attachment to a particular form of 
strategy, independent, expedient and short-term, appealed to the American public. 28 
For that reason, having little idea of the issues, the public was prepared to endorse the 
government's various dealings with P6tain in 1940, Darlan, momentarily, in 1942, 
. 114 !- 
Giraud in 1943 and finally de Gaulle in 1944, all on the same principle of expediency, 
called for by American strategic requirements. 29 
Defending de GauRe and depending upon American arms were two of the most 
convoluted and conflicting issues that Churchill faced. In 1942, Hull threatened him 
with cancellation of Britain's Lend-Lease arrangements if he did not smother his 
condemnation of American economic support for Vichy. 30 Although he described 
himself to Roosevelt as his ardent and active lieutenant, Churchill, by defending de 
Gaulle, risked the President's disapproval. Churchill and de Gaulle suffered from 
being the dependent partner in a combination of relationships, i. e., Roosevelt- 
Churchill, Roosevelt-de Gaulle and Churchill-de Gaulle. Keith Sainsbury described 
the result of such an arrangement, 4 ... a relationship in which one side 
is so much 
27 Op. cit., FRUS, pp. 418-419,579-87. 
28 J. Hurstfeld, Op. cit., pp. 231-233. 29 Gallup Polls of 10 May, 2 July, 23 Oct., 6 Dec. 1940,16 Dec. 1942,11 July 1943,24 Apr. 1944, 
FDRL. 
30 R. Thomas, Britain and Vichy., The Dikmnw ofAnglo-French Relations, 1940-1942, (London, 
1979), p. I 10. 
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weaker than the other, and almost totally dependent, is bound to lead to an element of 
patronage in one partner, and to induce resentment in the other. '31 
The seizure of St. Pierre and Nfiquelon, Vichy-held islands off the East coast of 
Canada, by de Gaulle's Free French forces, in breach of American Vichy policy and 
hemispheric obligations, threatened Churchill's defence of de Gaulle whose actions had 
created a diplomatic storm in Washington. Hull complained to Roosevelt that, 
4 according to my information and that of my associates, some 95 percent of the entire 
French people are anti-Fhtler whereas more than 95 percent of this latter number are not 
Gaullists and would not follow him. ' 32 Colonel William Donovan, head of the OSS, 
expressed concern over, '... the deplorable condition of the whole Free French 
movement in this country and [suggested that they] inquire into the advisability of 
possibility of getting out of France some leader, perhaps like Herriot... 133 
Churchill's ambivalence toward de Gaulle increased, because of his difficult 
personality: While on a 1941 inspection tour of various Free French outposts, de 
Gaulle had taken the occasion to publicize his disagreements with the British, leaving, 
as Churchill commented, a 'trail of Anglophobia behind him. 134The Prime Minister 
thought that he '... had clearly gone off his head. This would be a very good riddance 
and will simplify our future course. 135While de Gaulle later placated Churchill, the 
advantages of personal 'court diplomacy', elements such as discretion, flexibility and 
independence of bureaucratic machinery, that they could have shared, were lost to both 
men in such rancorous episodes. Desmond Morton, Churchill's Downing Street aide, 
commented that, de Gaulle ' ... was anti-British, anti-democratic, vain and 
disloyal to 
Winston personally. 136Nevertheless, a bond between the Prime Minister and de GauUe 
31 K. Sainsbury, Churchill and Roosevelt at War, (London, 1994), p. 117. 
32 Hull to Roosevelt, FRUS, Op. cit., 2 382. . 33 Donovan to FDR, Ibid, 2 404. 
34 Churchill Interview with de Gaulle, PREM 3 120/2,12 Sept. 194 1. 
35 Churchill to Eden, Ibid, 3 120/5,27 Aug. 1941. 
36 'Morton Minute'jbid, 3 120/10A 6 Jan. 1942. 
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was formed. Never an alliance, it was a sustained resistance to Hitler and Vichy from 
which the Free French would seek American aid for its salvation. 37 
Conflicting reports emanated from Vichy indicating that the Resistance and Gauffism 
were making inroads on a French public that was becoming increasingly disenchanted 
with P6tain. Leahy disagreed in a letter sent to Roosevelt on 28 July 1941: 
Even those Frenchmen who were noted for their British sympathies had 
little regard for de Gaulle ... The radical de Gaullists whom I have met do not seem to have the stability, intelligence and popular standing in their 
communities that should be necessary to success in their announced 
purpose. 38 
The November 1942 Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, and the total 
German occupation of France in response diminished Vichy's creditability as a state 
entity. America's misguided choice of the faltering Giraud, the public outcry over 
Eisenhower's political arrangements with Darlan for a cease-fire and Darlan's 
subsequent assassination in Algiers, all contributed to the demise of the American 
Vichy policy. Lord Halifax, a keen observer of the American scene wrote: 
... the effect of public opinion on the US national policy is worth noting: the initial flurry and public uneasiness over the Darlan 
deal .... worried key official of the State Department sufficiently to make them desperately anxious to avoid a similar nightmare over 
Italy ... Public opinion 
is in a very fluid state ... The opposite seems true 
of the State Department, whose policy towards, e. g., the problems of 
French politics underwent no more than the minimum change 
necessitated by the march of events. Elasticity is not among the virtues 
of the molders of day to day foreign policy of the USA .... 
39 
Upholding the State Department's inelastic thinking, Leahy wrote in his diary that, 'If 
we the Allies succeed in crushing Germany, Admiral Darlan will join the centuries old 
galaxy of heroes of French history. '40 As the attraction to Vichy ebbed, Hull favored 
working with weak local colonial French authorities and was against the establishment 
of a supreme political power, such as a provisional government. The British took the 
opposite view, preferring to deal with a single French authority. By 1943, de Gaulle, 
37 FO 371/28545, from C-in-C ME to WO 88526,4 Aug. 194 1. 
38 Adm. W. Leahy, I Was There, (New York, 1950), pp. 534-536. 
39 CAB 122/103 Lord Halifax, FO Despatch 715 Erom JSM 29 Sept. 1943 '(2nd) Quarterly Report', 
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40 Adm. W. Leahy, 'Admiral Darlan', 25 Dec. 1942, Wiffiam D. Leahy Diary and Papers, Washington, 
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supported by French public opinion that repudiated Vichy and mistrusted Giraud. 
consolidated his control over the French Forces of Liberation, the North African ArmN- 
and the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL). a broad association of 
colonial forces, underground and resistance elements, political parties and trade unions. 
Churchill and Eden fought for recognition of the French National Committee, 
preferring to negotiate with it than de Gaulle alone. Roosevelt refused, he would go as 
far as limited-acceptance, because recognition implied that the Committee was the 
government of France. 
Meanwhile, the President gave 'autocratic instructions' to the FNCL through 
Eisenhower that included the banning of further FNCL meetings and the retaining of 
Vichy Governor-General Pierre Boisson at Dakar, a doubtful and hesitating figure, 
who hated de Gaulle. Eisenhower considered some of the President's instructions 
politically de-stabilizing, more than the settlements concluded by de Gaulle and 
Giraud. 41 Despite French political trends expressing approval of the FNCL, Roosevelt 
insisted that, 'the constitution and government to be established for France must be 
determined by the French people after they shall have been afforded an opportunity 
freely to express themselves'. 42 Churchill, as usual, remained fiercely loyal to the 
President, and reported Macmillan's assessment of Eisenhower's wish to accept 
tentatively the FNCL. Roosevelt confronted Eisenhower by letter and sent Churchill a 
copy: 
Following is paraphrase of message I have sent to Eisenhower and 
Murphy: 'From London it is reported that recognition of the French 
Committee is being considered by you and Murphy. You are not to 
recognize the committee under any condition without fun consultation 
and approval of the President. Of course it will be necessary to havc 
joint action by British andUS. '43 
Eisenhower was perplexed by Roosevelt's directive, because he had never considered 
exceeding the bounds of his official brief. Churchill thought Eisenhower's 
deliberations disloyal, but separate British and American statements, expressing 
41 Macmillan to Churchill, PREM 3.181n, 2 June 1943. 
42 W. Kimball, Op. cit.. 11. Rooscvelt to Churchill. 20 July 1943. pp. 337-340. 
43 Ibid., 11. pp. 311-312. 
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varying degrees of 'recognition' of the FCNL were published on 27 AugUst. 44Much 
time had been lost due to the previous political wrangling, a diversion that delayed the 
harnessing, organizing and activating of French military power, of which the 
Resistance was a parL Roosevelt's aversion for and Churchill's malevolence towards 
de Gaulle had stalled an agreement needed months before. For Roosevelt, faced with 
the dilemma of having publicly committed to Giraud, considered his removal as an 
embarrassment and an insult and abhorred having to share military secrets with the 
FCNL. According to Roosevelt's son, Elliot, the President insisted that de Gaulle was 
out to achieve one-man government in France. He distrusted him more than anyone, 
regarding his whole Free French movement as honeycombed with police spies and 
agents spying on the French general's own people. Leahy went as far as to described 
him as 'a dirty dog'. Roosevelt believed that de Gaulle's sense of freedom of speech 
meant freedom from criticism of him. 45 By writing letters in which these sentiments 
were expressed, the President stated that, 'I am fed up with de Gaulle ... there is not the 
possibility of our worldng with de Gaulle ... I agree with you that he would double- 
cross us at the first opportunity ... I agree with you that the time has arrived when we 
must break with him-46 ... he is animated by dictatorial instincts and consumed by 
personal ambition... he shows many symptoms of a budding Fiihrer'. 47 
Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill appreciated the histrionics; and both failed to 
understand de GauRe's perception of his position and his circumstances. These were 
manifested by the French general's different modes of behavior, conduct and 
expression, which verged on the unacceptable in an Anglo-Saxon political 
environment. Without any real visible means of support with which to carry on the 
war, all that remained for de Gaulle was Gallic 'passion', considered an aberration in 
Anglo-American political-military traditions. The word 'passion' was an apt 
description and concordant with the mood of a volatile people. One of passion's major 
44 FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 'Recognition and Acceptance of the FNCL, 27 Aug. 1943, pp. 
1170-1171; A. Chandler, Op. cit., 2, p. 1273; Churchill to Macmillan, 23 June 1943, Op. cit. 
45 E. Roosevelt, Op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
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ingredients is a romantic nationalism regarding one's own country, and in pursuit of its 
gloire, difense or liberation: In late 1942. de Gaulle spoke to the French nation from 
London, 
... Our Algeria, our Morocco, our Tunisia are to serve as a starting point for the liberation of France ... Join our allies without reservation. Fighting France adjures you to do so. Don't worry about names and 
formulas. Only one thing counts: The salvation of the 
Motherland ... thanks to France the war will be won. 
48 
Passion was expressed by guile, tact, charm, temper. flattery, sulks and arro-t-, ance. De 
Gaulle fought tenaciously for French interests to such an extent that British and 
American commanders, as members of a profession requiring order and discipline, 
found him almost intolerable. Politicians and serving officers alike, with the possible 
exception of Eden, did not fully appreciate that the French general was fighting in a 
foreign political climate that reduced him to rage, despair, impotence, dissent and 
i ii subordination. Behaving like aprima donna was more prevalent and acceptable in the 
French Army. In the British and American Armies such behavior, while not unheard 
of, was considered less acceptable. Generals Patton, MacArthur and Montgomery 
were the obvious exceptions. In the beginning, distracted and distraught over the loss 
of mainland France, de Gaulle was not thought of as the champion of national honor. 
To the contrary, not only was he considered a dangerous irrelevance by Roosevelt, but 
Main and Wegand considered him to be disobedient and a tool of the British. De 
Gaulle suffered from the French surrender as did General LeClerc, with une rage au 
coeur, a passion that totally possessed him. 49 De Gaulle could wound with icy 
courtesy, as he did Churchill, by refusing to meet him in Algiers in 1944-50 Although 
de Gaulle knew that Roosevelt was personally hostile toward him. the Frenchman had 
to come to terms with the President, because he held the key to French rearmament. 
48 Gen. C. de Gaulle. Op. cit., L'Unilt;, p. 393. 
49 A. Clayton. Three Marshals of France, (London, 19922). pp. 2-7. 
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Creation of SOE 
Distinct from Allied top-level diplomatic in-fighting, Churchill, upon becoming Prime 
Minister, directed his government to explore ways of disrupting the Nazi occupation on 
the European continent Special Operations Executive (SOE), placed directly under 
Hugh Dalton, the Minister of Economic Warfare (MEW), became the agency created to 
conduct 'irregular warfare'. It was ironic that Chamberlain, as one of his final 
governmental functions, signed the paper on 19 July 1940 that created SOE. Tbree 
months later, the COS accepted the government's proposals for its creation. 51 Nothing 
in the inter-war years necessitated the establishment of either a British irregular warfare 
agency or a French chain of resistance, because neither government remotely 
contemplated the alacrity of the French defeat in June 1940 and its aftermath. That was 
beyond their comprehension and foreign to their expectations. Rather, in late August 
1939, the French C-in-C, General Maurice Gamelin, expressed the view, prevalent on 
both sides of the Channel, that, 'Hitler will collapse the day war is declared on 
Germany 
... the 
German Army will be forced to march on Berlin to suppress the trouble 
that will immediately breakoUt'. 52 
When France collapsed instead, time was needed to absorb the shock of being driven 
from the continent, to redirect British strategy, to assess the demands of clandestine 
warfare and to build the appropriate structures through which German occupied Europe 
would be attacked. Unfortunately time with which to find, train and direct the agents 
needed to punish the Germans, as part of an overall strategy, was in short supply. 
Even the Americans, enjoying the advantage of two years of graduated belligerency 
before Pearl Harbor, failed to properly utilize the time to establish an organization 
comparable to SOE. Lord Selborne (who replaced Dalton as Minister of Economic 
Warfare ) later summarized the position facing Britain at this time. 'Underground 
51 M. Foot, SOE, The Special Operations Execidive, 1940-1946, (London, 1984), pp. 19-21; 
'Subversive Activities in Relation to Strategy', Gen. Directive from the COS, 25 Nov. 1940, COS 
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warfare was an unknown art in England in 1940; there were no text-books for 
newcomers, no old hands to initiate them into the experiences of the last war; lessons 
had to be learned in the hard school of practice'. 53 At its inception, SOE was described 
as 6no more than a hopeful improvisation devised in a really desperate situation. ' 54 
British Government Reorganization 
On 27 May some government agencies in Whitehall were reorganized. Secondary 
sections of the British War Office and Secret Service were consolidated and ultimately 
led to the formation of SOE. It was established to maintain contact with resistance 
groups in France through its own circuits. These circuits consisted of an organizer, his 
lieutenant and a wireless operator. All were infiltrated into France to train, supply and 
direct saboteurs recruited locally. In addition to the non-Gaullist F-Section, a Gaullist 
RF-Section was established to co-operate with the de Gaulle's Bureau Central de 
Renseignements et dAction [Militairej (13CRA). Moreover, under London's 
direction, both were to assist the French Resistance conducting operations against 
specific enemy targets, in conformity with the plans of theCOS. 55 General Cohn 
Gubbins, an early participant and later the leader of SOE, stated: 'Thus from the very 
moment of the fall of France and the commencement of total warfare against Germany, 
British officers and others, after due training, were parachuted into occupied territories 
to start the organization of resistance. 156 
What Churchill said to his critics of the Anglo-French Alliance on 24 March 1939, still 
applied, 'But I can assure you in the pass to which things have come, we stand at least 
as much in need of the aid of France as the French do of the aid of Britain. 157 Since 
53 Lord Selborne, 'SOE Assistance to OVERLORD', 13 Oct 1944, WP(44) 570, CAB 66/56. 
54 B. Sweet-Escott, 'SOE in the Balkans', P. Auty & R. Clogg, (eds. ), British Policy towards 
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'Republican' France no longer existed, all Dalton and the SOE could do was to try to 
subvert the German occupation of Europe, under Churchill's supervision. 58 
However, a fundamental consideration to the success of an undertaking of this 
magnitude was the state and condition of the resistance elements following the crushing 
defeat of France. Expectantly, SOE agents, initially drawn from the three military 
branches, from public schools and universities, the City and from industry, were 
trained in clandestine operations. 59Whether acting singly or through networks, they 
represented an anti-Fascist 'fifth column', using various methods of subversion within 
the defeated countries and arms supplied by Britain, they would disrupt the German 
hegemony by fomenting economic discontent and indigenous revolt, e. g., industrial 
and military sabotage, labor agitation, strikes, propaganda, terrorist acts against traitors 
and German leaders, boycotts and riots. 60 However, Dalton's view was that a left- 
wing political revolution by the industrial working classes lacked the practical precision 
needed to assist Britain in fighting the Germans. In addition, London based 
'Goverm, nents in Exile', fearing retaliation and reprisals, opposed violent resistance, 
including assassination. Both views combined to limit prospective SOE activity in 
Occupied Europe. 
'For the first two years of its existence, SOE was dependent upon the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) for its personnel, technical assistance and 
communications. 161 The COS, acting on the 1942 recommendations of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, directed that SIS be given priority over SOE in most of western 
European countries. With few planes and meager arms, SOE had little chance of seeing 
action. 62ChurchiR wanted to aid the conquered people, to subvert the occupying 
power and to land an army of liberation at the appropriate. The ground troops would 
but come as policemen, to occupy, not to invade. 63 He believed that unlik the Great 
58 'SOE Charter, CAB 65/14; CAB 65/8 WM (40) 209,22 July 1940. 
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60 Lord H. Dalton, Memoirs 1931-1945; The Fateful Years, 2, (London, 1957), p. 368. 
61 D. Stafford, British and European Resistance: 1940-1945, (Oxfbrdý 1983),, p. 38. 
62 CAB 84/85 JIC (42) 156 (0) 29 Apr. 1942. 
63 J. Moffat to J. Dunn, Washington, 16 July 1941, DF 740.0011, RG. 59. 
214 
War, 'Me Second World War would be decided by an economic and psychological 
struggle rather than attritional warfare. The Future Operations Planning Section 
(FOPS) of the Joint Planning Staff cited in its report of 16 June 1941 that even with full 
American help, 'we cannot hope to defeat the existing German Army in the field and so 
open the road to Germany and victory. '64Doubting the British soldier's ability to 
prevail against his German adversary, a War Office report hypothesized how intricate 
those psychological factors were: 'Men may lose the will to fight while the means still 
exist, or resources may come to an end while courage is still high', if a nation is 
subvemd. 65 
SOE was expected to play an every increasing role in European subversion and revolt. 
The original concept of partisan and guerrilla activity, as viewed by Dalton and integral 
to SOE's brief, was exchanged for indigenous secret armies and paramilitary 
organizations in support of an invasion. 66 The Resistance, which had begun 
subversive activities almost at the signing of the Franco-German armistice, had to be 
nourished, supplied and protected, if its morale were to be upheld. Late 1942 heralded 
two changes concerning France, the complete enemy occupation of the country by the 
Germans and the beginning of a London partnership between the American Office of 
Strategic Service (OSS) and SOE. The dissolution of the two French zones demanded 
that the disparate Resistance movements, in many respects operating independently and 
disconnected from each other, while representing the whole spectrum of political 
thought and aims, needed to be unified. Only one organization, the indigenous Francs 
Tireurs et Partisans fl? ), representing the Communi st Front National, had operated 
across both zones. In the Occupied Zone, five major Resistance movements were 
active: Ceux de la Liberation, Ceux de la Resistance, Difense de la France, Libiration- 
Nord and Organisation Civile et Militaire. Resistance groups in southern France under 
such headings as Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie's Liberation and Henri Frenay's 
Combat merged. T'hese two organizations and the FI? united in March 1943 and 
64 The Distant Future', CAB 79/12 JP(41) 444,14 June 194 1. 
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established the Mouvements Unis de la Resistance (MUR): the new umbrella 
organization recognized de GauHe as head of the FCNL. In May 1943, Jean Nloulin. 
de Gaulle's Resistance representative, who had worked tirelessly to establish the NIUR. 
subsequently succeeded in forging the Conseil National de la Risistance (CNR), an all- 
encompassing Resistance organization composed of resistants from various 
backgrounds and professions, pledged to evict the enemy from France. Churchill and 
de Gaulle, on 27 October 1942, considered establishing an organization in France that 
would prepare the French people for a national revolt to conform with an Anglo- 
American invasion. Britain approved of the idea as long as SOE remained its 
responsible agency, allowed to contact Resistance organizers in France regardless of Z- 
their political persuasion. Complications abounded: the FTP, which strode its own 
communist and military path, was suspicious of the military Resistance groups, such as 
the Armee Secrete (AS), de Gaulle's military wing, or the now defunct 100,000 strong 
Vichy Armistice Army, from which many soldiers formed a clandestine fraternity 
known as the 'Organization of Resistance of the Army' (ORA). 67 The FrP preferred 
the leadership and guidance of the Communist Party or the CNR within France, rather 
than the FCNL in Algiers, although both councils had declared de Gaulle as the sole 
leader of the French Resistance. 68 Contacts had been established early in the war 
between the Resistance in France and the BCRA, which tried to organize and co- 
ordinate clandestine activities against the Germans from London. 
Contacts Between and the Proposed Merger of OSS and SOE 
Even before the Americans entered the war, the Anglo-Americans were not idle. 
London-based OSS Special Operations (SO) and SOE, two of a number of Allied 
clandestine organizations, co-operated at the operational level. Sympathetic to Britain's 
plight, a small group of American secret agents, controlled from London, not 
Washington, assigned to the embassy in Vichy, operated throughout France during 
67 j. Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944. (De Kalb. IL, 1976). pp. 231-231 
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1940-41. While avoiding direct contact between themselves and SOE aients in the 
field, the Americans sent their intelligence estimates to their controllers in London NvhO 
shared them with the British. Since consultation between OSS and SOE was crucial to 
the operation, extended co-operation was sought. 69 Donovan and Sir Charles Hambro. 
his counterpart at SOE, signed an agreement, negotiated in London on 24 June 1942. 
The agreement specified 'world-wide spheres of influence', which automatically placed 
any future secret operations in western Europe under the control of SOE until OSS SO 
had achieved a level of independent operating fitness. 70 By 1943, SO operations werc 
controlled by the European Theater US Army (ETOUSA). but by II November 194-3 
SO joined SOE under the control of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander 
(COSSAC), 71 because the two secret agencies were already collaborating with cach 
other. 72 The British considered both organizations as a single subversive organization 
to assist a potential Allied invasion force, in spite of a JCS view to the contrary (the 
continuation of independent OSS operations controlled and directed by the 
Commanding General US Forces Europe). Even if assimilation appeared to be taken 
for granted in practice by both organizations since June of 1942, the JCS reserved 
. judgment 
and failed to endorse a union until 1944. Washington's reluctance was in 
direct opposition to London's existing custom and practice, which pooled agents and 
resources. The JCS finally acceded to Eisenhower's recommendation that the pro 
forina integrative arrangement be allowed to stand. 73 The principle of joint 
administration, dual control and equal opportunity between the two clandestine groups 
superseded the 1942 agreement and fully merged SO with its British equivalent. The 
basic purpose remained the same, as detailed in a joint paper of 29 December 1943: 
To promote disaffection and if possible revolt or guerrilla warfare in all 
enemy and enemy occupied territories. To hamper the enemy's war 
effort by means of sabotage and subversive warfare in those areas and 
69 OSS War Diary. 'Preamble to January 1944, p. xix., Reel 1. 
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217 
to combat enemy interests and fifth column acfiýities bý- 
unacknowledgeable means. 74 
However, experiences in North Africa, Washington and London revealed that Alhed 
personnel were not as co-operative as they might have been: 
In general SOE-OSS relations were a microcosm of the sense of historic 
antagonism which continued to exist along with the spirit of co- 
operation generated by the war so amply demonstrated in Anglo- 
American discussions about the future role of the British Empire in 
world affairs. 75 
Sir Robin Brook, who as liaison with OSS was responsible for western Europe SOE 
operations, concluded that co-operation at the operational level was tempered by 
friendship and mutual respect. Personnel of each agency planned and performed 
dangerous tasks together without any sense of antagonism. 76 However, at the 
command level, there seemed to be a remarkable lack of collaboration, intcrspersed 
with xenophobic outbursts and strong disagreements. When Eisenhower assumed 
command of SHAEF, which also served as the command structure for Allied ground 
forces in Europe, in January 1944, he inherited COSSAC's complexity of problems. 
These related to the preparations and plans for a full scale assault against the Contmcnt 
of Europe. The problem of employing and controlling the French Resistance during the 
liberation of France was part of his inheritance. 
Allied Planning and the French Resistance 
Even in late 1943, COSSAC had expressed concern over a premature Maquis uprising 
based solely on rumor of an impending Allied invasion, the results of which would be 
disastrous. 77 Timing and politics aside, representatives of SOE and the British Army 
concluded that if a French general strike or an uprising were going to take place at all 
and succeed, it had to be done on a national scale, as part of Allied strategy. 78 
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Attempting to resolve the twin problems of resistance and civil affairs, Eisenhower, 
pressed for time and relying on COSSAC evaluations of the problem, requested and 
received from Roosevelt permission to deal informally with the FNCL, in the person of 
de Gaulle's military attach6, General Frangois d'Astier de la Vigerie, Emmanuel's 
brother. Eisenhower, realizing that Resistance co-operation was necessary, tried 
resolve the muddle, by agreeing to rearm the Resistance with SHAEF assets, placing 
senior French officers on his staff as advisors and choosing General d'Astier as the 
Delegate of the FCNL responsible for all questions pertaining to all resistance action in 
France. Eisenhower also sought an arrangement that would utilize French divisions for 
the military occupation of France and in the ensuing battles on her territory, rather than 
employing Anglo-American divisions for occupational duty. 79 
While Eisenhower wrestled with these problems in London, two separate North 
African meetings, one between John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of State for War, 
and Henri Frenay and another between Churchill and Emmanuel d'Astier in January 
1944, resulted in the same conclusion, i. e., that if the Allies were to obtain any benefit 
from the French Resistance the entire operation had to be co-ordinated with the 
Normandy invasion. 80 As soon as Churchill returned to London on 27 January 1944, 
he requested Lord Selbome, General E. E. Mockler-Ferryman, head of SOE and other 
important French and British representatives to attend an ad hoc meeting. Churchill 
may have hoped to force his ideas upon these men whom he could dominate, rather 
than risk open controversy with the Americans. 81 
Although the bombing of Germany was Churchill's ultimate priority, he insisted 
enough planes be diverted from Bomber Command to supply SOE supported Maquis in 
southern France, 20,000 of whom, between Geneva and Grenoble, were insufficiently 
armed. He refused to consider augmented assistance to other regions of France. By 
79 D. Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945, (New York, 1986), pp. 162-166. 
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intensffyin rearmament in the southeast, he might succeed in having ANVIL canceled. 1-9 
Iberefore, Churchll promised unilaterally to double the aid to the Maquis in that region, 
a decision which so upset air drops in other areas, including Yugoslavia, that he was 
forced to relent, albeit reluctantly. In addition, Churchill agreed in March that greater 
priority would be given to the Resistance in northwestern France. Avoiding any 
mention of the 27 January meeting, in a letter to Roosevelt, he described Emmanuel 
d'Astier de la Vigerie as the 'Scarlet Pimpernel' type, intrepid and resourceful. 82 
Concurrently, McCloy's summation of his meeting with Frenay, in which he wrote 
that, 'They [French Resistance] ought to be taken out of the OSS level and put on the 
basis of staff planning, and it should be done at once', was now in the hands of the 
JCS. They queried Eisenhower how his SHAEF Headquarters was related to the 
French Resistance. 83 Eisenhower requested SOE to fonnulate a response, not knowing 
that Churchill's subterfuge had already ordered a course of action for SOE and the 
Maquis. Eisenhower, briefed by SOE, replied: 'We have had contact in the past and 
are now continuing contact with and assisting French resistance groups through the 
French Committee of Action. Under my general supervision and direction is SOE/SO 
with whom we are working. 184 
By 7 March 1944, Eisenhower ordered SHAEF to change the SOEISO designation to 
Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ), as an indication that both secret bodies were now 
fully integrated and subject to the Supreme Commander's main and cover plans. There 
were two practical reasons for the change: the need for a common name and open 
mailing address and an obliteration of any reference to resistance groups in general as 
'SOE controlled and supplied. 185 By integrating, duplication of effort was avoided, 
competition in the field minimized and security increased. 86 The bonus of having 
friendly forces behind the enemy's lines was considered sufficiently likely and 
sufficiently valuable that extensive preparations were made to develop and control it. 
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On 23 March SHAEF issued a directive to the newly designated SFHQ, the co- 
ordinating authority connected with sabotage and the organization of resistance groups, 
regarding their activities in western Europe and in support of OVERLORD. 87 The War 
Department inquired of Eisenhower on 30 April, 'if the Army needed continued and 
increased help fromSO (OSS)? 188 Eisenhower replied that, 'The OSS is definitely 
useful to the Army in this theater ... There are highly important functions necessary to 
the success of the projected military operations which no agencies other than ... OSS are 
prepared tofUlfill. 189 
Under SHAEF's direction, SFHQ controlled the activities of Resistance groups in 
occupied territory, co-ordinated with military forces, in support of a full scale invasion 
and sought to lower German military morale by sabotage. 90 Accounting for most 
foreseeable contingencies, such as an enemy withdrawal or an unconditional surrender, 
SHAEF had various instructions filed with the resistance through SFIfQ. Contingency 
planning not withstanding, these possibilities smacked of earlier British wish- 
fulfillment and reality-avoidance, i. e., that Anglo-American air bombardment and naval 
blockade would so erode German morale and fighting power that an Allied invasion 
would become unnecessary. 
SOE and OSS in North Africa had operated independently and co-operatively at the 
worldng level throughout the Mediterranean since November 1942. The SOE base, 
code-named MASSINGHAM, was headquartered near Algiers. One month before, 
Donovan and George Taylor of SOE met in Washington and decided that a common 
OSS/SOE establishment should be created. SOE Washington cabled SOE London with 
the agreed recommendations. Whether by accident or design, the notification was 
never circulated, while concurrently, a similar meeting had been held with top-level 
staff in London that came to the opposite conclusion. Donovan was furious, feeling he 
87 RG. 331 SHAEF (44) 25, Operation Directive to SFHQ, Washington, 23 Mar. 1944, SHAEF G-3 
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had been double-crossed by SOE. 'I'lie melee ended with SOE and OSS aborting the 
agreement and establishing two independent bureaus. with the attendant loss of 
efficiency and increased duplication, after the TORCH landings. 91 
At an Allied Force Headquarters meeting in January 1943. attended by Lt. Colonel 
Douglas Dodds-Parker, MASSINGHAM's newly appointed commander, Maj. Generýd 
Colin Gubbins, executive director of SOE, Donovan, and Lt. Colonel William Eddy, 
head of OSS-Algiers, Eisenhower, AFHQ's commander, urged those present, as he 
symbolically entwined the fingers of both hands, to work even closer together. 92 ThiS 
appeal for added co-operation was based on a CCS directive of December 1943, 
requiring Eisenhower to consolidate the two groups within a new single organization 
called Special Operations Mediterranean (SOM); the OSS tacitly declined to 
participate. 93 For reasons to be explained later, Eisenhower's sense of urgency for 
close co-operation with the secret services was not extended to the French. 
To assist the prQjected Normandy invasion now under Eisenhower's command, a 
repetition of London's SOE/SO integration was finally accomplished in Algiers on 21 
April, after a year's delay. Approved by SHAEF and in operation on 23 May, two 
weeks before D-Day, the newly created Special Projects Operations Center (SPOC), 
was detailed to organize resistance groups in southern France in support of 
OVERLORD. 94 For all practical purposes three colonels, assigned to SPOC, one 
American, British and French, acted in haison to service the resistance in southern 
France in preparation for ANVIL, but the French were not permitted complete access 
prior to D-day. SPOC, its 'united group' known as the 'Operations Room', its four 
departments, French, Air, Jedburghs and OG's and Intelligence, linked to SHAEF 
through SFHQ in London, awaited instructions and orders. Supreme Allied 
Commander/Mediterranean passed control of these resistance groups on 21 May 1944 
to SHAER Joseph Scribner. of OSS-Algiers, concerned about inter-allied competition 
91 J. Beevor, Recollections and Reflections, 1940-194 5. (London, 198 1), pp. 84-85. 
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and the potential British domination of SPOC, viewed OSS participation as 'starting out 
behind the eight-ball; however, sufficiently intelligent [American] personnel in the 
'Operations Room' ought to equalize our numerical disadvantage'. 95 
According to the German authorities, a 'terrorist' was defined as any person acting 
against the State alone or as a member of a French Resistance group. These groups, 
the Maquis, whose ranks were dramatically increased by young men openly evading 
the German imposed mandatory forced labor service, the Service du Travail Obligatoire 
(STO) in early 1943, became known as the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) after the 
invasion. From the Occupation's inception, men evaded enforced coRaboration with 
the Germans and disappeared into the wilderness to form or join small bands of 
guerrillas, Les Maquis, a name originally used by rebels in Corsica 'who chose it 
because it was the name of tough undergrowth that proliferated in the mountains. '96 A 
1943 SHAEF survey revealed that an investment in the Resistance offered limited 
returns when compared to one in the bombing offensive; moreover, to expect the 
D'm 
Resistance to engage in a national uprising was unrealistic and to control its activities, 
difficult. 97 Since SHAEF had chosen not to rely on the Resistance, it followed that any 
successes were considered a windfall. Although the Resistance had not been a strategic 
component of COSSAC's initial planning, in 1944 SHAEF upgraded irregular warfare 
from operational to strategic control by transferring it from ANVIL task force 
commanders to SPOC. 'Resistance', SHAEF now believed, 'is primarily a strategic 
weapon which should be used accordingly. '98 For most of 1943-44, the belief that 
whatever the Resistance accomplished would be viewed as a bonus permeated the 
command structure. 99 Gervase CoweR, current SOE Adviser, stated: 
It would be in one sense correct, if brutal, to say that COSSAC plans 
did not take the Resistance into consideration, insofar as they did not 
include their possible contribution in their calculations, but viewed it as 
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a potential bonus. In another sense, since the plans made by SOE to co- 
ordinate the activities of the Resistance groups with those of the 
orthodox invading armies were all approved by SHAEF, the activities of 
the Resistance did form part of the overall planning ... 100 
If CoweH is correct, Resistance activities fell into the category of 'Operations', a 
connecting link between tactics and strategy, which ' ... encompasses the movement, 
support and sequential employment of large military formations in the conduct of 
military campaigns to accomplish goals directed by theater strategy or a higher 
operational formation. '101 
By definition, not only did SOE send agents to contact the Resistance, but SOE/SO and 
later SFHQ and SPOC realized that its men required arms and supplies, if they were 
going to subvert the Germans and assist in the invasion as perceived by SHAEF. 
Before Allied air-drops increased the foRowing year, the Maquis was M-equipped. to 
fight: armed with a few unreliable Sten submachine guns, under powered sporting 
rifles and ineffective grenades, action was hazardous. Although air-drops were the 
most practicable method, SOE efforts to supply the Resistance were always constrained 
by a lack of air transport otherwise needed for the bomber offensive. In 1942 and 1943 
only 40 aircraft were available; in 1944, air-drops to the Balkans were 13 times greater 
than those to France. 102Therefore, the demand for air support always outstripped the 
supply. However, Dodds-Parker recalled, '... that by June 1944, it was estimated that 
in response to radio messages on the BBC or Algiers Radio, over 4,000 Reception 
Committees could be alerted to receive a drop the same night in France alone. '103 
Because of the logistical limitations imposed by scarce resources, on 15 June 1944, 
SHAEF warned General Pierre Koenig, head of the Rat Major des Forces FrWaises 
de I'Intirieur (EMFFI), 'that the FFI should avoid open clashes with the enemy in 
100 Cowell to Weiss, Allied OVERLORD Planning, 17 Mar. 1994. 
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which his superior weight in equipment would give him an undue advantage. '104 
Perhaps if similar directives had warned the Maquis on the alpine plateaus of the 
Vercors and Gli6res earlier in the year, two massacres, due to premature uprisings, 
might have been avoided. Sabotage, in comparison was an exceRent weapon and more 
cost-effective than bombing, e. g., tank output at a French factory was slowed to a 
tri'dIrdle and those that were used in battle either malfunctioned under operational strain or 
were destroyed by enemy shell fire, because of substandard armor plate. Moreover, 
the simple act of interchanging destination cards between railway goods-wagons 
wrought havoc upon the Germans and led to excessive time delays. 105 Political and 
public relations combined to intervene on the Maquis's behalf when de Gaulle thanked 
Churchill for British support. The Americans interpreted de Gaulle's remark as 
criticism of their participation in supplying arms to the Resistance, resulting in a JCS 
cable to Eisenhower on 19 April: 
We are informed by the State Department that the matter of arming 
resistance groups has become an important issue politically. With the 
French there is a widely held opinion that everything being done in this 
field is done by the British, and that America, for political reasons, is 
against arming the Resistance. We desire that, insofar, as it is 
consistent with the requirements of military operations, you take such 
action as lies within your authority to bring about an equalization of 
effort between American and Great Britain in supplying and delivering 
equipment to resistant groups. 106 
Eisenhower complied by conferring with Koenig and then assigned 25 more aircraft to 
Special Operations over the protests of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, 'who doubting 
the value of the Resistance movement, considered the increase unjustified. '107 
Between 1941 and 1944, SOE was transformed from a British Action Service to an 
Allied Service, applying methods often based on Continental experience and later on 
American supplies. Dalton romanticized in 1940 that SOE's first task was to 
transform, mobilize and ignite left-wing opinion on the Continent into a revolutionary 
blaze that would force the enemy to flee. When the task was found to be beyond the 
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scope and application of SOE, the most viable alternative, the training and employment 
of paramilitary forces in Britain co-ordinated with the raising of local French Resistance 
forces and 'Secret Armies' in France, armed and equipped by SOE in support of an 
Allied military invasion of Northwest Europe, was not. De Gaulle's ire was aroused, 
slowing Franco-British co-operation, because he resented SOE conducting clandestine 
operations on in what he considered to be his territory. Moreover, Hitler's invasion of 
Russia unleashed an upsurge of anti-Fascist feeling throughout France, most 
pronounced amongst professionally trained Communi t groups, hitherto unavailable to 
SOE planners-108 
Those originally 'specially employed' by the S2 (Subversion) arm of SOE had entered 
occupied Europe disguised as civilians, but as D-day approached, much of their work 
and others was accomplished in the uniform of the paramilitary units of Anglo- 
American and national regular forces. 109 One major question posed constantly by the 
Allies regarding any French project was, 'how could the Resistance elements best assist 
the invasion forcesT That required COSSAC to change its perception of the Resistance 
from an information-gathering device to a combat organization, integrated with the 
OVERLORD and ANVIL operations. 110 The Planning to follow would require more 
French participation and COSSAC's disclosure of the OVERLORD plan. SOE/SO 
were notified on II August 1943, but the accompanying proviso, as per instructions by 
the CCS, stipulated that the French, whose security was weak, were not to be involved 
in any detailed planning for OVERLORD. According to M. R. D. Foot, French 
wireless codes were easily broken by German Intelligence. "'; Once corrected, 
COSSAC appealed on the grounds of impracticability to the CCS. The proviso was 
modified. 112 
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Even though the potential of the Resistance was an unknomm quantity, through the 
spring and fall of 1942, plans were made and approved at SOE headquarters in London 
to form and train three-man teams caRed Jedburghs to assist the Resls=ce. I 13 
Parachuted into France, 'these teams acted as focal units, m unifon-n. from D-day 
onward for contact, communication and control with Resistance forces within the orbit 
of the invading troops. '114During the early spring of 1943, as the idea of invasion 
assumed greater importance, SOE's participation in a field exercise called SPARTAN 
proved conclusively that Jedburghs dropped behind enemy lines during the invasion 
and the use of staff detachments in direct contact with the Resistance, would be of 
inestimable value. On II December 1943, SOE Planning Section presented a paper to 
G-3 Operations Division HQ's COSSAC, listed the possibilities for Resistance Groups 
and the consequent effects on SOE/SO activities on D-day. 115 By 1944, there were 
550,000 resistants in western Europe of which 25 percent were Maquis. to whom the 
Jedburghs delivered instructions from the Supreme Commander. 
Although the Maquis were initially deficient in stores and money, air drops increased 
once air supremacy over western Europe was achieved in the spring of 1944. With the 
introduction of operation 'CARPETBAGGER', massive daylight air supply missions, 
the Maquis became customer-members in business with the Jedburghs. 116 Eighty-two 
Jedburgh teams were dropped into France during June, July and August 1944. 
Thirteen OSS Operational Groups, consisting of approximately 30 paratroopers each, 
were dropped into southern France from Algiers during June, July, August and early 
September. 'Safe houses' and receptions committees had been established in enemy- 
held France earlier for incoming Jedburghs by Monsieur Millet, a French SOE 
organizer. The Special Air Service (SAS) had 2, OW men operating behind the main 
combat areas, which included French parachute units. During the summer. these 
airborne commandos, purposefully trained to harass the enemy's rear lines in the 
113 Ibid., p. xxxvii. 114 Sir R. Brook. Op. cit. 
115 OSS NVar Diary, Op. cit., L 'State of Resistance Groups'. 
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coastal area to a depth of 40 miles. The remaining 500 to 700 SAS, held as a reserve 
for operations in the French interior, were either dropped to reception committees. or 
operated in heavily armed jeep patrols as far as 80 kilometers behind the enemN- Iiiies. 
Many assisted, all co-operated with the FFI. As late as July. close liaison between 
SFHQ and SAS (Special Air Squadron) had not been achieved, although certain 
arrangements had been made at SFUQ for this purpose. Lacking a common planiiing, 
structure, concerted action between SFHQ and SAS suffered, e. g.. SAS plans and 
actions for Brittany, conceived at a separate airborne headquarters, were only partial]), 
shared with SFHQ. 117 
De Gaulle instructed Koenig to take full control of the Resistance. With the invasion 
imminent, Eisenhower agreed to a tripartite administrative structure known as Etat 
Major des Forces Franpises de l'Interieur (EMFFI), commanded by Koenig, which 
was established within SFHQ's table of organization. Although the change-over 
occurred on 6 June, the first fully integrated section was not in operation until " 
August, much too late to have assisted the Normandy landings. ' 18 Gubbins considered 
some of the politically ambitious French senior officers too inexperienced to handle the 
technicalities of Special Operations and offered his reaction to an aide, 'The taking over 
of French Resistance by Koenig has led to a first class battle here lasting six weeks. I 
have got most of my own way through sheer force of logic of events, but I feel that 
Koenig will make an awful mess of the whole thing. "19 
Two joint Anglo-American-French authorities were responsible to Koenig for those 
operations incorporated under OVERLORD and ANVIL. In London, SFHQ directed 
the Bureau de Renseignements et d Action de Londres (BRAL) and OSS/SOE special 
operations in France. In Algiers, SPOC directed BCRA and OSS/SOE special 
operations in southern France. Steps were taken to incorporate more French staff into 
SFHQ sections, but control of aircraft and communications would remain. as always. 
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with SFHQ and not with Koenig who had the authority to veto any SHAEF 
contemplated Resistance action. 120 SFHQ never intended to relinquish power and 
control of financial, communications and distribution resources that it held in practical 
fact. 
The successful conclusion of the first phase of the Normandy landings increased 
French involvement at the planning level. With the secret of D-day now history. and 
with the possibility of a breakout into Brittany by Patton's Third US Anny a strong 
probability, EMFFI was asked to analyze the possibility of active participation between 
the SAS and Resistance forces in that province. To organize the FFI in Brittany on a 
military basis, Koenig suggested the nomination of a ground force Resistance 
commander to serve under him, charged with co-ordinating his group's activities with 
those of the Allied armies. Thus, the field commander would be well positioned to 
iiegotiate directly with Army ground force commanders, while maintaining operational 
control of the SAS, OG's and Jedburghs. 
The important SAS teams activated under the 'Brittany Plan' were 'Dingson' 
'Cooney', 'Samwest', 'Derry' and 'Dickens'. Commandant Bourgoin, the one an-ned 
commander of 4 French Parachute Battalion (4 SAS) took part along side 'Dingson' 
and 'Cooney' in early June 1944, in which a total of 204 men and four jeeps were 
dropped by parachute between St. Malo and Vannes in Brittany, establishing a base 
from which they organized the local Resistance, interdicted enemy forces and managed 
to cut a number of railway lines. 121 The June and July SFHQ Reports disclosed that 
Results of FFI activities ... generally with 
OG, SAS and Jedburgh 
assistance greater than expected, despite lack of arms. Potentialities if 
arms supplied more fully, would be immense... Brittany forces 
crystallizing round 400 uniformed SAS troops of 4th French Parachute 
Bn. and Jedburgh teams. In Brittany, on I July there were 30.5(X) 
resistance troops, of whom 5,000 were armed. Resistancc to be built 
up to 77,000 men and Field Headquarters... by the end of July to create 
a military diversion. Brittany resistance aided advaiicing Allies by 
attacking moving columns, attacking isolated groups, protectiiig bridges 
from destruction, etc. Also mopped up behind Allied thrusts and kept 
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The first Jedburgh team, called 'Hugh',, dropped blind (without a reception committee) 
near Chateauroux, a town 100 kilometers Southeast of Tours, during the early hours of 
6 June; two other teams followed three days later: team 'George' accompanied SAS 
team 'Dingson' and team 'Frederick' went in with SAS team 'Samwest' on 9 June. 123 
To finance the Resistance in relation to OVERLORD, SOE, as the principal British 
procurer of foreign funds, purchased 700 million francs worth of French currency on 
the black markets of Europe and Asia. The difference between the official and 'black 
market's' rates of exchange saved the British government almost a million pounds 
sterling per month. Since January 1944 SOE secretly obtained for the Bank of England 
well over 1.7 million pounds sterling worth of foreign currencies including 445,000 
French francs in notes of small denominations. 12A SOE had also acted as paymaster for 
A- - the British Treasury, by turning over sums of up to 100 miHion francs per month to the 
FNCL, who apportioned it among the Resistance in France, based on unit 
participation. 125Weapons were not the only supplies that were air-dropped. Each 
Jedburgh officer, jumping into France carried 100,000 francs in an army issued money 
belt, while the W/T operator carried 50,000. During September 1943, Colonel Roger 
Heslop, 'Xavier', the leader of SOE's MARKSMAN circuit, landed in eastern France 
with 500,000 francs for his personal use; although he was requested to keep an account 
of expenses. 126OG paratroopers were issued French Louis d'Ors, valuable gold coins 
with which to bribe their way out of a tight situation. 127 OSS headquarters in Berne 
distributed 4 million French francs per month to those French regions adjacent to 
Switzerland. During the period 29 March 1943 to 20 November 1944, Berne's total 
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disbursement reached 66 million French francs. 128 By 9 June, 5.5 billion francs were 
in circulation with the Allied armies in France, 129 but agents in the field signaled their 
complaints, regardless of the totals: 'Must receive 5 million francs to 1'eed men send 
soonest'. or 'Destroyed 8 railway bridges, 3 trains, 14 engines. 3 observation posts. 
made 40 pfisoners. You must send us arms, ammunition, explosives. We can not 
fight with our bare hands. 1130 
Anglo-American antipathy towards de Gaulle and French security measures hampered 
and delayed tying the Resistance to OVERLORD planning. 'Me excellent reputation of 
74,000 French soldiers fighting in Italy, or the availability of ten recently armed French 
divisions for action in an ANVIL type operation had little effect. '[lie Anglo-American 
military and political hierarchy considered a number of talented and experienced French 
officers to be poor security risks and deliberately chose to limit their involvement in 
OVERLORD planning, until after D-day. The OSS War Diary states: 'No French 
officer was ever taken into confidence and given the slightest bit of advance information 
on the date selected for the opening of the second front. Prior to D-day, Koenig was 
completely bypassed by SHAEF. '131 
W. H. B. Mack who served as British Foreign Office Political Liaison Officer with 
Eisenhower observed at a COS meeting that the Chiefs disliked de Gaulle intensely and 
vetoed his return to Britain from Algiers on D-2.132 Roosevelt's pursuance of Vichy 
policy and his choice of Giraud, excluded de Gaulle and his chosen generals from the 
center of policy and planning. De Gaulle, bitterly anti-American over Roosevelt's lack 
of support in 1940, responded in kind. In spite of Churchifl's ambivalence towards de 
Gaulle, he remained loyal to him, as illustrated by a wiflingness to share the date ofthe 
TORCH landings, a decision that Roosevelt immediately vetoed. SHAEF Directive of 
23 March 1944 to SFHQ, which prohibited the disclosure of military intentions, aimed 
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to keep de Gaulle in the dark, although the other Allied government (in exile) were 
banned as well. SOE/SO was not permitted to discuss any aspect of future Resistance 
group planning that might reveal or compromise military plans. However, French 
representatives were included in SOE/SO planning for Jedburghs and assigned French 
patriots to be dropped on and after D-day, but the exact date was not revealed. I "' By 
31 May 1944, Churchill insisted that de Gaulle be told of OVERLORD, in spite of COS 
feelings to the contrary. Churchill invited de Gaulle. then in Algiers. to come to 
London, from where he hoped that de Gaulle would broadcast a radio message to the 
French nation, calling for the Resistance to unify in order to help the Allies during the 
critical D-day period. With Eisenhower's concurrence, Churchill briefed de Gaulle mi 
4 June concerning the invasion plans, believing that security was safe at this late date. 
As a precautionary measure, de Gaulle and his Chief of Staff were sworn to secrecy. 1; 4 
The Prime Minister discovered on 5 June that de Gaulle not only refused to broadcast, 
but he would not send French liaison officers with the invasion force. Cadogan 
recorded Churchill's reaction at a Cabinet meeting: 
We endured the usual passionate anti-de Gaulle harangue from the PM. 
On this subject, we get away from politics and diplomacy and even 
common sense. It's a girls school. Roosevelt, PM, and, it must be 
admitted de Gaulle, all behave like girls approaching the age of puberty. 
Nothing to be done. 135 
Excluded by political and military prejudice, French general officers were not 
considered part of the Allied team. Eisenhower said as much at a meeting with press 
correspondents on 31 August 1944: 
Relations with French generals were not easy: they had not grown up as 
members of this team. They were liable to suffer from an inferiority 
complex after events of 1940. It has not been easy to get them doing 
things, the way if we turned to a British or American Commander and 
asked him to do so and so-, we have to use a little strong-arm method. 136 
John Bross. an OSS officer stationed in London, concluded that from the outset. the 
British were against any French participation in Allied planning. The British ", crc 
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afraid of it for political and security reasons. French breaches of security and the 
possibility of French political factions fighting each other rather than the Germans, 
increased their objections. For this reason, they were strongly opposed to organizing 
the Resistance on a national basis and wanted it decentralized. 137 Lord Selborne 
concluded, as Bross did, in a report to Churchill, that Gaullist groups in France were 
playing for political stakes at the expense of military action. Increased Resistance 
casualties, a result of unrestrained temptation to over-centralize and increased Gestapo 
activity, had occurred. 138 Even if de Gaulle were considered reliable, the FCNL was 
not. A number of leading FCNL representatives, their attitudes and purposes complex 
and unpredictable, had lived in the Unoccupied Zone before TORCH and several had 
been recruited from various colonial administrations. German Intelligence had easily 
penetrated this group, and since it was impossible to know whom among the French 
could be trusted, no one would be trusted, including de Gaulle. 139 Since D-day could 
not be disclosed, Allied military talks eventually broke down. This resulted in the 
British and Americans co-ordinating most of the details of the French participation in 
OVERLORD. SHAEF organized men, transport, and aid for Resistance, funded by the 
British. 140 Under these conditions, detailed plans for direct French support of the initial 
phase of OVERLORD were not made until the last week before the invasion. As for 
French military participation, they insisted on the right to by-pass SHAEF and to 
intercede with the United States and British governmen , in lieu of CCS 
representation. The Allies refused to admit the French to the CCS, or to accord any 
special rights. 
Jean Moulin: Security and his Arrest 
Jean Moulin, President of the CNR, considered to be the most impressive figure in the 
whole French Resistance, had returned to France, in part, to improve Resistance 
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security. He had planned to reorganize it along classical lines to minimize the risks of 
capture or penetration, this to be accomplished by forming cells, 'no one cell to know 
another; only the leader to know the identity of his superior and propaganda services to 
be separated from para-military groups. '141 Before these security measures were 
applied, Moulin inadvertently breached them himself in Lyon and was captured and 
tortured to death by the Germans in June 1943. Moulin's seizure and demise was part 
of a ferocious German counterattack on French Resistance groups during that year: 
many F and RF circuits were attacked, penetrated and smashed, their leaders either 
killed or in hiding. 142As a result of over-centralization, a group of senior French 
Secret Army officials meeting in Switzerland in June were exposed to the Gestapo. 
When the visiting French officials returned to France, they were arrested by the 
Germans who seized many important incriminating documents. 143 By contrast, the 
Communist FTP, whose members numbered 100,000, suffered less casualties, 
because it organization was cellular rather than centralized. A proposed Maquis Plan 
was considered to alleviate the over-centralized Resistance command and its consequent 
top heavy communication systems, by establishing self-contained elite forces dropped 
by parachute into appropriate sub-regions of France. These elite groups, at the disposal 
of and under the control of the Allied High Command in London, would be hidden and 
placed in readiness for D-day. In addition, small groups of Allied officers would be 
attached to the various district Maquis chiefs, thereby eliminating an overall central 
Resistance Headquarters. Once these military missions were established, SOE advised 
that the general direction of the Resistance movement be kept out of France entirely. 144 
It was doubtful how a national uprising by the French people could have been 
organized without these changes. 'The institution of the Maquis Plan represented both 
141 J. Beevor, Op. cit., pp. 154-155. 
142 M. Foot, SOE in France, (London, 1966), pp. 257,266,289-290; D. Stafford, Op. cit., pp. 127- 
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the beginning of the paramilitary movement and the first inclusion of the French on any 
basis of equality with the American and British. '145 
Co-ordinated Military and Resistance Action in Normandy 
At the tactical level, however, according to the coded action messages transmitted by 
the BBC from London on 5 June to the various Resistance networks, the invasion and 
an insurrection were imminent. SHAEF's BBC coded messages such as Dites (ý 
quartorze que la terrasse de la reine est large. Les terrassiers ont vit la reine ditnanche. 
and C'etait enfin le roi etpas la reine qu'ils ont vu. were a few that sct all of the eight 
4 color-coded' rail, transport, power, telecommunication, fuel and ammunition storage 
sabotage plans throughout France in motion at once. Interference on roads, 
misdirection of traffic, the prevention of reinforcements, particularly an-nored 
formations, from reaching the coast, guerrilla actions taken against German Anny 
formations and headquarters and defence against German acts of destruction and 
demolition were also included as Resistance oýjectives. 146 
Under SPOC control, the organization and direction of the Resistance in southern 
France developed in two phases to insure maximum assistance to ANVIL. The first 
phase of 15 July was to provide equipment for major Maquis missions in all the regions 
of south and central France: 2,136 tons of stores were dropped in July from Britain and 
Algiers. On I August, two weeks before ANVEL, the second phase developed with the 
expansion of these Maquis regions into 3 main areas: the Rhone with 25,000 armed 
mcn and the Massif Central and the Pyrenees with 12,000 armed men each. In addition 
to the 'color-coded' sabotage plans, one specific task was assigned to the Resistance iii 
southern France: the protection of the port facilities at Marseilles, Toulon and Setc. 
Other events followed: 5W men parachuted in to assist in the heavy fighting that broke 
out on either side of the Rhone; the Spanish frontier was closed to escaping German 
troops: the large towns of Limoges, Chateauroux and Poitiers were Berated: public 
145 11) 1-d. P. xx L 
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utilities were seized and the enemy withdrawal disrupted. 20,000 German troops was 
taken prisoner between I 1- 13 September. Resistance accomplishments in support of 
ANVIL were the equivalent of four or five divisions, according to Gen. Alexander 
Patch, the American task force commander. 147 
Within the first week of OVERLORD, 960 railway demolitions out of a planned 1,055 
had been carried out. On D+l, 26 trwA lines were unusable, including the main lines 
between St. LO, Avranches, Cherbourg and Caen, due to Resistance activity in the 
north. Three hundred rail cuts were confirmed between 6 and 27 June. Enemy 
reinforcements were delayed between 48 and 72 hours, while the 2nd SS Panzer 
Division was delayed 12 days trying to reach Normandy from southwest France. The 
two main railway lines along the Rhone river were closed to German divisions trying to 
reach the battle area from southern France for most of the crucial D-day period. With 
much of the telecommunication network sabotaged by Resistance groups, the Germans 
were forced to use wireless communications, allowing for easy intercepts by Allied 
tactical Intelligence. June diversionary Resistance activities in central and south-eastern 
France absorbed the attention of 16,000 German soldiers and the I lth Panzer 
Division. 148 Notifying SHAEF, American General Omar Bradley, Commander of 12th 
US Army Group, indicated that he had received exceRent co-operation from Resistance 
forces. The most spectacular contzibution made by the Resistance was the liberation of 
Paris in which 30,000 to 50,000 patriots participated in a levee en masse. Armed with 
whatever weapons they could assemble, they fought through the streets against the 
Germans, seeking to destroy them on whatever terms. 149 Eisenhower, who believed 
that the Resistance had surrounded the Germans with a terrible atmosphere of danger 
and hatred which ate into the confidence of their leaders and the courage of their 
soldiers, 150 wrote to Gubbins in May 1945, 
147 Ibid., 1, pp. 80-84. 
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While no final assessment of the operation value of resistance action has bet been completed, I consider that the disruption of enemy rail 
communi ation , the harassing of German road moves and the continual and increasing strain placed on German war economy ... by the organized forces of Resistance, played a very considerable part in our 
complete and final victory. 151 
Evidence from many quarters, including the unsolicited testimonials of high ranking 
German prisoners of war, has indicated that the Resistance played a great part in the 
defeat of the Germans in the West. 152However, it remains difficult to measure the 
exact contribution and effectiveness of the Resistance, because operational records were 
ot kep n Va t, for obvious security reasons. Strategic deception, in which the Resistance 
guided by SOE, played an important part, succeeded in hoodwinIdng the Germans in 
believing that the chosen invasion site was the Pas de Calais and not Normandy. Pre- 
D-day diversions, further afield, included false action radio messages, an increased 
tempo of air-dropped supplies and stepped-up guerrilla attacks, which were used to 
thwart and confuse the enemy, as part of two deception plans, BODYGUARD and 
FORTITUDE. As a result, in March 1944, the Germans increased their garrison of 
first-class troops in Denmark from four to eight divisions, and Hider defended Norway 
with more divisions than necessary. He feared the military presence of General 
Andrew Thorne, GOC Scottish Command, a former British military attach6 in Berlin 
during the thirties, who had fought as enemies in the same World War I battle153had 
impressed the Fuhrer with his military skill and knowledge. 154 Believing that the 
British Fourth Army under Thorne might invade Norway, Hitler insisted that 
approximately 50 U-boats be stationed along the Norwegian coast to serve as a 
deterrent, a decision that deflected their use from the Atlantic convoy routes. As a 
consequence, the British released a large number of escort vessels from convoy and 
support duties to protect the Normandy landings from submarine attacIL155 Those 
officers, who had devised deception plans BODYGUARD and FORTTIUDE, were 
151 Gen. C. Gubbins, Op. cit. p. 218. 
152 Lord Selborne, Op. cit., Summary from July-Sept. 1944. 
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quick to seize on any opportunity to insure the success of OVERLORD. 156 Inte Lyral to 
these deception plans, the Resistance contributed to the lodgement, breakout and 
pursuit of the Allied armies beyond the expectations of the Ang lo -Americans, the 
results far exceeding the expectations of the military. 157 
Preoccupied with fighting the war in a conventional manner, the Allied military 
hierarchy devoted little time to the Resistance and clandestine warfare. The bombing of 
Germany was an Allied strategic cornerstone, that demanded the combined utilization ot 
an extraordinary amount of intelligent, well-trained personnel and sophisticated 
technology, two resources in short supply. These shortages in personnel, aircraft and 
supplies imposed tight restrictions on irregular warfare. Moreover, poor security 
within the French political-military system and German infiltration and destruction of 
many Resistance networks hampered SFHQ and Resistance efforts. At best, 
successful execution was seen as an adjunct to the great land battles in northwest 
France. Much more could have been accomplished by timely planning and execution of 
selected operations, if the major participants had been willing to exhibit the level of trust 
required. French officers, with an intimate knowledge of their own people and 
country, if invited to participate at the strategic level, could have made an important 
contribution to OVERLORD; instead, a major resource was lost. Few men addressed 
the issues of trust and co-operation, however delayed, with the candor of Eisenhower 
in a statement to de Gaulle: 
I shall need your support in France ... 
I can not tell you on what 
theoretical basis my government will instruct me to deal with you I But 
above principles, there are actions. I would like to tell you that, where 
action is concerned, I shall recognize no other authority in France but 
yours. 158 
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Arming the French 
As American wartime production increased between 1941 and 1943, the United States 
extended Lend-Lease, in principle and with modifications to the Gaullists. This 
removed an enormous burden from Britain's financial concerns. After the November 
1942 invasion of North Africa, the question of American large-scale and rapid 
rearmament assistance to the French demanded resolution. Prior to that time, Free 
French Forces operated under the control of the British who assumed the responsibility 
for their maintenance, training and supply. This practice was formalized by a CCS 
directive of 24 March 1942 in which either one of the two Allies would supply 
members of the United Nations, subject to the agreement: the Free French Forces 
remained within the orbit of British provisions and training. 159 De Gaulle's two 
infantry divisions, which had fought with the British Eighth Army were augmented by 
thousands of poorly clad volunteers from the French African Army that had been 
maintained under the Franco-German armistice of 1940. 
De Gaulle's Need for American Material 
At the mercy of the United States for war material, 160 de Gaulle, in the Spring of 1942, 
sought to implement a rearmament program in preparation for the eventual return of 
French forces to metropolitan France. This included, not only the re-equipping of 
existing French forces, but additional forces expected to be recruited. 161 A revitalized 
modem army, whatever the practical ramifications, would restore the prestige and 
national pride of the French. However, Marshall refused de Gaulle's proposals for an 
increase in direct US aid, not only because armament was needed elsewhere, but 
increased French demands for material were unwarranted. 162 
159 CCS 13 Meeting, Washington, 24 Mar. 1942, Reel III. 
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Churchill's and Roosevelt's personal dislike of de Gaulle intruded once again at the 
military level and hampered the French Army's rearmament and waining, necessarily 
dependent upon Allied goodwill and commitment. Churchill expressed his concerns in 
a letter to Roosevelt on 18 June 1943, but evaded the President's recommendation to 
break with the French leader directly: 
It is imperative that the French Army in North West Africa should be in 
loyal and trustworthy hands especially on the eve of the great operations 
which impend. I agree with you that no confidence can be placed in de 
Gaulle's friendship for the Allies ... and I myself could not be responsible ... if our bases and lines of communication in North Africa were disturbed or endangered through the existence of a French Army 
under potentially hostile control .... I am glad therefore to learn the clear instructions you have given General Eisenhower not to 'Permit de 
Gaulle to direct himself or to control through partisans of any committee 
the African French Army, either in the field of supplies, training or 
operations. 1163 
At a secret meeting of 23 October 1943, Roosevelt's military emissary in North Africa, 
General Mark Clark, pledged assistance to the 137,000 strong French North African 
Army, providing, of course, that it would join the war on the Allied side. Agreement 
was reached between Clark and Darlan on 22 November, two weeks after TORCH. 
Augmenting the French forces was 60,000 secretly trained colonial militia, previously 
unknown to Clark, and 103,000 additional men mobilized the same day. If the 
infrastructures of West and North Africa had been more efficient, the total would have 
gone beyond the 300,000 available effectives. 164 
The Anfa Plan of 1943 
During the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt and his prot6g6, French General and 
Commander in Chief, Henri Giraud, conferred and formulated a set of principles, 
known as the Anfa Plan, pertaining to French rearmament. This included, among other 
items, the delivery of enough material for three armored divisions and eight motorized 
divisions as well as an air force. In return, France would furnish 165,000 tons of 
shipping to the inter-allied pool. Since Roosevelt preferred Giraud and disliked de 
163 FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 1943,159-60. 
164 M. Vigneras, Rearming the French, (Washington, 1957), pp. 9-13. 
240 
Gaulle, the President excluded both Churchill and de Gaulle from the decision-making 
process. Upon discovery, the Prime Minister objected. His protest changed the way 
French rearmament was handled, i. e., it became subject to the military priorities and 
decisions of the CCS and not to the Americans alone. 165. Rearming a French Army, a 
complicated issue involving training, production and supply, created additional 
problems between the three Allies concerning the allocation of scarce resources, 
particularly global shipping. Regarding these sacrifices, Churchill expressed his 
apprehension, 'The commanders have been told they must cut their requirements to the 
bone. "66The British COS felt that the combination of limited shipping and an 
increased allocation of scarce military supplies to the French instead of other Allied 
troops would prejudice supply assignments required in operations such as HUSKY, 
the invasion of Sicily. 167 The Americans interpreted the shortages of tonnage and 
escort facilities experienced during the early phases of the North African campaign as 
limiting factors which would soon be overcome. Although the tonnage situation had 
eased, North African port capacity had become more acute because of HUSKY. 168 Ilie 
British were not satisfied, declaring that French rearmament cut into commitments to 
other Allied forces. They insisted that French rearmament was not required to 
implement agreed strategy and could not be justified militarily. The 12 March CCS 
meeting came to a complete deadlock, its members agreeing that the President and the 
Prime Minister would have to settle the French rearmament and shipping crisis. 169 
However, by 18 May the CCS concluded that, 'The rearming and re-equipping of the 
Free French Forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the 
availability of shipping and equipping will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the 
requirement of British and American forces in various theaters. '170 Although the 
Anglo-Americans were satisfied, the French were not, because the agreed pace of 
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rearmament and training, when crippled with the 24 percent French casualties suffered 
in Tunisia, would slow the creation of a modem army. 171 
Apportioning Scarce Supplies 
Moreover, in the light of world-wide strategy expressed in the practical terms of 
shipping, armament and production schedules, how binding was the Anfa agreement? 
Did the Americans in 1943 view Anfa as an 'agreement in principle', as the British had 
perceived SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942? And were the French insisting, like the 
Americans had insisted during SLEDGEHAMMER, that it was a firm commitment? 
Would the choice of an interpretation, with each side at variance, one side preferring the 
spirit, the other the letter, result in an irreconcilable conflict? How these questions were 
treated, follows. 
When the President wrote the words, 'oui, en principe ' in the margin of the original 
document, he may not have understood how much firmer a commitment it was than the 
less binding translation 'yes in principle', subsequently used in the official text. 172 
However straightforward some statements are, their intensity, denotation and 
implication vary from language to language. Not only did these semantic differences 
contribute to misunderstandings among the Allies, associated in waging a coalition war, 
but the phrase 'in principle', a non-binding statute of US and British real-estate law, 
translated differently by each of the Allies. 
Although supply shipments were underway, the current allocation of 25,000 tons per 
convoy was not enough to reach the eleven-division target set by the Anfa Plan. The 
Americans attributed this short-fall to the shipping demands of the Tunisian campaign, 
but according to Giraud, the Americans were not pushing the plan vigorously enough. 
Eisenhower warned that a critical situation was brewing between the Americans and the 
French in North Africa, if French uneasiness over rearmament was not dealt with on 
171 M. Vigneras, Op. cit., p. 58. 
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the political level immediately, 'I have here to face the insinuation that we are not 
straight-forward, that we are long on promises and short on performances. This 
impression must be dispelled before the situation deteriorates. ' 173 
To assuage French fears that the Americans would forsake their rearmament 
commitments, the President informed Robert D. Murphy, his political representative in 
North Africa: 
You can tell them [the French in North Africa] that at no time did I or General Marshall promise equipment for the French divisions at any 
given date. What was agreed on was the principle of rearming them to be done as soon as we found it practicable from a shipping point of 
view ... The French must remain calm and sensible. 174 
Giraud attended a special meeting of the CCS on 8 July 1943, hoping to exchange 
archaic Franco-German weapons, issued under the 1940 Armistice agreement, for 
modem ones. In spite of this handicap, ten French divisions had participated in the five 
month-long Tunisian battle, ending with the Germans defeated and the French suffering 
severe casualties. The French lost 15,000 men out of a total of approximately 75,000; 
many of those lost were officers. Moreover, Giraud indicated that inadequate 
replacements, scarce resources and the heavy wastage of clothing and equipment in the 
that campaign had resulted in French troops being left practically in rags. Discontent 
and damaged morale among the men were evident He urged that an initial installment 
of clothing and equipment for 100,000 men be delivered immediately. Assessing 
combat effectiveness, Giraud reported that certain units of the French Army, supplied 
with modem American equipment, had clearly benefited and were now capable of 
undertaldng active service in Europe, particularly in France. In exchange for this 
material, the French offered a secure North African base that included ports, airfields 
and communication facilities. 175 
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Promises Made, Deliveries Delayed 
To demonstrate good faith, Marshall tried to replace Roosevelt's 'agreement in 
principle' with a firm offer i. e., American depots would supply the French with the 
needed material, but only by delaying the activation of a number of American divisions 
in 1943 and by suspending delivery of the supplies they needed. At the same time 
Marshall observed when speaking with the President, that the Americans were 
committed to equip the French to the extent of II to 12 divisions, unless the matter was 
dropped soon. 176 Political implications overshadowed the military aspects of the North 
African situation to the extent that although preferential economies favored the 
Americans activating, training and supplying their own divisions in preparation for the 
i anticipated European land battles, they were forced to accept the time consuming 
process of converting a tattered foreign army into a modem one instead. Wartime 
destruction of French defence industries was so complete that they were not truly 
productive until ten years after the war. French military leaders were difficult and 
sometimes unrealistic in their demands, but these were typical complications, however 
convoluted, of coalition warfare. Lack of a common language and culture separated the 
protagonists and provoked misunderstandings. Differences in customs, dietary habits 
and clothing sizes added to the pressing problems of Allied shipping, of port, storage 
and distribution facilities and the trained personnel to handle this infrastructure with 
efficiency. To the French, rearmament symbolized the return of their prestige and 
position among nations. To the Americans, it was an inconvenience, driven by 
politics, over which they equivocated for three months. Nevertheless, one benefit of 
having France supply manpower, however complicated the rearmament arrangements, 
meant less disruption to the American civilian work-force already in place and fewer 
Americans in combat. 
Some of the participants were dissatisfied with the time and direction rearmament was 
taking. Some were openly dis=tful: Eisenhower was stymied by Roosevelt's 
176 jCS Meeting with the President, Washington, 15 Nov. 1943. 
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indecisiveness; Murphy reported that the French thought they were being 
'hoodwinked'; Giraud complained that there was opposition to rearmament, if not 
deception; Roosevelt advised that an 'agreement in principle' did not involve detailed 
commitments and Marshall agreed, implying that Giraud had knowingly misrepresented 
the facts, an opinion which distorted reality. 177 King believed that de Gaulle was 
constantly increasing his prestige and would certainly take advantage of these II 
divisions to further strengthen his position and Leahy thought that de Gaulle planned to 
use 9 divisions to enhance his reputation in France. If de Gaulle got into France, with 
about 10 well equipped divisions, Leahy ruminated, he could readily take charge of the 
government by force-178 The President understood that Eisenhower wanted these 
French divisions rearmed and trained. Marshall suggested that the JCS should remain 
silent about this matter until its members had an opportunity to speak with Eisenhower, 
who thought that it would be possible to determine within 60 days whether or not 
rearmed French units were going to prove worthwhile. If they did not, Eisenhower 
could opt out of the agreement by simply providing the French with discarded 
American equipment left behind by American forces quitting North Africa. Marshall 
concluded that the Americans would not ship any new equipment to the French but 
simply supply them with existing equipment already on site. 179 Subterfuge aside, Jean 
Monnet, a French financial expert approved by the Anglo-American governments, flew 
to Algiers to brief Eisenhower and Giraud on the rearmament case, as seen from 
Washington, in an attempt to dissipate their doubts and misgivings. 180 
During this running controversy, Colonel William Bessell of the OPD investigated the 
alternatives to the building up foreign forces, such as the French, as opposed to arming 
American troops. He considered the possible effects of either alternative on the 
American manpower situation and on Allied efficiency in prosecuting the war. 
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Reporting to the JCS, he and his committee observed that the United States was not 
only the 'arsenal of democracy', but was also a source of trained and equipped 
manpower. American continental military facilities could train up to 60 divisions a year 
and keep almost II million men in uniform indefinitely. Replacing civilian manpower 
losses remained the key factor. He concluded that if the war became a slow attritional 
process, the American public would soon tire and refuse to countenance any 
unnecessary prolongation. Because of time constraints, little could be gained by 
equipping and training the French beyond projected II divisions, but he urged their 
maximum use once accomplished. 181 Combat-ready troops were always in short 
supply, because the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) failed to appreciate or 
emphasize their value. These planners also considered cutting back the Army's 
personnel needs as the war progressed'82These combined miscalculations adversely 
affected the fall campaign of 1944 on the Franco-German border. To reiterate, the 
campaign was fought by poorly equipped, under powered and undermanned American 
infantry divisions, the combat teams of which experienced unnecessary hardships 
during a sequence of attritional frontier battles-183 
Problems in Rearmament and Training the French 
During the same meeting, General Rooks, Assistant CoS (AHFQ) reported that two 
French infantry divisions were combat ready, an additional division could be ready on 
I November and a fourth the following month. Unfortunately, the major inhibiting 
factors centered on the limited access to training facilities and the lack of organization 
within the French formations. In his own vernacular, perhaps revealing a prejudice, if 
not a doubt of French ability, Rooks believed that although certain cadres of French 
troops were trained in the uses of American equipment, those divisions in Tunisia, 
composed mostly of low-class colored troops with a small proportion of white officers 
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1821bid, p. 3; Wedemeyer to COS, 28 April,, 1943 RG. 165 OPD 381 Security, 118. 




had not; therefore, combat-effectiveness and organizational cohesion suffered. 184 
Among these African troops, serious shortages of trained technicians prevailed and the 
replacement of combat losses could not be provided for until the liberation of Europe. 
Historian Arthur Funk, serving as a young American naval lieutenant in Casablanca. 
stated 'that many of the French quartermaster personnel lacked the language t- acilit. v and 
mechanical abihty to assemble crated equipment in timely fashion. N lost of the 
instructions, therein contained, were written in English. ' 185 Until the reunification of 
the Armee dAffique, originally a force of a 100,000 French soldiers stationed in North 
Africa, with the Gaullists after TORCH, Free French military operations were more 
symbolic than real. 
Rearming the French remained a complicated task for the Americans. because the 
solution did not rest on logistics alone: conflict between both parties arose when the 
French decided to concentrate only on combat units, leaving supply duties to the 
Americans; on the other hand, they insisted on a balance of combat and support units, 
matching their own table of organization. 186American rearmament was linked to 
American military organizational techniques; for the French, acceptance was all or 
nothing. They considered it unheroic to raise support units, traditionally despised in 
the French Army, at the expense of combat formations, particularly to a population 
starved of battlefield victories. Even with American insistence, it took the French most 
ofthe war to develop a true appreciation of the balance between logistical and 
operational concerns within their forces. This defined the difference between a 
decentralized French system and a highly centralized American system, a conflict that 
was modified but never resolved. Moreover, the Americans insisted that the doctrine of 
combined-arms task organization be applied, replacing a French system of separate 
commanders for each individual arm: infantry, artillery and caN-alry within each army 
division. ANVIL's timc constraints demanded that training the French how to apply 
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this equipment within the concepts of maneuver warfare and integrated air/ground co- 
operation had to be done quickly. 187 
Compared to American commanders who would complain to higher authorities if 
supplies were delayed, French commanders remained traditionally passive. However 
Giraud complained to the Americans when they narrowly interpreted and breached a 
section of the Anfa Plan: their substitutions of modem equipment for obsolescent 
weaponry and tanks was affecting combat efficiency. The French demand for weapon 
equality between both armies was denied by Lt. General Wilhelm D. Styer, CoS, Army 
Service Forces on 4 November 1943, because he believed that the assignment of a few 
substitutions such as the M-3 gun for the 74-mm and the M1903 rifle for the MI had 
not handicapped French units in any appreciable way and was still 'equipment of the 
most modem kind. '188 
The French Training Section 
American assistance in the French training program was specifically geared to technical 
instruction alone under the rubric of the US Fifth Army's French Training Section 
(FPC). After consultation with Giraud, Marshall, on 18 April 1943, approved of a two 
month training cycle for existing infantry divisions, three months for existing armored 
regiments and six months for technical units to reach combat-effectiveness and technical 
efficiency with American material. 189 FIPC's purpose was twofold: to give maximum 
training assistance and assurance by means of inspections that the units were adequately 
trained and properly equipped. Suggested by the Americans and approved by the 
French, the establishment of divisional schools to which students selected from 
individual sections of the division were assigned, became the most successful method 
of training. American instructors, on duty at each divisional school, collaborated with 
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their French colleagues to train each division's cadre in the most efficient manner. 
French members of the FrC co-operated with various schools in the United States and 
later in North Africa, to train thousands of French personnel to become specialists in all 
branches of the military. If any problem existed, it was not the implementation of the 
course-work, but the questionable proficiency of English, as a second language, among 
some of the students-190 
By October 1943, not only were seven divisions receiving technical training from 
American personnel, but five of these divisions were designated for amphibious 
training as well. Although the training program had reached a satisfactory level, 
progress had been impeded by the lack of officer supervision and equipment and 
training aids. Sometimes the French failed to take advantage of American offers and by 
the end of October training of service units still lagged behind schedule. Courses in 
regimental signal communications and chemical warfare suffered, because of poor co- 
ordination or flagging interest. To improve the level of training commensurate with 
battle conditions, instructors accompanied infantry divisions into combat and then 
reported their findings upon returning to North Africa. 
Throughout the war, French commanders were acutely conscious of their manpower 
limitations. Addressing this problem, three training centers were established during 
mid-May 1944 in Italy to serve the Corps Ekpitfitionnaire Franfais (CEF) to meet its 
combat replacement and skilled manpower requirements. When the French 
Expeditionary Force grew to five divisions, the Americans turned over an American 
training camp in North Africa capable of housing 8,000 to 10,000 men to them. 
However, General Patch, C-in-C of the US Seventh Army, assumed the general 
direction of CEF training ten days before the ANVIL landing, because technical training 
remained insufficient. On 10 September, almost one month after ANVIL's launch, 
Patch recommended that the French take responsibility for and control over the training 
of their personnel. When British General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson became Supreme 
190 RG 165 Memo, G-2 MIS VM for ACOS OPD, 28 Aug. 1943, OPD 226.2 France, Sec. I- 
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Allied Commander Mediterranean (SACMED). three F7S training centers operated in 
southern France. By late October, as the battles moved northward, the training of 
French troops under American guidance in North Africa ended. 
Political ramifications had delayed the creation and implementation of a French 
rearmament program. The administrational structures needed to rearm and train the 
French had been piecemeal, dependent upon the demands perceived at ý'arious times. 
However, most of the supply and training problems were finally overcome in time for 
the French participation in ANVIL When the war ended, approximately 700,000 
French men were deployed, II divisions and 300 supporting units served; all of the 
supporting units and eight of the divisions had received the latest American equipment, 
which represented over three million measured tons. Ever bound to the Americans for 
logistical support, French divisions proved highly efficient in combat during the Italian 
campaign. By early 1944, the French Army was ready to join its Allies in the invasion 
of the European continent and the liberation of its homeland, 'winning American 
confidence and overcoming British skepticism', 191 but political issues and military 
prejudices delayed this final operation, of which ANVIL was a part. Much argument 
and wrangling followed before the latest tactical methods and the geographical areas 
were agreed upon by the western Allies and applied. 
Prior to D-Day, since the Anglo-American French policy towards France remained in 
disarray, de Gaulle declared the FNCL to be the Provisional Government. As its chief 
representative, he demanded that the Corps Expeditonnaire Franqais (CEF) fighting in 
Italy under General Juin and the ten French divisions mounted in North Africa under 
General de Lattre de Tassigny play a leading role in the liberation of southern France. 
Realizing that the success of ANVEL depended upon French participation, as the 
opportunity to iree his country loomed, he agreed to the formulation of those plans. 
191 A Vigneras, Op. cit., p. 404. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANVIL, OVERLORD and the ITALIAN CAMPAIG. lv' 
This chapter explores the final aspects of the Anglo-American strategic controwrsy, in 
which the interplay between the military, economic, political and psychological factors 
intensified. 1 
Before the Tehran (EUREKA) Conference, Churchffl requested a summit meeting in 
Cairo (SEXTANT I) was preceded by a summit meeting in Cairo (SEXTANT I), 
requested by Churchill, to resolve and co-ordinate Anglo-American strategic policy 
before meeting the Russians. Because of disastrous British ventures in the eastern 
Mediterranean, which were proving highly prejudicial to a deteriorating Italian 
campaign, Churchill sought a modification of the QUADRANT Agreement, in which 
seven Mediterranean- based divisions and 60 LST's were scheduled for transfer to 
Britain, beginning in November 1943.2 The attritional. battles south of Rome, in which 
II ill-prepared and under-manned Allied divisions encountered 19 experienced and 
well-positioned Gennan divisions, foreshadowed a long arduous winter campaign. To 
relieve growing anxiety over the front's tactical imbalance, Churchill and the COS 
sought to cast the seven idle divisions and the 60 landing craft, designated for the 
cross-Channel attack, into the battle. 3 Churchill petitioned Roosevelt, questioning the 
practicality of the relevant QUADRANT decisions, as measured against the 
deteriorating conditions in Italy. Churchill felt that accepting the QUADRANT 
commitment, despite Roosevelt's insistence, would be both negligent and 
irresponsible. Even if the British and the Americans disagreed about the obýjectivcs, the 
Italian campaign. Churchill's willingness to negotiate more openly represented a chanix 
I rom the artful positioning of previous summit conferences, particularly the 
MODICUM and SYMBOL meetings. 
1 M. Stolcr. Op. rit.. (London, 1977). pp. 132-135.140-154. 
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Most labor-management agreements have a clause that allows for the re-opening of 
negotiations based on a specific issue, but acceptance usually requires the assent of 
both sides, a stipulation absent from Anglo-American military agreements. Even 
without it, Roosevelt entertained Churchill's entreaties related on the following issues: 
increased American support for British efforts in the eastern Mediterranean, Operations 
ACCOLADE and HARDIIHOOD, 4and the merger of the two Mediterranean commands 
into one, subsumed under one commander. 
However, Roosevelt, preoccupied with the possibility of a personal meeting with 
China's Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in Cairo, considered the QUADRANT 
Agreement and its decisions related to the cross-Channel attack as settled. Both he and 
his JCS were alarmed and irritated at Churchill who sought to re-negotiate these salient 
features of the agreement. It appeared to them that the Prime Minister was again 
abandoning OVERLORD in preference for an intensified Mediterranean poliCy. 5 
The subordinated Italian campaign had the following effect upon Major General Fred L. 
Walker, commanding the American 36th 'Texas' Infantry Division, fighting on the 
Cassino front during the winter of 1943. Unknown to Churchill, but inextricably 
linked to him in this regard, Walker wrote, 
The Italian campaign will not be finished this week, nor next. Our 
wasteful policy or method of taking one mountain mass after another 
gains no tactical advantage, locally. There is always another mountain 
mass beyond with the Germans dug in on it, just as before. Somebody 
on top side, who has control of the required means, should figure out a 
way to decisively defeat the German Army in Italy, instead of just 
pushing, pushing, pushing. 6 
Men like Walker suffered the consequences of Allied indecision: the British would raise 
the level of the Italian campaign, the Americans would preserve the sanctity of 
OVERLORD. The object of this competition was the kind of craft. known as Landing 
Ship Tank type (LST) capable of sailing between theaters of war. Brooke believed that 
2 F. Loewenbeim et al, (eds. ), Op. cit., pp. 386-388. 3 CAB 79 (COS), 14,19 Oct. 1943. 
4 F. Loewenbeim, et al, Op. Cit., pp. 370-374, pp. 312-313. 5 UCS 117 Meeting, Washington, 5 Oct. 1943, Reel H. 
6 Gen. F. Walker, Op. cit., p. 290. 
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the Americans had misinterpreted the British position, which m. -as to maintain prcý'sure 
in the Mediterranean to further weaken the Germans, thereby making OVERLORD and 
a landing in southern France more practicable. 7 According to the American 
Ambassador to Britain, John Winant, the British believed that the psychological 
moment for launching OVERLORD could not be fixed months in advance. Nlorcovcr, 
the British feared that the contract and agreement of terms signed at QUADRANT took 
precedence over subsequent changes in the military situation. He concluded that the 
principal difference of opinion between the two parties was simply one of fiming. 8 
What he did not know was that the Russians expected the Anglo-Americans to stage 
OVERLORD at the earliest possible moment. 9 If the Americans seemed inflexible to 
the British, the British seemed opportunistic to the Americans. Both observations 
contained a degree of truth, but the Americans, fighting a two-ocean war, considered 
logistics as the primary factor for creating such opportunities. Although the Amcricans 
remained focused on a May OVERLORD, they were not indifferent to the problems 
raised by Churchill regarding the attritional warfare unfolding under appalling weather 
conditions and shortages on the Italian peninsula. Unfortunately, Churchill and 
Brooke overstated their case and aroused American suspicions by advocating further 
British operations in the Dodecanese, a group of islands off the Turkish coast, of which 
Kos and Leros had recently fallen to two Gennan battle groups. 10 Churchill's urging to 
postpone OVERLORD in favor of Mediterranean operations was resented by 
Roosevelt, Marshall and Stimson. Conversely, Brooke complained of American 
intransigence that prevented them from realizing the benefits of British Mediterranean 
policy. Writing in his diary on I November, 
If only I had sufficient force of character to swing those American 
Chiefs of Staff and make them see daylight. how different the war might 
be. We should have been in a position to force the Dardanelles by the 
capture of Crete and Rhodes. We should have had the whole of the 
Balkans ablaze by now. and the war might be finished in 19431 11 
7 FM Lord Alanbrooke. 2/VIlI. 20 Nov. 1943.829. 
8 FRUS Cairo anti Tehran, 1943, Washington, 22 Nov. 1943. pp. 301-303.327-330- 
Ibiti. 
10 J. Holland, TheAegean MISsIon, (New York 1988). pp. 169,172. 
1 FM Lord Alanbrooke. Op. cit., 3/A/X I No\-. 1943.808. 
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Although Roosevelt agreed to meet Churchill on the 22 November in Cairo, he 
carefully avoided meeting him privately, thereby deferring a decision on grand strategy 
until they met with Stalin at Tehran. 'Roosevelt was an artist in avoiding discussion of 
issues he did not want to discuss. On the other hand he was affable enough to make 
Churchill reasonably optimistic about the conference. '12Not knowing the preferred 
Russian strategy, the President avoided reaching a decision on Mediterranean versus 
OVERLORD issues that could leave him open to Russian criticism. He did not want 
the Russians to conclude that the British and the Americans were ganging up on them. 
It followed that Churchill's hopes for further Mediterranean action were dashed. 
Brooke wanted to thrash out policy and strategy for Germany's defeat with the 
Americans and then present a united front to Stalin. This was exactly what the 
Americans did not want. Roosevelt intended that the Anglo-Americans would go to 
Tehran without a common plan. 
Cairo: SEXTANT I 
The participants at the Cairo Conference of 22-26 November tried to do to much work 
into too little time, exhausting the participants before they traveled to Tehran. 
Churchill's attitude did not help. Brooding over the near-disaster at Salerno, he was 
convinced that a planned invasion of France would fail. He was ready to explode at the 
slightest provocation. All the spark that he required was discovering that 25 percent of 
the landing craft assigned to strengthen OVERLORD were to be transferred elsewhere. 
Hopkins considered Churchill's behavior obstreperous. 13 Brooke believed that 
Churchill's reaction to his loss of prestige was to secretly entertain the formation of a 
purely British theater in the Mediteffanean on which all the battle laurels would fall. 14 
According to John Eisenhower, son of the General, SEXTANT I was laden with such 
acrimony for several reasons: an accumulation of unpleasant decision deferred from 
12 K. Sainsbury, Op cit., p. 177. 
13 Lord Moran, Op. cit., p. 152. 
14 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/A/X, 18 Nov. 1943,823. 
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previous conferences, leaving basic disagreements unresolved, the loss of British 
partnership dominance, the concern over the meeting with Stalin and the presence of 
Chiang and his wife in Cairo. 15 According to Stephen Mings, the Anglo-Americans 
'compromised on areas where their interests were either disparate or in direct 
opposition. 116 Superficially that may be true, but compromise does not necessarily 
mean satisfaction or a willingness to fulfill partnership obligations under an agreement. 
The meetings became 'dysfunctional' as participants began paying lip service, 
supporting hidden agendas and being passive-aggressive. Ilese were the usual 
behavioral components, manifested by criticism, contempt, defensiveness and 
withdrawal. 17 Compounding these problems on a functional basis, CCS meetings were 
lengthy, overcrowded and their participants were frequently bad tempered. Marshall's 
memo to the COS, prior to the meeting, noted that approximately 50 officers in the 
American party would attend, to which General Handy took exception. He considered 
the am ount of staff insufficient to fulfill the needs of the American representatives. 18 
Accompanying them were officers, security and office personnel, communications 
specialists and messengers, protecting reams of boxed classified records containing top 
secret strategic information. Brief cases in which important secret papers were stuffed, 
were called 'albatrosses', because they were chained to their owners until they arrived 
safely in Cairo. 19 
The Conference registered two tripartite plenary sessions, five CCS meetings, in which 
two were attended by the Chinese military representatives, five COS and five JCS 
meetings, each body meeting separately, and numerous informal military and political 
meetings, and worldng luncheons. Nine of the items on the agenda pertained to 
Southeast Asia and four related to OVERLORD/Mediterranean. 
15 J. Eisenhower to Author, 2 Aug. 1994. 
16 S. hftgS, Stategies in ConjUct, Britain and the Anglo-American Alliance, 1941-1943, (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Texas, 1975), p. 386. 
17 J. Gottman, Why Marriages Succeed Or Fail, (New York, 1994), pp. 71-102. 
18 JCS 120 Meeting, Washington, 26 Oct. 1943, Reel 11. 
19 Richard Collins Papers, 'Details for SE)CrANT', quoted in T. Parrish, Roosevelt and Marshall, (New 
York, 1989), pp. 374. 
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The JCS considered the British proposals in 'CCS-409', which recommended shifting 
the war effort in Europe to the Mediterranean with a subsequent delay of OVERLORD 
for perhaps two months. If the delay were acceptable, the other proposals made by the 
BCOS presented no particular difficulty, but if the delay was unacceptable to the JCS, 
the problem appeared insoluble. King believed, that due to the slow progress in Italy, 
the British had a valid request, but certain issues, i. e., advance to the Po, Trieste and 
southern France needed further clarification by Eisenhower. It was a question of 
landing craft production, availability and distribution. 20 
The CCS met for the last time in Cairo on 26 November at one of the most crucial 
meetings of the whole conference. Before adjourning, the JCS, anxious that the 
Russians at Tehran might advocate a Balkan-Mediterranean policy or a Turkish entry 
into the war in preference to OVERLORD, persuaded the COS to consult privately with 
them on the issue before committing the Allies to an Anglo-American position. Brooke 
approved of this proposal and accepted the American suggestion of a unified 
Mediterranean command, but rejected the idea of an overall commander for Germany 
and an overall strategic bombing commander based in Washington, to which AOC 
Bomber Command Harris would never accede. The Americans, in a conciliatory mood 
on these issues, were willing to accept a limited postponement of OVEFJLORD. 21 
Eisenhower presented his views on the same day. As AFHQ Commander, in the 
central Mediterranean, he supported an all-out winter offensive in Italy and a build-up 
of Allied forces capable of moving east or west beyond the Po. Due to the shortage of 
landing craft, he considered a cancellation of an invasion of southern France. If 
additional means were available, he recommended limited operations in the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Balkans, and garnered support from his British colleagues. 22 
Marshall was not deterred, recognizing that Eisenhower, like all theater commanders, 
fought for his own comer and said, 'that the JCS tentatively accepted the British 




proposals implied in the capture of the Rimini-Pisa line and the capture of Rhodes, but 
that further discussion would take place on these proposals when the CCS returned to 
Cairo after TehrarL23 
Eastern Mediterranean versus Far Eastern Operations 
The real quarrel began, not over OVERLORD, but over the relative merits, political 
implications and priorities of operations in the eastern Mediten-anean versus those in the 
Far East. The extent of American flexibility on OVERLORD was tied to the British 
approving the Andaman Islands, BUCCANEER, operation in the Far East, which 
would have precluded an amphibious attack on Rhodes. When Brooke suggested that 
BUCCANEER be canceled and the freed landing craft be deployed to the Aegean, 
Marshall's reaction was severe. A heated argument developed with each operation 
heavily defended, that Brooke called, 'the father and mother of a row'. 24 King became 
so angry with Brooke's arrogance regarding shipping resources that he almost climbed 
over the table to get at him. 25 Because of Roosevelt's secret commitment to Chiang 
regarding BUCCANEER, the operation was not negotiable. Marshall had not changed 
his mind about the eastern Mediterranean. At a previous dinner meeting, attended by 
Churchill and his COS, Marshall was unshaken by the Prime Minister's bombast 
calling for an invasion of Rhodes. Marshall described the following scene to his 
biographer, Forrest Pogue, after the war. 
Churchill was red hot and all the British were against me. It got hotter 
and hotter. Churchill stood before me, his hands clutching his lapels 
and declared, 'His Majesty's Government can not have its troops 
staying idle. Muskets must flame'. I responded sharply, 'God forbid if 
I should try to dictate, but not one American soldier is going to die on 
that Goddamned beach. '26 
Because of these disagreements and the increased emotional content expressed at the 
meeting up to that point, the conference room was cleared of staff, while the major 
23 Jbid 
24 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/A/X, 26 Nov. 1943,830. 25 J. Stilwell, T. White, (ed. ), The StitweU Papers, (New York, 1948), p. 245. 
26 CCS 128 Meeting, SEXTANT Conference, Washington, 24 Nov. 1943, Reel IV.; F. Pogue 
Interview with Marshall quoted in T. Parrish, Op. cit., p. 390. 
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participants went 'off the record' to conduct their business in private. Sometimes even 
the secretaries, interpreting their roles as more than mere recordists, tried to break the 
deadlock by discussing an issue between themselves. By approaching their respective 
negotiators with a suggested impartial course of action, the impasse might be broken. 
Sometimes disputes arose from causes no deeper than the different shades of meaning 
given to some simple word, e. g., British 'demand' versus American 'request' If their 
attempts at conciliation failed, the remaining 'off the record' meeting lost any hope of 
being officially transcribed, eliminating any opportunity for further assessment and 
interpretation of the business conducted. Nor were the British less thorough in the 
presentation, although they outwardly demonstrated light-heartedness. However, 
behind this outward aplomb, they held their position to a man. British planners viewed 
high-level war preparations impersonally and based much of their operations on 
mathematical calculations, because the war had gone on much too long; to them, having 
had much experience with a variety of operations, an operation was worth while if it 
were cost effective. 27 Therefore, they sought no third party such as Stalin, the least 
impartial of third parties to arbitrate in their clash over strategy with the Americans. 
The Tehran Agreement 
Five days later, the Americans returned from Tehran with a binding agreement, based 
on Soviet strategic preferences comparable to their own, regarding operations in the 
West. Binding, because it was as if the Americans had written the agreement 
themselves, thereby eliminating any attempts to subvert it, as they had done with past 
Anglo-American agreements. Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean and 
the Dodecanese were made obsolete in three days during the full length of the 
EUREKA meeting of 28-30 November. Replacing these activities in the Mediterranean 
were OVERLORD and ANVIL, considered by Stalin as a single, indivisible military 
undertaking. 28 Both were planned to coincide with a Soviet summer offensive and 
27 Col. C. Donnelley, quoted in T. Parrish, Op. cit., pp. 384-86. 28 CCS 132 Meeting. EUREKA Conference, 30 Nov. 1943, Washington, Reel IV; G. A. Harrison, 
Op. cit., p. 125. 
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increased Allied operations in Italy. Moreover, Stalin insisted that a Supreme 
OVERLORD Commander be named quickly. Roosevelt and Stalin had achieved 
primacy over an angry ChurchiR, who, feeling excluded and disappointed by 
Roosevelt's successful attempts to curry favor, however naYve, with the Russian 
leader, eventually had no other course but to comply. He disliked having to leave Cairo 
without a decision on combined plans for Europe in 1944, and then having to argue 
with the Americans against their overall plan in front of the Russians at Tehran. 29 
Cairo: SEXTANT II 
By 2 December the major participants had returned to Cairo exhausted, only to be 
locked in debate for another five days upon arriving. The Americans had left Cairo for 
Tehran in a despondent mood, believing that Stalin wanted an Allied operation close to 
his own front, in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would conform to the British 
position. When instead Stalin supported the American view, the British were 
astounded. They said the southern France operation could not be done due to a lack of 
resources, but when American plans, organized on the spot, demonstrated it could, 
they lost the argument. 10 The Americans returned to Cairo elated. One major issue, 
Operation BUCCANEER, and three subsidiary issues relating to the allocation of 
resources for the Italian campaign, southern France (ANVIIL) and operations in the 
Aegean demanded resolution. The British were dumbfounded when the Americans 
announced that pohcy-maldng at SEXTANT H had to be completed in three days. 
There were no apologies, but Churchill expressed his apprehension over an early 
separation. Before the Conference closed, Churchill wished Roosevelt to abandon 
BUCCANEER, because landing craft were desperately needed in the Mediterranean. 
BUCCANEER's fate seemed doomed when Mountbatten requested three times the 
manpower and material than originally sought for the operation. Roosevelt hesitated 
29 CAB 65/40 WM(43)169,13 Dec. 1943. 
30 Gen. T. Handy Interview Washington, 28, Sept. 1956, RG 165, 'Plan for Invasion of Southern 
France'; JPS 249, Washington, 5 Aug. 1943, 'Study, Operation Against Southern France'; 'ABC 
384 Europe' (5 Aug. 1943), 9-A, 29 Nov. 1943, RG 165 WPD. 
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and his Chiefs were divided. As with the aborted SLEDGEHAMMER operation, the 
British were being asked to supply the bulk of the forces. The British and Americans 
remained deadlocked and British recommendations for a smaller operation in order to 
break the impasse were denied by the President. Finally, Roosevelt capitulated; 
BUCCANEER would not be implemented, because he accepted that there were not 
enough resources to mount both it and OVERLORD on the required scale. 31 The 
deadlock was broken and the British, who had persevered, were pleased, but it 
remained one of the bitterest strategic arguments of the war. At the third plenary 
session on 4 December, Churchill called on Brooke to express his views of the 
Conference. 32 
This Conference has been most unsatisfactory. Usually at all these 
meetings we discussed matters till we arrived at a policy which we put 
forth to the Prime Minister and the President for approval and 
amendment. And that we subsequently examined whether ways and 
means admitted of this policy being carried out. Finally putting on 
paper for approval which formed our policy for the future conduct of the 
war. This time such a procedure had been impossible. 33 
Nevertheless, the British military hierarchy remained dominant in the Mediterranean. 
Wilson assumed supreme command of a unified Mediterranean Theater on 24 
December 1943, Alexander was appointed C-in-C Italy and Cunningham, Naval C-in- 
C Mediterranean. Eisenhower relinquished his Mediterranean command and 
transferred to OVERLORD as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SCAEF). Under the agreement 68 landing craft would remain in the Mediterranean 
until January 1944 as part of projected amphibious operations in Italy and the intended 
Allied advance to the Pisa-Rimini line. In addition, Aegean operations were left to the 
discretion of SCAEF, and finally, to allow enough time to mount the aforementioned 
Italian operations, OVERLORD was postponed from I May to I June 34 The end of the 
toughest Anglo-American summit thus far loomed in sight. Prior to adjournment, 
Brooke recommended that each COS should study how best to reduce the enormous 
31 Papers and Minutes ofMeetings, SEXTANT Conference, (Washington 1943). 32 ]pRUS, Cairo and Tehran, Op. cit., p. 699-705. 33 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/A/X, 4 Dec. 1943, p. 858. 
34 'Papers and Minutes of Meetings', SEXTANT Conference, Op. cit. 
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work-load of future conferences, warning that they would undoubtedly have to occur at 
shorter intervals. Yet nine months were to pass before the Allies convened at Second 
Quebec (OCTAGON) in September 1944, having achieved the longest separation since 
America had entered the war which seemed to stand as an act of avoidance and defiance 
by each side. 35 
On 31 December 1943, the US Secretariat and the COS suggested to the CCS ways and 
means of improving the worldng conditions and agendas of future conferences, in 
recognition of the negotiating debacle at SEXTANT. 36 
The Cairo and Tehran meetings were tripartite summits whose results represented a 
form of coalition warfare based upon an alliance of distinct parties combining to fight a 
common foe, but not united enough in their efforts to form a co-ordinated strategy. 
The Second World War coalition was an entente cordiale between the three great 
powers, in which all the participants had a common goal of defeating the Axis, but this 
did not amount to a Grand Alliance. The two alliances pursued separate policies and 
Stalin only influenced but never truly co-ordinated them, and their separate military 
offensives rarely became a triangular military effort. 37Moreover, as Churchill's 
influence with Roosevelt waned after 1943, the President responded to Churchill's two 
page letters either by cable or through a third party, such as HopIdns or Harriman, and 
many important military questions were hardly addressed. 38 This turnabout may have 
been partly due to Roosevelt's declining health, diagnosed after Tehran as 
hypertension, hypertensive heart disease and congestive heart failure. 39 
35 R. Parkinson, Alamein to VE Day, (London, 1974), pp. 197-208. 
36'Preparation for Future US-British Conferences, Washington, 31 Dec. 1943, Rg 218. 
37 A. Perlmutter, FDR and Stalin, (London, 1993), p. 55. 
38 D. Kaiser, 'Churchill, Roosevelt and the Limits of Power, International Security, 10: 1, (Summer, 
1985), 204-221. 
39 H. Bruenn, MD, 'Clinical notes on the Illness and Death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt', 
Annals of Internal Me&cine, (April 1970). 
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The ANVIL versus ItalianlBalkan Debate 
The decision on the timing, preparation and size for both French operations was 
unavoidable, because of the May guarantee. Reporting to the CCS on 17 January 
1944, Eisenhower weighed the requirements of OVERLORD, increased from time to 
five divisions, against the feasibility of a simultaneous three divisional ANVIL. 
Generals Montgomery, Smith and Morgan deemed ANVIOL unfeasible if mounted 
simultaneously with OVERLORD, due to the shortage of landing craft. if ANVIL 
could not be eliminated entirely, they suggested, it should be used as a diversion and 
reduced to a one divisional threat. 40 Eisenhower refused, insisting that ANVIL would 
be most effective as an operation. The commitment to the Russians and the financing 
of a French Army meant as far as Eisenhower was concerned, that ANVIL was not 
negotiable. 41 In addition, Eisenhower and Marshall realized that these forces would 
stagnate (or be appropriated for some British scheme) in the Mediterranean, if ANVIOL 
were canceled. 
Eisenhower was willing to postpone OVERLORD beyond I June in order to keep 
ANVIL alive, a postponement to which both the COS and the JCS subscribed. During 
early January when the COS debated ANVIIL's cancellation, Portal and Cunningham 
recommended ANVIL as a useful two divisional diversion to OVERLORD. On 4 
]February, Churchill concluded that OVERLORD and ANVIL were not strategically 
entwined, as perceived by Stalin. Consequently, Churchill doubted ANVIL's 
diversionary value, even with limited resources. 42 In part, this was a reaction to the 
worsening of the Italian campaign and the Allied failure at Anzio. Brooke concurred, 
writing, 'We had a long COS meeting about the wire to send the American COS to 
convince them that with the turn operations have taken in the Mediterranean, the only 
thing to do is to go on fighting the war in Italy and giving up any idea of a weak 
40 COSSAC (44) 5, Op. ANVIL, Washington, 6 Jan. 44, RG. 331, SHAEF SGS FILE 370.2/2 1. 
41 CCS 142 Meeting., Washington, 21 Jan. 1944, Reel IV; J. Hobbs, Dear Gen.: Eisenhower's 
Wartbu Leuers to MarshaI4 (Baltimore, 1971), pp. 131-48. 
42 'Firm Recommendations with Regard to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD', RG. 33 1, SGS File 
370.2/2 1; CCS Meeting 144, 'CCS 465/4', Washington, 4 Feb. 1944, Reel IV. 
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landing in southern France. "43Marshall remained obdurate. He responded in a 
strongly worded statement, which noted the irreconcilable differences Brooke and him: 
ANVIL was essential to the success of OVERLORD as was the use of French forces. 
Marshall saw it as an instrument for reducing the enemy build-up against the 
OVERLORD lodgement during the critical period of Allied consolidation and 
expansion. Although the availability of landing craft was, as ever, critical, adequate 
resources would be found to provide for an expanded assault lift for both OVERLORD 
and ANVIL. Marshall discounted the recommendation to transfer French troops from 
the Mediterranean to Normandy as impractical, because of shipping shortages. He 
agreed that the actual date of assault might have to be delayed to 2 June, but sufficient 
latitude was permitted SCAEF by designating 31 May as the target date. With the 
defeats at Cassino and Anzio, the Italian campaign continued to deteriorate - further 
upsetting Allied logistical and tactical time-tables. Marshall considered the theater was, 
... a vacuum demanding our time and resources in a region which never will be decisive militarily, and ... the partial diversion of our strategic bombing effort against the Reich in support of surface operations... 
... Although it is agreed that the campaign in Italy has not developed according to expectation, it is not agreed that this situation affords a 
sound basis on which to intensify the Italian campaign at the expense of 
ANVIL.... 
Therefore, we consider that on balance, the results to be achieved by 
slow and costly progress north in Italy as compared to a stabilized 
strategy combined with ANVUL in support of OVERLORD, weigh 
heavily in favor the latter. 44 
Roosevelt and Churchill had proposed that the CCS meet in either London or 
Washington to settle the matter. 45 Brooke, convinced that trans-Atlantic cables were 
ineffective as instruments for resolving the existing level of conflict, invited Marshall to 
London. Marshall demurred because of pressing Pacific concerns; instead, he 
authorized Eisenhower to represent the JCS in any forthcoming negotiations with the 
COS, stipulating that the JCS would accept the results as binding. 46ne COS agreed, 
43 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op., cit., 3/B/XI, 19 Jan. 1944, p. 895. 
44 JCS 'Record of SHAEF on OVERLORD and ANVIL', Washington, 5 Feb. 1944, Reel 11. 
45 Eisenhower to CCS, 'Meeting, London', 8,9 Feb. 1944, RG. 165, Exec. 10, Box 54. 
46 CCS 145 Meeting., Washington, 11 Feb. 1944, Reel IV. 
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provided that in the event of disagreement, the question would be referred back to the 
CCS. 47 
If OVERLORD were to be the climactic battle of the war in which America would 
destroy the German Army first and foremost, Marshall's behavior is open to question. 
Although he should have accepted Brooke's invitation to resolve the strategic conflict in 
camera, it is possible to conclude that his management and leadership techniques led to 
his refusal, i. e., Marshall preferred to delegate authority to someone trustworthy like 
Eisenhower. 'Marshall only picked officers who were confident in the outcome of the 
actions they were undenaking. 148Whatever his intentions within the short time 
available, by placing Eisenhower between him and Brooke, Marshall removed himself 
from direct involvement. 
On 4 January, Generals Bernard Montgomery, C-in-C 21 st Army Group, Walter B. 
Smith, Eisenhower's CoS and Admiral Bertram Ramsey C-in-C Allied Naval 
Expeditionary Force (ANCFX)), met in London and agreed to a diversionary role for 
ANVIL, thereby compounding the confusion. 49 By approving ANVIL, they hoped to 
please Eisenhower, who, in turn, hoped to please Marshall, all at severe cost to 
OVERLORD. Brooke intervened and stopped the foolishness, at least on the British 
side, remarking sarcastically, 'What a way to run a war! ' 50Marshall expected 
Eisenhower to accomplish these conflicting Herculean problems facing him, not only as 
the newly appointed Supreme Commander, but also as the agent for the JCS. 
Eisenhower, saddled with this added burden tried to compose a command team, 
determine OVERLORD's parameters and compensate for Marshall's elusiveness. 
Concurrently, Eisenhower, recalled to Washington, missed preliminary Anglo- 
American staff conferences in London, crucial to his new appointment. 'Mis state of 
affairs complicated and needlessly prolonged negotiations with the British. One of 
47 Eisenhower, Memo 'OVERLORD/ANVEL Conference', London, II Feb., 1944, RG 165, Exec. 10, 
Box 54. 
48 Col. P. Munch, 'Gen. George C. Marshall and the Army Staff, Military Review, lVxXiv, 8, 
49 
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50 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/B/XI, 16 Feb. 1944,902. 
264 
Eisenhower's messages read, 'Late developments in Italy create the possibility that the 
necessary forces required cannot be disentangled in time to mount a strong ANVIL. '51 
Marshall accused him of localifis, a pejorative term that Eisenhower interpreted as 
succumbing to the British point of view. Eisenhower denied the charge. No one was 
more loyal to Marshall than Eisenhower; Marshall could have lessened his fears, if he 
had agreed to negotiate in London. 52 
Negotiations by Proxy 
Two meetings convened on 21 February 1944; a JCS morning meeting and a JCS- 
Presidential afternoon meeting, the same subject dominated both meetings: the need for 
a simultaneous ANVIIL. 53Marshall's failure to negotiate with the COS in London 
became apparent. At the earlier meeting, Marshall believed that an impasse had 
developed between the COS and the JCS in connection with OVERLORD-ANVIIL. To 
break it, he proposed two alternatives for consideration: if the Allies failed to reach 
Rome by I April, they ought to defer ANVIOL and release approximately 40 percent of 
its landing craft to OVERLORD - or fight a defensive war in Italy and make their main 
Mediterranean offensive through southern France. However, he was sure Montgomery 
and Churchill would disagree. 
Marshall urged that a telegram be sent to Eisenhower referring to 'COS(W) 1156', the 
British directive which urged complete abandonment of ANVIL and to inform him that 
as their agent conferring with the COS on OVERLORD-ANVIL, he had failed to 
furnish the JCS with an in-depth report related to the results reached. By not 
complying with the JCS request, Eisenhower had complicated an already complicated 
issue. Marshall was prepared to stand by Eisenhower, but the COS had already by- 
passed the Supreme Commander rather than risidng a clear-cut break- From the 
51 Eisenhower to Marshall, Washington, 6 Feb. 1944, RG. 331 'OVERORD/ANVIL' SHAEF SGS 
ffle 381. 
52 Marshall to Eisenhower, Op. cit., Washington, 7 Feb. 1944, CM-OUT 277; J. Hobbs, Op. cit., 
134,138-141. 
53 jCS 147 Meeting; 'Meeting with the President', Washington, 21 Feb., 1944, Reel IL 
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American point of view, Eisenhower had to seek an immediate conference with the 
COS and either reach an agreement or, failing that, prepare a careftffly stated rebuttal for 
which the JCS. Acknowledging Eisenhower was under great pressure, the JCS 
dispatched a message to him, 'CM-OUT 8770' with an added closing phrase, 'and the 
JCS will support your decision subject of course to the approval of the President. ' 
King thought it best to settle the ANVIL question in Washington, rather than risk 
compromising Eisenhower's position any further. He added that the President should 
be informed of the deadlock in view of the commitments made at Cairo and Tehran. 
The JCS agreed, that during the afternoon meeting with the President, they should 
propose a definite program for action rather than merely describe the present 
OVERLORD-ANVIL impasse. 54 
COS Proposals to Break the Deadlock 
At the afternoon White House meeting, the President was informed of the COS request 
to cancel ANVIL, its need for an immediate response and an invitation to the JCS to 
come to London for talks. Moreover, the COS gave first priority to the deteriorating 
Italian campaign, insisting that there were not sufficient resources to mount ANVIL, 
destroy the German forces in Italy and accumulate the means to mount a re-enforced 
five divisional OVERLORD. Since Eisenhower maintained that he had enough 
landing-craft for both operations, the JCS strongly opposed its cancellation. The 
President agreed, noting that ANVIL's cancellation would displease the Russians. 
T'hey had insisted, however upon transferring two or divisions to OVERLORD, if 
ANVIL could not be mounted. 55 
Roosevelt concurred with the message sent to Eisenhower, but cautioned SCAEF that 
the United States was committed to a third power, who would not abandon ANVIL in 
the light of previously broken promises. Roosevelt preferred not to talk with the 




had broken its promises in the past, it had better not do so again. -% ffis premise was 
self-serving, defending a position which ignored the situation in Italy. By avoiding a 
Russo-American dialogue, he also limited his strategic options. While the President, 
unlike Marshall, conceded that 'Eisenhower was badly pushed and placed in a difficult 
position as the JCS representative in the OVERLORD-ANVIL conversations"57 but he 
did nothing about it 
With little time remaining, the President inquired if the JCS were familiar with a British 
proposal to send a joint expeditionary force into Yugoslavia led by an American 
general? Marshall said, 'No', and added, 'that it would be very bad indeed and 
probably (would) result in a new war'. The President assured the JCS that Yugoslavia 
was not an option, because he and the American public wanted to get the Army out of 
Europe as quickly as possible. He had told Churchill as much. In an aside, the 
Dra 
. resident observed that the British were selling US Lend-Lease tires through a 
commercial company at exorbitant prices. 58No discussion followed, and the purpose 
of President's 'British-bashing' remained in doubt. Certainly, these accusations did 
little to improve the immediate negotiating climate. 
Eisenhower's Search for Compromise 
Eisenhower, as JCS agent, was not only more flexible than Marshall, but more 
realistic. Being Supreme Commander, as well as a co-operative personality, helped. 
He searched for a compromise between Marshall's insistence to mount ANVIL and 
Brooke's desire to cancel it Depending upon Cunningham in Naval matters, Brooke 
charged his planners to find provision for a balanced logistical and tactical lift, if both 
amphibious operations were to be attempted simultaneously. On 19 February 
Eisenhower's compromise plan was attacked by 21 st Army Group Planners and 





assault lifts for special forces and eliminated that ready combination of assault and 
reserve forces on the same ship. 59 The American planners made a fundamental error 
that bedeviled calculations for months to come; having failed to consult with either 
COSSAC or British GHQ Home Forces, they concluded that an LST's capacity was 30 
tanks, the figure for stowage in transit. When loading tanks for an assault landing, the 
true figure was 25.60 Minimum OVERLORD assault loading requirements were nearly 
satisfied but fell short by tantalizing small percentages, i. e. 0.07 percent for men and 
0.05 percent for motor vehicles. 61 Eisenhower realized that only by weakening 
OVERLORD could he mount a simultaneous ANVIL; and both were held hostage by 
events in Italy. This exercise highlighted how landing craft, a finite resource, 
hampered strategic amphibious operations throughout the war. Coupled with upper 
echelon indecision, the shortage continued to played havoc with the required minimum 
standards and calculations on which the success of an amphibious operation depended. 
Competition from Anzio 
At the end of December, Churchill, convalescing with pneumonia at Marrakech, 
discussed future Italian operations with his Mediterranean Commanders, Wilson, and 
Alexander. With Brooke in London, Churchill, as Minister of Defence, exercised his 
'military talents' on these appointees with a free hand. When Churchill's doctor and 
confidant suggested that Churchill, like Hitler, not only directed the policy, but even 
planned the details of war, Churchill responded, 'Yes, that's just what I do. 162He 
pressed for a landing at Anzio and the capture of Rome, before the Allies undertook 
OVERLORD and ANVIOL. Churchill, Wilson and Alexander concluded that a two 
division assault, supported by airborne troops and followed up by an armored 
formation, based on the elements of a third division should be sufficient to achieve their 
objectives in Italy. Unfortunately, any systematic attempt to predict both the enemy's 
59 Special Meeting, 'OVERLORD/ANVEL', London, 17, Feb. 1944, RG. 331 SHAEF SGS File 381 
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capacity or will to resist or his strategic reaction later was missed at Marrakech. Even 
though on 3 January, just three weeks prior to the landing at Anzio, Operation 
SHINGLE was defined as a high-risk venture, none of the Allied commanders were 
willing to argue against the Prime Minister's enthusiasm-63The decision-making 
process unraveled, because the implications of decisions at each level were not pursued 
downwards or was two-way communication maintained. Six Corps General John P. 
Lucas, designated to lead the Anzio assault, had not even been invited to Marrakech. 
On 9 January he attended a meeting at General Alexander's Italian headquarters and 
later wrote in his diary, 
I felt like a lamb being led to slaughter but felt entitled to one bleat so I 
registered a protest against the target date as it gave me too little time for 
rehearsal. I was ruled down .... The real reasons can not be military ... 64 
SHINGLE would be executed, but with far less means than originally planned. 
Although the demands of the Italian campaign overrode ANVIL's intent, Allied 
preoccupation with ANVIL gave little assurance that SFUNGLE would succeed. If 
SFUNGLE failed, the operation would not serve strategy and policy would suffer. The 
slow pace of the Allied advance in Italy, reports of assault shipping departing the 
Mediterranean for the UK, leaving the remainder too weak to mount another Anzio-type 
operation, prompted Hitler to issue a formal directive on 4 October 1943. Not only 
would the Germans choose to resist and fight for central Italy, but they even considered 
going on the offensive. Hitler deduced that the Allies aimed at securing the political 
prize of Rome and using Italy as a base from which to attack southern France or the 
Balkans. 65 Hitler's prescience was borne out by Wilson's summation of the central 
Italian campaign, in which SACMED made the error of assuming that German and 
British intentions for Rome were identical: 'The political effects of the capture of Rome 
would, in my opinion, be as important as the military consequences. The prestige of 
63 F. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 111, Pt. L (London, 1984), p. 185; CAB 
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possession of the Italian capital, like Stalingrad, was equally important to the enemy as 
ourselves... '66 
Wilson's elevated Rome from the 'Eternal City' to the 'Sacred City' on a par with 
Verdun; the reasons for reciprocal escalation in 1916 were inappropriate in 1944. 
Nevertheless the Italian campaign had developed into a war of attrition. French General 
Alphonse Juin, Commander of the French Expeditionary Force during the battles for 
central Italy, commented on the high price paid for a politically-driven campaign: 
Once again we have run into one of the stumbling blocks of coalition 
warfare: the Allies cannot come to an agreement and co-ordinate their 
efforts. Questions of prestige are shaping events, each one wanting to 
make the entry in to Rome. History will not fail to pass severe 
sentence. 67 
Even with the benefit of ULTRA intercepts'68the insufficiencies of Anzio, like Salerno 
before it, reminded Eisenhower that without military dominance, the invading 
OVERLORD forces could be driven into the sea or suffer from the same sort of 
stalemate. 69 A post-war indictment read: 
The 43,000 casualties suffered on Anzio were the result not of 
compelling military logic but by frivolous political forces and a tragic 
series of faulty assumptions. Specifically, the landings lacked a single 
clear objective; the turning movement was too shallow and the most 
glaring defect was the inadequate size of the landing force. 70 
'Me popular historian, Alaistair Home, in his biography of Montgomery ignored 
Churchill's responsibility for Anzio and the diversion of landing craft elsewhere. They 
were needed to supply and reinforce the six divisions on the beachhead, and 
consequently jeopardized ANVIL. Home chose to blame the Americans instead, citing 
as the major factor contributing to the shortfall the production of destroyer-escorts and 
escort carriers in 1942 and most of 1943, urgently needed in the Battle of the AdantiC. 71 
In 1942, Britain's design and Production difficulties seriously slowed the landing craft 
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program down to a trickle. In a memorandum to the President, Marshall warned, 'that 
more shipping that is now in sight is essential if the national war effort is not to be 
neutralized to a serious extent. '72Unfortunately, the conversion to landing craft came 
too late to offset the shortage in 1944.73 Other factors contributing to the problems in 
the Mediterranean included King's tight control over the release and distribution of 
landing craft 74 and Montgomery and Eisenhower's demands for a reinforced five 
divisional OVERLORD. Moreover, Home does not substantiate his claim that during 
the ANVEL debate, Churchill clearly expressed the desire to project an ANVIL force 
into the Balkans. 75 Both Home and Nigel Hamilton have distorted reality by writing 
that landing craft were sent from Britain to the Mediterranean rather than the other way 
round, an error perpetuating a belief that the Americans were not only intransigent, but 
strategically naYve. 76 
On the 19 February Eisenhower and the COS agreed that Italy required immediate 
assistance, ANVIL would revert to the scale originally intended, planning would 
continue and 20 British LST's (Landing Ship Tank) and 21 British LSI's (Landing 
Ship Infantry), in exchange for 6 US AKA's (Attack transports) would sail from the 
Mediterranean to Britain, on 20 March. 77 
The Joint Intelligence Committee QIQ on 12 January assisted the Joint Planners in 
examining SHAEF's recommendation that OVERLORD should be strengthened and 
ANVIL reduced to a threat It suggested that the land opposition to OVERLORD was 
'unlikely' to be less, and in the early stages might 'exceed', what the COSSAC Plan 
had allowed. Opposition would not be any greater if ANVIL was reduced to a threat. 
There was no evidence that any reduction of ANVIL would lead to substantial changes 
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in enemy dispositions. British Intelligence emphasized, on 24 February, that if the 
Allied plan of tying down German formations in Italy were to succeed, Hitler had to be 
deceived about Allied intentions and resources in the Mediterranean. If it failed, 
German formations would transfer to Normandy to augment the forces already there. 
Ile JIC evaluations indicated that the enemy 'appeared' nervous about a threat to 
southern France, but suggested an assault in the Adriatic on the Istrian Peninsula, 
ediately after OVERLORD, would offer greater assistance than ANVIL. 78 
The onerous conditions in Italy prompted Montgomery to reverse his position, and on 
21 February he wrote the following petition to Eisenhower: 'I recommend very 
strongly that we now throw the whole weight of our opinion onto the scales against 
ANVIOL. Let us have two really good major campaigns, one in Italy and one in 
OVERLORD. 179 It took one more month of discussions for Eisenhower to accede to 
Montgomery's recommendations which echoed those of the COS and ChurchiU's. 
However, on 21 February he wrote the following to Montgomery, 'OVERLORD 
would have no real support from the Mediterranean. This bothers me. '80 
Conferring on 18 February in Italy, Wilson and Alexander agreed that either a one 
divisional assault in the spring or a two divisional assault later against southern France 
was dead. 81 Marshall and Eisenhower sought compromise by: 
1. ) suggesting that the reallocation of assault shipping should take effect 
in April 
2. ) by planning ANVIL as a two divisional assault composed of 88 
LST's, 90 LCI's, 60 LCT's and 8 LSI's 
3. ) reviewing its feasibility on 20 March. 
If it were concluded that ANVIOL was impracticable on that date, anything above the lift 
for one division would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and assigned to 
OVERLORD. By 24 February all of the principals involved agreed to the above 
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arrangement, amidst the search for landing craft. The Italian campaign was granted 
6 overriding priority over all existing and future operations in the Mediterranean 9 and 
given 'first call on all resources, land, sea and air' widiin the theater. 82 Since ANVIL 
was being crushed between the demands of OVERLORD and the Italian campaign, 
Eisenhower, with CCS approval, canceled ANVIL on 21 March. 83nerefore, 
SFUNGLE had not served strategy and policy suffered. At one stroke, by agreeing to 
postpone ANVIL until Rome was captured, the Americans threw away their most 
important card, the operation conceived to siphon German reserves from OVERLORD. 
The 'hammer' without its 'anvil' was compromised. The JCS claimed that the 
Germans had gained the strategic initiative by default, and disagreed with the COS that 
the capture of Rome was worth the heavy engagement in Italy: 'After the bridgehead 
and the main front have been joined, there will remain, in our opinion, no further 
militazy objectives in Italy which justify the time-consuming land costly effort to attain 
them. 184Even with America's phenomenal production capacity, a sine qua non of 
coalition dominance, it failed to achieve the actual power needed to force British 
compliance. Marshall, the 'Westerner', a believer in the concentration of effort at the 
decisive point in France failed to convince Churchill, the 'Easterner', a believer in 
diversionary operations in the Mediterranean, that to change was worthwhile. 85 'MiS 
may be an out-dated description of and slightly unfair to Churchill, 'because Britain not 
only had a position to defend in the Middle East, but the resources which could be put 
to immediate effect against the enemy. '86 
The Proposed Transfer of Paciftc Landing Craft 
The JCS opposed serious continuation of the Italian campaign beyond Rome. It was 
becoming obvious that it and alternative operations suggested by the COS (a big 
offensive north of Rome coupled with amphibious operations near the Po Valley and in 
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Istria). would only feed the campaign's insatiable appetite. Marshall agreed to 
ANVIL's postponement, but refused to cancel it. He proposed that if the COS would 
accept a two divisional ANVIL, mounted on 10 July in support of OVERLORD, the 
JCS would transfer 26 LSTs and 40 LCI(L)] from the Pacific to the Mediterranean. 87 
King concurred and the COS accepted the American proposal, assuming that when the 
strategic situation was reviewed in June, the additional landing craft would be used in a 
Mediterranean operation offering the most support to OVERLORD, e. g., Italy or 
ANVIIL. 88 The British meaning of ANVIL changed, and becoming non-specific and 
non-exclusive. This assumption was in direct opposition to the JCS interpretation, 
who had consigned the Pacific landing craft to ANVIL only. On 29 March Dill warned 
the COS that the JCS was not receptive to any deviations. An irritated JCS maintained 
that ANVIL was the July support operation for OVERLORD89 and protesting the 
British view, cabled, 
... that the delayed 
ANVIIL will be vigorously pressed and that it is the 
firm intention to mount this operation in support of OVERLORD with 
the target date indicated'. The USCOS are firm in their conviction that a 
decision must be taken to launch ANVIL on a specific date. They 
consider it is clearly evident that the operation will not be launched 
unless such a decision is taken .... 90 
A0 
As the debate continued Brooke viewed the JSM, his representation in Washington, as 
no more than a post office delivering messages from the COS in London. 91 He 
preferred that they not express their own views or opinions, as if they too were 
suffering from localitis. Given his dissatisfaction, Brooke shrugged off the possibility 
of traveling to Washington. Like Marshall, he refused to grasp the nettle, and by 
avoiding direct confrontation, mismanaged and prolonged the negotiations. 
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An Alternative to ANVIL 
On both sides of the Atlantic, attention focused on OVERLORD and the logistical 
support required for its success. Speculating on the consequences of a canceled 
ANVIL, General Roberts of the OPD wrote a memo to his superior, Handy: 
We get into political difficulties with the French; Overlord will lose at least ten fighting divisions. Our service forces continue to support the 
western Mediterranean. Our divisions and French divisions will be 
committed to a costly, unremunerative inching advance in Italy. The 
people of both the United States and France may or may not take this indefinitely and once committed to Italy, we have our forces pointed 
towards southeastern Europe and will have the greatest difficulty in 
preventing their use for occupation forces in Austria, Hungary and 
southern Germany. 92 
Roberts' argument in support of a southern France landing as the sole alternative not 
only increased American Anglophobia, but disregarded the possibility of a drive into 
northern Italy by a combination of all existing and newly created Allied divisions. For 
example, if ANVIL had been canceled, its seven divisions, released from a ten week 
amphibious training schedule, could have carried the May DIADEM offensive beyond 
the Franco-Italian border. Allied fighting power, already dominating sea and air, 
would have increased by a 5: 1 ratio; more than enough to further damage the already 
weakened German Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. Roberts assessment, in support of 
Marshall's prejudice, that a land move into France from Italy was too slow, may have 
discounted Alexander's generalship, which, like Montgomery's, failed at the breakout 
and pursuit phase of a battle. 93 In theory, if the German Army, faced with unremitting 
Allied pressure, had collapsed on both the Norman and Italian fronts in July, rather 
than September, the Allies would have gained two more months of fine fighting 
weather, time enough to effect a linkage on the Franco-German border for the advance 
into Germany in 1944.94 Only Churchill had considered an attack on southern France 
from Italy as a possibility. However, the Prime Minister weakened his case when he 
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placed it on par with a move into Istria, thus raising American suspicions and 
opposition. 95 
The Istrian Alternative 
Regarding an Istrian option, in early 1944, Alexander, supported by many of the 
military principals in the Mediterranean, including Wilson and General Mark Clark 
(Commander, Fifth Army), considered a plan, Operation ARMPIT, to break through 
the Apennines and carry the Ljubljana gap, no more than 30 miles wide, through which 
the main road and railway run from Italy into northern Yugoslavia. Vienna lay at the 
end of this 250 mile narrow road network, an objective of great political and 
psychological value. 96 Landings in Istria were also considered, but Admiral Hewitt, 
commander of the US Eighth Fleet in the Mediterranean, disagreed with Clark, 
suggesting that naval operations in the northern Adriatic would put too much strain on 
the US Navy. US General Jacob L. Devers, Wilson's theater deputy, agreed with 
Hewitt. One survey of the region revealed that, 'The western shore of the Istrian 
peninsula is made up of numerous cliffs, scattered coves, occasional anchorages, a few 
tiny beaches and nowhere is it suitable for the classical, broad scale, textbook style of 
landing. 197 Alexander, his CoS, Lt. General Sir John Harding, Allied Armies Italy 
(AAI), who had devised a plan that would fulfill Churchill's dream of a British advance 
on Vienna, either minimized or ignored the experience of the Italian campaign in which 
it had taken their troops over a year of fighting to reach northern Italy. Lt. General Sir 
Sidney Kirkman, GOC British 13th Corps, did not. Describing the egregious 
problems along the Gothic Line, he wrote to Harding repudiating Alexander's view, 
The enemy has a superiority of two to one of our heavy or medium 
guns. This is a most serious state of affairs for a major offensive. We 
have never been in such a position before. At Cassino our superiority 
of guns for counter battery fire was about two to one ... As long as these 
conditions exist, offensive operations in Italy are likely to incur very 
heavy causalities, and owing to the tiredness of our infantry, may well 
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fail. Without an adequate quantity of ammunition, the enemy will not be 
effectively neutralized, and troops who have been fighting for so long 
without rest, are unhkely to reach their objectives. 98 
Kirkman continued that 'Central Europe as a goal was political and military 
moonshine', 99 and that Alexander's June cables to London, stating that his armies were 
ready to assault the Apennines and the Alps, were 'pipe dreams'. 100 ýMe whole 
dispute, bitter as it was, had nothing to do with a conflict between a Bal]= and 
Western Strategy, because the object of the British and American tactical commanders 
in March and April 1944, was still limited to brealdng through the German winter line, 
capturing Rome, and reaching the Pisa-Rimini axis. The possibilities beyond that stiR 
lay in the realm of speculation. Two weeks after the Normandy landings, Eisenhower 
cabled the following message to Marshall, 'It is my belief that the Prime Minister and 
his Chiefs of Staff are honestly convinced that greater results in support of 
OVERLORD would be achieved by a drive toward Trieste rather than to mount 
ANVIL. '101 
Discounting the frightful winter weather and poor Istrian infrastructure, it was doubtful 
that a force of more than six divisions could have been sustained through the Ljubljana 
Gap to invade the Danube Valley; perhaps not that many, because the railroad through 
the gap had plenty of tunnels vulnerable to destruction by German demolition 
experts. 102 Alexander closely questioned Lt. Colonel Peter WiUdnson of SOE in March 
1944 concerning the feasibility of an Istrian landing. Wilkin on replied, 'that it 
contained formidable technical difficulties and great risks. '103 Roosevelt agreed, and in 
a letter to Churchill, expounded further: he was convinced that not only was it an area 
of poor beaches, limited natural cover, undeveloped mountain roads, impassable in 
winter's heavy snows, and easily defended exits leading to the Danubian plain, 
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101 Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 June 1944, RG. 218, JCS, Box 4, Chair. File. 
102 K Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, (Bloomington, IL, 1981), p. 332. 
103 T. Barker, Op. cit., p. 61. 
277 
through the Ljubljana Gap, but that an operation here did not support OVERLORD and 
therefore was unacceptable. 104 
Until July 1944, the Gennan General Staff, OKW. believed that the Allies wcrc 
planning a large scale amphibious attack in the Gulf of Venice, the objective being 
Austria and southern Germany. 105 If German invasion predictions were satisfied hN, 
Allied amphibious forces threatening the northern Adriatic, enemy troops would have 
been diverted from Normandy. Although the Anglo-American political and military 
positions varied, a Balkan excursion, opposed by Stalin, remained no substitute t'or 
ANVIL, defined as a drive into southern France from Italy. Exchanging ANVIL for a 
Balkan operation would have inhibited Allied concentration in western Europe and 
probably lengthened the war by several months. 1(16 
British Misperceptions 
The COS failed to realize that their response to the magnanimous JCS offer to reroute 
66 Pacific landing craft was considered a rejection. Moreover, the Americans did not 
intend to squander additional resources for an indeterminate operation or to simply 
increase the general supplies in the Mediterranean. The JCS was shocked by the COS 
position, concluding that the British had missed the connection between an American 
public pressuring its government for a swift German defeat followed by an immediate 
escalation of operations against Japan. In sum, any momentum achieved in the Pacific 
would not be sacrificed for an ambiguous ANVIL The COS had accepted the 
American legacy of landing craft, but disregarded the terms of the will, ANVIL. The 
JSM advised the COS to send Wilson a draft directive ordering him to proceed 
vit,, orously with plans and preparations for a 10 July ANVIL, while maintaining I 
flexibility and allowances for alternatives. The JSM presumed that this would satisfy 
104 'JCS Operations to Assist OVERLORD', Washington, 29 June 1944. Reel VII. 
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the JCS-107 Marshall believed that Churchill had agreed to ANVIL at Tehran. Churchill 
isted that the strategic situation had changed vastly since then, and that Rome could 
not be sacrificed today for an ANVIL tomorrow. The landing craft shortage continued 
to drive both men to distraction. 108 
American Productive Might 
During 1943, American shipyards built more than 19,000 assault craft of which two or 
three types were British. King, who assumed control over all landing craft, allocated 
the meager sum of only 1,000 of this number for use in Europe. T'he maximum 
capacity of British shipyards was about 350 a month, which produced a total of 4,000 
by May 1944. Even with the addition of the American 1,000, a total of 5,000 specialist 
ships could only lift three OVERLORD divisions. 109 In Mid summer 1943 Landing 
craft programs were increased significantly from the existing directive. This presumed 
the conversion of certain ship yards, the re-allocation of carbon and alloy steel needed 
in landing craft production, the cancellation of 2,200 medium Army trucks in 1944 in 
order to release labor in the Detroit area and the expansion of GM diesel engine 
manufacturing facilities, the most critical component of all. 110 The Evansvil1e, Indiana 
Shipyard, a 30 month old gigantic facility created on the site of a municipal dump along 
the Ohio River, met the government's frantic call for stepped up production by 
producing 20 LSTs in April-May 1944. Known as 'The World's Champion LST 
Builder', its 19,000 shipyard workers set all kinds of production records. "' 
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Momentary Compromise in Anger's Wake 
Feelings remained tense in London and Washington. At a rare and urgently called 
Saturday CCS meeting, Dill found Marshall obdurate towards the British vicw poiiit 
and remained unwilling to withdraw landing craft from the Pacific to assist a vvcak 
course of action in Italy. 112 Moreover, he planned to reappraise further American 
resource allocations to the Mediterranean. 113 Brooke, who thought Marshall was 
hopeless as a strategist, wrote, 'History will never forgive them for bargaining 
equipment against strategy and for trying to blackmail us ... by holding the pistol of 
withdrawing craft at our heads. 1114 Cunningham wrote that, 'the Americans. had 
consented ungraciously to abandon ANVIIL. '115Without the extra landing craft, 
ANVIL, in support of OVERLORD was dead, regardless of Anglo-American strategic 
differences. The COS proposed a compromise to break the deadlock in the form of a 
directive to Wilson, which in summary, stipulated that actions against the Germans in 
the Mediterranean offered OVERLORD the greatest possible assistance, particularly by 
an early all-out offensive in Italy, and that a threat developed against southern France 
and the seizure of any opportunity with available amphibious forces, either arising in 
southern France or elsewhere, would be most beneficial. 116 The JCS agreed to the 
draft proposal, but added two amendments, although mutual suspicions concerning 
nitent and purpose remained: all offensive action in Italy would be discontinued when 
the mission was accomplished. ANVIL would be given a high priority. Although Dill 
considered the agreement flawed, he recommended that the COS acceptit. 117 He 
wrote, 'No formula can be a substitute for honest agreement. " 18 
The JCS was infonned in late April that Wilson, Eisenhower and the COS planned to 
meet in London to consider the future of forces in the Mediterranean made redundant by 
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Italian operations. The JCS interpreted this review as a means of resuscitating ANVIL. 
If ANVEL were revived by an agreement reached in London, King would allocate a 
month's production of landing craft for the operation. The COS had in mind a possible 
landing, mounted from North African ports, along either the southern or western coasts 
of France three weeks after OVERILORD-119 As soon as the conference's results were 
recorded, the COS would submit its proposals to the JCS. The tension of many weeks 
quickly subsided and the atmosphere brightened perceptively in Washington. 120 
American Joint Staff Planners, ordered to study and submit recommendations on 
'CCS-561', felt only a landing, the landing west of the Rhone River was worthy of the 
extra Pacific landing craft proposed by King. It was doubtful whether a landing in 
western France could have succeeded, because of certain disadvantages, i. e., a long 
ocean journey, sole dependence upon carrier-based air-cover, prey to the U-boat 
menace in the Atlantic, a poor supply situation and increased distances from 
Mediterranean bases. 121 
Operational Considerations and a Balkan Adventure 
The results of the Wilson/Eisenhower meeting were contained in 'CCS-561/2' and 
implied how intertwined were operations DIADEM, ANVIL and OVERLORD. Since 
Eisenhower depended upon the seizure of a deep water port and a breakout from the 
lodgement area, he could not release landing craft and airborne units to the 
Mediterranean before that occurred. Once the operations in Italy and France succeeded, 
Wilson recommended any of three locations for an amphibious assault: S6te, west of 
the Rhone, the Gulf of Genoa and Civitavecchia, forty miles north of Rome. By 7 
June it seemed clear to Wilson that he could prepare for an amphibious landing against 
southern France by 15 August. 122AIthough some French and American units were 
already engaged in amphibious training, Wilson continued to emphasize operations in 
119 CCS 158 Meeting, Washington, 28 Apr. 1944, Reel IV.. 
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Italy, a drive to Vienna and an Adriatic amphibious operation in September, which 
echoed the argument of the COS. 123 
Prior to flying to Europe on 8 June to visit the Norman beaches, the JCS won approval 
on 26 May for a closed session to be held at the conclusion of every regular CCS 
meeting. No reasons were given for this change, and, as usual, no records of these 
sessions were to be kept, but the arrangement might have had something to do with the 
COS stalling on ANVIIL. 124 Eisenhower warned Marshall in late June that, 
... I have the further impression that although the British Chiefs of Staff may make one more effort to convince you of the value of the Trieste 
move, they will not permit an impasse to arise, and will, consequently, 
agree to ANVIL. I feel that their idea would be to keep intact the tactical 
ground and air staff that has been functioning so well in Italy. They 
would then frankly recognize the Italian area as a secondary one and 
turn over the troops there to General Clark or other qualified officer. 125 
On 10 June, four days after OVERLORD, the COS took exception with Wilson's 
French assessment and postponed the choice of the landing site, until the battles raging 
in France and Italy were decided. The COS believed that ANVIL, like any other 
operation, depended upon a most careful balance of strategic factors; it was false to 
assume that it was the only alternative; nor could the intrusion of unforeseen events be 
excluded from eliminating ANVIL and deeming it inappropriate within the larger 
European picture by 15 August-126 
On 19 June, Wilson informed Eisenhower that landings in western France were too 
difficult; Instead, he recommended that the Allies advance eastward beyond the Po, 
through the Ljubljana Gap and into the Danube Plain, possibly supported by a 
September amphibious operation at the head of the Adriatic. 127 
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The ANVIL controversy flared once again between the two staffs when Eisenhower's 
forces suffered logistically from a severe Channel storm that lasted from 19-24 June 
and jeopardized the time table of the 21 st Army Group. General Sir Nfiles Dempsey's 
Second British Army's enveloping offensive toward Caen was postponed for a week. 
The delayed attack, held hostage by the storm, demonstrated the need for the additional 
port that ANVIL could provide. 128 At a 16 June meeting in Naples between Marshall 
and Wilson, who seemingly had converted to the American side of this issue, reversed 
himself, and opposed any limitation on DL4LDEM's successful advance. Rejecting 
Marshall's recommendation to seize a major French port, (Cherbourg had not been 
captured), Wilson instead proposed ANVIL's cancellation in exchange for his 
Italian/Balkan alternative, formalized in writing to Eisenhower and the CCS three days 
later. Eisenhower appreciated Wilson's wish to pursue his Italian offensive, but 
remained committed to ANVIIL, and opposed a thrust towards Vienna. 129 
Eisenhower's anxious concerns were expressed in a cable to Marshall, 'AFHQ 
apparently fails to appreciate that achievement of a successful bridgehead in France 
does not of itself imply success in operation OVERLORD as a whole ... that it will be in 
urgent need of any assistance possible from elsewhere for sometime to corne. ' 130 The 
two ports under consideration were Marseilles and Bordeaux. Marseilles, if cleared 
quickly, was much better suited to handle large scale replacements than Bordeaux, 
which, although closer to the battle area, had constricted beaches. 
The JSM was authorized to send a copy of Wilson's telegram to Eisenhower to both the 
COS and the JCS, but the JSM did not receive its copy until 27 June. 131 The delay led 
to further misunderstanding. In the meantime, the JCS received Eisenhower's report, 
which included a summary of Wilson's comments, four days before than the JSM copy 
arrived. Eisenhower repeated in his report Wilson's Italian and Balkan 
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recommendations, which ran contrary to his strong preference for ANVIL over any 
other alternative. He noted that Wilson was prepared to carry out ANVIL, if the 
decision were made. 132. The JCS quickly accepted Eisenhower's proposals, rejected 
Wilson's and ordered him, in a proposed draft directive, to launch a three divisional 
ANVEL against southern France by 15 August. 133 The JCS stated: 
We are convinced that the best use to which we can put our resources in 
the Mediterranean is to launch an ANVIL at the earliest possible date. This is the only operation which: will provide early and maximum. 
support for OVERLORD, provide for an additional major port required by SCAEF and will put the French forces into the battle for their 
homeland... Ilie resources to be employed in ANVIL will be 
predominately US and French. We do not believe that extensive and long preparation to achieve perfection of arrangements is necessary or justiflable. 134 
The Disagreements Intensify 
The COS reacted with a fum rejection of an ANVEL landing and insisted that Wilson 
continue the battle for Italy, while mounting a threat against southern France. 135 The 
JCS was dumbfounded by the COS reaction, since the COS had already agreed to 
closing the Allied advance on the Pisa-Rimini line. Moreover, the COS had reacted 
without seeing Wilson's report. Consequently, the JCS considered the British 
proposal a contravention of the agreement reached in London and a reversion to the old 
argument of ANVIL versus Italy. While the JCS had succumbed to this argument two 
months before, they would not do so again. Strong objections were raised against the 
COS proposal. The Americans insisted that effective employment of large forces in the 
Mediterranean and those awaiting transportation from the United States be initiated at 
the earliest possible date, demanding that their directive be accepted and sent to Wilson 
ediately. 136 In unequivocal terms, it read that, 
ANVIL will be launched at the earliest possible date. You will use 
every effort to meet a target date of I August You will prepare for the 
operation on the basis of approximately a3 division. assault, an 
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airborne lift for the equivalent of I division and a build-up to at least 10 divisions as quickly as the resources made available to you will permit, having in mind in your preparations the steady reduction in German 
capacity to resist and the vital importance of prompt support of the OVERLORD operation. 
You will use all available Mediterranean resources not required for 
ANVIL to carry out your present directive with regard to operations in 
Italy ... 
137 
On the 26 June, the British Chiefs defied the Americans and turned ANVIL down. 
They pressed for the destruction of all German forces in Italy, citing, 'Any 
compromising of the prospects of the destruction of the enemy armies in Italy as this 
critical phase in the war, without a compensation in the early destruction of equal forces 
elsewhere, would be wrong. 1138 They advocated that Eisenhower's demands for 
additional Allied Mediterranean forces to be met by shipments to the Breton and 
Norman ports closest to the battle area. 139 The Americans countered the next day, 
The proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff to abandon ANVIL and to 
concentrate on a campaign in Italy is unacceptable. The fact that the 
British and US Chiefs of Staff are apparently in complete disagreement 
in this matter at this particular moment when time is pressing presents a 
most deplorable situation. We wish you to know now, immediately, 
that we do not accept the statements in your answer in general with 
relation to the campaign in Italy as sound and as in keeping with the 
early termination of the war. 140 
The Americans brought the negotiations to a standstill. They concluded that no reason 
existed to continue the discussions, which could only delay a required decision needed 
to be made. 'The wording of the directive we have proposed in 'CCS-603' give 
sufficient latitude to the command concerned, both as to resources and target date. 
We ask that it be sent to Wilson immediately. 1141 
The JSM had become alarmed at the sharpness of the American response. To soften 
the impact of the American reply, the Mission sent a private message to London 
explaining the reasons for the American reaction: failing to have received a copy 
beforehand of Wilson's report, the JCS was shocked by its content. The Americans 
137 Ibid 
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were outraged by what seemed to be a complete reversal of the agreements reached in 
London. '11ey were adamant that ANVEL must not be reduced to a threat in favor of a 
major campaign in Italy beyond the Pisa-Rimini. line. In view of the hardened 
American. attitude, the JSM suggested that the COS should either agree to ANVIL with 
good grace or make a straightforward confession that the fundamental issue had not 
been clarified in London and must now be aired and resolved. 142 
A Pivotal ULTRA Intercept 
JSM efforts to ease matters achieved little. The American reply, described as 'rude' by 
Brooke and 'rather tough' by Cunningham, only served to get British backs up. 
Believing their strategy correct, the COS agreed, on 28 June, to stand fast 143 Their 
position was augmented by new Ultra intercepts that the Germans were prepared to 
fight for northern Italy, south of the Apennines, to prevent a breakthrough into the Po 
Valley, the loss of which would have severe military and political consequences. 
Moreover, the intercept supported Churchill and Brooke's views on ANVEL, i. e., 
nothing would be gained by a landing in the south of France which was not already 
ensured by the Italian campaign. Cryptographic difficulties delayed the delivery of the 
intercepts. If presented earlier, the Americans might have opted for a quick and 
overwhelming victory in Italy, an end to the war in 1944 rather than ANVIL and a 
different partition of Europe. 144 The British were sure that ANVEL would impair the 
possibility of destroying Kessehing's forces. They deemed it 'unthinkable for want of 
patient discussion to risk taking a false step at this critical period of the war. '145 Side- 
stepping the COS appeal and dismissing German intentions, the Americans chose to 
defeat the Germans in Normandy, rather than to destroy them in Italy. 146 
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As the Washington 29 June negotiations ended in deadlock, the JCS, their minds made 
up, stood firm against the points stressed by the JSM, embattled surrogates of the 
COS. 147 Cunningham recorded: 'It was decided that though militarily we were quite 
unshaken in our views, since the Americans appear to be so set that we had better agree 
to carry out ANVIL. I feel myself that taking the long view we shall gain by this 
seeming surrender. '148 The divergent Anglo-American military positions were best 
expressed in a flurry of letters, which included charts and lengthy staff-constructed 
supporting documents. These were exchanged between 28 June and I July, in which a 
pleading Churchill was thwarted by an unyielding Roosevelt. 
Churchill to Roosevelt: 
The Deadlock between our Chiefs of Staff raises most serious issues. I 
most earnestly beg you to examine this matter in detail for yourself. I 
think the tone of the US Chiefs of Staff is arbitrary and, certainly, I see 
no prospect of agreement on the present lines. 149 
Roosevelt to Churchill: 
It seems to me that nothing can be worse at this time than a deadlock in 
the Combined Staffs as to our future course of action-You and I must 
prevent this. ANVEL, mounted at the earliest possible date, is the only 
operation which will give OVERLORD the material and immediate 
support. 150 
Churchill persisted: 
We are deeply grieved by your telegram. The splitting up of the 
campaign in the Mediterranean into two operations neither of which can 
do anything decisive, is the first major strategic and political error for 
which we two have to be responsible... 
... I fear a costly stalemate 
for you ... What can I 
do Mr. President when 
we are to see the integral life of this (Italian) campaign drained off into 
the Rhone Valley in the belief that it will in several months carry 
effective help to Eisenhower so far away in the north? 
If you still press upon us the directive of your Chiefs of Staff to 
withdraw so many of your forces from the Italian campaign, His 
Majesty's Government, on the advice of our Chiefs of Staff, must enter 
a solemn protest. It is with the greatest sorrow that I write to you in this 
sense. 151 
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Roosevelt was obdurate, but replied, 
I appreciate deeply the clear exposition of your feelings and views on 
this decision. My Chiefs of Staff and I have given the deepest 
consideration to this problem and to points you have raised. We are still 
convinced that the right course of action is to launch ANVEL at the 
earliest possible date. I do not believe we should delay further in giving General Wilson a directive ... Will you ask your Chiefs to dispatch it to General Wilson at once-152 
COS Attempts at Conciliation versus Churchill's Anger 
According to Brooke, Churchill, Wilson and Alexander had ruined Allied chances of 
destroying German forces in Italy in 1944 by introducing the Balkan alternative. He 
also noted that the some of the President's reasons for choosing ANVIL were more 
political than military. Roosevelt advised Churchill that he would not have survived 
politically if OVERLORD had suffered the slightest setback due to large forces being 
diverted to the BalkanS. 153 Brooke dissuaded Churchill from sending another letter to 
Roosevelt, in which the Prime Minister stated that he would do anything 'to end this 
deadlock except become responsible for an absolutely perverse strategy'. If Roosevelt 
desired, he continued, 'I would come at once across the ocean to Bermuda, or Quebec, 
or, if you like, Washington, given good weather and a fast aeroplane'. Brooke 
believed Churchill was spoiling for a fight, one that would lead to a fatal rupture with 
the Americans. Churchill felt that he had every right to expect some consideration from 
his friend, Roosevelt, since their joint ventures had 'dazzled the world'. Feeli g 
petulant, he expressed his resentment on I July, certain that by meeting, as he so 
frequently proposed, they would have settled matters-154 'All right', Brooke wrote of 
the current Anglo-American relationship in his diary, 'If you insist on being damned 
fools, we shall be damned fools with you, and we shall see that we perform the role of 
damned fools damned well. 1155 
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The CCS directed Wilson on 2 July to launch a3 divisional ANVIL as soon as possible 
with a target date of 15 August. 156Cunningham observed that Churchill could 'never 
give way gracefully'. 'He must always be right and if forced to give way gets 
vindictive and tries by almost any means to get his own back. '157 Churchill was 
furious and wanted to impress upon the Americans how ill-treated the British felt. 158 
Visiting London at the time, Harold Macmillan, who knew little of the protracted 
negotiations, decided that 
in my view of the heavy contribution of American forces to the 
European campaign and the general situation, we should have to give in 
if Eisenhower and Marshall insist upon ANVIL We can fight up to a 
point, we can leave on record for history to judge the reasoned statement 
of our views, and the historian will also see that the Americans have 
never answered any argument, never attempted to discuss or debate the 
points, but have merely given a flat negative and a somewhat Shylock- 
like insistence upon what they conceive to be their bargain. 159 
John Winant, American Ambassador to Britain, who was familiar with the exchange of 
messages, sent one of his own to the President at Hyde Park, in which he said that, 'I 
wanted you to know how deeply the Prime Minister has felt the differences that have 
ended in his accepting your decision. I have never seen him as badly shaken. He 
believed completely in the program he was supporting... '160 So convinced of the 
perversity of American strategy was Churchill that in his outrage he considered 
resigning. 161 Cognizant of his loss of power within the coalition, Churchill maintained 
his view in an exhortation to the COS, 
... Let them take their seven 
divisions-Let them monopolise all the 
landing craft they can reach. But let us at least have a chance to launch a 
decisive strategic stroke with what is entirely British and under British 
command-I am not going to give way about this for anybody. 
Alexander is to have his campaign ... if we take everything 
lying down, 
there will be no end to what will be put uponUS. 162 
Seeldng conciliation and clarification, the COS sent a position statement sent to 
Washington on 12 July. The COS declared that the JCS should have no doubt 
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whatsoever about the British attitude towards Mediterranean operations. In addition. 
both lEs Majesty's Government and the COS emphatically declared that ANVIL was 
not the correct strategy; but having accepted ANVIL, the British intended to do their 
utmost for it to succeed. 163 By retreating before the Americans on this issue, they were 
not trying to gain their point by delaying tactics. 
The JSM in Washington considered these remarks inflammatory, a continuation of the 
controversy, and decided to omit them from a forthcoming COS message. Several 
days later, the JSM received word that the COS intended to inform the JCS of these 
remarks, using the JSM as its transmitting agent The JSM concluded that three 
options was open to it: to put forward an additional paper, explain the matter, or present 
it as an item for discussion in a closed session at the next CCS meeting. 164 Admiral 
Noble informed the COS that he was quite willing to speak to Marshall, to which the 
COS replied that it wanted their remarks placed on the record at a CCS closed 
session. 165 
On 28 July during a CCS closed session, Noble, wishing to avoid further controversy, 
explained that COS remarks were merely a statement of fact and should not be 
construed, in any way, as an attempt to reopen the debate. The CCS took note of the 
statement and thought that the long, contentious debate over Anvfl had ended. 166 
Breakout in Normandy and Churchill's Machinations 
On 27 July 1944, Churchill requested that ANVIL be renamed DRAGOON; chosen to 
deceive the Germans, it also stood for the contempt he felt for the operation. 'Done', 
he later wrote, 'in case the enemy had learned the meaning of the original code 
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word. "67 Cherbourg fell on 29 June and the first cargo ships arrived on 16 July. 
During the last week of the month, successfully using a massive tactical carpet bombing 
technique, American forces broke through the German lines, poured out of the 
Normandy bridgehead and opened the way for Patton's Third Army to sweep into the 
heart of France. By contrast, Wilson informed London that Alexander, after taking 
Florence, had called off his Italian offensive for three weeks, due the loss of American 
and French troops transferred from his command to that of DRAGOON. Moreover, 
Allied air power in Italy would be reduced to provide the necessary air cover for the 
same operation. 168 Although Marshall said, '... we will do our utmost to support 
Wilson in the two battles he has to fight in southern France and Italy' '169it did not 
square with COS apprehensions. These concerns faded, for the moment, when 
Churchill announced to the COS that on 4 August had Eisenhower decided to cancel 
DRAGOON and ship its divisions to Brittany instead. Brooke agreed that this was the 
best solution, although the Americans had discounted this British idea earlier. The 
Prime Minister gave the impression that Eisenhower had already wired the President. 
Churchill, against the advice of his military chiefs, who felt he was side-stepping the 
JCS, sent a telegram to the President concerning the elimination of DRAGOON, in 
which he wrote, 'I beg you will reconsider the possibility of switching DRAGOON 
into the main and vital theater where it can immediately play its part... '170 He insisted 
on COS support in the guise of a telegram sent to the JCS. On the 6 August Brooke 
discovered to his consternation that not only did Eisenhower never send a telegram, but 
he opposed any change in DRAGOON. Whoever double-crossed whom, Churchill 
had done little to improve relations with the Americans-171 It was Churchill, who 
considered DRAGOON to be the last straw and sheer folly who had the most to gain, if 
his one last chance to persuade Roosevelt succeeded. The Prime Minister mused on the 
167 W. Churchill, The Second World War, VI, (London, 1953), p. 58. 
168 CAjB 122/1308 MEDCOS 167,5 Aug - 1944. 169 M. Matloff, Op. cit., p. 473. 
170 W. Kimball, Op. cit., 'C to R, C-742,4 Aug. 1944. 
171 FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/B/Xll, P. 992. 
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eve of the landing, 'If only those ten divisions could have been landed in the 
Balkans. 1172 
Refusing to give way gracefully, Churchill pursued his argument vvith Eisenhower at a 
5 August meeting in Portsmouth. Eisenhower's aide, Captain Harry Butcher, 
described Churchill as someone obsessed with shifting DRAGOON to the Bnttanv 
ports. In the face of Eisenhower's emphatic opposition, he refused to take no for an 
answer. Eisenhower, having argued for so long and patlently. observed later that the 
Prime Minister would try again. 173 Churchill's argument lasted a total of fifteen days. 
his longest of the war with Eisenhower. In spite of Churchill's persistence, both 
Eisenhower and the JCS firrnly agreed that DRAGOON would not be canceled. ' I" 
Resources allocated for DRAGOON would not be considered available for landings in 
Brittany. Churchill appealed to Hopkins, his sounding board and confidant during 
much of the war, for assistance, 175 and wrote on 6 August, 
I am grieved to find that even splendid victories and widening 
opportunities do not bring us together on strategy-The ten divisions 
now mounted for DRAGOON could be switched into St. Nazaire ... 
It' 
we are forced to make a heavy attack from the sea on the well fortified 
Riviera coast ... we start 
500 miles away from the main battlefield instead 
of almost upon it at St. Nazaire ... 
If you feel able to embroil yourself in 
these matters, I should be glad if you would bring my views before him 
(Marshall)... 176 
Hopkins warned Churchill on 7 August that the President would reject his proposal. 
When Roosevelt replied the following day, he denied Churchill's appeal and supported 
Eisenhower, stating, '... it is my considered opinion that DRAGOON should be 
launched as planned at the earhest practicable date and I have ful-l confidence that it will 
bc successful... '177 
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Acting as if it were his personal 'Dunkirk', Churchill invited Eisenhower to 10 
Downing Street on 9 August to consider his last hope of stopping DRAGOON: 
continue loading the ships, set sail through the Straits of Gibraltar and enter France at 
Bordeaux. ýFhe idea of abandoning a carefully planned operation, shift it 1,600 miles 
on the eve of its execution, alter the balance of the whole campaign in western Europe 
and abandon a strategy having the appearance of fmality, was a complete abdication of 
responsibility. 178 Astonishingly, the British Chiefs of Staff supported Churchill in his 
folly. When Churchill threatened to resign, Eisenhower, who knew the Prime Minister 
well, realized he was bluffing. Nevertheless, he could not understand why Churchill,, 
obviously agitated and despondent, attached such importance to DRAGOON. 179 On 10 
August, five days before DRAGOON's implementation, the CCS informed Eisenhower 
that with the Brittany diversion dead, he was to proceed with ANVILIDRAGOON as 
originally planned. 180 Churchill's frustration and prolonged preoccupation with this 
one campaign illustrated his inability to direct strategy and influence Roosevelt, his 
grudging admission of American domination of the coalition, his fear of the Russian 
threat and his uncertainty regarding the fighting spirit of the British soldier and Britain's 
emerging manpower cnsis. 181 
ANVIL-Is Metamorphosis 
Planning for ANVIL had gone through many stages, since its beginning on 19 
December 1943, when AFHQ asked Patton's Seventh Army Headquarters planning 
staff to consider drawing up plans for an amphibious operation. During the last week 
of December, they were instructed to plan an operation, code named ANVIL, which 
would involve American and French forces. The scale of the assault, increased from 
178 jSM to COS, CAB 105/46, JSM 180, IZ 5728,7 Aug. 1944. 
179 Eisenhower to MarshaH, Washington, Aug., 1944, RG. 165 CM-IN. 
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181 T. Ben-Moshe, Op. cit., p. 264; J. Strange, The British Rejection of Operation 
SLEDGEHAMNFR, An Alternative Motive', JMA,, 46, (February 1982), pp. 6-15. 
293 
diree to ten divisions, and required the acquisition of the port of Marseilles and the 
seizure of naval base at Toulon. 182 
On 12 January 1944, Force 163, the cover designation for General Garrison H. 
Davidson's US Seventh Army planners, which included representatives from the three 
services, took over from AFHQ- By 28 February, Clark, relinquished his ANVIL 
responsibilities as Seventh Army Commander 'designate' to General Alexander Patch, 
a veteran of the Pacific 1942 Guadalcanal campaign. As the ANVIL debate raged at the 
higher levels, Force 163 planners, groping for something definite on which to plan, 
believed that the operation had been relegated to a 'Command Post Exercise". Was 
ANVIL to be abandoned, postponed, diminished or expanded? Was the meaning of 
'abandoned for the time being' synonymous with 'postponed indefinitely'? If an 
operation is abandoned, what is the purpose of planning for it? General Jacob Devers 
at AFHQ insisted that planning continue, Patch asked for a firm target date. In early 
spring, Force 163 planners were joined by French staff officers who shared their 
knowledge of the French Provengal coast and its surrounding area; French Resistance 
fighters, in support of the landings, increased their supply of tactical intelligence 
information. 183 
On 29 April ground, naval and air plans were presented, modified and accepted by 
Wilson with Eisenhower's subsequent approval. However, the target date remained 
indefinite. On 15 March, de Gaulle visited Wilson in Italy and, after withdrawing his 
demands that a senior French general serve as ground commander, declared his full 
support for the operation. A month later, de Gaulle chose de Tassigny to command 
ANVIL's French contingent. Force 163's logistical planning continued and supplies 
ordered in January began to arrive in April. By 15 July SACMED ordered American 
General Lucian Truscott's VI Corps in Italy to release the 45th, 3rd and 36th 
Divisions, two French divisions and certain auxiliary troops to be assigned to Force 
182 US Seventh Army: Report of Operations in France and Germany, (Heidelberg, 1946), pp. 1-29. 
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163 for administration, planning and training. Finally an agreement was reached: 
ANVIL would take place on 45 miles of coastline between Cannes and Cavalaire and 
east of Toulon not later than 30 August. 184 Paratroopers and Special Force units landed 
on the night of 14 August, D- 1. On D-Day, 15 August 1944, after nine months of 
Anglo-American wrangling, the ANVIL invasion force, having embarked from various 
Mediterranean sea ports and air fields, attacked the French coast. Set in motion were 
1,300 ships, 4,000 planes, and 250,000 men. Visibility was 4 miles, hazy and 
improving with a gentle shifting wind and negligible sea. 185 The landing proceeded on 
schedule against light opposition. Pre H Hour bombing and gunfire were extremely 
effective and very little naval gunfire was required later. 186 The airborne landings went 
off as scheduled, the assaulting infantry successfully breached the beach defences and 
no Allied aircraft were reportedloSt. 187 It was a major tactical success, as described in 
the following message from Wilson to the Allied command centers: 
Secret operation DRAGOON slight opposition only encountered by 36th 
Division landing on beaches either side of Agay road. Isle Port Crus 
captured. Pre 12 hour gunfire reported very effective. No air attacks up 
to noon. Two small enemy ships sunk during initial assault. 188 
The assaulting infantry divisions were followed by similar elements of the American 
Seventh and French First Armies. Three hundred and eighty thousand troops crossed 
the beaches in little more than a month. Movement was swift French forces took 
Toulon in 11 days rather than the predicted 20; Marseilles fell in 13 rather than 45 days, 
even though Hitler designated both ports as fortresses. Task Force Butler and elements 
of the 36th 'Texas' Division drove 190 miles in seven days to liberate Grenoble in the 
French Alps on 22 August. 189 Eisenhower wrote to Marshall in late summer, 'Every 
day I thank my stars that I held out for ANVIOL in the face of almost overwhelming 
pressure. "90 Having battered the weakened and dispirited German Nineteenth Army, 
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retreating before ANVIL's tactically well-planned and well co-ordinated operation, 
experienced and accomplished veterans of the three services performed with 
considerable mastery. The landing, the liberation of southern France, the advance 
northward astride the Rhone valley that trapped 79,000 Germans, and large amounts of 
equipment captured or destroyed attested to their success. 191 On 12 September Seventh 
Army elements made contact with Patton's units at several points near Dijon and Autun, 
thereby sealing the fate of thousands more German troops. 192 On 15 September 
Eisenhower assumed operational control of Devers newly constituted 6th Army Group 
under which the American Seventh and French First Armies served. In less than one 
month, not the three that Churchill had gloomily predicted, these Franco-American 
Armies had surged northward 400 miles from the Mediterranean. 193 'The lines of 
communication at the end of the first 45 days were twice as long as the plans for the 
operation had estimated. '194 Considered by Liddell Hart as an operation that went 
according to plan, but not according to timetable, ANVIL came ten weeks too late to 
help OVERLORD strategically or to suit him. 
Eisenhower claimed in, Crusade in Europe, that 'There was no development of that 
period which added more decisively to our advantages or aided us more in 
accomplishing the final and complete defeat of the German forces than did this 
secondary attack coming up from the Rhone Valley. '195 His postwar view did not 
support American military doctrine, that of inflicting a massive defeat upon the German 
Army. Only four under strength German divisions, composed of a high proportion of 
ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, over age native Germans and impressed Poles, 
Russians and Czechs, were stationed south of the Loire and in Provence. 196 Five 
divisions had already headed north to participate in the Normandy battles of June and 
July. Those left behind were incapable of defending against ANVIL. 
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Tbus ANVIL's professed objective, to keep German reserves occupied in the south and 
away from OVERLORD, failed. Moreover, ANVIL's ground forces were given the 
role of protecting Eisenhower's southern flank in August when air power having 
functioned in this role since the Normandy breakout, could have continued to do so. 
On the 17 August Ultra intercepts demonstrated that Hitler's response to ANVIL was 
not reinforcement but evacuation; Ultra had unmistakably pointed to this conclusiong 
and indicated that a southern France invasion would accomplish no more than 
threatening to doSo. 197A threat no longer, ANVIL sounded the alarm for the German 
Nineteenth Army to begin a hasty but well co-ordinated retreat northward. ANVILs 
timing served the Nineteenth well, whose retreat coincided perfectly with the German 
forces retreating headlong from Normandy. The Nineteenth joined them at the extreme 
left of the front being hastily organized to defend the upper Rhine in September. If 
ANVIL had simply threatened the Nineteenth, it would have been cut off by the 
OVERLORD forces advancing eastward. 198 Instead, ANVIL was part of Eisenhower's 
broad-front strategy and reflected the American Army's preference for moving directly 
forward behind overwhelming firepower and massive resources, rather than by feint, 
exploitation and maneuver. 199 ANVIL's strategic shortcomings were overshadowed by 
the arrival of the Franco-American Armies whose presence inspired the French people 
to join in their liberation. 
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Democracies during the inter-war period, as typified by the Britain and the United 
States, suffered from an unwillingness or inability to provide for timely protection 
against potential enemies - even when threatened with increased levels of military 
aggression. Japan was as much a threat as Germany. How to be safe and solvent 
remained an immutable question. National political administrations expected an 
unknowing or apathetic public, entrenched in its prejudices and relying on its 
government for protection, to heed a call to arms if and when war came. A composite 
and mutual failure between the government and the governed resulted in neither Britain 
nor the United States being prepared for Hitler's onslaught in late 1939. If the main 
purpose of the State is self-perpetuation, both countries defaulted. Due to the Great 
Depression, US military inductees were in generally poor health, and one in five was 
functionally illiterate. ' The House of Representatives, in August 1941, extended the 
Selective Service Act by just one vote, 203 to 202, denying the events in Europe. Tlie 
results of the First World War and Great Depression may have been contributing 
factors, from which Britain and the United States forfeited the necessary monetary 
appropriations for the building of a suitable defence against an unlimited war. Even in 
the appropriation of manpower, they ran into difficulties. A commitment in theory to 
universal military obligation came into direct conflict with an aversion in practice to 
compulsory national service. 
Britain was handicapped by limited manpower and scarce materials. Money alone could 
not increase its meager resources. Once embroiled in the war and fighting for her 
survival, Britain, having exhausted her ability to buy supplies on a cash-and-carry 
basis, facing bankruptcy, was forced to appeal to the United States to defer payment. 
I L. Kennett, Vie American Soldier in World War H, (New York, 1987), pp. 15-17. 
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During 1940 and part of 1941, Roosevelt's sympathetic words were not matched by 
deeds, because the American business community seized the opportunity for pecuniary 
gain and exploitation of Britain's crisis - entering British commercial markets, buying 
British companies and leasing British western hemisphere island real-estate, all under 
'disaster-sale' conditions. If this opprobrium were not enough, the beleaguered 
country had to satisfy the equivalent of an American means test: a testament of its win 
to fight. But how could Britain fight without the tools with which to finish the job? 
This senseless condition represented an example of the 'double-bind', in which to lose 
is the only outcome. American offers of aid in the shape of antiquated weaponry were 
no match against Hitler's modem equivalent. That was the conundrum which many 
Americans failed to realize, that Britain was fighting for both countries. 
Roosevelt's lethargic behavior reflected the American political scene and the varying 
attitudes of the electorate to which he was finely attuned. However, he did little to 
educate his constituents regarding the magnitude of the threat or the consequences of a 
British defeat. He preferred to fbHow the opinion polls and seek consensus, even 
posing some questions with which to test public opinion. Whether Roosevelt was 
pragmatic or misinformed, he played Britain off against his wish to remain in office, in 
spite of his professed sympathies. 
Moreover, equally as maddening for Britain was Roosevelt's preoccupation with the 
war that he and his military advisors expected to fight, a war that had little in common 
with the one raging in Europe. His advisors suggested that a far more immediate and 
direct threat to American security was the possible German seizure of strategic 
Caribbean islands, Atlantic outposts and parts of South America, followed by an 
invasion of the United States through Mexico or the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. 
Entangled in these perceptions, obsessed with hemispheric defence and lacking any 
military training or experience, Roosevelt remained indecisive. The President 
considered provoking an enemy act of aggression to justify an American declaration of 
war. Churchill warned against waiting too long. For the British people, courage alone 
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was not enough. Refusing to stir, America was not militarily or psychologically 
prepared to enter the war until the attack on Pearl Harbor forced the issue. Total 
American mobilization was delayed, Britain's sovereignty jeopardized, but in 1940-4 1, 
Roosevelt refused to hazard the risks of domestic and international confrontation that 
accompanied bold and aggressive leadership. Germany's 1941 invasion of the Soviet 
Union offered a relief, but not a solution, for Britain's survival. The odds remained 
poor. 
Lend-Lease to Russia developed slowly because the British and American Chiefs 
predicted her immanent defeat. When that failed to occur, Roosevelt resolved to give 
Russia all possible aid to keep her in the war. By 1942, the President realized that the 
Russians were killing more Germans and destroying more equipment than the western 
Allies put together. Later that year, a massive concentration of 226 divisions, totally 
more than six million men, faced each other on the Eastern Front. 2 Even if 25 Allied 
divisions were able to advance on and take Vienna in April 1945, it seems doubtful that 
an Allied military presence there would have had any lasting geographical or political 
impact on the advancing Red Army and its commissars. 
The parliamentary system was better equipped to mobilize the British nation for war 
than its American counterpart. As Prime Minister, Churchill represented a coalition 
government - an instrument of the people and the expression of its combined political 
will. Civilian responsibility characterized by the decision-making power of the War 
Cabinet, willing to improve the functioning of the war economy quickly, related to a 
committee system that had deep roots in British constitutional practice. By 
establishing, for example, a Man Power Committee for munitions labor, a Controller 
for Raw Materials, a Concentration of Production program and new Ministries of State 
when needed, Britain achieved a level of economic mobilization in a 'command 
economy' unmatched by the United States. If the British complained that American 
2 0. A. Rzbesbevsky, 'The Soviet Union-Tbe Direct Strategy, D. Reynolds, W. F. Kimball & A- 0. 
Chubarian (eds. ), Op. ciu., pp. 41-43. 
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strategy was sometimes based on political rather than strategic considerations, they 
were correct. Ile presidential elective process remained in force during the war. To 
remain in office, Roosevelt had to win re-election. In power, he had to out-maneuver 
his political rivals and adversaries and overcome varying degrees of Congressional 
dissent, if his policies were to be accepted or enacted into law. Even for a healthy man, 
this would have been an arduous process; and Roosevelt was not in good health. 
Unlike Britain, America saw itself to be an unhurried slumbering giant that once 
awakened could accomplish anything including winning the war. Unlike its British 
counterpart, American industry and labor did not co-operate as willingly or with the 
same sense of urgency in 1940-41. Not only did industry demand ironclad guarantees 
before it was willing to expand production, it also insisted that the government accept 
cost-plus-fixed fee contracts. 'The outcome was lack of control, overrun costs, and 
the squandering of scarce resources. 13 The emerging defence program suffered from 
waste, favoritism and lack of direction, with government agencies doing business with 
larger rather than smaller companies. Roosevelt created government offices to cope 
with industrial expansion, such as Office of Production Management and the Office of 
Price Administration. But oversight was not enough, because these newly created 
offices lacked the authority to decide major policy questions. Cost overruns, misuse of 
manpower, pricing violations, poor resource allocation, excessive corporate profits, 
divisive industrial action which were not brought under control until 1943. 
Even with the proliferation of inefficient government agencies and Roosevelt's 
disorganized, uncoordinated and loose-handling of the economy, American industry 
and labor produced an overwhelming total of 300,000 aircraft and 51 minion tons of 
merchant shipping, besides a variety of essential military products, during the war. 
71fis underlines what Geoffrey Crowther wrote in 1940. '... if a country has more 
well-trained men that its enemies, more equipment and more raw materials to replenish 
its stocks and feed its people, even the most appalling financial bungles can hardly 
T. Wilson, The United States Leviathan', Op. cit., pp. 175. 
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prevent it from winning the war. 14The advent of unconditional Lend-Lease aid (an 
'Act to Promote the Defence of the United States') and the establishment of a number of 
Combined Boards for munitions, war output, raw materials and transportation, to name 
a few, enabled Britain to gain access to America's colossal productive and technological 
resources, but there was a price to be paid. Britain had tied her supply position to 
American foreign policy; and fixed her dependence upon the United States. 
In April 1941, British and American nucleus military missions were exchanged and 
established in both Allied capitals. Organized as representatives of their respective 
COS, they were intended, in part, to collaborate in the formulation of military plans and 
policies, once the United States entered the war. Subsequently, the British-American 
military committee (CCS), created at the ARCADIA Conference, with offices and staff 
to be established in both Washington and London, was changed to Washington only. 
The American equivalent in London of the senior British officers (JSM), ) 
representatives of their COS, left behind in Washington was struck from the agreement. 
Hence, Washington became pre-eminent in combined planning and only the JSM 
would meet regularly with the JCS. This arrangement had unfortunate results: the 
Americans lost the opportunity of becoming familiar with the personalities, the customs 
and practice of the COS in London. The insights and evaluations that could have been 
gained by recurrent meetings and by learning to 'speak the same language', invaluable 
aids to a negotiating process, were lost An American with Dill's ability would have 
grasped similar opportunities in London, if the American mission had not been 
abolished by Roosevelt. Gone would be Brooke's suspicions of American duplicity 
after SEXTANT III. 
Throughout much of the literature, particularly in the official histories, emphasis has 
been placed on 'getting along', as if senior participants blandly negotiated and calmly 
reached their decisions, descriptions of which run contrary to their own personal 
writings. Moreover, if the planners, whose role was to advise and support their 
4 G. Crowther, Paying for the War, (Oxford, 1940), p. 3. 
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Chiefs, failed to do so, as was the case in proposing Sardinia over Sicily, Brooke 
insisted they revise their planning. 5 The Chiefs created the thrust, direction and 'big 
picture' of the war, leaving it to the working planners to interpret their meaning and to 
formulate plans. They faced the complexity of fighting a global war and learned that 
logistics, the gathering and transporting of men and supplies, in and timely fashion, to 
fulfill an operational directive, was an awesome consideration. The civilian industrial 
work force aside, for every soldier at the front, eight others toiled behind the combat 
area in support. Chiefs of Staff decisions were left to others to implement along the 
whole chain of command; how these men succeeded, thousands of miles from home in 
a war zone, can be measured by time it took to achieve dominance over the enemy: five 
years. Marshall and Brooke, had chosen known and qualified subordinates to get the 
job done; some failed and were replaced; others failed and were not. 
r%-- One contributing factor, may have been a level of self-deception in American strategic 
thought. Such commanding figures as Marshall and Stimson espoused the traditional 
American doctrine of Grant's mass concentration of men and material at the vital point 
to utterly destroy the enemy. Putting the theory into practice was another matter, and 
when the attempt was made, territorial advance seemed more important. As in 
SLEDGEHAMMER, the British refused to gamble their meager resources upon a plan 
based upon a doctrine antithetical to their own. However ambitious the American plan, 
another 18 months would pass, after December 1941, before the United States could 
field a trained, albeit an inexperienced force. Finally, after three Mediterranean 
amphibious operations, they encountered the full force of the German Army. By 1943, 
massed concentration was eroded by the scuttling of the preconceived 200 divisional 
American Army to 80 divisions, with approximately half of its 7.7 million men 
assigned to Air Corps; and by the year's end, the United States was still deploying 
more men against Japan than against Germany. 'Germany-first' was a misnomer. 
Victory through air power alone may have been modified and de-emphasized, but the 
FM Lord Alanbrooke, Op. cit., 3/A/VHI, 21 Jan. 1943, p. 610. 
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ground forces lacked the talent and intellect required to defeat the Germans quickly in 
the imagined final encounter. The manpower and logistical crisis beginning in the fall 
of 1944, eliminated any serious attempts, regardless of effort, to employ and fulfill 
American doctrine. Brought into conflict was the question of the broad and narrow 
front concepts. Pressure for individual United States infantry replacements increased 
exponentially and fathers with children were drafted for the first time. These shortages 
eliminated any possibility of ending the war in 1944. 
In theory, the American replacement system might keep an army in the field, but the 
short 13 and then 17 week basic training periods were designed to convert civilians into 
soldiers by mass production methods. Small group cohesion and leadership, required 
to survive the rigors of attritional warfare, would have to be learned on the battle field. 
The average combat soldier was poorly served by the generals commanding, if the 
battles of northwest Europe were any measure, i. e., the butchery of the Normandy 
hedge rows, the failure to trap the enemy at Falaise, the costly confusion along the 
Franco-German frontier, the bloody fumbling in the Heurtgen Forest and the debacle in 
the Ardennes, to say nothing of the problems of the Italian Campaign. British and 
American generals suffered from conservatism and unimaginative caution. For the 
most part, they lacked the ability to achieve operational success consistently, were 
inferior to the Germans in leadership and were predisposed to conduct careful 
campaigns with limited objectives. The US First Army, relying on infantry tactics 
rather than combined arms, whose successes were offset by a lack of flexible 
exploitation, buried more dead than any other American Army. 6 If any doubts 
pervaded Marshall's thoughts regarding the American soldier's ability to defeat the 
German in combat, they was not apparent. Certainly not in the way that it disturbed 
Churchill and cast doubts upon the tenacity of the British combat soldier. Time after 
time he found the Army inadequate, better organized for fighting a colonial war 
insuring imperial pacification than smashing the Germans. Using the Alam el Halfa 
Maj. D. Bolger, 'Zero Effects', Military Review, (May 1991), pp. 61-72. 
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and the Normandy battles as examples, much of the British staff and tactical leadership 
failed to believe in initiative and flexibility insofar as their application was instinctive 
and automatic. 7 
Churchill would have showed less concern, if more time had been available for 
organizing the Army's combat arms, a two year task. This argument is based upon the 
intense preparation and training methods used for airborne troops in which physical 
fitness, small team cohesion, morale and initiative are stressed, before entering combat. 
Lord Lovat trained Fourth Commando in Scotland for a year prior to combat. 
Unfortunately the bulk of both Am-iies was improperly trained and poorly indoctrinated 
for the combat roles and tasks ahead. Training was completed in combat, if a soldier 
survived that long. The Why We Fight series of documentary films, produced in 
Hollywood for the US War Department, visually described infantry combat according 
to the trench warfare of the Great War, a poor preparation for the battles to come. In 
late 1944, some experienced American infantry divisions formed their own training 
centers, in which newly arrived replacements were indoctrinated into each unit's 
method of fighting before going up front. When Montgomery arrived in the western 
desert in 1942, he revised and improved the training techniques of his new command, 
the Eighth Army. For commanders to expect citizen-soldiers to perform at a 
professional level in combat without proper training, and then complain when they do 
not is demanding too much. 
The Anglo-American service chiefs who fought the war were at the top of their 
profession. In Marshall and Brooke were to be found the most outstanding soldiers of 
their generation. However, as soldiers, they had not been chosen to lead based on 
their negotiation skills. In conference, Brooke's demeanor irritated Marshall and King. 
On the other hand, it was Dill, more than any of the others, who demonstrated the 
necessary negotiating skills that usually led to compromise and agreement when none 
7 Maj. G. Scott, 'British and German Operational Styles in World War H', Military Review, (Oct. 
1985), pp. 38-41. 
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seemed to exist. He understood and could interpret the American position, and got 
along exceedingly well with Marshall, thus saving many of the coalition negotiations 
from collapse. 
The 'indirect approach' in the Mediterranean, a war on the periphery, served as the only 
area for the effective use of British arms. Reality not theory intruded, i. e., to fight the 
Italians in North Africa rather than the Germans in northern France was within British 
capabilities To the Germans, North Africa was a side-show, to the British it was their 
main theater of operations where Hitler could be attacked at his weakest link. The 
Americans, eager to appropriate Britain's dwindling resources to further their own 
definition of 'Germany-first', discounted the art of the possible and failed to appreciate 
the value of attacking through the Mediterranean, as an intermediate step, albeit 
diversionary, toward Germany's destruction. Even though Roosevelt approved of 
TORCH and the Casablanca Agreement, Marshall repeatedly disavowed further 
offensive action in the Mediterranean with a smoldering anger and suppressed 
resentment. He, King and Wedemeyer did not properly assess Britain"s strategy on its 
merits. And rather than defend their own strategic concepts, they remained preoccupied 
with deflecting Brooke's recommendations. 
Both John Grigg and Keith Sainsbury believed that a Normandy beachhead was 
possible in 1943, if the Anglo-Americans agreed to forego the opening up the 
Mediterranean for shipping and the benefits of Italy's collapse. On year earlier, a 
cross-Channel landing in 1942 would have been even more problematic, i. e., a small 
beachhead frontage, too few men and little reserve against a well fortified and 
aggressive enemy. If a Normandy landing had succeeded in 1943, the potential for the 
beachhead becoming another Anzio was high, because of the strength of the German 
Army and Air Force. Of primary concern to the British was the relative speeds of 
build-up between the Allies and the Germans. Until 1944, the enemy could bring 
overwhelming strength to bear against any landing. Moreover, the amphibious 
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technology, the additional Allied manpower reserve and the elimination of the enemy air 
force was yet to happen in 1943. 
There are a number of 'ifs' on which to speculate: what if Tunisia had been taken at 
Christmas 1942 rather than the following May? What if the Allies had bypassed Sicily 
in 1943, had stayed clear of Italian entanglements and island hopped from Sardinia to 
Corsica, then to southern France? What if ANVIL had remained a threat in 1944 and 
the intact 15th Army Group (AAI), during September of that year, broke through the 
Gothic line in northern Italy with the coast road to France open? 8 Note that forty-seven 
years later, during the Desert Storm phase of the Gulf War, seaborne US Marine 
combat teams threatened Iraqi ground troops stationed along the coast with an 
amphibious landing, while allied ground forces were set to execute the decisive action 
elsewhere. Allied 'Special forces operated throughout the theater' to keep the enemy 
off balance. 9 
Did ANVIL live up to its planners' expectations? To answer, one must ask: 'What plan 
is under discussionT Originally, ANVIL was conceived as a simultaneous operation to 
OVERLORD, it then became a feint only, and re-emerged, in its fmal form, as a three 
divisional assault. Tactically, it was a successful, professional and superbly executed 
amphibious operation. Strategically it failed, because it was non-synchronous with 
OVERLORD, no longer its anvil. Me actual landing in southern France only 
encouraged Hitler to withdraw its substantial garrison back to reinforce the main 
[Norman] front, whereas if a feint had been employed, there was more chance of 
trapping them when Eisenhower broke out from the Normandy beachhead. '10 ANVIL 
established Eisenhower's broad front policy, a sign of his military conservatism. 
ULTRA decrypts revealed that Hitler's response to ANVIL was not reinforcement, but 
8 Interview with K. Sainsbury, London, 14 Mar. 1995. 
9US Army Field Manual 100-5, (McClean, VA, 1994), pp. 6-16. 
10 Jackson to Author, Op. cit., p. 5. 
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evacuation. ULTRA had unmi takably pointed to this conclusion, and indicated that 
A- - the Germans considered the southern France invasion as nothing more than a threat 
'Me strategic debate changed to one of logistics with the inclusion of Marseilles and 
Toulon. As seaports they served their designated purpose: six divisions passed 
through them in October and December 1944,12 and by the end of the war, almost a 
million troops disembarked, the equivalent of 45 divisions. Monthly supplies reached 
30 to 40 percent of Eisenhower's needs, and over four million long tons of cargo were 
unloaded. 13 
The introduction of American-armed French forces as part of ANVIL was more 
political and psychological than strategic. The Italian campaign suffered when French 
troops under Juin were withdrawn. If ANVEL had been abandoned, Eisenhower 
planned to have those French forces enter France through Normandy. 
'The growing flow of US manpower and supplies to France assured the triumph of 
Marshall's concept of a concentrated, decisive war, an objective reinforced by the 
addition of the 'unconditional surrender forinula'. 14 Britain had no choice but to 
follow. The ANVIL debate defined the fundamental differences between British and 
American thinking. The United States with its vast resources, could afford head on 
colliding power-drives applying the 'direct approach'. The British, using allies to make 
up for her lack of resources and prizing economy of effort to succeed, relied on the 
'indirect approach'. This kind of warfare had to be flexible and oppoMMiSt 15 
Therefore, Brooke and the British did not gull and outmaneuver Marshall and the 
Americans; the American reaction to conference negotiating results was a symptom not 
a cause, maintained by the JCS's accumulative perceptions of the British. Historically, 
as described earlier, Anglophobia and anti-colonialism pervaded sections of the 
11 R. Bennet, Op Cit., pp. 296-297. 
12 W. Jackson, et al, Op Cit, p. 200. 
13 A. Wilt, Op Cit., p. 168. 
14 M. Matloff, '713e Anvil Decision, Crossroads of Strategy', US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
(Annapolis MD, 1958), p. 389. 
15 Jackson, Op. cit. 
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American public and the civilim-military leadership. Moreover, American military 
planners believed that Britain's national policy and strategy considered the defence of 
her empire to be incompatible with American interests, a policy that could influence and 
infect the United States, resulting in a disastrous subordination of American forces, 
strategy, and interests to those of a foreign power. 16To the extent that London's 
perceptions of Britain and the Empire, as part of an interdependent global system 
dependent upon Middle Eastern oil, among other things, dictated a defensive and 
dispersed strategy, that was true. It did not mean, however, that Britain sought to 
subvert the United States or bend its will, any more than American Western 
Hemispheric defence could corrupt Britain's strategy and concerns. 
Unfortunately for British interests, Embick, Chairman and Army representative on the 
JSSC was hostile to Britain throughout the war. By 1942 and early 1943, his 
committee and the S&P of the US Army's General Staff, studied the political aspects 
of the British Mediterranean strategy. To reiterate, S&P was primarily responsible for 
strategic thinldng and war planning within the Army and for liaison work with the other 
military services and the State Department JSSC and S&P concluded that British 
strategy was militarily unsound, politically inspired and contrary to American interests. 
Separate from what motivated American behavior, during an interview in 1948, Major 
General Ian Jacob, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet, agreed in principle with 
Liddell Hart's suggestion that, 
if we had not been driven by American confidence and enthusiasm we 
would never have dared to make the cross-Channel assault,... if the 
Americans had not been restrained by the British determination to guard 
against every mishap and to plan and prepare to the last detail the assault 
would almost certainly have been a ghastly failure. 17 
The American military leadership's fixed beliefs and prejudice poisoned and 
jeopardized inter-allied negotiations. To argue the relative merits of different strategic 
view points is to be expected; to argue strategy as a means of subverting one's coalition 
16 M. Stoler, Op. cit., pp. 325-6. 
17 Sir B. Liddell HaM Op. cit., 15/15/1, p. 5. 
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partner is not. To suggest that British strategy was used to gain unfair advantage for 
secret purposes, at American expense, resulting in control of places and events, smacks 
of fraud and deception, by which all other issues pale. In addition, separate from their 
military merits, OVERLORD and ANVIL may have symbolized to the Americans J 
neutralization of British Mediterranean strategy and the end of Britain's alleged secret 
intentions in the Mediterranean. Although Britain had no secret master plan, the 
British, by their demeanor, did little to assuage American fears and suspicions. For the 
good of the coalition, Churchill's importunate Balkan suggestions ought to have been 
tempered or diverted by his military advisors. Grudging concessions on each side were 
made for the sake of coalition accord, but the suspicions of intention by either group 
were amply justified. If there really was a special relationship between Britain and 
America, it was of contention and argument. 18 
The coalition prevailed, because the external threat, with all its variations, was greater 
than its internal discord and dissent. Its citizen armies, whose many officers performed 
as middle and upper management within the various integrated headquarters, knew little 
of the prejudiced and competitive nature of the leading regular military men above; 
willing to comply and co-operate, in the spirit of good fellowship, these younger 
officers, and the men they led, worked to end the war as quickly as possible. 
Although Allied grand strategy suffered at the hands of the Anglo-American leadership 
and the use of hidden agendas and subterfuge impeded its implementation, the coalition 
can be explained as a representation of the human condition; fraught with uncertainty 
and imperfections, it was also effective and competent to the extent that policies such as 
'Germany-first' prevailed over 'Japan-first', that Combined boards and staffs, 
established to oversee all aspects of the higher direction of the war, performed wen and 
that their planning satisfied the needs and sorted out the complexities of global warfare. 
The system was good enough-just. 
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